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CHAPTER I
THE CITADEL AND THE FORTIFICATIONS OF QUEBEC

he Fortifications of Quebec have always been in an intermittent state of development from the time when Champlain put up his first palisade under the cliff down to our own day, when the very idea of defending the city by a stone-faced citadel and surrounding wall has become as obsolete as the walls themselves. But though this three centuries of development was in a sense continuous, yet its history falls naturally into six periods, each of which embodied its own idea, either in the form of regular new works, or merely in temporary shifts and expedients to meet the most pressing necessities of the moment.

I. From 1608 to 1689 there was nothing more than an isolated fort into which the people could withdraw in case of an Indian raid, or a stray attack from the sea.

II. But from 1689 to 1759 there was a constantly developing scheme of defence, mainly concerned with the protection of the key of New France against regular British attacks in force.

III. From 1759 to 1778, there was continual tinkering at the defences in time of danger; but though the old French works were useless, no new British scheme was attempted.

IV. After five years’ work, the first comprehensive scheme took form in 1783; but even then the works were not really of a permanent nature.

V. After another forty years, a new, and much more complete, scheme was undertaken in 1823, on a far greater scale. The result was the Citadel and walls as they stand to-day, except for the demolition of a few of the gates and minor buildings.

VI. Finally, when modern conditions had made it impossible to rely on the present citadel and walls, a new scheme of distant detached defences was taken in hand about 1865-1870, but never carried out beyond the erection of the present forts on the heights of Levis.

The extremely interesting history of all these successive schemes has never been fully known until the present year, 1903, when the original plans and documents have been collected and studied in their entirety for the first time.

The tiny settlement which Champlain founded in 1608 was defended by a sort of compromise between a mediæval castle and a backwoods stockade. An illustration of it, copied from the Voyages de Champlain, published in 1613, is given in this work. There was a drawbridge, a ditch and a court yard, with platforms for the cannons and loop holes for musketry all complete; but the whole edifice was built of wood and earth only. This “Habitation”, with additions and improvements, served the needs of the colony until 1620, when Champlain commenced, on the crest of the rock, a more important structure, afterwards to be distinguished as Fort St. Louis.

The work in connection with this fort was necessarily tedious on account of the scarcity of workmen and the lack of material. On the eve of his departure for France, in 1624, Champlain urged the inhabitants to continue the building of the fort during his absence to the best of their ability; but upon his return, in 1626, he found that no progress had been made. He therefore caused the walls to be levelled to their foundations, and commenced the construction of a more spacious fortress. The new building was at length completed; and it served as a residence for the invader, Kertk, from 1629 to 1632. Champlain took up his abode in the fort in 1633, and resided there until his death, in 1635.

Montmagny succeeded Champlain, and it was under his régime that the first stone fort was built. In the year 1646, a contract was passed between the Company of New France and certain contractors, for the construction of more extensive works of defence. In the following year, 1647, the foundation of the first Chateau Saint Louis (logis) was laid. The Chateau was erected between the boundaries of the Fort, and a distinction between the “Fort” and the “Chateau” has not always been preserved.

In the course of time it became apparent to those in authority, that if France desired to retain a foot-hold in the New World, the position of Quebec must be strengthened.

“And finally, in order to plant effectually the fleur de lys there, I see nothing better than to fortify Quebec; erect one fort at its right, on the opposite side of the river, and another on its left, at the river St. Charles, and support these with reinforcements of three thousand men, as I have already communicated to the Baron du Cochet; thus this post would be thoroughly secured, and thereby a very important work commenced. To effect this, two things are necessary: First, one hundred thousand écus, for the fortifications, and one hundred thousand francs, for munitions of war and provisions. Secondly, it will be necessary for the three thousand men to be selected not only for war but also for labour.”

From this letter it is evident that the French, at an early date, recognized the importance of Quebec as a strategic point.

Four years passed, and no effect was given to the suggestions made by D’Avaugour. In 1667, the great Colbert wrote:

“It is of the greatest importance for the security of the colony to devise practicable means to place the fort of Quebec in a state of defence, by constructing a regular fortification there, stocking it with an efficient artillery and all sorts of munitions of war, so that it might not only not be insulted, but be capable of a vigorous defence, even though the most experienced nations of Europe laid a regular siege to it.”

During the next ten years representations were repeatedly made to the King setting forth the advisability of making provision to withstand an assault, but no aid was forthcoming. In 1681, Frontenac complained that the Chateau was in a deplorable condition, and that the walls of the Fort were in ruins. A plan was prepared by the Engineer, Villeneuve, for extending the boundaries of the Fort, and for providing suitable walls and buildings; but this plan was not carried out in its entirety.

During the seventy years between 1689 and 1759, Quebec was the constant objective of all British schemes in America. New England was always watching the opportunity of putting into practice “The Glorious Enterprise” for the final conquest of New France. This statesmanlike proposal, first formulated by Peter Schuyler, Mayor of Albany, in 1689, was substantially the same plan as that ultimately adopted by Pitt for the campaign of 1759. The few men of true strategic foresight on both sides had always foreseen that New France could only be struck down for ever by a simultaneous attack along three lines of advance. One column was to cut the French communications with the West along the line of the great lakes. Another, and much larger, force was to move on Montreal by way of Lake Champlain. And, whilst the French were being seriously attacked in these two places, a great combined naval and military force was to strike directly at the strategic centre of both sea and land power at Quebec.

Colbert had been anxious for the safety of Quebec more than twenty-five years before this; and Frontenac was even more alarmed during his first administration of New France, from 1672-1682. Things came to such a pass that the inhabitants at last proposed to erect fortifications on their own account. The paternal French Government immediately seized this excellent chance of overworking the willing horse; as we can see from the letter authorized by the King in 1690:

“His Majesty having learned that the inhabitants of Quebec have made preparations to enclose that town with palisades, they must be obliged to lose no time in proceeding therewith, and if they should not be absolutely able to complete the work without some help, the Sieurs de Frontenac and Champigny will examine the means of making provision for that purpose.”

In the interval, between the first and second administrations of Frontenac, de la Barre made a request to France for ammunition and supplies, as set forth in the memorandum of the 11^th of November, bearing his signature:

“Six milliers de poudre à canon.

“Quatre milliers de poudre fine.

“Deux cens livres de plomb en table pour les platines des canons.

“Six Douz^nes de garde fus sçavoir une douz^ne de dix-huit, une douz^ne de huit et 4 Douz^nes de 6 et de quatre.

“Six milliers de plomb en balles à mousquets.

“Deux crys pour monter les canons.

“Les entreprises des Iroquois m’obligent de demander de plus à Monseigneur le marquis de Signelay:

“Douze pierriers de fonte et leur 24 boëtes et coins de fer.

“4 pièces de canon de fonte de 4^lb de balle qui soient au moins longues de cinq pieds pour pouvoir estre portées dans les Canots d’Escorces.

“Les cuilliers, refouloirs et autres ustancilles pour les d· pieces pour lesquelles nous ferons faire des affus de campagne au fort de Frontenac.

“Deux petites anchres, cablaux et menus cordages pour agreer deux barques de 35 à 40 tonneaux.

“Du fer non ouvré tant pour les chevilles que pour toute autre ferrure necess^re à la construction des d· deux barques.

“Du vieux cable pour faire de l’estouppe.

“De la toille à voille pour faire celles des d· barques.

“Des outils de calfateurs.

“Trois cens fusils.

“Quinze cens livres de poudre fine.

“Six milliers de plomb en balles du calibre des d· fusils.

“Dix mille pierres à fusils.

“Cinq cens bandouillières avec leurs bources.

“Cinq cens doulits pour les pierriers.

“Cinq cens paquets de mitrailles pour les mesmes pierriers.

“Vingt quatre cornes à amorces avec les degorgeoirs.

“Six chemises à feu prestes a appliquer.

“Six massons.

“Deux piqueurs ou corroyeurs de pierre (pour restablir les murailles de nostre fort qui sont tombées).

“Dix outils pour les massons.

“Deux ou trois masses de fer courtes de 35^lb chacune.

“Fait à Québec le XI^e Novembre 1682.

“Le Febvre de la Barre de Meulles”

Frontenac entered upon the work with characteristic energy, and, in the space of two years, fortifications of an apparently solid nature, and upon an extensive scale, were well advanced. These works, however, like all those executed under the French régime, were constructed more with an idea of profit than of durability.

Indeed, from this time on, when the scheme of fortification began to become so important that there was plenty of money to be made out of contracts, there is one long unvarying tale of shameless corruption, in nearly every department of the public service connected with the defences of Quebec. The military chiefs, like Frontenac and Montcalm, and the later engineers, like Franquet and Pontleroy, did their duty honestly. But the civil functionaries and contractors were utterly and shamelessly corrupt and incompetent.

On the 23^rd of September, 1692, five men who had escaped from Quebec concurred in the following statement made before Governor Fletcher, of New York:

“Saith, that nine ships arrived at Quebec from France on the 12^th of August last with pork, flour, wine, and salt and fish, and all sorts of merchandizes, with a supply of all military stores for Count Frontenac, and that they saw thirty great guns landed, twenty pettarioes, one mortar and 300 bombs, but no men. That a new stone fort is abuilding at Quebec, and a stone wall about the town, of which three hundred paces already made, ten paces high, and seven bastions, all of stone, for which the King hath sent forty thousand livres.”

All operations had to cease during the winter. But as soon as the snow disappeared, Frontenac, or “the Capitaine réformé”, staked out the work for the remainder of the season. Towards the end of the year, Frontenac sent to France an account of the work which he had accomplished.

“The Court will see by the plans transmitted, on which the whole of the enceinte is laid down, what are the works we have constructed, and it is true that including masonry, terraces and carpentry work, 500 men have not been employed over 50 or 60 days, the whole at a very reasonable cost to Canada.”

A copy of Frontenac’s plan, which is in our possession, shows that the walls were of a uniform height all round the city, following the level of the ground, the area embraced was not as large as that enclosed by De Léry, nearly thirty years later.

Frontenac’s walls, the first ever made round Quebec, crowned the waterfront for three-quarters of a mile; starting from the present Château Frontenac Hotel, running north for a quarter of a mile, along the present terrace, across the top of Mountain Hill and round the front of the old Parliament grounds. Then they turned westward, following the line of the present Rampart Street till they stopped at Palace Hill, where they protected the road to the fords of the St. Charles. On the landward side, starting again from the present Château Frontenac Hotel, they ran westward between Mount Carmel and St. Louis Streets, across Haldimand Hill, and then curved into St. Louis Street on reaching the corner of Ste. Ursule Street. Thence running north-westward inside the line of Ste. Ursule Street, and, trending slightly more and more in a northerly direction, they ran nearly through the intersections of Ste. Anne and Ste. Angèle Streets and then to the lower end of St. Stanislas Street, whence they curved north to Palace Hill. The total circuit was about a mile and a half, and the area enclosed about half that contained by the present walls, exclusive of the Citadel. The landward faces were particularly weak, little danger being feared from any force coming from that direction.

Frontenac, no doubt, took every precaution to safeguard his designs; but, nevertheless, a full description of the nature and the strength of the defences of Quebec was transmitted to the British authorities through the treachery of one de Nelson. This man had succeeded in gaining the friendship of Frontenac in order to obtain the details of his scheme, and he finally confessed, after imprisonment in the Bastille, the methods he had employed to secure the information, and the use he had made of it.

“Jurian tells me that the messenger at Oneyde braggs much of his strength; of their fortifications at Quebec; number of men firing mortar pieces, and such like stratagems.”

“Count Frontenac is busy with his fortifications at Quebec, and if left alone a year or two more, it will require an experienced officer and considerable force to turn him out.”

The British evidently employed every means at their disposal to keep in touch with the progress of events at Quebec. Amongst the papers referring to Quebec in the Public Record Office, London, there is a report of the affairs in 1694, obtained from two men, examined before the Governor of New York, from which this extract is made:

“Q. How is Quebec fortified?

“A. By the waterside there is a platform. A stone breast work, very low, which will give shelter to their men. The greatest has twelve guns which will throw a ball of 30 pounds. The fort stands very high in the upper town, which is fortified to the landside by a wall of 16 foot thickness, of brush faggots and earth palisades, fronting outwards, to prevent running over the walls; this wall is not yet finished, but they have two engineers who have come over this summer, and we hear that they intend to build a stone wall round the town. In the town and fort of Quebec, there are 140 guns, and not above 300 inhabitants who can bear arms.”

The contractors entrusted with the construction of the works under Frontenac, appear to have paid more attention to the price they derived for their work than to its value. The official correspondence at this time reveals many scandalous facts.

On the 14^th of October, 1698, M. de Champigny addressed the following letter to the Minister:

“Les ouvrages faits l’année dernière pour fortifier quebec, n’ont été entrepris que sur les avis positife que vous prêter la peine de nous donner par le vaisseau que vous envoyâtes expres à l’Acadie, et nous les avons M. le Comte de frontenac et moy regardez comme une chose d’une indispensable necessité dans les conjonctures, ne s’agissant pas moins que de garantir la colonie de sa perte entiere c’est pourquoy je vous prie Monseigneur, d’être persuadé qu’a mon êgard je n’ay eu en cela d’autre veües que le bien du service et de ne point m’attirer du blâme en manquant a prendre des précautions qui me paraissoient si importante cependant comme sa Maj^te ne s’attendoit point a une semblable dépense et qu’elle a neantmoins eu la bonté d’ordonner 40,000 lbs pour l’acquitter, je la suplie trés humblement et vous aussy Monseigneur, qui y avez contribüé, d’en reçevoir mes très humble remercimens.

“Je n’ay jamais regardé la guerre des Anglois comme la principalle ocasion de nos depenses, excepté celles des fortifications de Quebec c’est pourquoy, Monseigneur, quoyque nous n’ayons rien a craindre de leur costé, je dois vous faire connoitre que si la guerre continüe avec l’Iroquois nous ne laisserons pas d’estre engagez dans d’assez grande depenses, qui seront ou plus forte ou plus faible selon le résolution qui seront prise ou de demeurer seulement sur la deffensive, ou d’aller contre les ennemis chez eux en gros et en petite partie.”

A few months before his death, in 1698, Frontenac wrote that the Sieur LeVasseur de Néré had been instructed to prepare new plans. Copies of these plans, and of the reports accompanying them, are before us.

The first report, which is very long, bears the date November 6^th, 1700. It commences as follows:

“L’Enceinte Fut tracée en 1693 par un capitaine reformé qui estoit en Canada. Il jetta la Fortification au hazard sans avoir egard aux hauteurs dont elle pouvait estre commandée aussy la plus part des bastions se trouvent-ils enfillez et vous deriver à n’en pouvoir approcher.

“Cette Enceinte n’est composée que de pieux de 11 a 12 pieds de longueur sur 8 a 9 pouces de grosseur, elle n’estoit terrassée qu’a moitié dans certains endroits et dans d’autres qu’au quart en un mot on ny connoissoit rien par les affaissements qui estoient survenus ce qui provenoit du peu de capacite de cet officier qui l’avait fait construire. Il fit mettre quantité de facines touttes entieres sur le devant des pieux et par dessus des pierres et de la terre meslée ensemble, de sorte que les eaux de pluyes et la fonte des neiges qui sont fort abondantes dans ce pays y soient couler incessamment la plus grande partye des terres entre le vuide des facines et des pieux. D’ailleurs le reste estoit gazonné avec si peu de precaution que cela tendoit a une destruction asseurée. Lorsque j’arrivay en Canada je fit retablir entierement tous ces ouvrages du mieux qu’il me fut possible pour les soutenir un peu et les mettre en estat de deffence.

“Les autres partyes de cette fortification ne sont pas a beaucoup pres sy fort commandez ce qui ma donné plus de facilité a y remedier j’aurais souhaitte pouvoir aussy bien empecher la ruine entiere de cette enceinte, dont les pieux se sont pourris a la longeur du temps et ont manqué dans presque toutte son estendue. Ainsy se seroit enfoncer le Roy dans un Facheuse depence que de travailler au Retablissement de cette mauvaise enceinte, ce qui nous donne occasion aujourd’huy de produire un nouveau projet pour en reconstruire une de maconnerie sur un plan que j’ay l’honneur d’envoyer a votre Grandeur.

“J’ay scituez tous les ouvrages de cette nouvelle enceinte sur les testes des hauteurs et j’ay encein le gros cap aux Diamans qui est la plus considerable afin d’y renfermer tous les fonds et les colines a la faveur desquelles on pouroit se derober et approcher la ville jusqu’à la portée du pistolet sans compter qu’il commandoit absolument la ville, Monsieur le gouverneur general et Monsieur l’Intendant ont tres fort aprouve ce nouveau projet et vous en rendre Compte.

“J’estime que cette depence nyra qu’a Cent Mil Livres.

“Il y a desja 3 ou 4 annees que la grande plateforme de la bas ville menace ruine, ce que j’ay representé plusieurs fois dans mes memoires.”

LeVasseur also points out that there is no cement in Quebec, and requests that ten tons be purchased and sent from LaRochelle.

A plan was transmitted to the King showing the progress made on the new works in October, 1701, and the suggestion was made that the inhabitants should be compelled to contribute their labour towards the defence of Quebec.

