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By Harold A. Innis

The disquieting character of the conclusions of two articles in the first number of the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science^[1] by the heads of the two largest Departments of Political Science and Economics in Canada, and of the point of view of Professor Knight,^[2] the author of the first article, warrants further consideration. Alert to the dangers of rushing in where older economists fear to tread and of the prospect of being exposed to the psychoanalyst—who will point to the two articles as representative of age and maturity in a major depression after a world war and to this “further consideration” as representative of youth and immaturity searching for hope where none exists, and as a further effect of the War, the depression, and the winter season—the writer is convinced that more needs to be said even if only by way of a note.

The argument as to the difficulties, if not impossibility, of a social science may be repeated and extended. In elaboration of the impossibility of building a science on a basis on which the observer becomes the observed, it may be suggested that not only is the individual subject to neuroses in terms of age, sex, height, health, family, and personal characteristics generally, but also that these characteristics are played upon by the infinite variety of circumstances of the modern world. A social “scientist”, who must be presumed to have made some attempt to allow for the errors of particular biases arising from his institutional surroundings, is continually haunted by the dangers of exaggeration or understatement.

The social scientist in the University^[3] may be regarded as relatively free from major sources of bias, but the dangers are numerous and subtle. At least one University president in Canada has urged that he should be expected to engage in activities outside the University and thereby make up a deficient salary in a long vacation. Important recent work in economics, as suggested by Professor Knight, has centred about the market, and an appreciation of the machinery and operation of the market may be obtained by participation in its activities; this may seem desirable, particularly if the social scientist is paid for obtaining such an appreciation. The most serious dangers arise possibly from the lowering of prestige among his fellow social scientists which accompanies participation in outside activities (offset possibly in the eyes of the social scientist concerned by a rise of prestige in other circles), and from the growing lack of confidence in his conclusions. But whether the social scientist succeeds in advancing the interests of any single enterprise or any group of enterprises by contributing to the solution of any problem, or whether he is employed by such an enterprise or group of enterprises for honorific purposes, his contribution is assumed by those who pay for it to have advanced their interests, probably at the expense of other interests and not necessarily to the advantage of the community as a whole—whatever that may mean. In any case, the social scientist is apt to develop strong vested interests in the prospects of an enterprise or of a group or of a society. He becomes concerned in many cases with the increasing profits and the increasing sale of products irrespective of the wants of the community, and acts largely in a predatory capacity.

Increasing attention by social scientists to the limitations of the price system tends to suggest that there is increasing danger of the social scientist placing his weight on the balance and giving estimates, without making due allowance. A state university is more apt to frown upon such activities than a privately endowed university, but it is apt to encourage activity, which involves similar assistance to the state, partly because this may in turn react favourably through encouraging support by the state to the University, but perhaps largely because of the conviction that assistance to the state implies assistance to the community as a whole. Limitations to the implication are numerous. As has been said, the state is a number of bald-headed men living in offices and most of these men have a strong political, i.e., party, sense. A politician succeeds by detecting and using to his advantage the weaknesses of others, and the others include the social scientist. Social scientists of reputable standing are known as nationalists or imperialists or internationalists or protectionists or free traders. Support to both or all parties to offset the disadvantages of support to any is not necessarily effective and involves considerable agility on the part of the social scientist concerned.

Assistance to ecclesiastical organizations is perhaps the most dangerous, not, as will be argued, because the remuneration is negligible, but because it appeals to the ecclesiastical bias of the University and of the social scientists. Large numbers of social scientists have been interested in ecclesiastical if not political organizations and have become social scientists because of their belief in the possibility of achieving their objectives more effectively. Objectives are more dangerous than politicians and it is fatal to attempt a study of society with definite views as to the direction society should take. The control or planning bias arises in part directly from this background.

A further danger to social science has arisen from foundations to subsidize research, because of the statement of objectives and of the extent of the subsidies. Social scientists with a bias toward a living, accentuated because of possible inefficiency and inability to obtain a living in more exacting employments, are attracted to the prospects of remuneration from foundations with standards of research adaptable to the achievement of an objective.

