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Title: The Battle of Flanders 1940
Date of first publication: 1941
Author: Ian Hay (1876-1952)
Date first posted: Dec. 29, 2019
Date last updated: Dec. 29, 2019
Faded Page eBook #20191256

This eBook was produced by: Al Haines




[Transcriber's Note: A Contents has been added for reader
convenience.]




[Frontispiece: FLANDERS & THE NARROW SEAS]




  THE
  BATTLE OF FLANDERS
  1940



  IAN HAY



  LONDON
  HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE




AUTHOR'S NOTE

The following narrative, which is based upon Lord Gort's Official
Despatches, is an attempt to describe, in as untechnical language as
possible, the experiences of the B.E.F. from the time of their
landing in France in September, 1939, to the final evacuation of
Dunkirk on 3rd June, 1940.

I have gone beyond Lord Gort's text in at least two respects.  I have
offered certain comments, which Lord Gort has punctiliously refrained
from doing; and I have included in my story certain incidents which,
since they did not occur under Lord Gort's official jurisdiction, are
not included in his Despatches, but will I hope be of interest to the
general reader.




  CONTENTS

  Foreword
  I. Flanders Once More
  II. Tuning Up
  III. Blitzkrieg
  IV. Disaster on the Right
  V. The Threat to the British Flank
  VI. Hitting Back
  VII. The Enemy Reach the Channel
  VIII. The Weygand Plan
  IX. Backs to the Wall
  X. The Dunkirk Bridgehead
  XI. Thalassa, Thalassa!




FOREWORD

_Perspective in Warfare_

In all wars the final victory must be won on land.  However
irresistible the armed forces of a country may show themselves by sea
or in the air, the naval and aerial arms can never strike the
decisive blow.  They can guard and protect on the one hand,
devastate, cow, and paralyse on the other, but they cannot break
through the last lines of defence.  That task must be left to the
tanks and their supporting infantry.

The importance of an early success or failure cannot therefore be
estimated at once; there must be an interval of waiting until it can
be fitted into the final pattern--it may be years later.  Of what
value were Marengo or Austerlitz to Napoleon the day after Waterloo
was fought?


The British Army, by traditional usage, always seems to be compelled
to start a war from small beginnings, and either play for time or
take desperate risks until it has built itself up into an effective
striking force.  The entire history of that Army is chequered with
tales of early reverses or expensive resistances, redeemed in the
end, as resources and experience accumulated, by the final crown of
victory.

This is due partly to the fact that though we have usually been
prepared to maintain a Navy second to none, and came recently to a
similar though somewhat tardy conclusion upon the subject of an Air
Force, we have systematically starved our Army throughout its
history, both in numbers, equipment, and adequate means of training;
and partly because, whenever we embark upon one of our periodical and
hasty campaigns for national preparedness, the Royal Navy and Royal
Air Force must of necessity be served first; for it is they who must
guard our shores and skies until the final arbiter, the Army, is
ready.  And this usually means a wait of two years.  In the last war
we could not really put our full military strength into the field
until 1st July, 1916, when, at long last, a highly trained and fully
equipped British Army went raging into the Battle of the Somme.

Military science never stands still.  No sooner is a new weapon of
offence forged than an effective means of defence is devised against
it.  Sometimes, therefore, the advantage inclines one way, sometimes
the other.  In the Great War, it lay in the main upon the side of the
defence; the battles of Verdun and Passchendaele are grim witnesses
to the fact.

But to-day the beam has tipped the other way.  The stoutest trench
and pill-box system of 1918 would find itself helpless against a foe
equipped in overwhelming strength with swift armoured fighting
vehicles and possessed of the command of the air.

That is the moral and the lesson of Lord Gort's Despatches.  They
tell a tale to stir the pulse and rend the heart at the same
moment--a tale of almost incredible gallantry, resource, and
fortitude, hampered at every turn from the very outset by lack of
adequate numbers and essential equipment.  There were other
difficulties too, almost inseparable from the operations of allied
forces who find themselves matched, without previous rehearsal,
against the natural dispositions of a single powerful enemy.

But a Commander-in-Chief in his Despatch does not discuss such
considerations.  He limits himself severely to a plain description of
his own dispositions and of the operations which followed them.
Criticism, whether of his superiors or his associates, he rigorously
avoids.  Neither does he seek excuses for himself, though Lord Gort
might have stated with perfect truth that the fate of the B.E.F. was
sealed, almost from the start of the 1940 campaign, by a
break-through many miles from its own front, and not by any failure
of British troops to hold positions of their own choosing.

But it is sometimes permissible to read between the lines.


The Flanders campaign of 1940 was a tragedy, redeemed by a heroic,
superhuman conclusion, but a tragedy for all that, especially for
France.  Yet ourselves it must inspire with hope, for it showed us
plainly that man for man our soldiers were superior to those of the
enemy, and, when similarly equipped, must inevitably prove their
masters.

The day of victory is not yet, and may not fall for some time; for we
have learned a lesson, and that is that until we have consolidated
our command of the air and endowed our young and spirited armies with
the mechanised aid that they require, the decisive blow can not be
struck.

So we must wait, with fortitude and patience until, by the
unremitting effort of the men and women of the factory and forge at
home and throughout the Empire, these vital necessities are
forthcoming and we can put forth our full strength.

When that victory is won, but not till then, the Flanders campaign of
1940 will fall into its true perspective--of as gallant a
contribution to ultimate victory as Gallipoli or Corunna.




CHAPTER I

FLANDERS ONCE MORE

I

_The Move Overseas_

A war must always provoke comparison with its immediate predecessor.
There must have been many of us in September, 1939, whose memories
turned back to those fateful weeks in August, 1914, when the British
Expeditionary Force, thanks to perfect co-operation between our naval
and military staffs, were conveyed swiftly and securely across the
Channel, without the loss of a man, to immediate participation in the
Battle of Mons.

Could that feat be repeated, we asked, under modern conditions?

It could, and was, despite new and unfamiliar difficulties.

Two of these were outstanding.  The first was the possibility--the
certainty, it seemed--of an overwhelming attack upon our transports
from the air.  The second was the fact that animals had been totally
replaced by mechanical vehicles, and this presented a new and, quite
literally, most weighty problem in transportation.

In the first case the most pressing essential was secrecy, and this
had been successfully maintained for many weeks, while detailed and
complex plans were prepared and carried out in peacetime.  The
agencies concerned were the War Office, the Admiralty, the Board of
Trade, and the French Naval, Military and Civil authorities, working
together in silent efficiency and loyal accord.

Further security was ensured by the selection of landing ports as
remote as possible from the German air-bases.  Calais and Boulogne
were held to be out of the question this time, so Cherbourg was
selected as a landing place for the troops, and Brest, Nantes, and
St. Nazaire for their stores and vehicles.  Nantes stands some
thirty-five miles up the estuary of the Loire; St. Nazaire, at its
mouth in the Bay of Biscay, was converted during the last war from a
modest coastal village into a considerable landing-port and base for
the use of the American Expeditionary Force; so suited our purpose
well.

So well in hand were our preparations in September, 1939, that within
a week of the outbreak of war these ports were ready for the
reception of the British Expeditionary Force.  Advance units were on
the spot even earlier, to organise docking and transportation
arrangements.  These units were in the main recruited from the port
authorities in Great Britain, and most efficient they proved
themselves.

Anti-aircraft defences and hospital accommodation had also to be
provided, for we had good reason to expect that disembarkation might
have to take place under intensive interference from enemy bombers.

So expeditiously were all these preliminary tasks performed that the
move of the Expeditionary Force as a whole to France was able to
begin upon 10th September, one week after the declaration of war.
They arrived safely on schedule time.

"Drivers and vehicles," we are told, "were on the road for long
periods, but their duty was lightened by the hospitality of the
French inhabitants, which all ranks will recall with gratitude".
There is a pleasantly familiar ring about that statement.

Upon the 13th September Lord Gort himself, as Commander-in-Chief,
left the War Office for Camberley, where his General Headquarters was
forming, and upon the following day followed his men overseas.  He
sailed in H.M.S. "Skate", and was accompanied by Lt. General Sir John
Dill, Commander of the 1st Corps, and his own personal staff.  Upon
landing at Cherbourg he proceeded by car to the Chateau de la
Blanchardière, Le Mans, which had been placed at his disposal by the
French Government.



II

_The New Factor_

In one respect the newly arrived B.E.F. enjoyed an advantage denied
to its predecessor of 1914: it had ample time to assemble and
reorganise after disembarkation; whereas twenty-four years earlier
our troops had been hurried into action as they set foot upon the
soil of France.

Perhaps this was just as well, for the Staff now encountered a
problem destined hereafter to add considerably to the difficulties of
communication--a problem arising from the necessity of _dispersion_.

As we all know to our cost, the bombing aeroplane has completely
revolutionised not only the operational but the administrative side
of war; and with it, what may be called the recreational or social
side.

In the last war troops were either in action or back at rest; and
when they were back at rest they really rested.  Thousands of
middle-aged and elderly Britons can recall to-day grateful memories
of pleasant billets in Bethune, or Bailleul, or Arras, or of
innumerable friendly villages and farm-houses scattered behind the
line, where exhausted units could make good their deficiencies and
recruit their energy.  But to-day all that is gone.  There are no
real rest areas anywhere.  Troops can no longer congregate in centres
of population; they must be dispersed in small contingents all over
the countryside, separated from their nearest neighbours by a mile or
so of field and plough, wrapped by night in an impenetrable black-out.