“J’ay l’honneur d’envoyer a Votre Grandeur le plan du Bastion de la Glaciere et le profil de cet ouvrage qui distingue ce qui a esté foit cette année d’avec ce qui reste a faire la prochaine, il y auroit longtemps que cet ouvrage seroit finy si Messieurs Le Chevallier de Callieres et de Champigny ne mavoient fait scavoir de Montreal qu’ils estoient obligez de faire de grande despences tant pour la paix avec les Irroquois que pour l’exécution du projet du détroit qu’ainsy j’eusse a me retrancher sur le nombre d’ouvriers et amener cet ouvrage lentement jusqu’a l’arrivée des vaisseaux cepend· Monseigneur il sera tout au cordon cette année et le restant sachesvera l’année prochaine.”

Early in the year 1702, the British were informed that the stone wall which encircled Quebec was complete, and that 56 guns and 82 mortars were set up around the city. This report was confirmed by the Governor of New York who, in June, 1702, wrote:

“We also informed ourselves of the state of Quebec. We understand that the place is well fortified with a stone wall round it, and there is a bridge over the creek, at which place the Bostoners stopped when they attacked it.”

The several improvements executed under LeVasseur’s first plan were completed in 1703; but soon after a lengthy correspondence commenced between the Minister in France, and the Engineer and the contractors, regarding the faulty nature of the work. Jealousy, and an unfortunate system of patronage, seem to have been at the root of the interminable disputes revealed by the official correspondence.

In 1704, LeVasseur prepared another plan, and certain new works were commenced which were completed in 1707.

Under LeVasseur’s plan there were three gates; but he appears to have intended to construct several others to the land side, as the walls were never closed in certain places, except by temporary barriers.

The King of France had certainly every excuse for exercising caution in supplying the constant demands for money for the fortifications of Quebec, which seemed to require perpetual alteration. Vast sums had been expended upon Quebec during the space of one hundred years, and, as soon as the appropriation granted was exhausted, an entirely different plan was proposed as being absolutely essential for the safety of the colony.

CHAPTER II
DE LÉRY’S SCHEME OF DEFENCE

lthough the works carried out under LeVasseur were intended to place the city in a proper state of defence, the officials appear to have devised means for the expenditure of further sums of money.

For five years after the completion of the walls, in 1703, there was a period of comparative quiet; but on the 23^rd of August, 1708, the Intendant Raudot addressed a letter to the Minister, which throws some light on the methods proposed:

“On a fait cette année recevoir un inspecteur sur les fortifications sans leurs sceu quoy qu’il y en eut deja un, les Srs Raudot ne l’aprirent que par la voix publique et firent dire a cet inspecteur qu’il n’avoit que faire dy retourner et qu’il ne seroit point payé il suivoit cet avis Monseigneur et la gallerie du chateau sur la qu’elle on pretendoit le mettre quand on commenceroit a y travailler n’ayant été mis sur les fortifications qu’en attendant, a été fort bien faicte sans qu’il en ait couté au Roy les appointements d’un inspecteur cet ouvrage n’en meritoit point assurement un.”

In view of a possible attack, certain works were considered indispensable, and on the 15^th of November, 1708, Vaudreuil addressed this communication to the Minister:

“Nous avons l’honneur de vous faire reponse Messieurs Raudot et moy dans notre lettre commune au sujet des fortifications de la ville de Quebec, et des ouvrages que nous fumes contraints de faire faire sur la nouvelle que les anglois venoient pour nous assieger j’auray l’honneur de vous dire dans celle cy Monseigneur que je donneray au Sr le Vasseur toutte la protection dont il aura besoin pour avancer les ouvrages, j’entreray mesme avec plaisir dans les expediens qu’il nous proposera pour y parvenir lorsqu’il ne seront pas trop a charge au pays.”

A difficulty arose as to the ownership of a certain portion of land required for the fortifications, and Raudot wrote to the Minister as follows:

“Les Srs Raudot feront examiner Monseigneur les pretentions du Sr D’Auteüil au sujet de l’arpent de terre qu’il pretend qu’on luy a pris en cette ville pour les fortiffications ils se donneront l’honneur de vous en rendre compte mais ils vous diront que le dit Sr D’Auteüil a profité d’une redoute de pierres qui appartenoit au Roy dont il se sert, et qui est présentement enclavée dans l’enceinte de la maison.

“Ils ont soin de mettre dans toutes les concessions qu’ils font qu’en cas que Sa Mte ait besoin de terrain pour faire des forts, et des fortiffications elle n’en remboursera rien au propriétaire, ainsi Sa Mte ne sera plus exposée à ces pretentions quand elle aura besoin de terrain.”

In response to pressing demands, the King ordered additional works in the year 1715; and Chaussegros de Léry was instructed to prepare a plan and a report of what was considered necessary.

De Léry was evidently in favour with both the Governor and the Intendant. An example of their opinion of his merit is found in the letter from which we make an extract:

“Nous ne sçaurions assés representer à Sa Mte l’activité et la vigilance du Sr Chaussegros et l’attention particulière qu’il a eu a l’execution de tous les ordres qui luy ont été donnés et nous sommes persuadés que personne n’est plus propre que luy pour faire travailler aux ouvrages des fortiffications de ce païs.

“Nous l’avons informé avec bien du plaisir de la gratiffication de 1500 livres que Sa Mte a bien voulu luy continuer.

“Le Sr de Vaudreüil trouve que les murs commancés sont trop épois et trop haut pour un pareil endroit étant persuadé que les anglais ne sauroient assieger cette ville dans les formes et qu’il n’y a que les sauvages à craindre, il donne 3 pieds reduits d’epoisseur de murs, 13 pieds hors de terre jusqu’au cordon et 6 pieds pour le parapet, ce qui fait en tout 19 pieds de haut.

“Cet ouvrage sera de depense attendu que l’enceinte de cette ville a pres de trois quart de lieü de tour, il la fait passer au devant des maisons qui sont sur le bord de la petite rivière et du fleuve, les maisons ont été commancées pour servir de cloture ce qui paroist au Sr de Vaudreüil suffisant pour ce costé là.

“Son sentiment est de ne donner que 14 à 15 pieds de hauteur hors de terre jusqu’au dessus du parapet et deux pieds d’époisseur de mur afin de pouvoir enfermer cette ville en peu de tems.

“La dépense de cette enceinte comme elle est commancée coutera, a ce que le Sr Chaussegros a dit au Sr de Vaudreuil plus de 2000.00 livres especes sonnantes et on ne verroit pas la fin de cet ouvrage dès que Sa Mte ne veut point faire de fonds pour cette dépense.”

The scheme of defence prepared by Chaussegros de Léry was under consideration for about three years; but it finally received the approval of the Court, and operations were commenced early in the month of June, 1720.

A preliminary plan was made in 1716, and a full report was sent to France during the same year. In 1717, de Léry went to France and discussed the project with the Court, and obtained the sanction for the works which he proposed. In transmitting the plan, Vaudreuil and Bégon wrote the following letter, which throws some light on the work which was going on in Quebec at that time:

“We have the honour to reply to the letter of the Council dated the 23^rd June last respecting the fortifications of Quebec and Montreal to which were appended the instructions given to the Sieur Chaussegros.

“Since the arrival in this country of the King’s ship on which he came he has worked with special diligence and attention at the plan, profiles, tracings and memoranda asked of him in connection with the fortifications of this town. We have the honour to send them to the Council in a tin box.

“The short time he has taken to do this work leads us to infer that nobody is more capable than he of carrying out what will be approved.

“We have the honour to represent to the Council that his zeal deserves at least that he should not remain here at his own expense and that the 1500 livres ordered to be paid him—on which he says he has received only 1300 livres owing to the tenth kept back from him—are not sufficient for the expenses he will be obliged to incur at the present time when everything is exceedingly dear.

“He will continue, during his stay here, to make all the observations in his power to improve the work and we shall have the honour to write our opinion of it to the Council next year when he will go to France.

“It is impossible to come to any decision as to the choice of the site of the two spots where the two powder-magazines are to be erected until the plan of the fortification is approved, as these magazines are to be in the gorge of the bastions. Nevertheless, next year, we will have the necessary repairs made to the powder magazine now in use.

“Work was continued on the Palace this year. All the masonry is finished with the exception of four vaults and three chimney-stacks to be raised above the body of the masonry. Two-thirds of the building are completely roofed in, partly in slate and the remainder in shingles in default of slate. The other third is roofed in only with boards and it is impossible to dispense with covering it with shingles in order to preserve the framework. Thus all that remains to be done to the building is to build three vaults and three chimneys and to put in some flooring, doors, and window frames, to make it complete. It is impossible to dispense with building such vaults and chimneys because the bricks are on the spot and the frost would spoil them if two winters were to pass without their being used. The planks for the floors are also on the spot; thus all that remains to be paid for is the labour. The Sieur Bégon having agreed with Monsieur Levesque to give up his house to him immediately after the departure of the ships, he cannot help going to lodge in the Palace and only the work absolutely necessary for this will be done. As regards the remainder, the Sieur Bégon will await the order of the Council.

“The Sieur Bégon has the honour to send to the Council a statement of what remains to be done to finish the building and of the necessary articles to be sent from France.

“He also has the honour to send to the Council the plan, profiles and elevations of the King’s magazine that was built this year in accordance with the orders given in 1714 to the Sieurs Bégon and Beaucours. It has been built on a portion of the walls of the old Palace. Nothing more useful for the King’s service could have been done than to repair those walls and build magazines with them because the cost of the party walls is not greater than that which would have been necessitated by the demolition of those old walls. Thus the only additional expense consists in the floors, framework and roof. In addition to the magazines in the building which are capable of containing all the munitions and merchandize that may be needed, there are also the prisons, the lodgings of the porter (concierge) and of the store-keeper. The munitions and merchandize that came out this year on the ship Le François are actually stored in it and from and after the first of January next we shall no longer have to pay the rent for store-houses amounting to sixteen hundred livres per annum. All that remains to complete the building is to build the ovens and bakery, the labour on some floors and some locks that have to be sent from France according to the annexed statement.

“The Sieur Bégon has requested the Sieur Chaussegros to take the general measurements both of the Palais and the magazines so that, on his return to France, he be in a position to make a report to the Council on the solidity of the work and the economy with which it has been done under the circumstances of the present time.

“The Sieur Morville, deputy engineer, who has had charge of the works, has taken all the care that could be expected of him and his success is a proof of capacity. He deserves a bonus and it is only fair that he be paid his salary of deputy-engineer in silver as his lieutenant’s pay has been.

“The Sieur Bégon has, this year, caused the necessary repairs to be made to the Chateau St. Louis and all that was set forth in the memorandum sent by the Council is the iron balustrade that is to be made in Rochfort and which could not be sent in the ship because it was not yet finished.

“We have received the plan for the enceinte of Montreal. The Sieur Chaussegros will make his remarks on it next spring after which work will be done on it until the six thousand livres to be supplied by the Gentlemen of the Seminary and the inhabitants of the said town, are expended.

“The Sieur Chaussegros is already aware that the chief difficulty in connection with work done in this country lies in the small number of workmen here and he believes, as we do, that we cannot expect to make any progress with the fortifications unless the workmen he asks are sent from France.

“Vaudreuil,

“Bégon.”

A copy of this report referred to in the letter is published herewith, and it is somewhat singular to note, that de Léry condemned the plans of his predecessors for some of the faults for which his own plans were subsequently condemned. The report is as follows:

“The situation of the place is favourable on the side of the St. Lawrence, and unfavourable on that of the land, as the locality is difficult of fortification, there being a great pitch from the summit at Cape Diamond to Coteau de la Potasse, and as the works will be partially commanded by the hill at Artigny’s mill, and by another hill undermarked 17; the ground rising according as it recedes from the place, it is favourable, inasmuch as nearly two-thirds of its circuit does not require to be fortified. All the portion from the Coteau de la Potasse, marked S, which fronts the river St. Charles around to the redoubt marked H, or top of Cape Diamond, and beyond that height, in front of the river St. Lawrence, has no need of any other fortifications than that of the batteries already there, as it is precipitous, and there are three good batteaux in the lower town, at high water-mark, marked F. D. E. Those on the escarpment, in the upper town, are not so well situated, being too high, especially that of the Chateau. The works on the land side, between the Cape Diamond redoubt H, and Coteau de la Potasse S, do not amount to much, being open in several places, through which the town is entered; some of these were left as entrances to the town, they have no gates, not even a miserable barrier; the space between Cape Diamond redoubt H, and the edge of the escarpment 2, is open, so that thirty men could enter the town abreast, that point having never been closed. This redoubt, though badly turned, having its left face undefended, is fit for use, being in good repair; and though it were well turned, flank 3 is situated too low to defend this left face.

“Curtain R, and flank 3, and face 4, are commanded by the hill 5 of Cape Diamond, or more strictly speaking, concealed by that height in consequence of its proximity: the Curtain is raised only four, five, or six feet above ground, and at one place as far as the cordon, as appears by the draft of the actual works, having a large breach towards its centre, some earth has been thrown up behind, which does not touch the wall; the flanks and faces of the tenail have open embrassures; to make use of them, it would be necessary to put some earth there for a platform and to construct the merlons. These works are without a ditch.

“The mill battery, marked G, is fit for service, and though it forms a dead angle, it is no less effectual, being greatly elevated. All the fortifications, 6, 7, 8, to complete the inclosing of the town, consist merely of an elevation without a ditch in front, open and crumbling in many places, having in one part a bad upright pallisade at the foot, which can be scaled without any difficulty, there being nothing to prevent it. Royal Redoubt, marked I. The barracks are good. This redoubt is not completed, as some earth still remains to be put up on the terreplain, and the merlons are to be constructed, some doors and windows are to be inserted and the flanks of the barracks to be finished. The Dauphin Redoubt is incomplete, much being still to be done to it. Its location is bad, being on the slope of a rising ground. The plans, profiles, elevations and drafts which I have drawn exhibit the actual condition of these two redoubts. Saint Ursula’s Redoubt, marked L, for the reception of cannon, consists merely of one double faced platform with embrasure of gabions, without a ditch, being enclosed by a miserable pallisade stuck upright; it has no communication with the place and is open at its gorge; the guns that might be put there in time of need would be soon captured; as this redoubt is at a distance from the place, without communication, and without a ditch, and surrounded by a wretched pallisade, it would be cannon and people lost.

“The fortification to enclose the palace is not advanced, having only the ditch which is marked; it is excavated some 2 and 3 feet; the rampart is not begun, the earth which has been removed from the ditch having been used to repair the gardens and fill up a pond, so that there is only this excavation of two and three feet.

“St. Roch Redoubt, marked M, is surrounded by a small ditch; the parapet, almost entirely in ruins, is made of gabions.

“The Potasse tenail, marked ff, is badly turned, not being defended at any point.

“The fortification raised on Coteau de la Potasse, which occupies the border of the escarpment, is too low, being in some places only 6 feet high above the escarpment, which can be made use of at this point.

“The fortification, Q. O. P., is imperfect; Joubert’s demi-bastion, Q., has neither its rampart nor parapet completed; it forms, on its left, a dead angle towards the escarpment, marked, 9, 10, 11, where there is a gate; the approach to this angle is by a covert way along the escarpment, and there is a passage of 7 and 8 feet between the end of the wall, which goes down to this escarpment, and the edge of the escarpment, 12, behind this wall, 10, 11; it is difficult to construct a rampart there, and at present there is no chemin de rondes from which we could fire over its parapet; there are some loop holes, beside the gate, but they are situated too low, so that the fire would be completely traversed from without; the curtain, 13, is raised six feet over the ground; in bastion O, the ramparts are not built; the curtain, 14 is not formed, except by a retrenchment the same as that of the Palace; the bastion F, is not finished; it is raised over the ground, as shown in the sketch. This bastion is entirely opposed to the hill at Artigny’s mill, being raised above the ground, like all the fortification, but without a ditch, it being impossible to make any at the right face of the Bastion O, which is situate on the brow of the hill which is very percipitous; from the height at Artigny’s mill, the faces of Bastion O could be easily destroyed. All the front from 15 to 16, is exposed to this hill, the fortification not being covered by any ditch; and if it were desirable to construct one to Bastion F, it would be necessary to lower the faces of said bastion, or to raise the counterscarp which would be built, and the covert way of about twenty feet above the level of the ground on which the faces of this bastion stand; this would cause a great expense, it being necessary to prolong the glacis of the covert way, which would not prevent the revetment of this bastion being always exposed at the heights; as the bastion is situated in a low locality, I doubt if earth be found in the neighborhood within two hundred toises to construct its ramparts, which will be thirty feet high, for the vicinity of the place is nothing but rock covered with a little soil. I have remarked that there is neither cistern nor well within the fort, and the Marquis of Vaudreuil is badly lodged there.”