Institutions act as channels through which civilization bears with persistent corroding effects on the position of the social scientist. The enormity of the task of withstanding the effects of corrosion, and of interpreting the complexity of social phenomena, has led to the emergence of schools of thought in which definite advance is made by an individual, to be followed by the work of others in merging the conclusions of separate schools or in testing the validity of assumptions and rounding out the details of schemes of thought. The mental limitations of social scientists and the pervasiveness of a pecuniary economy lead to the writing of texts which simplify the conclusions of schools, and to the creation of vested interests on the part of publishing houses, of departments, and of professorial chairs. The importance of vested interests and of rigidities in thought in the social sciences weakens the position of the social scientist in relation to impacts of cultural importance. For example, the current belief in progress reinforces the importance of change in the thinking in the social sciences. New departments and new countries as well as old departments and old countries capitalize the possibilities of new developments in the social sciences. Vested interests are implied in the resistance to change and the demand for change. The adjustment of social science to current demands has been facilitated by improved methods of communication, such as the radio, which strengthen the influence of lower levels of intelligence. An attempt to escape the difficulties by resort to history has led to the simplification of thinking in the social sciences in terms of the Marxian analysis and the class struggle.

With these difficulties increased by a depression following a great war, with the end of an era of rapid expansion, and with human misery on every hand, there is the temptation, with perhaps some justification, to cut the Gordian knot by resort to immediate action. The temptation and the activity are indications of the inadequacy of social thought which accompanies depreciation of cultural support following periods of strain. According to Professor Leacock’s paper, classical economics is valuable as a discipline of the class room and we must “faire faire”,—make things happen. One prominent economist in a recent book has suggested the task of undoing things which have been done and of energetically setting out to do nothing. The emergence of this school from the circumstances of the present depression coincides with the demands of democracy as reflected in the appeals of the politician. It is in part a form of whistling in the dark to keep up one’s courage, and is closely related to the school of thought which insists that something is going to happen, or else. . . . Its effectiveness is shown in the determined efforts of modern governments to stop leaks and to repair damages as they occur, and has a close parallel in the fable of the fly on the chariot wheel which was surprised at the dust it was raising.

Ceaseless wrestling with the beasts of Ephesus tends to leave the social scientist intellectually exhausted. The task of attempting to become a social scientist may be regarded as beyond human endurance. He may take comfort in the argument that thought in the social sciences grows by the development and correction of bias. On the other hand, he will receive small thanks and possibly much contempt and persecution for attempting to tear the mask from innumerable biases which surround him. It is not in the best taste to bare one’s views, certainly in a Scottish protestant community, which prefers the weak and “sound” to the strong, or to criticize one’s elders or one’s ancestors. The first duty of the social scientist is to avoid martyrdom. As a tribute to that duty the writer hereby brings to an end a list of biases which can be illustrated, or extended, or interpreted to illustrate the bias of the writer to the reader’s content.

The innumerable difficulties of the social scientist are paradoxically his only salvation. Since the social scientist cannot be “scientific” or “objective” because of the contradiction in terms, he can learn of his numerous limitations. The “sediment of experience” provides the basis for scientific investigation. The never-ending shell of life suggested in the persistent character of bias provides possibilities of intensive study of the limitations of life and its probable direction. “Introspection” is a contradiction, but what is meant by the word is the foremost limit of scientific investigation in a range extending back to geological time. The difficulty if not impossibility of predicting one’s own course of action is decreased in predicting the course of action of others, as anyone knows who has been forced to live in close relations with one other person over a considerable period of time. The exasperating accuracy with which such prediction is possible has been the cause of more than one murder in northern Canada and the dissolution of numerous partnerships. The habits or biases of individuals which permit prediction are reinforced in the cumulative bias of institutions and constitute the chief interest of the social scientist.