The same restrictions are imposed upon the activities of the Staff,
for in the case of G.H.Q., the brain and directing force of the whole
Army, it is obviously unsafe to keep all your eggs in one basket.
When G.H.Q. established itself at Arras, it was found advisable to
quarter the Commander-in-Chief and his principal Staff Officers each
in separate billets some miles apart.  This meant that whenever a
conference had to be held, valuable time was taken up in travelling,
or in a struggle with that most exasperating of instruments, the
field telephone.

This handicap of enforced dispersion made itself felt from the very
beginning.  Laval and Le Mans were fifty miles apart, and the base
ports three times that distance.  Despite the cordial help of the
French authorities, telephonic communication never proved
satisfactory, quite apart from the danger of a breach of security
involved.  It was found by Commanders and Staff that satisfactory
control could only be ensured by personal visits.  All this meant a
further waste of time on the road.

Dispersion of vehicles and transport in general also involved a loss
of time in their assembly--and in war, time is frequently the supreme
factor.

These handicaps were not of course insuperable, neither were they
suffered by the B.E.F. alone.  They were imposed impartially upon
both sides by modern conditions of warfare.  Moreover, the months of
comparative tranquility which followed gave to our young and
inexperienced Army breathing space in which to accustom itself to its
new problems.



III

_The British Sector_

By 21st September the concentration of the General Headquarters Staff
and of the essential Lines of Communication units was accomplished.
Next day the troops themselves began to arrive--units of 1st Corps.
On 22nd September Lord Gort left Le Mans for Amiens.  At
Mantes-sur-Seine he was handed a telegram from General Georges,
Commander of the French Front of the North East, indicating the
location and extent of frontage which it was desired that the British
Expeditionary Force should take over.

Lord Gort, it should be noted, was acting under the direct control of
General Georges, while General Georges himself served under General
Gamelin, in supreme command of the Allied Forces in France.

After a reconnaissance of the allotted sector, Lord Gort visited
General Georges at Grand Quartier General upon 26th September,
accompanied by his Chief of the General Staff, Lt.-General H. R.
Pownall.  He agreed to take over the sector proposed, which followed
the Belgian frontier for some fifty-five miles, beginning at Maulde
on the right and running roughly northward to Halluin (immediately
south of Menin on the Lille-Menin road), turning thence in a
south-westerly direction along the River Lys--a name familiar to many
a British soldier of the last war--as far as even more familiar
Armentières.  Within the salient formed, and protected by it, lay
Roubaix, Tourcoing and the great city of Lille.

As the British Expeditionary Force only consisted so far of four
Divisions, a French Division, the 51st, was included in Lord Gort's
command.

At General Georges' express desire, Lord Gort did not wait for the
arrival of his entire present Force in its concentration area, but
agreed to move 1st Corps into the line without delay, in the sector
running north from Maulde.  They were to be in position by 5th
October, and General Georges was informed that 2nd Corps would join
them a week later.



IV

_A Great Troop Movement_

Now came the task of moving 1st Corps from its assembly area to the
Belgian frontier, a distance of no less than two hundred and fifty
miles.

Tanks, tracked vehicles, and slow-moving artillery were despatched by
train; the remainder of the Force proceeded by three parallel routes.
Three days were allotted for the move of each formation.  Two
"Staging areas" were arranged on each road, south of the Somme and
Seine respectively.  Anti-aircraft protection was provided at each
crossing--another pregnant sign of the times.

It will be interesting for a moment to examine the composition of
this vast and novel cavalcade.  ("Cavalcade" is a misnomer in itself,
for there were no horses in the British Expeditionary Force of
1939-40, except some transport animals brought later from India.)
Five hundred vehicles moved daily over each stage of the route,
maintaining a prudent interval of one hundred yards between vehicles.
The first stage was one hundred and twenty miles, and a halt of one
day was made at the end of it for purposes of maintenance and
overhaul.  It was found that the vehicles had stood up well, and
breakdowns were few.

However, various valuable lessons were learnt.  The drivers became
accustomed to the novel sensation of keeping to the right-hand side
of the road.  A French-speaking British officer, acting in liaison
with the French road authorities, proved of great value.  The
advisability, too, was driven home of early reconnaissance of
staging-areas, and of control at the dispersal points.

Upon 3rd October, the agreed date, "after the largest road movement
ever undertaken with motor transport by any British Army," 1st Corps
took over from the French the sector Maulde-Grison on the Belgian
frontier.  This sector lay between that of the 1st French Army and
16th French Corps.

Our own 1st Corps consisted at this time of the 1st Division (Major
General the Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander) who occupied the left of the
sector, and the 2nd (Major General H. C. Loyd) who occupied the right.

Lord Gort himself established his headquarters in familiar and
friendly surroundings at Arras--or rather, once again in deference to
the need of dispersion, at a chateau in the tiny village of Habarcq,
eight miles west--upon 2nd October.

On 12th October, as previously undertaken, 2nd Corps began to arrive
from Le Mans, and the 3rd Division (Major General B. L. Montgomery)
moved into the line between Bouvines and Lannoy.  The 4th Division
(Major General D. G. Johnson, V.C.) was located in General
Headquarters reserve.

1st and 2nd Corps having thus punctually arrived at their allotted
positions, embarked upon their duties at once.

These proved to be no sinecure, consisting as they did of helping in
the construction of the elaborate defensive works designed to protect
the frontier of France from the northern end of the Maginot Line to
the North Sea.

In this connexion the French High Command have been criticised as
having been too "Maginot minded".  Still, it is possible to organise
a strong defensive scheme without entirely eliminating the intention
to attack.  In any case it is reasonable to suppose that if the
Maginot Line and the Belgian Frontier defences had ever been given
the opportunity, as a completed and occupied whole, to serve the
purpose for which they had been designed, the history of 1940 might
have been written differently.  But--in the grammar of war
conditional sentences have no status.



V

_In the Line_

The essential feature of modern defence is defence in depth, with
special provision of effective tank obstacles.

Such an obstacle was already in existence when 1st Corps took over.
It consisted of an almost continuous ditch, covered by concrete
blockhouses built to accommodate anti-tank and machine guns.  By
previous arrangement, certain French technical troops continued to
work in the sector under the command of the French Commander of the
Defensive Sector of Lille, Colonel Bertschi.

But of course these works were a mere beginning.  It was decided to
organise three main defence positions--namely, the existing frontier
position, a Corps reserve position extending across the base of the
Lille salient, and further in rear a position following the line of
the Haute-Deule, Sensée-La Bassée Canals.

This involved the construction of an elaborate system of field
defences, including "pill-boxes", to afford protection to those
weapons which formed the backbone of fire-defence throughout the
whole depth of the positions.  To save time, these pill-boxes were so
standardised as to accommodate both British and French weapons.

Here then was work in plenty for all, and of a most intensive
character, for none could know how much time was available.  Work
upon the pill-boxes was immediately begun by the Royal Engineers,
assisted by other arms.  In addition, a specially constituted force
composed of twelve field companies of the Royal Engineers (drawn from
Territorial Army Divisions at home) known as X Force, arrived early
in November, accompanied by certain sturdy companies of the recently
established Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps.

It was a hard winter.  The weather in October and November was wet
and stormy, and work later on was delayed by a long series of frosts.
But by the end of January the position had been developed to a
considerable depth--pill-boxes completed, wire erected, and many
miles of anti-tank ditches dug.



VI

_The Saar Detachment_

All this time our troops had been employed in the main upon purely
manual labour, many miles from the theatre of hostilities.  Obviously
such employment, however necessary, is not calculated to inculcate in
the soldier either mental alertness or a fighting spirit.

It was therefore agreed between Lord Gort and General Georges that in
order to give the British Force, so far as was possible, some
preliminary experience of actual contact with the enemy, British
troops should be transferred to the Saar front and permanently
maintained there in rotation, to the strength of an Infantry Brigade,
under the command of a French Division.

Accordingly, upon 4th December, such a Brigade took over a sector
from the French 42nd Division.  Here the fortifications of the
Maginot Line, manned of course by French troops, were situated to
rearward of them; the enemy positions lay on an average some fifteen
hundred yards from our foremost posts.  Our battalions were, as
usual, arranged in depth.

Here was ample manoeuvring and patrolling ground, and full advantage
was taken of the opportunities which it offered.  Raids between our
own troops and those of the enemy began immediately, and increased in
intensity with varying fortune on either side, and many important and
at times salutary lessons were learned by our young soldiers.

"Since that date" (4th December) says Lord Gort in his first despatch
dealing with events before the opening of the great battle, "infantry
brigades of the British Expeditionary Force have successively
completed short tours of duty in the sector, and junior leaders have
thus had valuable training, in their day to day duties, when in
contact with the enemy."

Incidentally, it is in the description of these operations that
mention is first made of that extremely useful weapon the Tommy
gun--more respectfully described here, however, as the sub-machine
gun.

It will be appropriate to add in this connexion that the Saar front
Infantry Brigade ultimately grew into a Division, complete with
attached troops, including cavalry, machine guns, and pioneers.  (The
term cavalry, here and hereafter, must be understood to denote
armoured fighting vehicles.)  Our 51st Division was selected for this
purpose, and upon 7th May relieved the 7th French Division on a front
of 12,000 yards, from Guerstling to Remeling.

This Division, as we shall see, was destined not to return to Lord
Gort's direct control, nor to take part in the operations with which
this narrative is concerned.



VII

_The B.E.F. grows_

But we have been anticipating a little.  Let us return to our
dispositions along the Belgian frontier.

So far 1st and 2nd Corps had consisted of two Divisions each, the 1st
and 2nd, and 3rd and 4th respectively.  Additional units arrived
during October and November, including elements of the 5th and 6th
Divisions, in the form of the 15th and 17th Infantry Brigades.  Lord
Gort was now able to complete the 5th Division (Major General H. E.
Franklyn), and presently it became possible to man the British sector
entirely with British troops.  Accordingly the French 51st Division
and the British Expeditionary Force dissolved partnership, with many
expressions of friendly regret, upon 1st December, 1939.