Although the work of constructing the fortifications of Quebec was to be intrusted to de Léry, his rank was no greater than that of the Engineers who were carrying out his instructions. He therefore asked the Council to give him the rank of Captain. His letter on this subject is dated the 28^th of October 1719:

“I have the honour to represent to the Council that it has always been the custom in the colony to give companies to the Engineers. As there is no vacancy I most humbly beg the Council to give me the rank of Captain. I am obliged to make the troops work on the fortifications. It is therefore necessary for me, in the interest of the King’s service that I should have the rank held by all my predecessors. The Sieurs de Moville and Catalogne, Engineers, are lieutenants in the troops while as for me who have the honour of being in charge of the execution of all the works that will be done in the colony, it seems extraordinary in the country that I should not have the rank held by Messieurs LeVasseur, Beaucourt and Termite. I beg the Council to grant me what I have the honour to ask.

“Chaussegros de Léry.”

The foundations of the new fortifications which had received the approval of the Court, were laid by Michel Bégon, the Intendant, on the 9^th of June, 1720; and the following inscription was engraved on a leaden plate inserted in one of the stones:

Regnante Ludovico XV,

Christianissimo Gallorum Rege,

Ætatis Suæ annum agente XIum, Regni Vum:

Augustissimo ac Potentissimo Principe,

Duce Aurelianensium Philippo,

Regis avunculo: Regnum Gubernante.

Illustrissimo ac serenissimo Principe,

Ludovico Alexandro de Bourbon,

Tolosæ Comite,

Concilio Maritimo Reique maritimæ præposito.

Illustrissimo Joanne D’Estrée, Franciæ Marescallo,

Americæ Septentrionalis, Meridionalisque pro Rege,

Concilii Maritimi præside,

Ac maris præfecti Legato:

Philippo de Rigaud, Marchione de Vaudreuil,

Novæ Franciæ Gubernatore:

hisce Munimentis

Regiis sumptibus Conciliique Maritimi autoritate extructis,

Prima hæc posuit fundamenta,

Michael Begon:

Civilis Disciplinæ

Rei Judiciariæ, Ærariæ, âc Maritimæ,

atque hujus Coloniæ præfectus.

Dirigente Gasp: Chaussegros de Lery:

Regio bellicorum operum machinatore,

Nonis Junii. An. Dom. MDCCXX.

There appears to have been much confusion as to the nature and the extent of the fortifications constructed by de Léry.

It has been claimed that the walls of 1720 extended only a little beyond St. Ursule street. This is an imperfect description. From St. John’s gate to St. Louis road, the walls ran in this direction; but between St. Louis road and Cape Diamond, Joubert’s bastion, Glacière bastion, and St. Louis bastion, formed a continuous line in the direction of the present road to the Citadel. This position is also shown on the plan made by Patrick Mackellar, chief engineer, for the use of Wolfe during the siege of Quebec.

A word concerning this plan which was no doubt often in the hands of Wolfe, may prove of interest.

Before Wolfe came to Quebec, Mackellar had secured a copy of the plan made by the French engineer, which he enlarged, and supplied with many references obtained from personal investigation and from various other sources. To this plan he attached a report, the original of which was shown to the writer by Colonel Townshend during his visit to Quebec. Three days after the battle of the Plains, Brigadier General Townshend addressed a letter to Brigadier Monckton, requesting him to send him the plan made by Mackellar, if it were amongst the papers of the late General Wolfe. Monckton answered that he had not found the plan, but possibly it might be in the hands of the engineer. After much research, this plan is now available to the student through the efforts of His Excellency the Earl of Minto, and a copy is reproduced for this book.

The plans prepared by de Léry provided for the most elaborate works constructed under the French régime, although they did not include any buildings of importance upon Cape Diamond, as we have been led to suppose. With the exception of a small redoubt on the Cape, called Citadel redoubt, the works in this direction remained the same as under the plan of LeVasseur. It was in the extent of the outer walls, and in the addition of certain redoubts and batteries, in other parts of the city, that de Léry’s work consisted. The walls themselves, however, contained many of the defects of the other plans, and the workmanship was very faulty.

De Léry made several plans of the works which he prepared to carry out at Quebec, some of which are still in existence. In order to show the peculiarities of the ground, he prepared a plan en relief. This plan was sent to France and, according to Father Charlevoix, it was deposited in the Louvre. At the present time, however, the authorities are unable to give any information concerning its whereabouts, or its fate.

Mr. A. G. Boyé, Consul, of Paris, who has rendered us valuable service in procuring copies of other plans, kindly undertook to search for this plan en relief. After making numerous enquiries, as may be seen by the following correspondence, Mr. Boyé wrote a note to the editor of L’Intermédiaire des Chercheurs et Curieux which we republish, and we hope that in the course of time some information may be obtained thereby:

“Monsieur le Directeur,

“Un de mes amis du Canada, M. Arthur Doughty, bibliothécaire de la Bibliothèque de la Legislature de la province de Québec, qui prépare un important ouvrage sur son pays, m’a prié de lui envoyer la photographie du “Plan en relief de Québec” en 1716, par M. Chaussegros de Léry.

“J’ai vu à ce sujet M. Kœmpfen, directeur des Musées nationaux, qui m’a certifié que ce plan, que mon ami m’assurait être au musée du Louvre, n’existe pas là.—Je me suis alors adressé aux Invalides, où l’on n’a trouvé nulle trace du dit plan.

“M. Kœmpfen m’a promis de faire faire des recherches dans les greniers du Louvre, après que mon ami aurait indiqué comment il savait que ce plan avait été déposé au Louvre.

“Voici la réponse que j’ai reçue:

“—Pour ce qui est des renseignements, voici où je les ai pris: Je lis dans Journal d’un voyage fait par ordre du Roi dans l’Amérique septentrionale, adressé à Madame la Duchesse de Lesdiguières, par le P. de Charlevoix, de la Compagnie de Jésus, t. 5e, p. 116, Paris, M. DCC XLIV, ce qui suit:

“Québec est encore aujourd’hui dans le même état, ce que vous pourriez justifier sur le plan en relief que M. Chaussegros de Léry, ingénieur en chef, a envoyé cette année en France pour être mis au Louvre avec les autres.” “Il y en avait donc plusieurs avec celui-là? Quels pouvaient-ils être?

“—De plus vieux citoyens de Québec disent l’avoir vu au Louvre, par le passé.”

“A ces renseignements que je lui ai transmis, M. Kœmpfen me répond:

“—J’ai l’honneur de vous faire remarquer que si le Plan en question a été apporté au Louvre en 1744 (date donnée dans un rapport du P. de Charlevoix), ce n’est pas du musée du Louvre qu’il s’agit, l’ouverture de ce musée ne datant que de 1793 et celle de la section de la Marine de 1827. Ce serait donc quelque dépendance de la maison du roi, au palais du Louvre, qui aurait pu le recevoir, ou bien il aurait figuré au Louvre dans une exposition temporaire. Que sera-t-il devenu plus tard? Je l’ignore. Il n’est pas impossible qu’il se trouve parmi les plans remis à l’Hôtel des invalides.”

“D’où il faut conclure que M. Kœmpfen ne fait faire aucune recherche dans les greniers du Louvre; il a tort.

“Serai-je plus heureux, Monsieur le Directeur, en m’adressant à vous et aux lecteurs de votre si utile et intéressante publication pour retrouver ce fameux plan de Québec que l’on connaît au Canada et qu’on ignore en France?

“Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Directeur, l’assurance de mes sentiments très distingués.

“A. G. Boyé.”

“Paris, 7 mars 1903,

“9 rue de la Bienfaisance,

“Monsieur,

“Depuis que j’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 16 mars dernier, je m’occupe de satisfaire à votre demande de la photographie du plan des fortifications en relief de Québec en 1716, par Chaussegros de Léry.

“On m’avait affirmé que ce plan était aux Invalides et que je n’avais qu’à écrire au gouverneur militaire de Paris pour avoir l’autorisation de le reproduire.

“Mais ici tout se complique: le gouverneur de Paris m’adresse au général directeur du service géographique du ministère de la guerre qui, lui, après recherches m’affirme que ce plan n’est pas aux Invalides. Je retourne donc au Louvre, où ce général m’assure que le plan existe. Là, je revois le directeur qui fait faire des recherches qui demeurent vaines. Cependant il me promet de faire fouiller dans les magasins du Louvre où il y a des foules d’objets remisés. Dans une vingtaine de jours, après avoir compulsé les inventaires de plusieurs années, il saura me dire si réellement ce fameux plan existe dans les combles du Louvre et il le mettra à ma disposition pour le faire photographier. Mais il m’a demandé: Comment votre correspondant a-t-il pu vous écrire que ce plan est au Louvre? Demandez-le-lui donc.

“Je vous serai obligé de me mettre à même de répondre à cette question. Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, les assurances de mes sentiments les plus distingués.

“A.-G. Boyé,

“Mons. A.-G. Doughty,

Québec.”

“Palais du Louvre, 22 juin 1903.

“Mr.

“En réponse à votre lettre du 4 juin courant, dans laquelle vous me donnez copie des renseignements que vous tenez de M. Doughty rélativement à un plan de Québec, qui aurait été exposé au Musée du Louvre, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire remarquer que, si le plan en question a été apporté au Louvre en 1744 (date donnée dans un rapport du R. P. Charlevoix), ce n’est pas du musée du Louvre qu’il s’agit, l’ouverture de ce musée ne datant que de 1793 et celle de la section de la Marine de 1827. Ce serait donc quelque dépendance de la maison du roi, au palais du Louvre, qui aurait pu le recevoir, ou bien il aurait figuré au Louvre dans une exposition temporaire. Que sera-t-il devenu plus tard? Je l’ignore. Il n’est pas impossible qu’il se trouve parmi les plans remis à l’Hôtel des Invalides. Vous pourriez sans doute savoir à quoi vous en tenir sur ce point, en vous adressant au général Kion, commandant supérieur de la défense au camp retranché de Paris à l’Hôtel des Invalides.”

“Paris, 7 juillet 1903.

“Monsieur,

“Dès réception, j’ai communiqué votre lettre du 18 mai dernier à M. A. Kempfen, directeur du Musée du Louvre, qui m’a fait la réponse, dont copie incluse.

“Je me suis de nouveau adressé à qui de droit à l’Hôtel des Invalides et je ne suis pas plus avancé qu’avant.

“J’ai appris que le plan en relief de la bataille d’Austerlitz, dont Napoléon lui-même avait disposé les petits soldats en plomb, avait disparu sans qu’on ait jamais su ce qu’il était devenu.

“Il me reste une resource: je vais demander par l’Intermédiaire des Chercheurs où se trouve ce fameux plan de Québec. Peut-être arriverai-je à le découvrir.

“J’aurai donc le plaisir de vous écrire sous peu.

“Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l’assurance de mes sentiments distingués.

“A. G. Boyé.

“Monsieur Arthur Doughty,

Québec.”

CHAPTER III

or several years while these extensive works were in progress there was an attempt made to organize a volunteer corps in Quebec. But from all the indications which we have been able to find it would appear that the efforts put forth in this direction were altogether inadequate for the requirements of the place. The scheme of defence provided for numerous batteries in different parts of the town, separated by a long distance. Consequently a large number of men would be required for this purpose. Years before this date it had been suggested that to place Quebec in an effective state of defence, at least three thousand men would be required. According to the statement, however, which we publish herewith, only nineteen men received special instruction during the space of three years. Those in authority were apparently more interested in building works of defence than in maintaining their efficiency.

“Estat contenant les noms des Bourgeois et habitants de la ville de Québec qui se sont présenté pour faire apprentissage de l’exercice du canon pendant les années 1725, 1726 et 1727.

“Je certifie le présent Rôle véritable et tous les hommes présens qui ont servi pendant les trois années ci-dessus dite, à Québec, le 10 8bre 1728

“(Signé) Lentard.”

It will be seen from a letter of Beauharnois and Hocquart of the 25^th of October 1729, that a certain citizen had built a wharf on the line drawn by de Léry; but whether this caused any alteration in the plan, is not shown.

“We will seize the favorable moment for the establishment of the barracks in Quebec and will not lose sight of the matter.

“The Sieur Lefebvre, merchant, who has built a house near the Vaudreuil battery, having this spring asked the Sieur de Beauharnois permission to build a wharf before his house, the latter permitted him to build it on the line drawn by M. de Léry and that individual derives a benefit from it.”

In “A New Picture of Quebec,” the author, Mr. Hawkins, asserts “That from the period of their renovation by de Léry (1720) the fortifications were maintained by the French Governors with great care, until the capture of Quebec in 1759.”

This statement, like many others made by Mr. Hawkins, is directly opposed to the facts. In 1728, the condition of the fortifications was so defective, that an urgent demand was made by the Marquis de Beauharnois and M. Dupuy for an enormous sum of money to place them in a proper state of defence. The King refused this demand, and at the same time said:

“MM. Beauharnois and Dupuy must examine the project maturely in conjunction with the engineers; draw up a plan of fortification which will not be susceptible to alteration, like previous ones, and transmit it to His Majesty.”

Again in 1734, the Marquis de Beauharnois and M. Hocquart wrote to France requesting aid to make such works and repairs as were absolutely necessary, and stated that as their demands of the previous year had been denied, they would place the batteries in good order, and construct others where necessary. In the year 1740, Nicolas Belin made several improvements, and altered the position of the batteries near the Palace.

Notwithstanding the assurance given to the King, in 1720, that the works then commenced would meet all requirements, we find that de Léry himself found that they were defective, and on the 5th^th of June, 1745, he wrote:

“Vous verrez, Monseigneur, dans le mémoire, que la face droite du Bastion St‑Louis est mal tournée, je propose de la placer autrement.”

From these letters, and from those which follow, it will be seen that the walls erected by de Léry were very defective, and that between 1720 and 1759 a much more extensive system of defence had been carried out than was embraced in de Léry’s plan of 1720.

A lengthy correspondence ensued concerning the proposed changes in the plans, and at last both the inhabitants and the King grew weary of the ceaseless burden. Early in the year 1746, the King gave an order for all the work to be discontinued, which seems to have pleased the majority of the inhabitants. Those in authority, however, viewed this action with alarm, and even the Bishop wrote to the King setting forth the gravity of the situation, and suggested that if the work were continued the expense to the King might be lightened by the imposition of a tax upon wine and silk.

“Je me crois obligé de vous marquer, Monsieur, que la liberté que vous avés donné de continuer et de demolir les fortifications a eû un effet tout contraire a vos intentions. Le partage de sentimens surtout dans les tems critiques me paroit a craindre. L’idée de la taille qu’on a que trop repandue a fait un mauvais effet, et si vous vous determinés a les faire continuer et que vous exigiés que ce soit aux frais de la colonie, permettés moy de vous representer qu’une taxe sur les boissons ennyvrantes et meme si on veut sur la marchandises de soye principalement ne fera crier personne. En ce cas il paroistroit juste que Montréal fut decharge de ce qu’elle paye pour ses fortifications. Je ne doute pas Monsieur, que vous ne receviés differents Memoires a ce sujet. Quand j’ay vû les esprits s’échauffer j’ay crû devoir demeurer à l’exterieur dans une parfaite neutralité? Je puis ajoutés que j’ay cent fois admiré dans cette occasion l’extreme prudence de M. le Marquis de Beauharnois.”

On the 26^th and 30^th of July, a meeting was held in the Chateau St. Louis to discuss the question of the fortifications of Quebec, at which the principal officers of the colony, and the chief inhabitants of Quebec were present. At this meeting, the majority were in favour of carrying out the instruction of the King, and they declined to be further taxed.

“Nous avons reçû le 5 juillet der. La Lettre que vous nous avez fait l’honneur de nous écrire le 7 mars précédent au sujet des fortifications de Quebec.

“A La réception de vos ordres, M. Le Général estant à Montreal, M. Hocquart fit cesser tous les travaux jusques a ce que par l’assemblée que M. le Mqs de Beauharnois devoit convoquer il Eut esté jugé s’il n’Estoit pas plus convenable et plus avantageux de démolir ce qui avoit esté fait que de continuer L’Entreprise. En consequence L’Assemblée a esté tenue au Chateau St Louis Les 26 et 30: du d. mois de juillet; à laquelle ont esté appelez les principaux officiers de la colonie et les principaux habitans de Quebec aux quels nous avons fait lecture de vos ordres, ci joint copie de la délibération ou résultat de ce qui s’est passé dans L’assemblée, Vous verrez, Monseigneur, que les avis sont partagés, Les uns pour, les autres contre les fortificaôns, dans une pareille diversité d’avis nous sommes tombez d’accord de demander votre décision pour nous y conformer.”

“......si Sa Majesté ordonne que L’Entreprise soit continuée, nous ne voyons d’autre moyen pour subvenir à la dépense de ce qui est fait et de ce qui Reste à faire que d’Etablir une imposition Extraordinaire Sur les vins Eaux de Vie et guildives qui entrent dans la Colonie, cette imposition paroist estre la moins a charge de toutes, En ce que les Peuples y contribueront, ce qui paroist juste, puisque le principal but qu’on s’est proposé dans l’Entreprise Est la conservation de toute la colonie. Il Entre année commune en Canada 2500: Barique de Vin, 35. a 30: pr veltes d’Eau de vie et 15. a 1800: Bariques de Guildive, on peut fixer le droit sur le vin a 12 livre: par Barique au lieu de 9 livre celuy sur l’Eau de Vin a 24 livre: par Velte au lieu de 16 v 8c: et sur la guildive 24 livre: par Barique au lieu de 15 livre, ce droit extraore, donneroit produit par an de 30: a 40 m livre ce qui vous paroist sufisant pour le remboursement de ce qui Est fait Et le payement de ce qui reste a faire.”