The economist as suggested in Professor Urwick’s paper has possibly been fortunate in having at his command measurable data arising from the activities of the market, but he has undoubtedly lost much through his failure to attempt a study of factors underlying the market and to resist the fatal attraction of analogies with the physical sciences and particularly with the possibilities of mathematics. The spread of industrialism and of the price system has stressed physics and chemistry and mathematics and the development of these subjects has had its effect on biology in the emergence of such fields as biological chemistry and biometrics. The price system has presented material admirably adapted to the penchant for mathematics with the result that enormous numbers of studies in mathematical tabulations and small numbers of advanced mathematical arguments have been published; the possibilities of proliferation are endless. “Scientificismus” in the social sciences has been in part a result of the extensive development of statistical elaboration. The overhead costs of plant and equipment in terms of calculating machines have given a drive in the same direction. Moreover, the limitations of language, illustrated in the problem of Marshall, who attempted to write for business men but who has been understood with great difficulty by social scientists, have contributed to the introduction of mathematics. This is not to deny the importance of studies of price phenomena or of statistics but to emphasize their limitations and inadequacies and their position as an introduction to social science. They are comparable in contributions to social science to studies of the palaeontologist or the archaeologist or the anthropologist or the geographer. Price phenomena are only a part of the “sediment of experience” and throw light on its character similar to that of the study of architecture, literature, or other evidences of cultural activity. Incidentally, the significance of a classical training to the social scientist should rest in the breadth of the approach and its emphasis on the range of human activity, but unfortunately, like the social sciences, it tends to concentrate on aspects which appeal to individual interests and to be even more barren.

The fundamental limitations outlined by Professor Urwick involve the salvation and the despair of the social sciences. Habits and institutions, even stupidity, are the assets of the social scientist. Relative capacities of social scientists for observing, in contrast to being observed, extend his range. Institutions such as professional associations, office hours, and a reputation for curtness may serve as defences in improving the position of the observer, but like all the paraphernalia and equipment of modern scholarship they have their advantages and limitations. The significance of discussion has been emphasized, but organized discussion is a contradiction in terms and other types of discussion involve the dominance of a relatively small number or the outbreak of violence, such as is implied in signs which hang in dining halls of lumber camps, “No talking during meals”. Nor are treatises on the art of thinking particularly illuminating except as indices of the shallow thinking of the authors.

The decline of intelligent discussion has been indicated in its persecution on the part of interests which profit most from freedom of discussion. The news value of intelligent discussion has practically led to its suppression or to its restriction to circumstances in which the press is not admitted. A fundamental difficulty even under favourable conditions continues in the complexity of the social sciences. Discussion through debates which imply oratory and chicane practically excludes contributions to the solution of problems of the social sciences. Conferences arranged for discussion in the social sciences, and not including the large majority arranged definitely for the prostitution of social science to an avowed objective, are faced with innumerable and obvious handicaps. The emphasis has been to an increasing extent on publication as a medium of discussion—the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science being a case in point.

Intelligence in the social process is, therefore, seriously confined in its attempts to predict general trends, but in so far as the “sediment of experience” becomes deeper its task becomes at once easier and more difficult. Its range may be narrowed and its data may be increased. Intelligence in the social sciences tends to be absorbed in the abstruse and abstract tasks of adjustment and to be lost in specialization, with the result that it is unable to participate in the endless and complex and possibly fruitless search for trends. The elements of the curricula of the social sciences conflict, in emphasis on the “scientific” aspect, and in attempts to meet the demands of social organization (especially economic) for trained workers. The technician may be engaged in loosening or remoulding the clutches of outworn institutions or even in tightening and repairing the breaches. The chances of the existence of surplus energy to be directed to the extremely complex task of determining trends of development are slight. The possibility that a discovery of trends may involve a change in the direction of institutional growth is slight since at best intelligence will be slow in detecting the prevailing drift and will tend to reflect rather than to predict.

The periods and regions with sufficient stability to support freedom of inquiry in the social sciences have been short and small and surrounded with hazards, but death is persistent and the removal of dictators inevitable. The elusiveness of life involves change. Contributions to an understanding of social trends have been made from a great number of approaches. Illustrations of contributions which have been significant include the studies on technology as outlined by Marx and elaborated by Sombart, Veblen, and others; on metropolitan growth as described by Gras; on economic theory by Adam Smith; on overhead costs by Clark; on geographic influences by Vidal de la Blache. These indicate determining factors in the drift of social development. They have involved intensive study on the dead shells of human life but have indicated in an extremely rough way the general background to the development of modern life; to mention them is to indicate the extent of the gaps which remain before even that which is possible has been mastered. Neglect of these contributions is an indication of a decline in the role of intelligence in the social process.