The arrival of the 48th Division (Major General A. F. A. N. Thorne)
in January completed the establishment of the first contingent of the
British Expeditionary Force, which now consisted of two corps of
three divisions each, with corps and army troops.

At the end of January the strength of the Force stood at 222,200 of
all ranks, not including the Air Component and other units of the
Royal Air Force for whose maintenance the Commander-in-Chief of the
British Expeditionary Force was responsible.



VIII

_The Air_

In modern warfare operations by land and in the air must be closely
co-ordinated, whether for attack or defence.  For this reason the
British Expeditionary Force included a Component (to employ the
accepted term) of the Royal Air Force, under Air Vice Marshal C. H.
B. Blount.  This at first consisted of two Army Co-operation Wings,
one Fighter Wing, and one Bomber Reconnaissance Wing.  These aircraft
were flown out to France at the outbreak of war, and came under Lord
Gort's command from the dates of the disembarkation of their ground
units.  Other units were added later.

Anti-aircraft units, too, were early on the scene, having been
disembarked at the base ports on 14th and 15th September, in
conjunction with fighter units of the Royal Air Force, in order to
protect the landing and forward moves of 1st and 2nd Corps.
Thereafter our available anti-aircraft resources were divided between
forward defences and Lines of Communication.  A searchlight zone was
also established, as a protection against enemy night bombing.

Until the necessary aerodromes could be constructed, the Royal Air
Force was largely dependent for accommodation upon French
hospitality.  This, needless to say, was freely forthcoming, together
with every other kind of help, as is gratefully acknowledged in the
Despatch.

As for the aerodromes themselves, it had already been decided that
all aerodromes used by the Royal Air Force in France should be
constructed and maintained by the British Expeditionary Force,
together with their signal communications.  It was soon evident that
the magnitude of this task had been underestimated.  There is little
firm turf in France, and concrete runways were found to be
indispensable in most areas.  Special units of the Royal Engineers
had therefore to be raised to construct these.

The actual duties of the Royal Air Force during this long period of
waiting and preparation were confined for the most part to air
reconnaissance, upon a strategical plan worked out in conjunction
with our own Air Ministry and General Monchard, commanding the Air
Forces with the French Armies of the North East.  The work was
extremely arduous, for owing to our scrupulous observance of
international law, our aircraft never flew over neutral territory,
and this involved them in very long detours, usually at a great
height and in the face of enemy opposition.

"But," says Lord Gort, "this rigorous duty has been boldly and
cheerfully undertaken.  Much photography has been undertaken with
useful results, both in information obtained and in experience gained
of photographic and survey methods."

He was right.  Certainly this period of semi-activity was furnishing
our young men, whether on the ground or in the air, with an
invaluable opportunity to educate themselves for the stern tests
which lay ahead of them.



IX

_Problems of Administration_

Every war produces its own perplexities, and Lord Gort soon found
himself confronted with problems some of which had not been foreseen,
while the seriousness of others had been underestimated.

The outstanding difficulty was that of Security--of maintaining the
necessary secrecy regarding our strength and dispositions.

The great Duke of Wellington once said that victory in battle lies
with the leader who can guess correctly what is going on upon the
other side of the hill.  But to-day no guessing is required.  Not
only is the other side of the hill open to inspection, but the whole
face of nature.  The slightest troop movement or concentration can be
detected from the air and immediately communicated by wireless to the
parties most interested.  More than that; where modern telegraph
systems are concerned, the longest way round is frequently the
shortest way home.  At any moment some indiscreet item of news may
slip past the censor, cross the Atlantic, be published in New York,
and recabled to Germany an hour later.

In our case there was no need for information of interest to the
enemy to follow any such circuitous route.  In the autumn of 1939
thousands of Belgians were working upon the beet-harvest of Northern
France, right in the British zone, and an average of at least twenty
thousand local inhabitants crossed and recrossed the frontier daily,
upon their more or less lawful occasions.

It was obviously impossible to keep tally of this mixed multitude,
especially since the French frontier control officials had been
seriously reduced in numbers upon mobilisation.  Those available,
together with our Field Security Police, did their best, a very
efficient best; but it was manifestly impossible to stop all leaks.

In modern warfare too, especially during periods of comparative
inaction, the postal censorship must keep its eyes wide open.  This
was particularly necessary in the British zone during the winter of
1939-40, for Thomas Atkins, incited thereto perhaps by the tranquil
and somewhat monotonous surroundings in which he found himself,
developed a passion for correspondence on a scale which had not been
entirely foreseen.  In view of the abnormally large numbers of
letters despatched daily it was found necessary to make a
considerable increase in the censorship personnel.



X

_The Rearward Areas_

Despite the lack of immediate active operations, the British
Expeditionary Force, as we have seen, was kept busy enough during
these winter months.  Not only had every effort to be made to render
the northern defences secure, but long-term plans had to be put into
execution for the accommodating and training of future contingents.

Here it was found necessary to enlarge upon the original plan.
Maintenance depôts had already been established at Brest and Nantes;
but in view of the extreme length of our lines of communication it
soon became apparent that an advanced base must be established.
Havre was selected, and Field Supply Depôts were set up further
forward.  By mid-December the staff of the Movement Control were
operating some ninety stations, while fourteen ports were in active
use.  Through these ports passed a quarter of a million men,
forty-five thousand mechanical vehicles, and a monthly tonnage of
sixty to one hundred thousand tons of stores.

Works projects were put in hand everywhere.  From the bases to the
forward line huts and buildings began to spring up; hospitals and
reinforcement camps were put in hand, and electric power installed.

The supply of labour was a perpetual problem.  French civilian
labour, owing to mobilisation, was practically unobtainable, and the
bulk of the work fell upon cavalry and infantry reservists.  Later,
the Pioneer Corps absorbed the units already in France.

All these activities were under the general control of the G.O.C.
Lines of Communication Area, the late Major General P. de Fonblanque.
They covered almost a third of France, stretching from Dunkirk to
Brest and from Cherbourg to Marseilles.

Despite these preoccupations, the training of the Force for active
operations never ceased.  Thanks to the co-operation of the French
Army, artillery practice camps were established and many other
training facilities provided.

Eight hundred and fifty officers and men were sent home in the course
of the winter as instructors, to assist in the training of the new
formations, and an equal number from home were attached to the Force
for instruction.

The shortage of officers was being acutely felt about this time.
Four hundred candidates, mostly Warrant Officers, Class III, were
recommended for immediate commissions, and another four hundred sent
home for the necessary training as such.



XI

_Telling the World_

The need for publicity and propaganda, those most potent weapons of
modern warfare, furnished a complete set of thorny problems of their
own to the Director of Military Intelligence and his staff at General
Headquarters.  These were shared with the Department of Public
Relations at the War Office.

There was urgent need, for instance, of countering German propaganda
among the French troops themselves--the well-worn suggestion that
while French soldiers toiled and bled in the forward line, the
British Army was taking its ease in the rearward areas and diverting
itself with French wives and daughters.  Much was done in this
direction through the medium of the British Mission at Grand Quartier
General, under Brigadier J. G. des R. Swayne, and its opposite number
at our own General Headquarters, under General de Division Voruz, to
whom Lord Gort pays warm tribute.

Then there was the problem of a public at home clamouring for news,
and of the war-correspondent, the broadcaster, and the camera-man at
General Headquarters itself.

"The significance and requirements of the press," says the Despatch,
"and of press and cinematographic publicity in the field in modern
war, have proved greater than was anticipated prior to the outbreak
of hostilities."

It need hardly be said that the extent of these requirements had
never been underestimated by the Press itself.  Indeed the difficulty
was to keep these requirements within reasonable bounds.  Every
newspaper, every broadcasting corporation, every news-reel
agency--each demanded its representative at General Headquarters.
Had all been permitted to come who wished, the ancient city of Arras
could not have contained them--unless the Army had moved out.

Finally, and properly, the selection of accredited representatives
was left to the Newspaper Proprietors Association in London, who
performed their highly invidious task with tact and discretion.  The
B.B.C., of course, sent its own official representatives, and five
news-reel companies each contributed a unit.

Correspondents disappointed of a place in the quota were subsequently
brought out from home upon periodical conducted tours.

In all, some fifty-five war correspondents were permanently
accredited to the British Expeditionary Force.  They were divided
into sections, each under military conducting-officers selected by
the Department of Public Relations at the War Office, and working
under a local Assistant Director of Public Relations, who was himself
responsible to the Director of Military Intelligence at General
Headquarters.

The American correspondents, who had been allotted a generous quota,
were gratified to find themselves placed in a section of their own,
and not mingled with the other "neutrals."

All concerned were naturally irked for many months by the lack of
exciting operations and the perpetual demands of some of their
employers for "hot news."  It is strange to remember now that there
was at this time a good deal of criticism in certain quarters of
"this phoney war."  One American correspondent indeed was heard to
complain that in the opinion of his employer the war was not being
"put over at its full entertainment value."

However, these impatient scribes were destined before long to taste
actual war conditions--and right gallantly they rose to the adventure.



XII

_A Contrast_

In Germany, it may be interesting but not surprising to note, they do
these things differently.  War correspondents, war artists,
camera-men, broadcasters--all are enlisted in the Army, and serve
under military discipline.  They go into action carrying the tools of
their trade, and when (and if) they come out, they publish their
impressions to the world; or rather, they hand them to Dr  Goebbels,
who edits them to his own liking and passes them on, in uniform and
stereotyped form, to the German Press.

It is a convenient and businesslike method of reporting a war, but
unfortunately impracticable in countries where the press is free, and
variety of individual opinion is the breath of public life.