It was proposed that, if the works were continued, to raise the money upon a tax on wine, but this was not carried, and an arrangement was made for the payment of the work already completed by the contractors. The existing work, however, was so defective, that urgent repairs were completed in the following year, and extra expense was incurred in 1748 and 1749.

At the request of the Court of France, the Intendant caused a statement of the expenses of the fortifications between 1745 and 1749 to be prepared by de Léry.

In 1750, de Léry made another estimate of the cost of the fortifications for 1750, placing the sum at 147,726-16-4.

From the correspondence of de Léry, at this time, it would appear that complaints had been made against him by certain persons ^[1], and on the 5^th of October, 1749, he wrote a long letter to the Minister in France, from which we make an extract:

“In 1745, when news came of the capture of Louisbourg, the majority of the principal inhabitants of the country begged Monsieur the General to have the town of Quebec fortified. He did so. At the same time I inspected the ground most suitable as a site for the fortifications. The position being difficult, in the autumn I sent M. le comte de Maurepas the plan of the place with the projected fortification indicated thereon.

“Monsieur the Intendant made the contract with M. Deslauriers namely: 67 livres 10 sols for the masonry and 5 livres 10 sols for the earth work, the whole per cubic toise; and for the gates with the Sieur Dominique Lapalme, the masonry at 67 livres 10 sols and the cut stone at 45 sols per square foot, the square toise of the arched work at 20 livres.

“In 1746, the work was stopped; the contractors were paid for the work they had done and for the materials remaining on the spot. In 1747, orders were received from the Court to continue the work and push it on. The tax was imposed to pay for the same. Monsieur the Intendant ordered a fresh adjudication for the masonry which was adjudged to Sieur Pierre Boulanger at 62 livres, for that above St. Louis gate, and 57 livres for that below. Nobody having said anything about the earth work, the Sieur Lapalme continued his contract on the gates which were begun.

“Monsieur the Intendant appointed the overseers to distribute tickets to the carters and also in the following year. I was unable to ascertain whether they did not perform their duty properly; what I do know is that tickets were forged which I at once found out and those who had them were deprived of them. They were forged by soldiers and by Swiss porters who were kept in prison for some time.

“Last winter, I proposed to Monsieur Bigot to dismiss all his overseers and to have all the carting of earth done by the cubic toise as is done in France. He approved of it and at the same time gave an adjudication to the lowest tender; 6 livres per cubic toise was allowed for the ramparts and 4 livres 10 sols for outside. The work was done on that scale and at the same time the exact cost of the work is known.

“The Council of Marine and Monsieur le comte de Maurepas wrote me every year and I sent in a report on the progress of the work. I beg you, Monseigneur, to rest assured that I will render faithful account as I have hitherto done and as is done in France.

“I beg you, Monseigneur, to question Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois and Monsieur de la Galissonnière. You will see what they will say of me.

“The principal works done in the country in my time were ordered by the court. The Governors General and Intendants have had others done in consequence of the war; the latter are inconsiderable and they ordered them and saw them done. The Intendants have caused the workmen to be paid on my certificates without any difficulty. I go almost daily to the Chateau and to the Palace. When those gentlemen asked me how the works were going on I told them and they saw for themselves. As to the cost of building Fort St‑Jean which Monsieur le Marquis de la Galissonnière thought proper to build on account of the advantages to be derived from it; as he may tell you—my son had it built last year; he was in command there; it was finished only in March this year—Monsieur Bigot told me he would inform you of its amount.

“My intention was to fit out fourteen vessels as fire-ships to try and burn the English squadron and I was to be in command; to have a flying camp to prevent landings and a garrison in the town. This was approved by Monsieur the Governor General and all the brave men of the country who wanted to come with me.

“Monsieur le comte de Maurepas wrote me the following last year:

“There must be no more question of what has occurred in connection with the contract for the Quebec fortifications as the King has approved of their being continued and all that remains is to hope that they will yield all the advantages that we have been led to expect from them and that they have been built with due solidity and economy.

“The raising of the sieges of Carthagena, of Pondicherry and Port Louis clearly show the advantage of fortifying sea-ports.”

“The revetments of the main body of the place are finished with the exception of five sally ports, the opening whereof serves as a passage for conveying the earth to the ramparts which is taken outside the inner walls of the parapets. They cannot be made until the earth work of the ramparts is settled. Nevertheless I have caused the merlons of two flanks and the inner walls of two faces to be built as I found the earth settled and solid.

“The counterscarps are made as well as the two sections of the covered ways and the glacis, also the two main gates in the curtains at the end of the two main streets. Next year I will have work done on the covered ways and glacis.

“I remain, etc., etc.,

“Chaussegros de Léry.

“Quebec, 8th October, 1749.”

Franquet, a French engineer, was sent out from France to make a report upon the different works, which he completed some time after. In his first letter to the Minister, before his final report, he stated that the walls constructed by de Léry were evidently erected without regard to the evident requirements of the place and that the work was conducted in an unbusinesslike manner. He then points out the various defects, and the remedy which can be applied under the circumstances. In his examination of the work, he discovered that the builders were working without plans, and he communicated this intelligence to the Intendant, who, we find, instructed de Léry in the future to consult with Franquet, and to comply with the suggestions he had made.

Franquet’s letter is a lengthy one: but it is of special interest, and we therefore print the whole of it:

“I had the honour to write you on the 12th. June from Louisbourg, by royal waggon mail, that I had made arrangements to come here. Accordingly I left on the 15th on the schooner La Salamandre, 120 tons burthen. On the way I visited Port Dauphin situate on Isle Royale. I arrived here on the 13th. July. Monsieur Bigot—whose politeness and the assistance he gives me in the performance of the duties of my commission I cannot too highly praise—received me most cordially. After discoursing about the fortifications of the new enceinte of this town I told him I would like very much to take advantage of the fine season to inspect those of Montreal and the forts nearest to the English and within shortest reach of the Savage nations who, in the event of war, would attack our enemies, in order to judge both of their usefulness for defence and the extent to which they might be enlarged. For that purpose I embarked on the 24th. of the said month. I arrived at Three Rivers on the 27th; on the following day I went to the St. Maurice forges and proceeded on the 1st. August to Montreal. From there I went to the Indian villages of Sault St. Louis and the Lake of Two Mountains. I returned to Montreal on the 6th. and left on the 9th. for Fort St. Jean whence I went in four days by Lake Champlain to Fort St. Frédéric. Then, wishing to see the way by which the English can reach our settlements I went to Lake St. Sacrament, I crossed the portage thereof, half a league in length, and examined the Rivière à Chicotte.

“These two places are the only ones by which they can penetrate to our settlements in that quarter. From there I came down the first lake, landed at Fort Chambly and continued down the river Richelieu until I reached the St. Lawrence at Sorel. Then I went to the Indian villages of St. François and Becancourt whence I returned here on the 23rd. August.

“I am engaged in drawing up a report dealing with all these matters. It is well advanced but will reach you, Monseigneur, only in the course of next year, and with the help of God and your good pleasure I myself will be the bearer thereof.

“Whilst I was on my tour of inspection, I received the letter wherewith you honoured me respecting the defence of the Lower Town by the Upper and of a plan of works for effecting the former. These two things require much reflection. Nevertheless, I think I have discovered the best means for that object. Messieurs the Marquis Duquène, Bigot and Lery have been on the spot to investigate and decide as to their advisability.

“The plans will show the site of these works better than anything I can say to you. In consequence those gentlemen have stopped the building of a house that was being erected on the line of that part of the enceinte and I had the honour to inform Monsieur the Bishop of the necessity of cutting off a portion of his poultry yard and that care would be taken to cause him the least possible damage.

“Many plans might be made in connection with the enceinte to be laid out for enclosing the lower town. Two will be submitted: the former will show a wharf facing the river all sides whereof will flank one another and on which, if necessary, a parapet might be raised. The Pointe à Carcy will be occupied by a round battery and two faces will be regularly fortified, terminating on one side at the end of the wharves and on the other at the foot of the bastion supporting the right of the new enceinte of the upper town will close it in on the side of the River St. Charles and St. Roch’s suburbs. By this plan the Intendance will be enclosed in the lower town but its garden and the potash store will be destroyed. They can be spared solely by making the lower town works exceed those of the upper town and thereby leaving them unprotected from all the heights of the former town.

“The second plan consists in carrying the front face of the fortification to St. Roch’s suburb, in front of the houses built there, about on the line of the palisade enclosure erected during the last war.

“But an examination of the plan which Monsieur de Léry will no doubt send this year with a report thereon and on which the new fortification will most probably be indicated, will show that the latter plan will be practicable only if the works of the front face are covered by several others to be established in front of the right of the upper town and otherwise it differs in nothing from the first. I am well provided with all the materials required for the execution of these two plans but I am warned of so many difficulties to which the ice will give rise that I have no hesitation in spending the winter here to judge of their effect.

“The third object of the service to which I must devote particular attention relates to the enceinte of the town which affects the lines of streets in consequence of the enlargement resulting from it. On my arrival, the walls were all built. My first care was to examine the works with Monsieur de Léry in a tour of inspection we made together and to return alone there the following day to judge more at my ease of their utility for defence and of their solidity. Nothing but the particular principles of that officer can admit of there being any rules in them. I admit that he was impeded by the heights in front but these drawbacks did not dispense him from making specifications that would explain the arrangement of the materials in every part of the works, the plans, profiles and sections necessary for the direction thereof and the notes for making the measurements of the same. Hence there is reason to believe that he is more capable than another and that, having his work in his head, he directed it as it went on and spares himself the trouble of arranging it beforehand. As he is an old officer I did not point out to him the drawbacks that would usually result from the lack of such arrangement. I must however admit that all parts of the faces of that enceinte flank one another; that it is true he has excavated no ditches but forms one by means of a counterscarp wall from 6 to 7 feet high in such manner that terre-plein of the covered way will be raised by so much above the natural level and that by means of an elevation of 7½ feet of parapet, the foot of his enceinte will be covered to the extent of 14 or 15 feet. I would further add that he had to deal with difficult ground, but whatever may have been the inconvenience to which he was put, there was nothing to prevent his removing the earth and rock from that kind of a ditch. It is generally by this that one begins all the more so that everything not suitable for making parapets is burried up.

“I informed Messieurs Bigot and Duquesne of all this and I think the best thing to be done is that you should be pleased to write Monsieur de Lery to act in concert with me with regard to the completion of the works, that we ascertain together the memorandum establishing the rule and order therefore and that he instruct Monsieur de Couagne, the under-engineer, to have the same observed and to report to him thereon.

“With respect to Monsieur de Couagne, I would consider myself deserving of reproach did I not speak at length of him. He is a young man full of talent as regards his profession, of intelligence and application, a moral and religious man who asks nothing better than to learn and who is not embarrassed by any of the operations. I have set him to work and employ him daily. As I work with him I am surprised at his capability and in addition to all these qualities he is distinguished for right mindedness and equity. His pay is only four hundred livres. He deserves more, Monseigneur; it would be for the good of the service that his pay be increased. I feel the necessity of this so much that were I, through my labour, to deserve favors of that kind I would relinquish a portion of them to beg you to grant the same to him.

“This is approximately, Monseigneur, all that relates to the objects to which my attention will be devoted this winter. I have the honour to inform you that I will leave in the proper season to proceed from here to Louisbourg. Consequently, if you have any orders to give me concerning the aforesaid plans and works, I beg you to do so by the first ships sailing from France for this Colony; and that if any explanation is needed in connection with my work at Louisbourg or a new inspection is required, if I receive instructions in July I shall be in a position to comply with the same.

“I beg you to approve my intention to proceed afterwards to France by one of the King’s ships that may go there during the campaign. I will not conceal from you that my health requires this and that I give up the indispensable necessity of restoring it through zeal for the service.

“I have the honour to be etc.,

“Franquet.”

From a letter of Franquet dated the 4^th of November, 1752, it may be seen that the citizens were eager to take advantage of the land in the vicinity of the line of fortification; but Franquet recommends caution in granting these lots:

“The enlargement of the upper town by the new enceinte and that which will result in the lower town from the proposed enceinte there, will give several building lots that may be utilized for the public service. My opinion would be to dispose of some of them by grant, but that before doing so, the plans of the works should be decided upon. The facility with which they have been hitherto granted presents drawbacks onerous to private individuals and, in order to avoid such, I have the honour, Monseigneur, to submit these representations.

“Moreover there is a lot of land over sixty toises long in front, on a street situate opposite the Chateau battery and adjoining the same which has hitherto remained unoccupied and undisposed of because it was intended to erect an arsenal there. We went to inspect it. It is true that it is narrow and that another more suitable was offered on the left side of the street leading to St. Louis gate, belonging to Monsieur de Vergore, a captain of this colony. I would be of opinion that the former land should be disposed of in favor of that officer only, in the event of His Majesty taking possession of his property for his service.

“I beg you, Monseigneur, to suspend all arrangements in connection with this until the plans of the ranks relating thereto have reached you.

“I have the honour to be, &c., &c.,

“Franquet.”

When de Léry made another report, in 1757, as to the urgent necessity of further works, the Court determined to have the operations in future conducted under the direction of Franquet, who was instructed to draw up a plan of the work necessary. At the time that Franquet made his report, in 1752, as we find by another letter, in 1753, the work under de Léry was too far advanced to make much improvement, as the walls were already up nearly the height intended, and the new plan would entail the demolition of these walls. The walls were therefore left standing in the meantime, and Franquet’s project was postponed. Vaudreuil, in 1757, transmitted to France a list of works proposed, which he could not execute for want of means. The Court, however, entrusted the charge of the fortifications of Quebec to Montbeillard, and ordered the engineer Franquet to prepare a plan for restoring the defences.

Franquet’s plan was sent to France, and received the approval of the King. In November, 1757, the Marquis de Vaudreuil wrote to France requesting the return of Franquet’s plan, as it would be of great service to the engineer Pontleroy, in carrying out the instructions of His Majesty.

In 1758, Pontleroy was actively engaged in repairing the most defective part of the walls, but in many places they were so bad, that works were erected in front of them.

“As soon as the ground shall be uncovered by the melting of the snow, I will determine the covered way in Quebec and work shall be done on it as well as in stopping some breaches remaining in the body of the place. M. the Marquis de Vaudreuil will send for M. de Bonnefons, commandant of the royal corps, to see to the execution of the works......”

“Les fortifications sont si ridicules et mauvaises qu’elle seroient prises aussitôt qu’assiégées.”

In 1759, before any assault had been made upon Quebec, the breaches in the walls could be seen at a distance of five hundred yards; and Mackellar reported to Wolfe that the works would offer very little resistance.

After the battle of the Plains, when the British took possession of the city, they found that it was impossible to repair the walls because they were so badly constructed.

Whether de Léry was personally to blame for the defective work or whether it was solely due to the contractor, we do not know; but Bigot and La Galissonnière complained to the Minister in France that de Léry would not render accounts, and Bigot advised him that the earth required at Quebec would in future be paid for by the toise, and not by half loads containing only a handful of earth. Vaudreuil also stated after the battle, that the walls were badly constructed. Montcalm, too, wrote: “But how can you expect that M. de Pontleroy, or any other man in his place can with honesty remain in the country. He must rob or be ruined, for his pay and allowances amount to only 100 louis d’or: You will object to me that these are the emoluments allowed to his office since the time of M. de Léry, senior, a great ignoramus in his profession—it is only necessary to look at his works—who robbed the King like the rest.”

CHAPTER IV

ne of the first acts of general Murray after the capitulation in 1759, was to draw up a report of the condition of the fortifications of Quebec. The position of Quebec was critical, but from 1759 to 1778, the British Commandants had to make the best of a very bad state of things indeed. The old French works were worthless and the home authorities refused to carry out any new scheme at all. The only thing possible was to throw up temporary works in front of the French walls.

In 1760, the Marquis de Lévis evidently thought he could batter down with ease the then existing works if he had anything like a proper siege train. He says:

“Il fut décidé, après avoir reconnu la place, qu’on couronneroit par une parallèle les hauteurs qui sont devant le front des bastions St. Louis, de la Glacière et du Cap au Diamant, et qu’on y établiroit des batteries, d’où on espérait, malgré l’éloignement et la faiblesse du calibre de nos pièces, qu’elles pourroient faire brèche, le revêtement étant mauvais dans cette partie.”

On the 6^th of June, 1762, General Murray transmitted to the King his Report from which the following is quoted, as it does not appear to have been published hitherto:

“Cape Diamond is nearest the river St. Lawrence and is likewise the highest ground, from whence there is a continued slope, sometimes very quick, towards the river St. Charles, in consequence of which the walls not being built upon a level, but humouring the nature of the ground, the flanks of the Bastions cannot defend their opposite faces in a proper manner, for the flanks of the lower ones must throw theirs above it. To remedy this defect, the French built two Counter-guards or Fausse-brays with casemated flanks, before the right face and flanks of la Glacière Bastion, and the left face and flank of Bastion St. Louis; this however introduced another inconvenience, of which they appeared sensible when Monsieur de Lévis besieged the Town in 1760, as he directed his fire to this place, which had such an effect, the rubbish of the Wall filling the Counter-guard, and that from the lower ditch, that an easy ascent might have been very soon made to the breach.