The University may be regarded as at least an active centre in strengthening the position of the natural and social sciences, but limitations to its possible assistance are numerous. The social scientist is concerned with departmental routine: discussion with colleagues and students on subjects which imply salary, promotion, popularity, and things other than the search for truth. The presence of “leaders”, of “strong” men, and of the frictions which accompany them (odium academicum) is sufficient evidence of the pervasiveness of intellectual handicaps. The natural sciences, on the other hand, impose few restrictions on the “scientist” other than the discipline which may be acquired in the laboratory, and consequently permit him to indulge in all the biases from which the social scientist is barred. (It may be argued that the prevalence of these biases at close range should provide the social scientist with an excellent laboratory but it is seldom regarded as such.) The inhibitions of the social scientist tend to weaken his position in the University in the prevailing competition for staff and equipment, but these dangers may be offset by alertness on the part of the governing authorities. Equipment and buildings are tangible indications of “scientific” work and of the importance of more equipment and buildings, whereas a social scientist is just another social scientist. The appearance of solidity and certainty and the possibilities of display attract the interest of the supporting public and actually encourage the “scientist” to advance from statements in his own field, about which he may have private doubts, to statements of certainty in the field of the social scientists, about which he has no doubts. This situation has been met in part during the depression by demands for pronouncements from social scientists, and the latter, encouraged by University authorities, have responded to the warmth of popular acclaim with statements of certainty about which privately they must entertain grave doubts. The social sciences tend to become the opiate of the people. Statements of certainty made by social scientists, without encouragement from University authorities, have raised the problem of academic freedom. In the main the statements have done little more than reveal the poverty of the social sciences, but University authorities have been concerned unfortunately with other grounds. Whereas they have been absorbed with questions of freedom of expression, the fundamental problem is that of standards in the social sciences. Discussions of academic freedom in Canada on the part of the University authorities and the staff are little more than indications of the irritableness which accompanies a high wind.

The cultural background of the University is of fundamental importance. The War and the post-War periods have involved serious disturbances in Russia, Italy, and Germany and far-reaching changes in Great Britain, France, the United States, and other countries. Periods of profound disturbance create difficulties. The character of phenomena with which the social sciences purport to deal becomes more refractory and the mental distress of the observer greater. (This article is, of course, a product of such a background.) The University can protect the social scientists in part. Even in countries which have witnessed the most serious disturbances, apparently work in the social sciences can continue without serious interruption, chiefly because the complexity of the subject renders conclusions of little value to those in control of policy, and terminology becomes a defence against the inquisitive. Moreover, Universities with centuries of tradition serve as a defence. In countries in which traditions are less conspicuous, in which an old generation of University presidents is being replaced by energetic young men guaranteed to do things, and where the development of the social sciences is so weak that conclusions are understood by those in control of policy, difficulties become serious even though the cultural background has been less seriously disturbed. The defence of the social scientist, a defence which is important in communities without sufficient mental acumen to perceive its weakness, follows the fallacy of the argumentum ad hominem. Because conclusions are reached by scholars in Universities with long-established traditions, they are held to be valid and applicable universally. The more subtle of the social scientists will proceed by careful study to discover the weak points in the intellectual armour of the community and to utilize the conclusions with effect, and consequently they say that because Great Britain has a certain type of machinery therefore Canada should have it, that capitalism is a good thing, that we should produce for use and not for profit, and that we should read our Bibles. There are apparently advantages and profits to be gained by advocating any one or more of these “remedies”, including production for use and not for profit. The natural scientist, of course, cannot be criticized as he has not had a training intended to make him aware of the fallacies of his statements. It would be cruel to single out special illustrations, and mention of controversies over Genesis and evolution, over pronouncements of geologists and physicists on immortality and on the existence of a Divine Being, and of the prevalence of references to science in Canada or in the Empire, must suffice. The problem of the social scientist is the problem of the University.

TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Misspelled words and printer errors have been corrected. Where multiple spellings occur, majority use has been employed.

Punctuation has been maintained except where obvious printer errors occur.

A cover which is placed in the public domain was created for this ebook.

[The end of The Role of Intelligence, by Harold. A. Innis]