XIII

_Unbending the Bow_

"Welfare" is a new term in Army language.  It covers the provision of
recreation, sport, entertainment and comforts, both bodily and
spiritual--all the _imponderabilia_, in fact, which make the
difference between inspirational and mechanical obedience--between a
Damascus blade and a broomstick.

There was considerable need for these beneficent activities in the
British Expeditionary Force, for its composition and outlook were
different from those of its predecessors.  It was a much more highly
educated Force, and educated people can never find recreation in mere
idleness: they require something for their minds to bite on, all the
time.

Their general health had been good.  Despite severe weather
conditions, the number of troops in the care of medical units had
never exceeded 2.8 per cent. of the strength of the Force.

First in every soldier's thoughts and hopes comes the question of
leave, and by the middle of December it was found possible to declare
leave "open."  By the end of January ten days' leave home had been
enjoyed by some sixty thousand of all ranks, apart from many cases of
"compassionate" leave.

Some ninety Expeditionary Force (or "Naafi") Institutes were
established along the Lines of Communication, where a soldier could
purchase the small comforts of life and perhaps sit in a real chair
for an hour or two.  Naafi also provided concert parties and mobile
cinemas.  The concert parties, varying in size and ambition, were
furnished from home by a body known as The Entertainments National
Services Association; or more conveniently, "Ensa."

Some day, it is to be hoped, the story of the Ensa parties will be
written in full.  They gave their performances in many strange
places, and stranger still were some of the adventures they
encountered--none of which loses in the telling of it.

Correspondence with home, as already noted, was prodigious.  As many
as nine thousand bags of mail were handled on a single day by the
Postal Service.  A supply of free newspapers, too, was daily
forthcoming, thanks to the generosity of the Newspaper Proprietors'
Association.  The Continental _Daily Mail_ actually published a
periodical supplement devoted entirely to news of special interest to
the Force.  Books were available in goodly quantities, and the
enterprising shop-keepers of Arras and other towns soon had
quantities of assorted English literature on sale.  Penguins were
almost as numerous as in the Antarctic Circle.

Visits from distinguished visitors made a welcome break in routine.
His Majesty the King was enthusiastically received upon December 4th.
The President of the French Republic, the Prime Minister, and many
other prominent and familiar figures were made welcome.

So the long period of waiting and preparation drew to its close.  The
Force had learned much, and endured a good deal.  But it had found
itself.  Whatever lay before it now would be faced with full
efficiency and high heart.  Whatever we might lack in material, the
men were all right.  Lord Gort sums it up:--


    "The British Army contains to-day very few regimental officers
    and other ranks who fought in the last war.  Much that was common
    knowledge then must therefore be learned again.  Nevertheless,
    events on the Saar front have proved beyond doubt that the young
    officer and his men, once they have had experience of active
    service, will be in every way worthy of their predecessors."


Events were shortly to prove the entire truth and justice of his
words.




CHAPTER II

TUNING UP

I

_The Growth of the B.E.F._

Spring was on the way, and there was a feeling of expectancy in the
air.  Lord Gort was entitled to look forward now to the immediate
expansion of his Force to the dimensions already laid down for it.
That is to say:--


    "I had been informed that the expansion of the Force was to be
    continued by the despatch of 3rd Corps during the early months of
    1940; the Armoured Division was to follow in May, and a Fourth
    Corps, with the 1st Canadian Division, during the late summer.
    Furthermore it had been decided that the Force should be divided
    into two Armies as soon as the number of divisions in the field,
    excluding the Armoured Division, rose above eleven."


In view of this expected increase in strength, it had been arranged
that the left front of the British Expeditionary Force should be
extended to the north-west as far as Croix-de-Poperinghe, a few miles
from Bailleul, thus relieving French troops, upon the arrival of 3rd
Corps (Lt. General Sir Ronald Adam, Bt.).  This Corps consisted of
the 42nd Division (Major-General W. G. Holmes), the 44th
(Major-General E. A. Osborne) and the 51st (Major-General V. M.
Fortune).  Indeed, the British took command of the new sector upon
February 1st.

But the actual relief could not be effected for some time.  An
unexpected delay intervened, "owing to the situation elsewhere in
Europe," and the arrival of 3rd Corps was postponed.  Lord Gort was
also disappointed of certain shipments of ammunition and other war
material upon which he had counted to make up some serious
deficiencies.

However, the 51st Division arrived during early February, accompanied
by the 50th (Motor) Division (Major-General G le Q Martel), and at
the end of March the main body of 3rd Corps was finally despatched to
France.

Yet another disturbing diversion was created by the German invasion
of Denmark and Norway upon April 9th.  Army leave was stopped, and
the 15th Brigade of the 5th Division despatched to England, _en
route_ for Norway.  The air was full, too, of rumours of an immediate
invasion of Belgium and Holland.  Certain units were placed under
short notice to move, and there was much diligent air-reconnaissance.
But the fateful moment was not yet.

It was during this period that the 51st Division, as previously
related, was despatched to the Saar front, and out of Gort's hands
for good.



II

_The Equipment Situation_

Meanwhile the training of the troops and the development of further
defensive positions were continued without relaxation.  By the 10th
May over four hundred concrete pill-boxes had been completed, with
another hundred under construction.  Training areas were being
prepared to accommodate the Armoured Division on arrival; Corps
Schools were established for the training of junior leaders.  In fact
everything that could be done to render the British Expeditionary
Force efficient and, secure seems to have been done--so far as the
men on the spot could do it.


    "But"--says Lord Gort--"the situation as regards equipment,
    though there was latterly some improvement in certain directions,
    caused me serious misgivings, even before men and material began
    to be diverted by the needs of operations elsewhere.  I had on
    several occasions called the attention of the War Office to the
    shortage of almost every nature of ammunition, of which the
    stocks in France were not nearly large enough to permit of the
    rates of expenditure laid down for sustained operations before
    the War."


Grave words.  As matters turned out, the ultimate operations lasted
for too brief a period for these shortages to be felt.  Our disasters
arose from other causes.  But it is none the less uncomfortable to
speculate here as to how our resources would have stood the strain,
had the Battle of Flanders been prolonged for twenty-five weeks
instead of twenty-five days.

The shortages were not primarily the fault of the War Office, nor for
that matter of the Ministry of Supply.  They were the fruit of our
national predilection for a policy of _laisser faire_ and wishful
thinking.  But the net result was that the Army had to be asked to
make the best of what it could get, until the machinery of production
could provide in full for the needs of all three Services.  And to
that all too familiar appeal the Army was to make, as the event
proved, its usual heroic response, and more.



III

_Plans of Action_

During all these months Lord Gort and his staff had been eagerly
concerned to know the exact part to be played by the British
Expeditionary Force in the event of an advance into Holland and
Belgium.

In his Despatch Lord Gort refrains from comment upon the merits of
the plans ultimately unfolded.


    "The question of such an advance," he says, "was one of high
    policy, with a political as well as a military aspect.  It was
    therefore not for me to comment on it: my responsibilities were
    confined to ensuring that the orders issued by the French for the
    employment of the British Expeditionary Force were capable of
    being carried out."


He adds, with a touch of proper pride: "Events proved that the orders
issued for this operation were well within the capacity of the Force."

The plans themselves were complicated and hampered from the start by
the dogged policy of neutrality _à l'outrance_ adopted and maintained
by the Belgian Government.

If Belgium were invaded by the enemy, it was obvious that the Allies
would have to enter her territory and assist in her defence.  In
other words, a joint Defence Scheme was plainly indicated.  Yet, says
Lord Gort:--


    "The French authorities were never in a position to obtain
    reliable and accurate details of the plans of the Belgian General
    Staff....  Such slender contact as existed between the British
    and Belgian Military authorities was maintained through the
    Military Attaché at His Majesty's Embassy at Brussels and General
    Van Overstraeten, Military Adviser to the King of the Belgians."


However, it was assumed that in the event of an attempted invasion of
their country the Belgian Army would be found occupying the best
available defensive positions along the Germano-Belgian frontier,
utilising such natural protection against tank attack as that offered
by the deep-set River Meuse and the Albert Canal.  It was further
understood that the Belgians were preparing an anti-tank obstacle
running south from Wavre to Namur, and covering an area particularly
vulnerable to tank-attack, known as the Gembloux Gap.

The obvious plan then was to distribute the Allied forces behind the
Belgian Army, ready to go forward to their support.



IV

_The Escaut and the Dyle_

Three alternative plans were devised upon by the French High Command,
in which Lord Gort agreed to play his part.  In order to visualise
their nature it will be well to consider the map of Belgium in some
detail.

Behind the positions presumably to be occupied by the Belgian Army
lie three rivers, roughly parallel with one another, the Dyle, the
Dendre, and the Escaut--presenting a valuable series of natural tank
obstacles.  The most easterly of the three is the Dyle, the most
westerly the Escaut, with the Dendre in between.  Owing to
uncertainty as to the reliability of the Belgian defences, the first
plan considered by Lord Gort and General Georges was upon what may be
called Safety First lines.  It consisted simply in manning the
Franco-Belgian frontier defences, and pushing forward mobile troops
to the line of the Escaut, while the French 7th Army on Lord Gort's
left held the enemy on the line of the Messines Ridge and the Yser
Canal.

This plan was soon discarded, probably as being a little too
Maginot-minded, and it was next proposed to secure and hold the line
of the Escant itself, from the point at which it crosses the Belgian
frontier at Maulde, northward to the neighbourhood of Ghent, where it
was intended to make junction with the Belgian forces extending to
the sea-coast.  From the Escaut armoured cars would reconnoitre as
far eastward as the second river, the Dendre, from which delaying
actions could be fought back to the Escaut itself.  This was known as
Plan E, and offered the great advantage that the Escaut positions
were within a day's march of the frontier, and could be quickly and
easily occupied.