“The high grounds before Cape Diamond and LaGlacière Bastions command all the lower fortifications toward the river St. Charles, and batteries for battering in breach may be erected at any distance, as the walls are high and seen in many places to the bottom of the Ditch, there being no covered way or outworks and even the counterscarp wall not well finished, neither can a covered way be constructed, but at a great expense, on account of the scarcity of earth and irregularity of the ground, besides that it must be crowded with traverses to prevent its being enfiladed.

“To make up in some measure the want of outworks, in the winter 1759, I erected a line of Blockhouses within musquet shot of the capital wall to secure the body of the place against surprises, such outworks are proof against musquetry only.

“The walls are built of an irregular unwrought stone and in many places the work is very badly executed as was sufficiently visible from the effect of the fire from the French batteries in 1760.

“The Gates are illplaced and not defended. St. Louis Gate is so near the right face of the Bastion of the same name, that it is beneath its fire, and the opposite flank can have but very little fire on it, that of St. Johns has the same fault, being too near the left flank of St. John’s Bastion.

“The Palace Gate is not much better constructed, and in general this whole front of the place, which indeed is the only fortified one, is enfiladed from the other side of the river St. Charles.

“The Wall from Bastion la Potasse to Palace gate, is pierced with loop holes, and is good in its kind. The Barracks which are built against it being also provided with loop holes serve as a second fire. This wall is continued to K and is built upon a Rock.

“From K to L is a very bad stockade on the top of an accessible rock, with one small stockaded place of arms. This is the part of the Town most exposed to a coup de main.

“From L to T there is a high Wall with a wooden gallery behind it, to serve as a banquette, and beneath it is a sally port to communicate with the lower Town.

“From T to the Sault au Matelot is a wall begun but carried no higher than a man is able to step upon it, there are here some plat‑forms for Cannon and Mortars. From M to M (sic) is the Royal Battery commanding the River St. Lawrence and built upon an inaccessible rock adjoining to the Bishop’s palace, part of which was taken in during the late siege to defend the communication from the lower to the higher Town, which was also defended by some Cannon planted at O.

“From O to P takes in Fort St. Louis and a nine gun battery; it is by nature inaccessible except two small paths shewn in the plan. Fort St. Louis is of no defence, being the remains of the earliest fortifications erected there.

“From P to Q the Citadel or Redoubt of Cape Diamond, is a quick or rather steep ascent, defended by a stockade only. Betwixt this Redoubt and the Bastions of La Glacière and Cape Diamond is a commanding ground overlooking the whole Town and Fortifications. This ground I judge very proper for the construction of a Citadel.

“From Q to R the same sort of stockade is continued, and from R to Cape Diamond there is a Wall with loop-holes, defended by two small flanks with Cannon.

“The rocky hill under these parts is very high, but accessible and in many places covered with brush, by the help of which small parties might advance to the very stockades.

“The lower Town is only cover’d by a stockade and some batteries. The Batteries marked q are to defend the road and annoy the shipping in passing the Town. The Batteries t, are for the same purpose. They serve likewise to flank the lower Town and the other Batteries.

“From the above report and annexed Plan it appears that the Enceinte of Quebec is very large and would require a very strong Garrison to defend it tho properly fortified. That at present it is open on two sides, has no out works not even a cover’d way nor hardly a ditch, for the foot of rotten walls is to be seen from the most of the Environs at the distance of 500 yards. That the whole Rampart is enfiladed from the other side of the River St. Charles, and that in its present situation, with a Garrison of 3000 men it is not proof against a well conducted Coup de main. Any temporary works that can be added, would be of little signification, as matters now stand; and to fortify the place upon the old plans is by no means advisable, the situation never can be render’d strong, and the attempt must cost an immense sum. I therefore am of opinion that if His Majesty shall think proper to be at the expense of strengthening Quebec, the most effectual method will be to erect upon the rising ground of Cape Diamond, a Citadel which will answer every purpose of the Towns being strongly fortified; may be defended 4 months at least by a small garrison, awe the Inhabitants, whose fidelity in case of an attack we cannot for some years rely on, and secure our Magazines. The ground I propose for this Citadel commands the whole Town and is commanded no where from the Country; in short it possesses every advantage to be whished for, and at a small expense may be fortified, as the Inhabitants of the Country and the Troops in the time of peace may contribute their labor towards it gratis; to this the former can have no objction as they were on all occasions formerly liable to Military service and were all allow’d only provisions.

“I order’d Captain Holland to take an accurate survey of the ground and have the honour herewith to transmit (a) the several plans he has drawn in consequence.”

We have seen that under the French régime, representations which were not always complied with, were frequently made to France for aid towards the construction of fortifications at Quebec. Under the British régime, similar conditions prevailed.

The official correspondence of the Governors from 1764 until 1811, is burdened with suggestions and demands in this direction. On the 29^th of May, 1769, Guy Carleton wrote to Lord Hillsborough concerning the fortifications, in these words:

“It is now long since I transmitted to Lord Shelburne, accompanying my letter No. 20, the plan of a citadel for Quebec; at that time, I expected the Engineer, Captain Gordon, who made but a short stay here in 1767, agreable to my orders, and his promise, would have drawn up an estimate of the expense; as he has never done this, at least that has come to my knowledge, I again transmit said plan with an estimate annexed, made out by Engineer Marr, who arrived here last fall from Halifax; I have already said so much of the expediency and utility of such an undertaking, that I have now little to add, I am however, to observe to Your Lordship, I have found it the general opinion of the Canadians that if Admiral Durell had pushed up in May, 1759, with only a small part of the army, the town might have been taken before the Governor in Chief could have sent there any assistance from Montreal, where and in the upper Country all the troops were collected to defend the entrance by the Lakes; that after the defeat of their army upon the Plains of Abraham, the 13th September, altho’ they had eight Battalions and forty companies of regular troops, with fifteen or sixteen thousand warlike militia in the field, after having had four months time to strengthen the town, they apprehended the same so indefensible that it surrendered immediately, before one single battery could be opened against it; and that if in the succeeding year the remains of ten brave Battalions were enabled to hold out until the arrival of our fleet, it was in a great degree owing to Monsieur de Levis’ army being in want of artillery and ammunition.

“For the foregoing reasons therefore as well as the many others before alledged, I must humbly recommend that essential and salutary work to be set about as soon as possible.”

For twenty years after the siege of Quebec, no repairs were made to the French walls, although temporary works to defend them were constructed. During Arnold’s expedition against Quebec, the situation of the city was indeed perilous, and on the 6^th of December, 1775, Montgomery wrote to Carleton stating that he was aware of its defenceless condition.

The only fortifications which Montgomery and Arnold attacked were the two barricades in Lower Town, thrown up for the temporary defence of Quebec in 1775, although Arnold had erected works in the vicinity of the present Parliament for the purpose of attacking the walls. On the night of the 31^st of December in that year, Arnold carried the Sault-au-Matelot barricade, which faced the north east and ran from the cliff to the river along the line of the present St. James street. Montgomery’s simultaneous attack failed before the Près-de-Ville barricade, which faced south and ran across the present Champlain street from the cliff to the river, just under the present Citadel. There was also a one gun battery on a ledge about fifty or sixty feet below the present Citadel. This gun should have supported the defence of the barricade; but the officer in charge failed to do his duty properly.

In 1778, the Home authorities at last began to listen to reason; but their action was dangerously slow for those stirring years. And none of the works then made were really permanent.

During the earlier correspondence of the Governors we come in contact with a familiar figure during the siege of Quebec, George Townshend, which proves that his interest in Canadian affairs did not cease with the capitulation of Quebec. The serious consideration of building a citadel at Quebec, under British rule, dates from 1778. In the month of October, in that year, the Governor wrote:

“In obedience to the commands given to me by your lordship, I shall not fail to take the proper steps for erecting a citadel at Quebec in such situation as assisted by the Engineers I shall be able to judge it most advantageous, the plans and estimates of which shall be transmitted as soon as they can be made and considered.”

In a letter dated the 18^th of June, 1779, addressed to Lord Townshend, Governor Haldimand clearly sets forth the condition of affairs in Quebec, and his requirements at this time. The letter is therefore quoted at length:—

“Very soon after my arrival in this Province I was convinced that the resources I was master of were by no means adequate to begin the construction of a formidable citadel at Quebec, so as to afford any reasonable hopes that it could assist us during the present Rebellion, and therefore I immediately resolved to content myself with making such necessary preparations as can be done without interfering with our present Defences, and yet such as may induce and enable the Government to push forward with vigour, when the situation of public affairs make it expedient so to do—by adopting this plan there will be sufficient time to obtain and compare different ideas, so as at last to determine upon some thing which may be adapted to the ground, the climate and the Government, and your Lordship is so well acquainted with these particulars that I must request your assistance, in this difficult task.”

“Major Holland, who arrived here a few days ago from Halifax, informs me that in 1762, or thereabouts, he gave General Murray plans, sections and estimates of a Citadel, all of which were forwarded to England, and are now in the drawing room of the Tower, and as Major Holland has no copy, I beg Your Lordship to indulge me with exact copies of the whole by the first opportunity, as your lordship must be sufficiently acquainted with the merit and ability of this officer, to know that some attention may be paid to his opinion, Captain Marr, who is at present the Senior Engineer in the Province, I found stationed at Quebec by General Carleton, and the entire direction of all other forts, etc., put under the direction of Captain Twiss. I continued this regulation both because I thought it for the good of the service, and as far as I could learn, that it was also your lordship’s intention that it should be so—a more thorough knowledge of these gentlemen has convinced me that I was right, and as Captain Marr is now old and infirm I have this summer consented to the request he made last fall (though late) of returning to England, and I shall order him to lay before your Lordship his remarks upon Cape Diamond, together with his proposals for a Citadel, and I do earnestly request that your Lordship will apply to His Majesty to have Lieut. Twiss appointed Chief Engineer of this Province, as I have found his zeal, activity and ability equal to the important trust, and although he has the misfortune to be low in rank, I am informed that he has been 19 years in the service, and very actively employed during the whole of that time.”

By a letter of the 18^th of June, 1779, the Governor informed Lord Townshend that plans were being prepared by Captain Twiss and Mr. Hunter, but that he hesitated to send them to England, “fearful lest they should fall into improper hands, and for this reason, and in consequence of his private affairs, I have consented to give Lieut. Slack leave to go to England.”

Very little work could be accomplished on account of the lack of materials and of tools, besides the scarcity of workmen. In order to carry out the projected works, the Governor organized a company of artificers, but Lord Townshend objected to its formation, and instructed the Governor to employ loyalists in the construction of any works undertaken.

The failure of the True Britain to reach Quebec, deprived the Governor of a valuable cargo of military supplies, and consequently the proposed improvements had to be postponed.

The plans prepared by Captain Twiss at this time, provided for the construction of those walls which were subsequently built beyond the line of the present fortifications.

The remains of these British works are still plainly visible on the western side of Cape Diamond. This was the first and only time that any fortifications were thrown up on this spot. There were none at all at the time of the French; and they were discarded in the British scheme of 1823. Their whole military existence therefore is bounded by the limits of the period which we are now discussing, viz, from 1778 to 1823.

The progress towards building the long discussed citadel was very slow. By a letter addressed to Haldimand on the 30^th of November, 1779, Lord Townshend does not appear to have been satisfied with the manner in which his suggestions regarding Quebec were received. He writes:

“I hope my former letter was received respecting the corps of artificers which you have determined as necessary upon Captain Twiss’s recommendation; all I can say is, that whenever the Secretary of State for the Department refers to me for my opinion upon the subject of Canada, I shall give my opinion as explicitly and frankly as I did some years ago upon a Citadel for Quebec which I lament to say has never been done, and of which I have never heard anything after.”

Lord Townshend refers to the subject again in a letter dated the 15^th of December, 1779:

“With regard to the Citadel proposed at Quebec, I am happy to find that a Post of such importance is not laid aside. My opinion was asked upon this subject some time ago, and I should have been sorry to have been so ignorant of the place and of the Province, to have hesitated giving my opinion in the fullest manner.”

A year later, in October, 1780, no progress had been made. General Haldimand wrote to Lord Townshend as follows:

“In our present situation your Lordship must be sensible that we could not begin the construction of a regular Citadel, but we have endeavoured to take every possible advantage of the ground, and have occupied the Cape with several detached redoubts, which I hope will soon be capable of some defence. Captain Twiss has applied for permission to send to your Lordship plans of the works now constructing.”

The only building within the area of the present citadel at this time, of any importance, was the Citadel Redoubt. The Hangman’s Redoubt, on Cape Diamond and the Powder Magazine, were only temporary affairs, constructed between the years 1760 and 1769.

Amongst the eighty manuscript plans of Quebec made by British officers, which have recently been collected through the exertions of His Excellency, Lord Minto, is a remarkably fine plan in colours, bearing this title:

“Plan of the Town and Suburbs of Quebec, showing the Fortifications as they were nearly completed in October, 1783. The Fortifications of this Town were not in any degree finished by the French, and the English never repaired any part of them previous to October, 1779, when His Excellency, General Haldimand gave his instructions to Captain Twiss, Commanding Engineer in Canada, for the construction of a temporary Citadel on Cape Diamond.”

This statement which is on the plan made by Captain Twiss, the Commanding Engineer, and bearing his signature, is in direct opposition to all the local historians; but the student, no doubt, will attach more importance to the writing of the Engineer and the official correspondence of the time, than to the statements of those who wrote over a hundred years after the events, and were not in possession of the material now available. This temporary citadel embraced nearly the same area as that enclosed by the present walls, which was at first suggested by Major Holland, and it also extended nearly to the steps leading to the river, including those works which have been regarded as belonging to the French régime.

These plans show what works there were upon the Cape during the old régime, and also the commencement and progress, and final abandonment of these old walls.

On the plan made by Captain Twiss in 1783, these famous walls are shown as being nearly complete, and they are referred to as follows:—

“(aa) New works whose Terre Plein are mostly excavated in the solid rock, they together form a temporary Citadel.”

The buildings executed within these walls, which extended beyond the present line, were:—

“(bb) New roads of communication for artillery.” (The entrance to these extended fortifications was behind the King’s Field, a plot of ground having a frontage of 550 feet on the south of the Grande Allée, opposite the Parliament.)

“(e) Reservoirs for water which is tolerably good, though rather hard, however they are at all times tolerably supplied.”

“(mm) Counter mines formed of cedar pickets under the Glacière bastion.”

These were the works constructed by the British in 1779, and completed in 1783, the remains of which have been regarded as the ruins of the French works.

The works erected by the British at this time within the main walls, that is, within the area of the citadel proper, were:

“(ee) Temporary bomb proofs made of timber, and will lodge:

“(ff) Sheds for carriages.

“(g) Workshops for all branches.

“(hh) Three counterguards to cover the detached redoubts with curtains to cover the communication from one redoubt to another, were not finished, and are almost the only part of the new works which are not.”

“1. Port St. Louis Gate from thence towards the new Citadel, the ditches and glacis are levelled, the parapets and ramparts are likewise completed.

“(k) St. John’s Gate, from hence to port St. Louis Gate there is no glacis and the ditches are in so rude a state by the French having excavated the earth from between the rocks that they are impassable not only for carriages, but also on horseback. The parapets and ramparts for this part are finished, and a very extensive Esplanade with proper ramps is almost completed behind these works.

“(l) Barrack Bastion whose parapet and rampart etc. are finished, but the parapet and rampart between it and St. John’s Gate as well as the ditches and glacis in front of this extent remain in the rude state in which the French left them, and are not capable of any proper defence.

“(n) Ground purchased by the Government for a wharf not yet commenced.”

The Citadel constructed under Captain Twiss was never intended for a permanent structure, and the correspondence between the Governors shows that they were repeatedly making demands for substantial means of defence. When they realized that the necessary aid was not forthcoming, and that repairs were urgently needed, the Governor ordered a complete survey to be made with a view of again placing the various works in a state of temporary efficiency. This survey was completed in 1790, and certain works were at once commenced.

By a plan made in 1804, we find that there were very slight alterations effected between the year 1783 and 1804, the most notable was a battery on the summit of the extended walls overlooking the path to the river. In the citadel proper, we find an ordonance store, constructed in 1800, and a powder magazine built in 1801.

In 1804, another plan was drawn up for the construction of three Martello Towers. Towers No. 1 and 3 were commenced in 1805, and finished in 1810. Tower No. 2 was commenced on the 11^th of May, 1809, but it was not completed until 1818. Tower No. 4 was not completed until 1823.

On the 28^th of July, 1816, Sir John Sherbrooke ordered an inspection to be made of all the fortifications and military buildings in Quebec, and of those in progress. In obedience to this command a Report was prepared, dated at the Engineer’s office, Quebec, November 20^th, 1816.

“The importance of this Fortress, not only as the seat of Government and key to the whole of the Canadas; the vast accumulation of Property, and Stores, both military, Naval, and private, together with the impressions, that would naturally be made, throughout the whole country, should the designs of any enemy succeed against it, renders it essentially necessary to be careful that peculiar attention is paid to its defences, in all regards.

“Your Excellency is well aware of the very little time I have had to devote to this important part of my duty, since my arrival, I therefore offer my opinion relative to the defence of this place, with the greatest deference.

“It is almost unnecessary to advert to the site of the Town &c of Quebec except for the sake of Military Argument.”

From this date the Home authorities appear to have recognized the importance of a permanent citadel.

The Commanding Engineer in Canada, Captain Nicolls, prepared an excellent plan of the city, its environs, and the whole of its defensive works. The colours of this plan are remarkably bright, and the lettering is a fine specimen of the penman’s art. It bears the title “Plan of Quebec, showing the present state of the works of defence, distinguishing those which are complete and what are in progress, with the military works and buildings that have been ordered, 18^th March, 1816.”

On this plan we find that the works beyond the present line, which have been hitherto regarded as of French origin, were partly dismantled. The reservoirs were removed, and the only building was the advanced blockhouse.

1. Telegraph (on Cape Diamond); 2. Stone Powder Magazine; 3. Fire Proof Ordnance Stores; 4. Cape Diamond Bastion; 5. Glacière Bastion and Barracks; 6. Shot Yard; 7. Wooden Ordnance Sheds; 8. Temporary Officers’ Barracks (of wood); 9. Casemated Barracks and Cavalier; 10. Temporary Barracks; 11. King’s Cavalier; 12. Another Powder Magazine; 13. St. Louis Bastion with Bomb Proof Barracks, Guard House and Cook House; 14. Wooden Ordnance Stores and Sheds; 15. Wheeler’s Shop; 16. Provision Stores; 17. Large Temporary Powder Magazine; 18. Telegraph and Flag Staff; 19. Powder Magazine.

The large temporary Powder Magazine occupied the site of the Governor General’s Quarters. This plan is very detailed, and the names of all Public Buildings in every part of the city are given. Amongst the works described on this plan are the Powder Magazine and the Cistern on the Esplanade, and a Powder Magazine at St. John’s Gate. Two Guard Houses, and a Cooking House are shown in the course of construction near the Jesuit’s Barracks.

These works served until the construction of the magnificent Citadel, in 1823, carried out on the basis of the plans of Holland and Twiss, by Lieut.-Col. Durnford, with additions by Colonel Mann, the main parts of which are to be seen to-day.

CHAPTER V

any plans had been suggested to the home Government before the first and last great permanent scheme was taken in hand in 1823, and carried out during the next nine years to what was considered a satisfactory conclusion. The total cost was $35,000,000.00. All the existing fortifications date from these years and nothing material has been added since. The chief changes have taken place in the gates, most of which have disappeared altogether, and others have been rebuilt in ornamental forms. Hope Gate was first built in 1786. It was altered in 1823-32, and strengthened outward in 1840. It was finally demolished in 1874.

St. John’s Gate was first built under Frontenac; removed by de Léry in 1720; rebuilt in 1791 and again in 1867; and demolished in 1898.

St. Louis Gate was built under Frontenac, appearing first in his plan of 1693. It was rebuilt in 1721; altered in 1783; again rebuilt in the scheme of 1823-32, and replaced by the present arch in 1873.

Palace Gate, first built under Frontenac, was restored in 1720 and again in 1790. It was rebuilt in 1823-32 in imitation of the Nola and Herculaneum Gates of Pompeii. It was demolished in 1864.

Kent Gate was built in 1879, Her Majesty Queen Victoria contributing to the cost, in memory of Her father, the Duke of Kent after whom it was named.

Chain Gate, forms a part of the works undertaken in 1823-32, and protects the road to the citadel, known as Citadel Hill.

Dalhousie Gate, which forms the entrance to the Citadel, was erected in 1827, during the administration of Lord Dalhousie.

When the progress of military science had shown that distant and detached fortifications would be required, a new scheme was formulated for the defence of Quebec and three forts on the Levis heights were erected between 1865 and 1871. The scheme never resulted in anything further. These forts have never been manned nor armed; but they are still in fairly good order and capable of service in case of necessity.

Since then there have been various other schemes mooted; but, as none of them have ever resulted in any tangible form, our survey of the fortifications of Quebec must close here.

We must once more remind the reader that there are no old French works of any kind now in existence, and that the works on the west face of Cape Diamond were purely of British origin; appearing first in the temporary scheme of 1783 and disappearing again in the permanent plan of 1823.

It is impossible either to look back on this long and stirring history, or to look forward to the heritage of Quebec in future generations, without entering a strong protest against any scheme for throwing down the walls, or any portion of them.

It is true that they are not so very old and that they lack the historic charm of containing at least some remains of the old French works. But, on the other hand, they are most interesting in themselves, and doubly so because they still mark the lines followed by those which existed in the days of Wolfe and Montcalm. Moreover, they have the priceless advantage of making Quebec absolutely unique among all the cities of America. It may be that if Quebec were to lose all claim to being the only walled city of the western world, she might still remain a queen among her sister cities. For her superb, unchallengeable throne was founded in strength and set here in beauty by Nature ages long ago. But it was Man who came and crowned her. And where the works of Nature and of Man have so perfectly combined in one befitting glory, it would surely be an abject desecration to discrown her now. For let it be clearly understood that the true disgrace of any such schemes lies in their very wantonness. Of course necessity knows no law; and of course everything must accommodate itself to its surroundings in the struggle for existence, or die out. We all know that. And of course if war should ever require the destruction of the present walls, then they must be destroyed. And, equally of course, if peaceful traffic should ever really require it, then they must disappear just the same. But, as a matter of certain fact, neither war nor peace require any such sacrifice at all. Modern defences would be far away from the city; and the walls around it could not do any harm, and might conceivably do good. And as for peaceful every day traffic, it already has all the natural outlets that it requires, and can pass freely to and fro at will, without let or hinderance, inwards or out. Indeed it may be truly said, that the walls are now no more of a material barrier to traffic to-day than their memory would be should they be wantonly thrown down to-morrow. But the greatest plea in their favour is that they are the living symbol of a glorious past, in which the honours of war were equally divided between French and English, and for the living monument of which, therefore, French and English alike should stand united. The waterfront is the same from which Frontenac hurled steadfast defiance at the discomfited fleet and army of England; and the landward face follows the same line of defence which stood there when the two greatest masters of the art of war ever seen in Canada fought for the dominion of a continent—the profound and aspiring Wolfe, and the equally great, though unfortunate, Montcalm.

And so these present walls really stand as a link between the twin honours of two gallant races, as well as what should be a perpetual link between present, past and future.

And their own mute appeal is more eloquent of all living honour than all the vain words that might record them after they had disappeared for ever.

CHAPTER VI
NAVAL AND MILITARY NOTES

he artillery of 1759 was in a state of transition in all the great armies of the world. The old heavy iron guns still in use were very little better than those of the beginning of the seventeenth century. Indeed, in some respects they were not so good; because the false idea that the greater the charge the greater would be the range and striking force, had led to an enormous waste of powder and an equally great waste of metal in order to prevent bursting. The guns cast by such founders as the Carron Company—even then a justly celebrated firm—were excellent of their kind. But the accidents resulting from the flaws originating from inferior workmanship caused a general nervousness among all gunners and a consequent call for extreme weight of metal. So general was the belief in the heavy make up of guns that it needed all the authority of the Duke of Cumberland to force through a reform in the direction of light field pieces with smaller charges.

Things had got to such a pass that 6-pounders weighed a good ton, and 32-pounders over three tons! The charges of powder were generally about two-thirds the weight of the shot. Both metal and charges were much reduced during the twenty years between 1744 and 1765. In the former year Colonel Weidmann, of the Prussian army, introduced most effective 6-pounders of copper, weighing only 280 pounds instead of a ton.

The charges used were proportionally decreased from two-thirds the weight of the shot to one-half, one-third, one-quarter, and even one-fifth, according to the nature of the service. The rate of fire was much increased at the same time. In 1751, Ligonier inspected some 6-pounders, of about a quarter of a ton, at Woolwich, when they fired 300 rounds in three hours and twenty-seven minutes without a hitch, and without receiving any damage at all. These were guns which had been used at the battle of Laffeldt a few years before. The ranges were also increased, by finding the proper proportion between the length of the gun and its bore, by reducing the charge, by using fixed cartridges instead of loose powder and by other improvements.

General Williamson, who commanded the artillery under Wolfe, had long been an expert. He conducted some valuable experiments at Minorca in 1745-6. Using siege-mortars with well made chambers, he obtained a range of 3787 yards with a ten-inch mortar, firing a 97-pound shell and using only twelve pounds of powder; whilst, with his 13-inch mortar, firing a 224-pound shell with thirty-five pounds of powder, he obtained a range of 4570 yards. He was one of the most energetic reformers of his day, proving by experiment again and again that guns were already over-metalled and over-charged.

In accuracy of fire there had been actually a retrograde step taken when some influential wise-acre substituted the ridiculous plummet for the fore and back sights, always used before and since. As a practical man of the day said “to find the centre line of a piece every time it is to be fired with a plummet or instrument, as is the custom, is very tedious, uncertain, and unmasterly; and when the shot does not hit the mark, the gunner is at a loss to know, whether it is owing to his want of skill, or to his line not being rightly marked; whereby it is impossible that he should be able to rightly judge how to direct the piece.” The French, though their artillery was hardly up to the British in other ways till the time of Gribeauval, who introduced tangent-scales and elevating-screws in 1765, were wiser in their generation as regards sights; and in spite of the plummets and instruments prescribed by the Board of Ordnance, the British rigged their own sights for use, even when they had to make them with a chalk line. Another drawback to accuracy was the excessive windage allowed: With a shot five inches in diameter the windage—or difference between the diameter of the shot and the bore of the gun—would be over a quarter, sometimes about half, an inch. Thus the shot would bounce about from side to side as it was starting along the bore and would issue from the muzzle with a considerable angle of random deflection.

The projectiles in use were solid shot, shells, grape and carcasses. The shells were extremely thick and contained only powder. They were burst by time fuses. Grape was used to practically convert a cannon into a gigantic shot-gun for short ranges. A number of grape-shot, each of a few ounces, sufficient all together to equal the weight of the solid shot used for that particular gun, were enclosed in an envelope of some retaining material, and fired with a low charge—to prevent too much scattering—at large bodies of men at short ranges. Carcasses were shells with five holes which allowed the burning pitch—or other combustible inside—to escape and set fire to buildings. Most guns were made of iron; which, on the whole, was found to answer best. When well cast and fired with proper charges, the weight could be reduced by at least a half in all calibres. And the disadvantages of brass guns were very great. They cost nearly ten times as much as iron ones, and they were inclined to melt at the vent and neck, and so become unserviceable altogether. Howitzers—then known as howitzes—resembled those of the present day, being a compromise between a cannon and a mortar. The old 13-inch, and even the 10-inch ones became obsolete from their lack of mobility; for they became so absurdly heavy that they could not follow an army at all.

The following table has been compiled from an immense mass of various data to show the average state of the artillery in 1759. There were almost infinite variations in weight, range and construction, and so this table can only be taken as a general guide to the state of siege and field artillery in the days of Wolfe and Montcalm. It should be noticed that the sea-service guns were shorter than the siege guns for land warfare, because shortness was required for quick handling and sponging on ship-board, whilst length was equally requisite in fortifications, in order that the muzzle might project clear through the embrasures, which might otherwise be blown to pieces. As a matter of fact, the embrasures had to be repaired constantly, sometimes every night!

The sea-service mortars, on the other hand, were much larger and more powerful than the land-service ones. Mobility was not a consideration with them and range and power were. Except for their unwieldiness ashore—they were three times as heavy as the same calibres for land-service—they were the most useful of all siege-artillery for bombardments, though needlessly heavy like other guns ^[2].

Note.—Weights of Guns. The weights given are not the extreme weights in each class; but the averages. There were 3-pounders known of over half a ton, and 6-pounders of less than 200 pounds.

The naval guns were generally between the two extremes given here.

Ranges.—The extreme ranges to which these pieces would carry, at random, and at an elevation of 45°, were about double those given in this table, whilst, on the other hand, the ranges at which any approach to real accuracy could be made were not more than one-half.

Naval guns differed from land-service pieces in being shorter, and usually lighter. The approved length of the gun ashore was twenty-one times the diameter of its bore; afloat it was reduced to fifteen diameters. Both brass and iron were used; but iron had the advantage named above, especially in price; brass costing £130 per ton, iron only £16. Naval was in advance of land gunnery in the tendency to reduced charges, being compelled to consider the effects of excessive recoil on the gun tackle and even on the hull in the case of very heavy pieces. In a 100-gun line‑of‑battleship the weight of ordnance was nearly 220 tons; the new guns fired a heavier broadside and yet weighed less than 170 tons. Similarly, the old 13-inch sea mortars were reduced from four to two tons in weight with great advantage in every way. A table of ship’s ordnance is given for each rating, according to the old establishment which prevailed in 1759.

SHIPS’ CREWS IN 1759

The following table shows the official complements of different classes of ships in 1759. But it must be remembered that Saunders had a good many men short in his ships’ companies. It would be well to allow ten per cent for this. Wolfe’s force had an establishment of 12,000, but he was thirty per cent short on starting from Louisbourg.

Nearly 2000 guns and mortars of all sizes, about 12,500 men, about 40,000 tons war-ships.

FRENCH CANADIAN MILITIA TO 1759

In the early days, under Champlain—1608-1635—there was no real military organization at all. The inhabitants only numbered a few hundred at the most and they had to depend upon themselves as they best could against the Indians, with whom, indeed, they had very few quarrels. In 1629, the English, under Admiral Kirk, took Quebec without a blow, Champlain and his little half starved colony having no adequate means of resistance.

In 1636, Montmagny rebuilt the fort at Quebec and drilled his little garrison, most of whom probably came out with him that summer from France. In August of the same year Father Paul le Jeune wrote home:

“Nous avons nombre de très honnêtes gentils-hommes, nombre de soldats de façon et de résolution; c’est un plaisir de leur voir faire les exercices de la guerre dans la douceur de la paix, de n’entendre le bruit des mousquetades et des canons que par réjouissance; nos grands bois et nos montagnes répondent à ces coups par des échos roulants, comme des tonnerres innocents qui n’ont ni foudres ni éclairs. La diane nous réveille tous les matins; nous voyons poser le sentinelles. Le corps de garde est toujours bien muni; chaque escouade a ses jours de faction; en un mot, notre forteresse de Kébec est gardée dans la paix comme une place d’importance dans l’ardeur de la guerre.”

During the greater part of the seventeenth century, Canada was exploited by a chartered company—Les Cent Associés—who were responsible for safeguarding the settlements by military force. Everything was done by contract; the idea being to sub-let so far as possible, take one’s own commission by the way, and shift the actual work of exploitation on to the new contractor’s shoulders. In 1636 the Knights of Malta undertook the defence of the colony on contract; but neither they nor the Cent Associés themselves did anything practical, and as the King sent no troops, the little settlements defended themselves as necessity arose by any expedient to hand. In 1642, there were only one hundred “soldiers” paid.

Colbert sent out some regulars between 1662 and 1670; and in 1673, after their departure, Frontenac began to organize the Canadian militia. From that time till 1760, there were two classes of Canadian troops. One was a small permanent force, which was under the administration of the Minister of Marine and Colonies in France; and so became known as “troupes de la marine”, though they never had any connection with the navy. The other was simply the whole able-bodied male population of Canada, priests and certain public functionaries alone excepted. The seigneurs were also exempt; but, as they were nearly always ready to lead their censitaires on all occasions, this exemption only made them the more willing to serve.

The Canadian regulars—the so called “marine troops”—were recruited mostly in Canada from among the Canadians themselves or from time-expired men in the French regulars serving there.

Some men were also raised in France itself, by direct recruiting; very much on the same principles that men used to be raised in England for service in India in the days of “John Company”. Unfortunately for New France, however, its “troupes de la marine” were never treated half so well in any way, and never reached anything like the same relative strength.

In short, New France was a half-organized “nation in arms”; and the actual number under arms at different times bore a very high proportion indeed to the total population. In 1691, with a population of 12,000, there were 1,313 of all ranks embodied at a cost of 218,000 livres. The census of 1698 gave the whole population as 15,000 and estimated those capable of bearing arms at from three to four thousand. In 1750, the actual rolls of the militia of the Governments of Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal together contained the names of 13,000 men. And about 15,000 were under arms at the same time in different parts of the country during the supreme crisis of 1759. Yet the whole population was only about 70,000. The drain on the resources of the country was so great that, except at such a crisis, only a portion of the men were embodied at the same time; and, on the other hand, the Canadian, and sometimes even the French regulars, were granted furloughs during the harvest to help the habitants to gather in their crops.

The Captains of Militia were men of great consequence at all times. They were leaders in peace as well as war, and were the chief representatives of Government in their own districts. They and their lieutenants were appointed by the Governor General; but the Majors were appointed by the Home Government. There was a good career open to Canadian officers, who might expect a patent of nobility, a grant of an estate and any decoration up to the Cross of St. Louis, as a reward for distinguished service on the field. But the question of relative rank between French and Canadian officers was always a burning one. At first and for a long time, Canadian commissions were entirely unrecognized except in an officer’s own command. And, even at the best of times, the local officers were in a position of distinct inferiority.