Meanwhile, however, the French authorities had been acquiring further
information regarding the defences of the Belgian Army, and had
formed the opinion--much too optimistic, as the event was to
prove--that it would be safe to count on the Belgian defences near
the Germano-Belgian frontier holding fast for a considerable time,
despite the absence there of anything in the nature of a Maginot Line.

The third plan was therefore considered--namely, to advance to the
most easterly of our three rivers, the Dyle, and take up a prepared
position there instead of upon the Escaut.

This was known as Plan D, and was ultimately adopted.  Its advantages
were that it offered a shorter line of defence, together with greater
depth; also, its northern end was inundated.  Lastly, it represented
smaller enemy occupation of Belgian territory.  On the other hand it
would involve the B.E.F. in a forward move of sixty miles against
time, over unreconnoitred country.

A final conference was held on 16th November at Folembray, the
headquarters of the French First Group of Armies, and Plan D was
confirmed.  There were present, besides Lord Gort and General
Georges, General Billotte, of whom we are to hear a good deal in the
future, and Generals Blanchard and Corap, commanding the French 1st
and 9th Armies.  It was agreed that the frontage of the B.E.F.
position on the Dyle was to be from Wavre to Louvain.

Plan E, however, was not entirely abandoned.  Both plans were worked
out in complete detail as alternatives to one another, in so far as
they could be worked out at all; for it must be remembered that they
could only exist so far upon paper.  No actual reconnaissance, troop
movement, or disposition could be made across the Belgian frontier
until the Belgian Government gave the word.

It may be added here, however, that these plans, based though they
were upon theory and supposition, actually worked out to schedule in
all respects.



V

_The Final Plan_

Generally speaking, the proposed defence scheme against invasion from
Germany now worked out as follows:--

The Allied line, beginning at Antwerp in the north, would run south
via Louvain, Wavre and Namur, thus covering Brussels itself.  The
British sector, extending from Louvain to Wavre, would have upon its
right the 1st French Army (Général d'Armée Blanchard), and upon the
left the French Seventh Army (Général d'Armée Giraud).  The plans of
this Army included a possible advance into Holland, and this actually
took place.

It was understood that the Belgian Army, if forced to withdraw from
its frontier defences, would come into the line upon the left of the
B.E.F.--that is to say, on a general line from Louvain northward to
Antwerp.

The British front was to be occupied initially by 1st Corps, under
Lt.-General M. G. H. Barker (who had recently taken over the command
from General Sir John Dill, to-day Chief of the Imperial General
Staff), on a two-division front on the right, and 2nd Corps on the
left, on a front of one division.  The Divisions in question were to
be the 2nd, 1st and 3rd, in the order named.  The 12th Royal Lancers
(Armoured cars) were to move in advance to a general line some miles
beyond the Dyle, to observe approaches from the east.  The move of
the three Divisions was to be by motor transport, and was to be
completed in 90 hours, continuing both by day and night.  Other
divisions were suitably disposed in positions of reserve.  Detailed
instructions were also issued for the preparation of defences on the
three rivers, for demolitions and inundations, and the organisation
of road traffic--including refugees, for whom special routes had been
allotted.



VI

_A Disquieting Report_

Any doubts which might have been entertained by Lord Gort regarding
the advisability of occupying the line of the Dyle instead of any
less advanced position were set at rest by some eleventh-hour news
regarding the Belgian tank-obstacle.

It now transpired that this obstacle, instead of covering the
dangerous Gembloux Gap, as reported, was sited much further eastward,
upon the line Namur-Perwez-Louvain, and was, moreover, not by any
means completed.


    "On the British front," says Lord Gort, "the River Dyle was so
    far superior as an anti-tank obstacle to any artificial work
    further east which the Belgians might be preparing, that I had no
    hesitation in urging adherence to the existing plan for the
    defence of the Dyle position."


The French 1st Army were in a different case.  They had no natural
obstacle to defend them, and this rendered them much more dependent
upon what the Belgians might or might not be constructing to the east
of them.

Definite information upon the matter was urgently demanded, but it
was not destined to be forthcoming in time.

* * * * * * * *

Such was the general situation in the first week in May, 1940, and
such were the plans which had been formulated and worked out, so far
as was possible under the conditions imposed.

The time was now fast approaching for the patiently designed machine
to be put to the test.  The "phoney war" was drawing to an end, with
the real thing close upon its heels.




CHAPTER III

BLITZKRIEG

I

_The Day_

The first direct intimation that the period of preparation and
waiting was over, and that active hostilities had begun in earnest,
came from enemy aircraft, which appeared over Lord Gort's
headquarters at Arras at 4.30 a.m. on Friday, 10th May, and dropped
bombs--not only there but upon Doullens, Abbeville, and numerous
aerodromes.

An hour later a message was received from General Georges ordering
instant readiness to move into Belgium.  This was immediately
followed by instructions to put Plan D into operation.

The weather, we are told, was set fair, and remained so, except for
an occasional thunderstorm, for the next three weeks.

The B.E.F. was quickly on the move.  Zero hour was fixed at 1 p.m.
that day, when the 12th Royal Lancers crossed the frontier upon their
dash to the Dyle, amid the cheers of the Belgian populace.  Lord Gort
himself moved to his command post at Wahagnies, midway between Douai
and Lille.

As already stated, Plan D ran almost exactly to schedule.  Enemy
action increased somewhat, but did not interfere with the forward
movement of the troops.  Traffic problems were successfully dealt
with, and the first phase of the plan, the manning of the Dyle
defences, was completed by 12th May.



II

_The Belgian Dispositions_

But already there was disquieting news of the Belgian Army out in
front.  Belgian cyclist troops were falling back upon Huy, on the
Meuse; and at Maestricht, on the frontier further north, it was
reported that they had been forestalled by enemy action from the
rear, and had been unable to demolish important bridges over the
Meuse and Albert Canal.  British bombers were despatched to deny the
crossing of these waters as far as possible, and did some most
effective work.

Next came a report from the reconnoitring French cavalry regarding
the Belgian anti-tank obstacles, which they had now had an
opportunity to examine.  As had been feared, there proved to be no
effective obstacle on the Gembloux line at all.  That on the Perwez
line was not only unfinished, but was badly sited and situated on a
forward slope.

In the circumstances General Georges decided to push out advanced
troops as far as the obstacle, in order to cover the Gembloux Gap.
He expressed a hope that the B.E.F. would conform,  1st and 2nd Corps
accordingly reconnoitred the anti-tank obstacles reputed to exist in
the Forest of Meerdael upon their left front, with a view to sending
forward detachments with anti-tank guns.  It was found that these
obstacles had only been completed in places.

All this was unsatisfactory enough.  Anxiety was heightened by the
information that a German thrust, with at least two armoured
divisions, was developing on the front of the French 9th Army, which
lay beyond the right of the French 1st Army in the Ardennes area,
opposite Luxembourg.

This was alarming news indeed, for two reasons.  In the first place
an attack in this sector had not been considered probable; in the
second it was rumoured that the efficiency and preparedness of the
French 9th Army were not quite on a par with those of the other
French forces in the line.

Lord Gort immediately requested the War Office to expedite the
despatch of our long-awaited 1st Armoured Division.  Indeed it was
sorely needed.  He was destined never to receive it under his
command, though it eventually came into action further south.

All during this day, Sunday, 12th May, there was great activity in
the air, the Royal Air Force battling gallantly to impede the enemy
advance across the Meuse and Albert Canal.  The enemy, however, had
established strong anti-aircraft defences at nodal points.  The
strain, moreover, on the fighter group of the Air Component was very
severe.  It was by now reduced to some fifty aircraft, and although
Lord Gort had asked for four fresh squadrons from home, only one had
arrived.  Still, in the first three days of the invasion the R.A.F.
in France destroyed one hundred and one enemy aircraft, against a
loss of seventy-eight of their own.



III

_Enter General Billotte_

It was high time that a definite scheme of co-ordinated action should
be evolved to meet the dangers which threatened us.

Accordingly, upon this same Sunday a conference was arranged at
Château Casteau, near Mons.  It was attended by the King of the
Belgians, now in supreme command of the Belgian forces, his Military
Adviser, General Van Overstraeten, Monsieur Daladier, Lt.-General H.
R. Pownall, Chief of Staff of the B.E.F., representing Lord Gort, who
was absent on pressing business elsewhere, and General Georges and
General Billotte.  We are to hear a good deal of the last-named in
future, for it was upon his shoulders that the task of co-ordinating
the French, British and Belgian armies in a common defence scheme was
now laid, by general agreement.  The B.E.F. were thus removed from
the direct control of General Georges.

There were no events of major importance during the next day, but it
was understood that the Belgian forces were now withdrawing to the
general line Louvain-Antwerp.

Upon the following day Lord Gort paid a visit to Brussels, where he
met the commanders of First and Second Corps at the British Embassy.
He also visited the King of the Belgians and impressed upon him the
importance of having fresh Belgian troops established early in
position on the British left, to continue the line covering Brussels.

The three squadrons of fighters for the Air Component asked for upon
12th May had now arrived, but it was necessary immediately to put
them at the disposal of Air Marshal Barratt commanding the Advanced
Air Striking Force for use on the French front; for the ominous
reports from the 9th French Army had been confirmed.  The enemy,
bursting through the Ardennes valleys, rendered passable through a
dry and early spring, had crossed the Meuse between Sedan and
Mezières.



IV

_Holland Out_

The tale of early misfortune was not yet complete, for on Wednesday,
15th May, after a heroic but hopeless resistance of less than a week,
the Dutch Army laid down its arms.  This event had little actual
effect upon the B.E.F. in Belgium, but naturally inflicted a further
severe blow upon Belgian morale.

The French 7th Army immediately withdrew its advanced forces to the
neighbourhood of Antwerp, always a position of vital importance; and
at the same time took steps to restore the situation in the Ardennes,
several divisions of this Army being despatched south to the support
of General Corap and the 9th French Army.  This involved a movement
across the rear and communications of the B.E.F., but owing to
efficient traffic control, was accomplished without delaying our
movements or the ordered development of Plan D.

The refugee problem was now becoming acute, and further complicated
because, despite Lord Gort's requests, the Belgian authorities had
done nothing to restrict the use of private motor-cars or the sale of
petrol.




CHAPTER IV

DISASTER ON THE RIGHT

I

_Back from the Dyle_

Before the end of the first week's fighting it had become obvious
that Plan D could not possibly be carried out further.  The situation
had deteriorated too completely.

In the north, Holland was in German hands, while to the south, the
French 9th Army appeared to be in danger of disintegrating
altogether; which meant that Arras and our right flank were already
threatened.  How badly was not yet realised, though the grimmest of
realisation was soon to come.

There had so far been no serious attack upon the Belgian positions
upon our left, nor upon ourselves, except for a temporary penetration
of our forward positions to the south-west of Louvain, which had
speedily been made good.  But the French 1st Army upon our immediate
right were in severe trouble, and had lost ground which they were not
likely to regain, despite the aid supplied by ourselves both on the
ground and in the air.

[Illustration: SITUATION OF B. E. F. 16th MAY, 1940. DIAGRAM 1]

In other words, a prolonged defence on the Dyle position was now out
of the question, and it was up to General Billotte, as co-ordinator
of Allied movements in Belgium, to organise fresh measures--possibly
a reversion to Plan E and a retirement to the line of the Escaut.

Lord Gort had already asked for instructions, especially as regards
timing, for the first step in such a withdrawal was bound to be a
considerable one--a stride in fact of some fifteen or twenty miles to
the Senne Canals, which lay between the Dyle and the Dendre.

He received his orders, and in the sense expected--Plan E and the
line of the Escaut, sixty miles back--that very night.

The withdrawal to the Senne canals was successfully completed by the
afternoon of the next day, but there was a hitch over tanks which was
to have unfortunate consequences.  Some enemy tanks and motorcycle
units had been reported on the right flank of 1st Corps, and as a
precaution, part of the 1st Army Tank Brigade, which had started to
withdraw for entrainment at Brussels, was turned round to meet the
thrust.  This naturally occasioned delay, and when the tanks
ultimately faced about again and arrived at their entraining station,
the necessary railway transport was no longer available, and the
remainder of the move was carried out by road.  This led to
mechanical trouble later.



II

_Break-through_

Meanwhile, what was really happening on the right, down in France?

The situation here on the morning of the 17th had been described as
"obscure", and doubtless it was; for British G.H.Q. were not being
kept too well informed by the French High Command, despite the fact
that Lord Gort contrived to maintain continuous liaison with General
Georges' headquarters.


    "I received no information through this channel," he says, "of
    any steps it was prepared to take to close the gap which might
    have been effected by my own command."


But alas, there was no "obscurity" about the actual situation at all.
The rumoured "gap" had become a corridor.  The enemy, in strength
increasing to ten armoured divisions, had broken through on a front
of some twenty miles south of the Forest of Mormal, and their advance
guard of swift tanks and motor-cycles was pouring westward right
across France--across the Meuse, across the Oise, along the Somme,
straight for Abbeville and the coast of France.

Unless the gap could be closed and the westward stream dammed, two
things would happen: the Allied Forces would be cut in half, and the
British Lines of Communication, which it will be remembered did not
run straight back to such ports as Calais and Boulogne, but
diagonally and south-westerly through Amiens, to Cherbourg, Brest,
and beyond, would be traversed and broken, perhaps beyond repair.



III

_Defence of Rearward Areas_

Having anticipated somewhat, let us return to Lord Gort's
Headquarters.  Here, at last, upon the night of Sunday, the 19th,
Lord Gort was informed by General Billotte of the full nature of the
break-through in the south, and of the steps which were being taken
to deal with it, including the tasks to be undertaken by the B.E.F.

There were in the rearward areas at this time, strung out roughly
south-westward upon our lines of communication, three British
Divisions which have not yet been mentioned--the 12th, 23rd, and
46th, consisting of eight or nine battalions each, with divisional
engineers but no artillery.  Their signals and administration units
were in no more than skeleton form; so were their armament and
transport.  In fact these divisions had merely been brought out to
France to work and train, and there had been no present intention
that they should undertake combatant duties, for which they were
ill-equipped and only partially prepared.  But every man was needed
now, and right nobly did this improvised defence force rise to the
nightmare emergencies of the moment.


    "Troops of these three divisions," says Lord Gort, "fought and
    marched continuously for a fortnight, and proved, if proof were
    needed, that they were composed of soldiers who, despite their
    inexperience and lack of equipment, could hold their own with a
    better found and more numerous enemy."


He spoke no more than the truth, as we shall see.

The first of these divisions put to work was the 23rd, who were
ordered by General Georges to occupy the line of the Canal du Nord,
on a frontage of 15 miles, from Ruyalcourt (10 miles north of
Peronne) to Arleux (6 miles south of Douai).  They moved to their
positions during 17th May, and were provided with about forty field,
anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns from ordnance reserves.

They thus faced east, with Rear G.H.Q., at Arras, behind them.



IV

_Further Improvisations_

But Arras WAS still inadequately protected, for just to the south lay
the break in the line through which the tide of invasion was pouring.
To formulate a plan for closing the gap was the business of the
French High Command--presumably by means of a strong counter-attack
launched both from north and south.

Meanwhile Lord Gort took immediate action to protect his own rear
G.H.Q.  The Commander, Lines of Communication Area, was ordered to
collect every available man, and to despatch the 12th and 46th
Divisions to the forward zone.  The position of the 23rd Division at
Ruyalcourt was strengthened by the despatch of a brigade of the 12th
Division, with four field guns, to cover the north-western exits from
Peronne, further south; while engineer parties prepared for the
demolition of crossings over the Canal du Nord between the Somme and
Ruyalcourt.

Further back towards the Somme various local defence units were
extemporised.  Few of these, or their commanders, had any previous
experience of fighting, but their determination was beyond all
praise.  A mobile bath unit played a stout part in the defence of St.
Pol, twenty miles to the west of Arras; while General Construction
Companies of the Royal Engineers and units of the Royal Army Service
Corps placed their own localities in a state of defence and manned
them until they were "overwhelmed, relieved, or ordered to withdraw."

The defence of Arras itself was entrusted to the O.C. 1st Battalion
Welsh Guards, who had under him some units of the Royal Engineers, an
Overseas Defence battalion (the 9th West Yorks), and an improvised
tank squadron.

One further improvisation should be mentioned here--the assembly of a
mixed force under Major-General F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, Lord Gort's
Director of Military Intelligence.  This force was known as Macforce,
and its task was to guard against a more immediate threat to the
right flank of the B.E.F. itself (now engaged in withdrawing to the
line of the Escaut), by covering the crossings upon the River Scarpe,
from Rache, a few miles north-east of Douai, to St. Amand.

But these could be but makeshifts until or unless the gap was closed,
and the continuity of the Allied line restored.




CHAPTER V

THE THREAT TO THE BRITISH FLANK

I

_Back to the Escaut_

Let us now return to the main body of the B.E.F., which it will be
remembered, had completed the first stage of its withdrawal from the
Dyle by reaching the Senne Canals on 17th May.

The next step plainly was to get back to the Escaut itself, and that
speedily; for the situation on the right flank was too hazardous to
permit of a moment's delay.  Lord Gort found himself in a momentary
dilemma here, for while General Billotte had ordered a withdrawal
that night, another order, from General Georges, seemed to
contemplate a wait of a further twenty-four hours.  Eventually, at
Lord Gort's urgent representation, General Billotte's original order
was adhered to, and arrangements for withdrawal to the Escaut were
put in hand at once.  The new line was to be held by six divisions,
two from each Corps of the B.E.F., extending from a bridge over the
Escaut at Bleharies to Audenarde inclusive.

At the same time the Belgian Army upon our left (after a short delay
due to the late arrival of orders) began a conforming movement to the
rear.  In the first stage they duly effected a junction with the
B.E.F. on the Dendre at Alost, without undue pressing by the enemy.

On our right, the line of the French 1st Army now ran through Mons
and Maubeuge, and was subject to fierce attention by enemy tanks.

Enemy bombing too was soon intensified along the British front, and
our fighters were kept busy during the hours of daylight.

However, by Sunday morning, 19th May, the withdrawal to the Escaut
was successfully and punctually completed.  But here a disappointment
waited.  The Escaut at normal level would have offered a formidable
tank obstacle.  But this level was found to be dangerously low--in
places less than three feet deep.  Sluices had been closed, it
seemed, by the French in the Valenciennes area, to produce
inundations--at the expense of the water defences on the front of the
B.E.F.  Co-ordination had gone wrong somewhere.

There for a moment we must leave our main body, to study further
developments upon the threatened right flank of the Allied forces.



II

_Penetration Completed_

Here the situation was steadily worsening.  The enemy had during 18th
May definitely penetrated as far as Amiens.  Our communications over
the Somme with Abbeville were still holding next day, and the town
itself was placed in a state of defence; but there seemed little
doubt that the armoured fighting vehicles of the enemy, reckoned in
this area at five divisions, would shortly penetrate to the coast
itself and so complete the traversing of our Lines of Communication,
and the cutting-off from the B.E.F. of the great bulk of its
reserves, whether for the purpose of maintenance or replacement.