All things considered, the Canadian militia was a very creditable force indeed for a country with so small a population and so little national wealth. In fact the whole strength of the country was constantly being concentrated in military force, which drained away so much of the manhood that none were left to develop the national resources. Besides, these resources were themselves the prey of infinite maladministration and dishonesty. And so there never was any reserve of strength behind the first line of defence—neither in men, money nor material.

The personnel of the militia were trained for their peculiar mode of warfare in the stern school of experience. There was always the menace of attack somewhere, either from the Indians or the British colonies. And the Canadians were themselves more ready to attack the British than these were to attack them. For in the American colonies there were both self-government in the political and self-development in the commercial sphere to encourage individual initiative, whilst in New France every act of the paternal government aided the natural set of the current of French life towards administrative positions or systems of exploitation as opposed to steady industry. And even exploitation was of the meaner kind; for it was hampered by monopoly and corruption of all kinds. The methods of the petty retailer were grafted on those of the bogus company promoter; and the natural results followed.

All this turned the natural energies of seigneurs and habitant alike into unfruitful channels; in fact, the settler became a nomad. But, as such, he was decidedly successful. Accustomed to travelling about in all weathers and under all circumstances, equally at home on snowshoes or in a canoe, forced to live on the wilderness he was passing through, he was constantly being trained in the three great essentials of war—the ability to rough it, march and shoot. But the other three requisites were wanting—discipline, organization and resources; and by the lack of these New France fell for ever.

“La milice se compose de tous les habitants en état de porter les armes, depuis quinze ans jusqu’à soixante; ils sont inscrits et obligés de servir toutes les fois que le gouverneur général les commande. Ils ont des officiers dans chaque paroisse; les capitaines y ont des grandes considérations; un banc à l’église avant celui des co-seigneurs; c’est à eux que les ordres s’adressent, quand ils servent; ainsi que leur miliciens, ils ne reçoivent aucune solde, mais la subsistance et un équipement; ils n’ont aucun rang avec les troupes réglées et sont même commandés par les sergents des troupes réglées. Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil pense proposer pour capitaines de milices ceux qui se distinguent et de leur faire venir des commissions du roi; et alors ils auront rang avec les officiers des troupes réglées, comme lieutenants du jour de cette nouvelle commission. Lorsqu’ils sont blessés ou estropiés au service, le gouverneur général leur procure une petite gratification amenable.”

On the whole they may be considered as valuable irregulars; as mobile, as well adapted to their own country and almost as good shots as the ordinary Boers; more amenable to discipline than most similar bodies, but generally with less individual initiative throughout. As they had never been trained in mass tactics, they were unused to the formal battle-fields of the eighteenth century; but as raiders and skirmishers they nearly always gave a very good account of themselves.

INFANTRY DRILL IN 1759

The regulation pace was thirty inches long, measured from heel to heel. This length has only recently been changed. But the rate of marching was very different from that enjoined by the Drill Book of 1902. The old “ordinary time” was 75 paces to the minute; the “quick time” was one hundred and eight paces, and the “wheeling march” was at the rate of one hundred and twenty paces. The man on the outer flank took a pace of thirty-three inches long. It is interesting to compare this with the directions given in 1902, which order the universal quick march to be 128 paces of thirty-three inches each in the minute, that is just four miles an hour, whilst the old quick march was only three miles an hour, and the old “ordinary” only two miles. The old “ordinary” time was used to keep the line perfectly steady when advancing.

As all regular armies practiced this the result was that whichever side could stand fast in line the longer at point blank range won the day.

There were then very good reasons for extreme exactitude in marching, dressing and covering off; so that a rigid line might be maintained. And all the motions of loading and firing had to be accomplished in a uniform manner and simultaneously when the men stood shoulder to shoulder and the rear rank men closed up to fire between the men in front of them. It was a real, and not a supposedly pedantic, advantage in those days to have the utmost uniformity attainable in every detail. Even in Peninsular days a drill book enjoins not only the equalising of companies, now only practised at ceremonials, but even aspires after the equalising of battalions:—“The companies should be equalised at all times in point of numbers when the battalion is formed for field movements; and could the battalions of a line also be equalised the greatest advantage would arise”.

The old attack was executed at the “goose step” or ordinary time of seventy-five paces to the minute. Every time there was a change in the time of marching, ordinary, quick or double, the men were halted for a moment in order to prevent any “waving” of the line. These minute exactitudes were not in those days the silly things which they afterwards became, when the dead formations appeared on the field of Jena under changed conditions. Leopold von Dessauer, “der alte Dessauer,” was a great reformer and systematizer in his own day, and his drill book has remained the prototype of all other drill books down to our own times.

The drill of 1759 was excellent for its own time and circumstances, and a little study of it will well repay any one who really wishes to understand the tactical means by which battles were then fought and won.

RIFLED BARRELS

It is not generally known that the principles of rifled barrels were well understood at the time of the Siege of Quebec. It was chiefly owing to the backwardness of applied mechanics that rifles did not come into general use until a hundred years later. The other great drawback being the adherence to spherical bullets, the shape of which constituted a retrograde step in the evolution of projectiles.

Anyone who will examine the “set” of the feathers on an arrow will see that the principle guiding the flight of a projectile by making it spin round its major axis came in with the long bow. The round bullet was an inferior form of projectile, only rendered more efficient by the force of gunpowder. Finally, the elongated projectile was again resorted to in conjunction with gunpowder, and so the modern rifle bullet is really the ancient arrow driven by the modern powder.

Wolfe’s pistols were rifled, and as well made as any turned out to-day. A few Rangers may have used their own rifles, too, but it was not till the American Revolution that even they used rifled arms to any extent.

The rifling was of course done by hand and this made it so expensive that very few men could afford to buy rifles; and for large armies the cost was quite prohibitive.

BROWN BESS

Some account of the old “Brown Bess” flintlock musket may be added. It came into use towards the close of the seventeenth century, lasted all through the eighteenth and was not displaced for good till well on in the nineteenth.

It varied, of course, a great deal at different times and in different armies, but in all essentials it remained the same for one hundred and fifty years. It was made somewhat lighter and handier about the time of the Seven Years’ War; but even then it was much clumsier than the modern rifle, and it weighed considerably more, always over twelve pounds. The range was two hundred yards, though it was not accurate beyond one hundred. The bullet weighed over an ounce and was three quarters of an inch in diameter. There was a considerable windage in ordinary muskets, which was sometimes mitigated by the sharpshooters, who wrapped the bullet up in a piece of linen which made it fit the bore more tightly. The invention of cartridges was a considerable advance on loading with loose powder. These cartridges were merely paper shells, each containing one measured charge of powder. To load, the soldier half cocked the hammer, drew the cartridge from his pouch, bit off the top of it, shook a little powder into the priming pan which he had previously opened, shut the pan, turned the musket up, letting the butt down to the ground, shook the powder into the barrel, put in the paper wad with the bullet on top of it, drew the ramrod, drove the charge home and settled it with two smart taps, then withdrew the ramrod and put it back in its loops. The musket was then ready to fire. The soldier had to look carefully to his flint, which had to be firmly gripped by its vice, so that it might strike the steel firmly and accurately and thus make sure of driving the sparks into the priming pan, whence the flames passed through the vent into the powder chamber. The rate of fire was wonderfully fast, in the case of well drilled men, all things considered. With the old wooden ramrods three shots could be fired a minute, and after the invention of the iron ramrod the best troops could fire five or six shots a minute. But four shots a minute was a very high average for continuous firing at the best of times.

THE GARRISON OF QUEBEC

The Permanent Force.—There are two Schools of Instruction for the Active Militia, one of Garrison Artillery and another of Infantry. There are two companies of Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery, about 100 men in each, and one company of Infantry. The R. C. G. A. are quartered in the Citadel, and the Infantry in barracks just inside St. Louis Gate. The main purpose for which these corps exist, viz:—the instruction of the Militia at large in the districts nearest to Quebec, is fulfilled by attaching officers and men of the Active Force to these Permanent Corps for either “long”, “short”, or “special”, periods of instruction. But the numbers are too small for learning their own work, performing garrison duties, and instructing Volunteers. The armament of the R. C. G. A. is mostly obsolete at present (1903) but rearmament is to begin in 1904. The Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery, and Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry both served in the North-West Rebellion of 1885, and both corps were very largely represented in the South African contingents of 1899-1902.

A detachment of the Ordnance Store Corps is the latest addition to the Permanent Corps in Quebec. It was authorised in 1903 and its establishment is 20 officers, 14 warrant officers, 72 noncommissioned officers and privates.

The 8^th Regiment, “Royal Rifles”, was first organized as a battalion in 1862. Its uniform is practically the same as that of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, which was formerly the 60^th Rifles, and originally “The Royal Americans”. These “Royal Americans” of the 18^th century were the first to introduce the Rifle green uniforms into the British service. Two battalions of them—the 2^nd and 3^rd—were with Wolfe at Quebec. The “Royal Rifles”, locally known as “The 8^th”, have no war service as a regiment; indeed, none but the Permanent Corps and the 9^th have any such record. But the 8^th have always been very well represented on every occasion when their services were required. They were called out for garrison duty during the first Fenian Raid of 1866; and again did the same duty when the Imperial regulars left for the frontier to repel the second Fenian invasion of 1870. A good many men of the Regiment also enlisted for the special battalion raised for service with the Red River Expeditionary Force under Colonel Wolseley, since Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief 1895-1900.

There were several occasions, during the next few years, when the Regiment performed duties in aid of the Civil Power; and in 1885 it furnished the Infantry of the garrison of Quebec at the Citadel, during the absence of the Canadian regulars, and the 9^th Battalion at the front in the North-West. And there was hardly another corps in Canada which supplied so large a quota, in proportion to its strength, to the First Contingent for South Africa.

The 9^th Regiment, “Voltigeurs de Québec”.—This regiment was raised about the same time as the 8^th and went through most of the same experiences. It is distinctively a French-speaking corps. It has the honour of having served as a complete battalion in active service in the field, having been through the North-West campaign of 1885 as such. Its uniform is the familiar Rifle green, differing in minor detail from that worn by the 8^th. It has been embodied on several occasions, either in aid of the Civil Power, or on duty during the Fenian Raids. It also supplied several men to the South African contingents. Its peace strength is the same as that of the 8^th.

The Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars represent the Cavalry. They have recently doubled their strength, having been only a single squadron up to 1902. As in the case of the two Rifle Regiments, their uniform was copied from that of the 13^th Hussars, who were stationed here many years ago. The Q. O. C. H. performed duty on all the occasions when the garrison were under arms; and supplied a very large number of all ranks to the South African contingents. This corps also has the honour of having won a V. C. and a D. S. O. in the late war; both in the person of their present Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Turner.

There are also a Field Battery, part of a Regiment of Canadian Artillery, and a detachment of the Medical Corps among the Quebec Militia. The Artillery have gone through very much the same experiences as the other corps mentioned above. The Medical branch is a new one in the Militia. The Engineers and Army Service Corps are, as yet, unrepresented in Quebec.

The officer commanding the Militia in the city and military district of Quebec has his office in St. Louis street, an old military office for generations past. He is officially styled the District Officer Commanding Military District No. 7.

The officer commanding the Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery in the Citadel is also the “Commandant of the Fortress of Quebec”.

MODERN MILITARY BUILDINGS

The Drill Hall.—This is a handsome stone building, over 300 feet long, first used in 1888. The armouries and store-rooms of all except the Permanent Corps are under the same roof, being situated in extensions at the back. Here all arms, accoutrements, equipment and articles of uniform are kept for the fixed peace establishment only. These extensions are to be enlarged at a cost of $50,000 in 1904, the present rooms being far too small to accommodate all they are supposed to contain. It would at present be utterly impossible to equip all the men of the different corps simultaneously.

The Ross Rifle Factory.—According to present plans, this factory is to be worked up to an output of 1000 rifles a month; but, at this rate, it would take more than eight years to arm the present contemplated war establishment of the Militia for whom arms are to be kept always ready. The Ross rifle is somewhat like the new service model to be introduced into the Imperial Army and Navy in 1904. It uses the same ammunition.

The Dominion Cartridge Factory.—This factory is now designed to be able to supply every kind of ammunition wanted by the Militia. It is to have an output of over a million a month in small arm ammunition for the Ross rifle. This ammunition is to fit the new Imperial Army rifle, the bore being the same as that of the Lee-Metford now in use—.303. The manufacture of big gun shells of all patterns to be used in Canada will be possible on an adequate scale, if the present plans of the Militia Department should be carried out in their entirety.

The Canadian School of Gunnery.—$30,000 have been designated in the supplementary estimates for 1904 for a School of Gunnery in Quebec, where it is intended that officers of Garrison Artillery will be able to learn the use of their proper armament in future.

APPENDIX

MEMOIR OF MONSIEUR THE MARQUIS DE MONTCALM

That of Quebec deserves the greatest attention. It is the capital, the soul of the Colony. With Louisbourg taken, our navy weak and almost crushed, it may be supposed that the English have formed the reasonable and decisive plan of attacking Quebec. It is to be hoped that they will not do so this year; the season is advancing and moreover allows us only at present to outline measures which will serve only for the next campaign. Therefore it will be necessary this summer to make every preparation for carrying out, immediately after the snow has melted, the project of defence submitted last year to Monsieur the Marquis de Vaudreuil. It is necessary, before the ice forms, that the redoubts, the lines and batteries be traced out and marked out in masonry; that, this winter, the posts, palisades and boards be cut and conveyed on the spot so that the various works be finished early in the spring and give us time to look after the frontiers.

M. de Pont-le-Roy, after determining and tracing the works to be erected at the head of the river, can at once come down to Quebec to prepare its defence. Moreover it will be necessary, this winter, to give all the detailed orders relative to this so that, from the Commandant of Quebec to the militiaman, which every one can and must do, may be decided and allotted to him.

It seems essential also that Monsieur the Marquis de Vaudreuil should, at an early date, forbid all Canadians to go fishing either in the lower part of the river or in the Gulf. Under present circumstances, we cannot, for the interest of some private individuals, risk the safety of those same individuals; for if the colony perishes, everything perishes. The crews of all those fishing vessels could be used to advantage on the lakes and in the defence of Quebec, and arms that belong to the country should not be employed in making money for the few. All sailors, both Canadians and those settled in Quebec, must be reserved for the interior of the Colony and not a single one allowed to leave it. I again repeat that I would retain a certain number of merchant vessels and would use for the actual and pressing needs of the Colony not only the crews but the rigging and even the hulls of those ships. The Court cannot but approve this resolution, the object whereof is to prevent the loss of a colony that has cost France so much. Moreover, the compensation to be paid the owners of such vessels is nothing in comparison with the use to be derived from them.

COPY OF THE LETTER OF M. THE MARQUIS DE MONTCALM, FROM MONTREAL, TO M. LE NORMAND

Since our last letters, dated the month of November, the enemy has compelled M. de Ligneris, Captain of the Colony’s troops, Commandant of Fort Duquesne, to abandon it after blowing it up. He withdrew to a so called fort named Fort Machoult. You will perhaps be surprised at this expression. Allow me to tell you, Monsieur, that when one examines, in the accounts of the Marine, the expense incurred in connection with the forts of Canada, one must be convinced that there are forts capable of stopping the enemy for some time considering what they cost to build; but it is only through the considerable thefts by all who are employed on them and through the dearness of labour, the result of bad administration. It will be the same so long as you employ Engineers of the country at this work. The priests of St. Sulpice may preach their best against theft of the King’s property, there will be no improvement so long as the chiefs seem to sanction it. You have at present available an honest, capable and disinterested man, the first Engineer of Canada; consequently he is thwarted and detested by those whose profits he tries to curtail. If you could compare the work done at Carillon last year, since the 8th July, when the King’s Engineers took charge, with that done by M. de Lotbinière, an Engineer of the country, as well as the expense, you would be surprised at the difference. But how can you expect the Sieur de Pontleroy to remain in this country, or any one else in his place who possesses any honesty. He must steal or be ruined for his salary and emoluments amount to a hundred gold louis only. You may object that these are the emoluments that were allowed to his position in the time of M. de Lery, the elder, who was greatly ignorant of his trade (one has only to see his works) and who robbed the King as the others did. But at that time people had not overstepped the boundaries as at present when every individual thinks he is very moderate if he has not now a hundred thousand francs in a campaign or on a special mission. The same applies to all parties.