In anticipation of this, however, several days' supplies had been for
some time accumulated and maintained north of the Somme.  This was
just as well, for two days later the enemy had not only reached
Abbeville, but was pushing a column forward to Boulogne.

In other words, our position was turned.  Failing the restoration of
the original line, or something like it, our only hope now was to
bend our right wing back and back until it faced south instead of
east, and so establish, as it were, a defensive wall along the north
side of the corridor, with what resources we could muster.

To sum up the situation at the moment, what may be called the B.E.F.
proper was, as we know, extended along the line of the Escaut, facing
roughly east.  The line was continued south by Macforce, covering the
Scarpe crossings.  Further south still, and facing east, lay our 23rd
Division, which it will be remembered had been ordered by General
Georges himself to hold part of the line of the Canal du Nord.  How
much of that line was really being held was not quite clear, owing to
the fact that a further order had been issued from French
Headquarters, allotting to the 23rd Division the sector
Peronne-Ruyalcourt instead of the sector Ruyalcourt-Arleux, which the
French apparently proposed to take over themselves, though they did
not immediately do so.

The only evident and indisputable fact was that from Peronne
southwards there was no Allied line at all.

To protect our right flank, thus exposed, yet another emergency force
was swiftly and efficiently improvised, under Major-General R. L.
Petre, commanding the 12th Division.  He was given charge of the
troops holding the Canal du Nord and the garrison of Arras.  This was
called Petreforce.  Meanwhile all troops not required for defence
(including rear G.H.Q., at Arras) were moved back in two echelons to
Hazebrouck and Boulogne in accordance with a plan previously
prepared.  Lord Gort resumed his former headquarters at Wahagnies.



III

_The Royal Air Force Affected_

Perhaps the most serious effect of the German penetration was that it
rendered our aerodromes in France untenable.

The Advanced Air Striking Force, which had been quartered in the
neighbourhood of Rheims ever since the previous autumn, now moved to
Central France, whence it could still operate; while the Air
Component transferred one of their main operational aerodromes from
Poix to Abbeville.  Under overwhelming enemy pressure even this was
abandoned upon 19th May.  Thereafter all arrangements for air
co-operation with the B.E.F. had to be conducted from England, though
an advanced landing ground was maintained at Merville for three days
longer.

Even under these trying and difficult circumstances organization and
cohesion were still maintained.  The air liaison work was carried out
in England itself, and the targets were selected and visited in
accordance with requests from the B.E.F.--telephoned or telegraphed
home so long as communication remained open.



IV

_A Council of War_

At midnight on 12th May, with the general situation as described
above, General Billotte paid a visit to Lord Gort at his
headquarters, and gave him an account of the measures which he
proposed to take to restore the situation upon the front of the
French 9th Army, though it was obvious that he had little faith in
his own prescription.

Lord Gort himself cherished few illusions upon the subject,
especially since from the reports received from his own liaison
officers, he was extremely doubtful as to whether the French had
enough reserves at their disposal south of the gap to furnish a
counter-attack northwards sufficiently powerful to close the gap and
restore the line.

However, all possibilities were considered.  Three alternative
courses were open to General Billotte and the French, Belgian and
British forces under his command.

The first and obvious--and, it may be added, only effective--course
was to bridge the gap by vigorous counter-attacks, delivered
simultaneously from north and south of it.  If this could be done, it
would be possible in theory to maintain the present line of the
Escaut, or at any rate the frontier defences, and continue it
southward on one or other of the canal lines.  But this was to prove
a counsel of perfection.

The second alternative was that the forces under General Billotte
should swing back from the line of the Escaut to the line of the
Somme, abandoning Belgium altogether; then turn about and, having
linked up with the French Armies south of the gap, establish a new
line of defence facing roughly north-east.

The advantage of this plan lay in the fact that it would greatly
shorten the B.E.F. lines of communication, based as they were upon
French ports far to the south and south-west.  On the other hand, it
would mean either leaving the Belgian Army to shift for itself, or
else to accompany the B.E.F., to the total abandonment of the soil of
Belgium.

However, with the enemy by this time already in Amiens, such a move
would appear to have been checkmated from the start, and there is no
evidence that it was ever seriously contemplated by the French
authorities.

Failing Alternative Number One, then, there remained only Alternative
Number Three--the counsel of desperation.

This was to fight a rearguard action towards the Channel ports,
making use of successive river and canal lines, and there establish a
"defensive perimeter," or final barrier, to cover the evacuation of
the B.E.F. to England, accompanied perhaps by French and Belgian
troops.

It was an agonising prospect, but the possibility of it at least had
to be considered; for there was no blinking the fact now that if the
situation deteriorated much further and the mortal wound in the
Allied line was left open, surrender or annihilation might be the
only other alternatives.  Here is Lord Gort's own dispassionate
appreciation of the situation on that fateful night.  One can imagine
with what feelings it must have been reached:--


    "I realised that this course was in theory a last alternative,
    and it would involve the departure of the B.E.F. from the theatre
    of war at a time when the French might need all the support which
    Britain could give them.  It involved the virtual certainty that
    even if the excellent port facilities at Dunkirk continued to be
    available, it would be necessary to abandon all the heavier guns
    and much of the vehicles and equipment.  Nevertheless, I felt
    that in the circumstances there might be no other course open to
    me."


But only "_might_."  The battle was not yet lost by any means, and
ten days of heroic if unavailing effort still lay ahead of the B.E.F.
and their tenacious leader.




CHAPTER VI

HITTING BACK

I

_The Defensive Flank_

The French 1st army, on our right, had been falling back in the
direction of Douai and Cambrai--towards the positions, in fact,
occupied by Macforce on the Scarpe and Petreforce along the Canal du
Nord.

On the night of the 19th May this Army, which was in a state of
considerable disorganisation after its hard fighting, took up
positions on the line of the Escaut, upon the right of our own 1st
Corps, as far south as Bouchain, some ten miles south-east of Douai.
But there, instead of continuing south to Cambrai (which according to
Lord Gort's information was not held in strength by the enemy) the
line was bent suddenly westward along the river Sensée.

This was certainly not going to help to close the gap, and it became
obvious to Lord Gort that he must take further and immediate steps to
establish his defensive flank to the south of the B.E.F.  This was
promptly done.  The 50th Division were sent to take up positions
along the line of the canal running north-west from Douai to La
Bassée--that is, on the right of Macforce.  This placed the Division
in a suitable position for the counter-attack to the south which it
was hoped shortly to deliver.

Meanwhile the 23rd Division, who had been holding on stoutly to the
Canal du Nord against heavy odds, were withdrawn, not without loss,
to a line on the Scarpe east of Arras.

Thus, by the evening of 19th May, the defensive flank was beginning
to materialise, extending as it now did as far as La Bassée.  The
situation was slightly easier.

But the Germans were in Amiens.  The kaleidoscope had taken a further
and definite twist, and a new and ominous pattern was beginning to
emerge.  It was no longer that of a line temporarily broken, but of a
besieged fortress.

"To raise such a siege," says Lord Gort, "a relieving force must be
sent from the south, and to meet this force a sortie of the defenders
was indicated."



II

_A Visit from the C.I.G.S._

That attempt was now about to be made, and not before it was time;
for the breach south of Arras had deepened and widened.  The enemy
armoured forces appeared to be directed upon two main objectives: one
down the valley of the Somme on Abbeville, and the other toward
Hesdin and Montreuil, on a course obviously set for the Channel
ports.  Arras was now hard pressed, though the Welsh Guards were
still holding on most gallantly.

Before Lord Gort could proceed further with his plans for a
counter-attack, he received a visit, early on the morning of 20th
May, from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Edmund
Ironside, bearing with him Cabinet instructions to the effect that
the B.E.F. was "to move southward upon Amiens, attacking all enemy
forces encountered, and to take station upon the left of the French
Army."

This practically amounted to an amplification of the second of the
three alternative plans discussed by Lord Gort and General Billotte
thirty-six hours previously--a plan discarded as impracticable then
and infinitely more difficult of execution now.  It was obvious that
the Cabinet instructions were based upon incomplete, or rather,
obsolete information regarding the present situation--which was not
altogether surprising, considering the breathless speed with which
events were moving.

Lord Gort did not hesitate, therefore, to point out to the C.I.G.S.
the almost impossible nature of the operation proposed.  He would
have in the first place to disengage seven divisions from the fierce
embrace of the enemy along the Escaut; he would have not only to
fight a rearguard action all the way to the Somme, but at the same
time attack into an area, including Amiens and the line of the Somme
itself, already strongly occupied by the enemy; and this with both
his flanks most inadequately guarded, if indeed they would be guarded
at all.  Secondly, the administrative situation made it impossible to
maintain offensive operations upon the necessary scale for any length
of time.  His communications were threatened, if not already cut, and
it was more than likely that if he exhausted his present supply of
weapons and ammunition, he would be unable to replenish them.
Thirdly, he was more than doubtful, if he attempted such a movement,
whether either the French 1st Army or the Belgians would be in a
position to conform.

Nevertheless, he added, he was prepared and determined to launch an
attack of some kind in a southerly direction.  Indeed he had already
arranged to do so to the south of Arras, with the 5th and 50th
Divisions, his only available reserves, the following morning.

General Ironside at once recognised the force of Lord Gort's
contentions, and agreed with the action which he proposed to take.
The C.I.G.S. then proceeded, accompanied by General Pownall, to Lens,
where he met Generals Billotte and Blanchard.  Here he explained the
coming operation by the 5th and 50th Divisions; with which General
Billotte fully agreed, and promised to co-operate with two divisions.