The Sieur Mercier, Commanding the Artillery, the creature, the confidential man of the two men in office, the man whom M. Hocquart saw arrive a private soldier, a recruit, now has a share in all contracts concerning the forges, the artillery waggons and the tools; there must now be one hundred thousand écus worth and there will be still more. Does the King require goods? Instead of buying it at first hand, protégés buy what is left in the stores and it is at once bought back from them at a profit of a hundred and fifty per cent. The posts of the upper country, all matters concerning the Savages are at present considered by the officers, store-keepers and clerks as so many opportunities for winning immense sums in a campaign by all kinds of false certificates or............. which the King is likewise made to pay. The supplying of provisions by contract has, I am convinced, been represented to the Board of Marine as advantageous to the King. This was when the Sieur de la Porte was at the head of the Board. The Sieur Cadet is merely the fictitious name of a company that is too much protected. What leads me to presume, with all Canada, that this contract must be a contract respecting which too much might be said, is the fact that it is unknown to me or to anybody. Nevertheless, I have frequently had occasion to address reprimands in this respect while discussing points relating to the subsistence of the troops. It is owing to all this excessive expenditure that, last year, draughts were drawn to the amount of twenty-four millions and this year there will be draughts for thirty-six. It is not my business to administer the finances, but I have no hesitation in stating that a more careful and a stricter administration would have diminished all the expenses by one-third and still with great facility and generosity on the King’s part. Consequently how many fortunes will be made which, when peace comes, will impoverish the Colony by being taken to France. You have already several who have not waited until peace came. Our officers who have no share in illicit profits, cannot live on their pay.

1. That the food absolutely needed for subsistence now costs eight times more than in 1755 when the troops came out. And the further we go, so long as the war will last, the dearer will it become even if there were an abundance of certain articles, for this incredible dearness is due less to scarcity—although it has contributed to it—than to what I will now mention: 1. On the arrival of the ships some twenty individuals, possessing favor and credit, buy up everything and thereby have the almost exclusive trade;

2. The large fortunes rapidly accumulated accustom those who possess them to luxury, prevent there finding food too dear lead bad men to hold money in slight value through the facility with which more can be acquired.

3. The farmer is dismayed on seeing, through the ordonnances of the Intendant added to the cards, thirty millions of money in circulation. It is feared, unnecessarily I think, that the Government may go into some kind of bankruptcy. This idea leads them to sell and to make contracts on an exaggerated footing and at exorbitant prices. And it will be much worse if, this fall, the bills of exchange are given in five terms, as report has it. The King will lose more than anybody because in this country, where he buys and where he has works done, his expenses will increase also.

You will find it difficult to believe a sure fact and that is that for twenty-four francs in specie, thirty six livres in notes are given representing money in Canada, and some of the inhabitants are beginning to offer twice as much because few people are willing to give up their specie because they are afraid of the paper. Anybody who is in a position to draw a bill of exchange on France for twenty-five thousand écus payable on the 1st April 1760 will get in Quebec one hundred thousand francs in orders of the Intendant and if, this autumn, the Intendant gives the bills of exchange in five terms only, one hundred thousand francs will be obtainable for from 66 to 67 thousand livres.

4. I have stated to you that thirty millions of money were in circulation in paper, in cards and in silver. There will be twelve millions more at the end of 1759. I suppose there are not more than a hundred thousand souls in Canada, at the most. I do not suppose that there are in the kingdom of France more than fourteen hundred millions of money in circulation and there are over eighteen million souls. Thus the proportion between the money in circulation and the number of the population is six times greater in Canada than in France. Therefore food and labour must be six times greater.

I have no doubt that a superficial examination of the accounts of the expenditure of the Colony will show you that the item concerning the land troops is a heavy one, judging from what has come to me and whereof, however, I have only half proofs, the only voucher for the Chamber of accounts is, in Canada, the ordonnance of the Intendant. Items are frequently shifted from one chapter to another and certain expenses are increased in order to mark others, and I have heard that in such cases this is done with the item of expenditure entitled “Land troops.” This is all the easier that we have not in our corps any proper commissariat officer ............ to check this. I am aware that some of our officers would squander as the others do if they had the opportunity or if they were allowed; but Monsieur the Intendant is obliged to admit that we consume less, waste less, have more order and less double employments. For my part, I would add, Monsieur, that there would have been still less, had the forms that I know been adopted, because they have been followed in our administration in Europe. But what are these petty abuses compared to those accompanying the expenses for the fortifications, the Savages, the provisions and the transport.

I think I have shown you the impossibility of our officers living on their pay. Consequently the amount of their debts in the Colony will be immense. They are all right as regards the treasurer. I cannot say as much for myself as I owe him ten thousand écus. But private individuals lend them money with great facility through the desire to realize and out of contempt of the ordonnances. I have foreseen this to such an extent that on my arrival I caused to be declared and to be published by M. the Intendant whom I called upon to do so, that the corps would not be responsible for any debts and that I could not compel the payment of any after the prohibition to loan which I again caused to be repeated last year. You will ask me what means should be taken for the support of the officers in Canada. After due reflexion I find but three at your disposal to prevent your being asked each year for an increase which will be necessary and ruinous for the King:

1. Give orders that each officer be given in winter, as when in the field, a ration for himself as for his servant. You will thereby assure his subsistence as regards bread and meat and the amount will be a trifle for the King because, as the latter has a contract with his supplier of provisions, it would be the same as if he fed from 400 to 500 extra men during the winter;

2. Confirm the additional pay which necessity and my representations have compelled M. the Intendant to allow us. This is all the more necessary and fair that you have seen, Monsieur, that the pay of his Majesty’s troops in Europe was increased last year and we should share the same advantage;

3. Order that the officer’s pay be paid in bills of exchange of the first term. It is merely the difference of paying six hundred and seventeen thousand livres, the amount of the officers’ pay, in one term instead of in three. No matter how much the price of food might increase, the officer who would have bills of exchange of the first term would feel such increase less owing to the value given to the kind of paper wherewith he would purchase.

These means seem to me to be better for the King than large increases of pay which would have to be renewed every year and the officers would be no better off. Moreover what I propose should be paid us in bills of exchange of the first term is all the more just that we should be paid in silver and that our moneys which should be considered as extraordinary war expenditure are paid in silver, I believe, to the Treasurer-General of the Colonies. The Sieur Bernier, War Commissary, has sent you a table of the present prices of food and of the prices in 1754, 1755 and 1756, accompanied by brief remarks; it seemed to me well made.

It is far from my character and from my birth to write anything that might bear upon the holders of the King’s authority in this Colony. I even have a liking for M. Bigot, a great worker, a man of wit, a near relative of M. de Pensieulx and M. the Marechal d’Estrées who have long honoured me with their friendship. I am even sure that had I not wished to be a man who wishes to observe the rules and perhaps have the air of a censor by my strict conduct, I would not owe ten thousand écus, all the more so that, if I wished, I could as well as any other give a shape to the expenditure I might order—The small amount that those I have been charged with have cost, has in fact always appeared in this Colony as a criticism. Such has not been my intention, but to do my duty, I have entered into a few details in this letter solely through the high esteem I, with the whole of France, have for you, Monsieur, and because it will be handed you by Monsieur the Comte de Baschy who will ask you to consider it as written for you alone.

You will perhaps be surprised that I should speak to you of the officer’s pay and not of the soldier’s. The soldier, whose subsistence is assured, who is clothed, who earns money by his work, who is given two pairs of shoes and two shirts a year, is well off and does not feel the increase in the price of food and merchandize as his officer does.

But one event of interest has occurred during the winter. Some small parties went out in the direction of Carillon where M. D’Hebecourt, Captain of the Régiment de la Reine, is in command, to secure prisoners who might give us news of the enemy. From all we have been able to learn, the new general (Amherst) proposes to enter the field early. The provincial assemblies of the various English Colonies were held in the month of December and voted all the contingents asked of them for prosecuting this campaign with vigor. The enemy will have in this quarter twenty-two battalions of troops from Old England, light troops and from twenty-five to thirty thousand militiamen. I venture to answer for the zeal of the land troops and of their chief officers.

Although I am but little aware of the views of M. the Marquis de Vaudreuil, of our resources in food and munitions of war, I have communicated to him in writing my views regarding the coming campaign. He has communicated his views to me superficially. Although we are not in accord on all points, I will execute my orders none the less faithfully, seconded by Messieurs de Levis and de Bourlamaque. I trust that any event as fortunate as that of the 8th July of last year will preserve this Colony.

The conditions of war in this Colony have completely changed. Formerly the Canadians thought they carried on war; there were expeditions like hunting expeditions; at present we have continuous undertakings.

Formerly the Savages were the main part of an expedition; now they are only accessories. Therefore other views and other maxims are necessary. I say so but the old prejudices remain.

The bad situation of the troops would necessitate an answer before the end of the campaign, if this ship reaches you in time to send out another this same year.

I have always represented; I have entered less into the true steps to be taken, hoping from year to year to see this arduous mission end in peace, or for favorable answers from the Minister of Marine. I enter into no details with M. de Namac. This is for you alone, Monsieur.

P. S. I have the honour, Monsieur, to append to this letter an exact statement of the troops the English have in this quarter and a private remark which I have thought proper to put in cypher, making use of that sent me last year by Monsieur de Noras,

M. BIGOT’S PRIVATE LETTER ON THE TWO GENERALS

I returned from Montreal a few days ago; I had been there on matters connected with the service and at the request of M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil.

I found him greatly displeased with M. le Marquis de Montcalm. He was told of a number of things that the land army had said about him after the action of the 8th July and he claims that M. le Marquis de Montcalm gave rise to them, having been the first to mention them.

On his side M. le Marquis de Montcalm complains that M. de Vaudreuil has no confidence in him and does not confide his plans to him. He even wrote to me lately from the army on the subject. I spoke of it to M. de Vaudreuil who told me that he had always been careful to inform him of what he intended to do.

I do my best with both to induce them to hide from the public the petty reproaches they think they have a right to address one another and I excuse them to one another when I write. An open quarrel would be as dangerous to the colony as the coming of an English army. There is already too much jealousy in the various corps.

M. le Marquis de Montcalm and M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil both possess the necessary qualities for the preservation and defence of Canada. The former has shown himself a good general, a master of details, a prompt and active man who is zealous for the service; the latter does what he wishes with the Savage tribes and the Canadians and is thoroughly conversant with the kind of warfare suited to this country. He also knows how to take advantage of the terror the English have of the Savages.

As I am equally attached to both, I would live on the best of terms with them but I doubt whether they would do the same. Their characters are too different from one another and for a long time they have seemed to me to live together solely from motives of policy.

M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil begs you to procure the command of the troops for M. le Chevalier de Lévis. He passes for a very good officer. He is beloved by all the corps and by the Savage tribes. But I think it would be necessary to send a third officer who would be above the commandants of battalions. M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil says that M. de Bourlamaque would do. This may be as regards the war. It is for him to judge of this. But as regards the police and discipline of the troops, a third officer of superior rank would maintain them better than the commandants of battalions. They are too indulgent to the officers and soldiers of their corps.

M. le Marquis de Montcalm has just rendered a memorable service to Canada. He has defeated the enemy and prevented him from penetrating here. The rank of lieutenant-general which that victory may enable him to attain will probably entail his recall to France; His Majesty perhaps will not wish to have a lieutenant-general serve under M. de Vaudreuil. Should he go back to France I shall regret him very much. I cannot too often repeat that he is a very distinguished officer and that he has a rare grasp of details and rare talents.

I thought it my duty, Monseigneur, to tell you what I knew regarding the mutual discontent of these two generals. I should be mortified were they to learn what I have had the honour to write you about them, because they might perhaps consider me partial.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Palace Gate	Frontispiece
	To face page
Hope Gate	5
Prescott Gate	7
St. John’s Gate, previous to 1867	11
St. John’s Gate, built in 1867	15
Old St. Louis Gate, inside	17
St. Louis Gate, to-day	25
Kent Gate, from the outside	29
Chain Gate, on Citadel Hill	35
Entrance to the Citadel (Dalhousie Gate)	41
The Drill Hall	55
Superintendent’s House	61
Old Artillery Barracks	67
The Citadel and Terrace, before the building of the Chateau Frontenac	73
Plan of Fort St Louis, 1663, by J. B. Franquelin	79
Quebec in 1700	84
Chateau St. Louis destroyed by fire in 1834	95
Ruins of Old Chateau St. Louis	97
Martello Tower, No 1	99
Plan of Quebec in 1800, by J. B. Duberger and Captain By	103
Wolfe’s Plan of Quebec, signed by Mackellar	105
Plan of the First Temporary Citadel under British Rule	107
Original Plan of the Battle of the Plains	110

CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER I
Defences under Champlain.—The first stone fort.—Chateau St. Louis.—Works under Frontenac.—LeVasseur’s plan.	1

CHAPTER II
Plan prepared by de Léry; proceeds to France to explain his project.—Scheme approved by the Court; nature and extent of works.—The famous plan en relief.	19

CHAPTER III
Military organization in Quebec in 1725.—Hawkins, on the fortifications.—Action of the citizens.—Enormous cost of works.—Franquet’s plan.—Montcalm’s opinion of de Léry’s work.	39

CHAPTER IV
Murray’s report in 1762.—Guy Carleton’s opinion of the works.—Montgomery’s attack.—Lord Townshend orders a citadel to be erected.—A temporary citadel constructed under Haldimand.	59

CHAPTER V
The permanent Citadel.—The Gates of Quebec.—A plea for the retention of the old walls.	79

CHAPTER VI
The Artillery of 1759.—Ships’ Crews in 1759.—Saunder’s Fleet at Quebec in 1759.—French-Canadian Militia to 1759.—Infantry Drill in 1759.—Rifled Barrels.—Brown Bess.—Garrison of Quebec.—Ordnance Store Corps.—Drill Hall.—Ross Rifle Factory.—Dominion Cartridge Factory.—Canadian School of Gunnery.	85

Appendix.	115

1745-6	. . . . . . . . . .	189,257- 6-1
1747	. . . . . . . . . .	54,064-12-0
1748	. . . . . . . . . .	292,952-15-1
1749	. . . . . . . . . .	232,900-11-5

“1.	The condition of the ground upon which it is proposed to construct certain works extending beyond the walls (that is, those works which have been regarded as of French origin.)
“2.	The nature of the proposed works as suggested by Captain Marr, distinguished by yellow lines, and those proposed by Captain Twiss, coloured red.”

c. 1	62 men	c. 2	82 men	c. 3	16 men
c. 4	36 men	c. 5	230 men	c. 6	125 men
c. 7	205 men	c. 8	234 men	c. 9	230 men
c. 10	230 men	c. 11	86 men	c. 12	50 men
	————		————		————
	533 men		632 men		421 men

Neptune	90	750	Vice Adm. Chs. Saunders,
			Capt. B. Hartwell.
Princess Amelia	80	600	R. Adm. Philip Durell,
			Capt. John Bray.
Royal William	80	600	Capt. H. Pigot.
Dublin	74	500	R. Adm. Chas. Holmes,
			Capt. W. Goostry.
Terrible	74	500	Capt.” Collins, Richard.
Shrewsbury	74	500	Capt.” Palliser, Hugh.
Northumberland	70	480	Capt.” Lord Colvill.
Vanguard	70	480	Capt.” Swanton, Robert.
Devonshire	70	480	Capt.” Gordon, W.
Orford	70	480	Capt.” Spry, Richard.
Somerset	64	440	Capt.” Hughes, Edward.
Alcide	64	440	Capt.” Douglass, James.
Bedford	64	440	Capt.” Fowke, Thorpe.
Captain	64	440	Capt.” Amherst, John.
Trident	64	440	Capt.” Legge, Julian.
Stirling Castle	64	440	Capt.” Everett, M.
Frederick	64	440	Capt.” Routh, Robert.
Pembroke	60	400	Capt.” Wheelock, John.
Prince of Orange	60	400	Capt.” Wallis, Samuel.
Medway	60	...	Capt.” Proby, Charles.
Centurion	50	300	Capt.” Mantell, W.
Sutherland	50	300	Capt.” Rous, J.
Diana	32	220	Capt.” Schomberg, Alex.
Richmond	32	220	Capt.” Hankerson, T.
Trent	28	200	Capt.” Lindsay, J.
Lizard	28	200	Capt.” Doake, James.
Echo	28	200	Capt.” Laforey, J.
Leostoff	28	200	Capt.” Deane, Joseph.
Seahorse	20	150	Capt.” Smith, James.
Scarborough	20	150	Capt.” Stott, John.
Eurus	20	150	Capt.” Elphinstone, John.
Nightingale	20	150	Capt.” Campbell, John.
Hind	20	150	Capt.” Bond, Robert.
Squirrel	20	150	Capt.” Hamilton, George.
Fowey	20	150	Capt.” Tonyn, George A.
Scorpion	14	100	Capt.” Cleland, John.
Porcupine	14	100	Capt.” Jarvis, John.
Hunter	14	100	Capt.” Adams, W.
Zeiphyr	12	72	Capt.” Greenwood, W.
Boscawen	16	120	Capt.” Douglass, Chas.
Halifax	14	100	...........
Vesuvius	..	50	Capt.” Chads, James.
Cormorant	..	50	Capt.” Mowat, P.
Strombolo	..	50	Capt.” Smith, Richard.
Rodney	4	25	Capt.” Percival, Hon. P. T.
Crown	18	140	Capt.” Mead, Joseph.
Baltimore	20	100	Capt.” Carpenter, Robert.
Pelican	20	100	Capt.” Mountfort, Edward.
Racehorse	20	100	Capt.” Richards, Francis.
	———	———
Totals	1962	13750

TheFORTRESS of QUEBEC

CHAPTER I THE CITADEL AND THE FORTIFICATIONS OF QUEBEC

CHAPTER II DE LÉRY’S SCHEME OF DEFENCE