Before returning to England General Ironside, in order to emphasize
the seriousness of the situation and the need for vigorous action,
sent a telegram to General Georges, saying that in his opinion the
Allied Army Group under General Billotte--that is, the French 1st
Army, the Belgian Army, and the B.E.F.--would inevitably and finally
be outflanked and surrounded unless the 1st French Army made an
immediate move southward on Cambrai; or unless General Georges
himself launched a counter-attack northward from Peronne.



III

_Counter Attack to the South_

Lord Gort immediately embarked upon his preparations for the coming
attack or his share therein.  The 5th Division was ordered to join
the 50th in the Vimy area, and its commander, Major-General Franklyn,
was placed in command of all the British troops operating in and
around Arras.  Frankforce, as it was to be called, consisted besides
the 5th and 50th Divisions (each of two brigades only) of the 1st
Army Tank Brigade, already reduced in strength, together with the
somewhat scattered and dog-weary Petreforce and the force under the
O.C. 12th Royal Lancers.

Next day, 21st May, General Franklyn attacked.  His immediate object
was to secure the line of the rivers Scarpe and Cojeul: he then
proposed to exploit success by advancing next day to the Sensée, and
thence towards Bapaume and Cambrai.  He had the full and willing
support of General Prioux, commanding the French Cavalry Corps of
light tanks, not more than one out of four of which, however, was now
fit for action.  Still, even in their reduced strength, these
afforded some protection to either flank of Frankforce.

There, however, French support ended.  It will be remembered that
General Billotte had undertaken to co-operate in General Franklyn's
attack with two divisions of the French 1st Army, and a conference
had even been arranged for the evening of 21st May at General
Franklyn's headquarters, to arrange final details.  But no
representative of the French forces put in an appearance.

Later, it is true, General Franklyn received a letter from General
Billotte to say that the two divisions might be able to move the
following night.  But the time factor was vital, and Franklyn
attacked with such forces as he had available--the 1st Army Tank
Brigade, the 151st Infantry Brigade of the 50th Division, and 13th
Brigade of the 5th Division, all under General Martel.  The French
1st Light Mechanised Division co-operated, as promised.

Enemy opposition proved stronger than was expected.  Nevertheless the
tired but indomitable British troops were not to be denied, and
reached their objectives for the day.  They inflicted casualties,
took some prisoners and put heavy tanks to flight--a most significant
feat.  That however was the limit of their achievement.  It was bound
to be, without the support of the French upon the left.  Moreover our
own tanks, which had been on the road continuously since leaving
Brussels (for reasons already explained) were inevitably developing
mechanical trouble.



IV

_The End of Arras_

All General Franklyn could do now was to hold his ground for as long
as possible.  He extended his line further westward, but to no
purpose: the enemy continued to outflank him.  There was increasing
pressure upon his right, and enemy troops were reported working round
to the southern outskirts of Bethune and the road from Lens to
Carvin.  If Frankforce was not to be hemmed in, it must be withdrawn.

So Lord Gort issued the necessary orders, and the gallant 5th and
50th Divisions, having delivered their lone offensive and inflicted
heavy losses upon the enemy, withdrew to the area round Seclin (south
of Lille) where they would be most favourably placed to take part in
any further counter-attack that might be staged.

So ended the defence of Arras, whose small garrison had provided an
invaluable delaying action and rendered possible the fresh
dispositions which had now to be made.  From information received
long afterwards it is clear that the retention of Arras must have
seriously delayed the German advance, for Arras was a nodal point of
communications essential for the advance of their northernmost
armoured divisions.




CHAPTER VII

THE ENEMY REACH THE CHANNEL

I

_The Canal Line_

It had now become urgently necessary to organise a continuous series
of defences for what was developing into the south-western front of
the B.E.F. along the canal line extending from the Escaut to La
Bassée, and thence to St. Omer and the sea.

By the 22nd May the whole of this line, some eighty-five miles long,
from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse (west of St. Amand) was
divided into sectors, for each of which a British commander was
responsible.

Yet another "force" was improvised--Polforce, this time--(originally
organised to defend St. Pol) under Major-General Curtis, commanding
the 46th Division.  To this force was allotted the protection of the
canal-line between Aire and Carvin.  Brigadier C. M. Usher, Commander
of one of the lines of communication Sub-Areas, was placed in charge
of the right bank of the river Aa, from St. Omer to Gravelines.
(Enemy detachments had already reached the left bank.)  He had under
him the 6th Green Howards of the 23rd Division and five batteries of
heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunction with certain French
troops of the Secteur Fortifié des Flandres.

The total strength of the troops on the Canal line did not at this
time exceed 10,000 men.  Stops were constructed, demolitions
prepared, but our supply of anti-tank weapons was woefully
inadequate.  There were hardly enough to cover all the
crossing-places.



II

_Withdrawal in Belgium_

Let us now return to our eastern front, and what may be called the
B.E.F. proper.

Here, upon the afternoon of 21st May, Lord Gort met his three Corps
Commanders.  These reported continuous fighting against very strong
and growing forces, and stated that in their unanimous opinion it
would be impossible to occupy the present line for more than another
twenty-four hours.

It was therefore decided provisionally to swing back to the defences
constructed by the B.E.F. along the Belgian frontier during the
previous winter, employing Maulde as the pivot.

But first Lord Gort had to consult the French and the Belgians: the
latter in particular would be seriously affected by the move.  He
accordingly proceeded to Ypres, where he met the King of the Belgians
and General Billotte.

It was here agreed that the Escaut should be abandoned, and that the
Allied Armies should occupy a line from Maulde northward to Halluin,
thence along the Lys to Courtrai and Ghent.  A glance at the map will
show that this disposition would leave the Belgian left flank in a
dangerously advanced position: and the King of the Belgians was
asked, if he were forced to withdraw, if he would fall back upon the
line of the Yser.  He agreed, with evident reluctance.

General Gamelin had now finally disappeared from the scene, and
General Weygand has assumed command of the Allied Forces.  He had
visited General Billotte the previous day, and had indicated that the
long-promised counter-attack from the south was being planned for the
following day, 22nd May.  Vain hope.



III

_Communications Finally Severed_

So much, then, for the immediate dispositions and exertions of our
beleaguered garrison.  Let us next consider for a moment the position
of the forces left outside.

These consisted of the Lines of Communication Troops, extending
south-westward to the base posts, under Major-General P. de
Fonblanque: the 51st Division, now returning from the Saar, and the
Armoured Division, which had at last arrived in France.  There were
in addition some nine battalions of the 12th and 46th Divisions, and
troops of the Pioneer Corps.

By 21st May enemy penetration into the rearward areas had increased
to such an extent that communication across the Somme was finally
severed.  On 23rd May, therefore, the War Office appointed General
Sir Henry Karslake to command the defences of the Lines of
Communication: in other words, the whole of the above-mentioned
force, with whose fortunes we are in consequence not further
concerned in this narrative, as they are now permanently removed from
Lord Gort's control.

The loss of the long-awaited Armoured Division was a sore
disappointment to Lord Gort, and he continued to urge the War Office
to use their best endeavours to enable the Division to break through
to his aid.  But the barrier, as matters turned out, proved
impenetrable.



IV

_Boulogne and Calais Isolated_

Upon the same day as the conference at Ypres, 21st May, news was
received that an enemy column of all arms was approaching Boulogne
from the direction of Abbeville.

This was a shock indeed, for it brought the enemy to a district of
France which has always been regarded by the British nation as a
haven of peace.  More serious still, it gave him continuous land
observation right across the Channel to the cliffs of Dover.

The rear elements of G.H.Q., including the Adjutant-General's branch
and the War Correspondents, had arrived in Boulogne on 18th May, but
had been moved to Wimereux the next day, as the result of bombing.

The defence of Boulogne and Calais, each an isolated episode in the
battle, was of great service in delaying the German advance up the
coast towards Dunkirk, and in enabling non-essential troops to be
evacuated in good order.

At Boulogne all possible steps had been taken to put the town into a
state of defence with the troops available, consisting of labour
units and the personnel of rest-camps.  The hospitals at Etaples were
evacuated, the bridges over the Canche demolished.  When the danger
became acute the War Office despatched from home a contingent of the
Royal Marines, followed by the 20th Guards Brigade.  These put up a
most strenuous and valuable defence until ordered to evacuate the
port, which they did upon 25th May, being taken off by a destroyer
under heavy fire.  One company of the Welsh Guards, heavily engaged
at some distance from the harbour, did not receive the order to
withdraw, and was left behind in the darkness.  Hampered by the
presence of unarmed civilians and refugees, they fought until
overwhelmed.

At Calais a similar gallant stand was made, this time by the King's
Royal Rifle Corps, the Rifle Brigade, Queen Victoria's Rifles, and
the 3rd Battalion Royal Tank Regiment, who were sent across from
Dover by order of the War Office.  Calais was soon completely
isolated, but a dogged defence was maintained until 27th May, by
which time the Dunkirk Perimeter had been organised and manned.




CHAPTER VIII

THE WEYGAND PLAN

I

_The Kaleidoscope Accelerates_

It is almost impossible from this point, and for some days on, to
give a continuous and coherent narrative of events.  We were by this
time fighting both on the eastern, or Belgian front, and upon the
southern, or canal front, while various detachments defended isolated
posts throughout the Pas de Calais and towards the Somme.  In
addition, Lord Gort was still making desperate and loyal attempts, as
we shall see, to co-operate in a counter-attack, or sortie, from
north to south.  Various troop movements were also on foot, by which
certain British units, at present in the line, were to be replaced by
French and Belgian troops, and so set free either for the
consolidation of the Canal line or for offensive operations to the
south.

It is therefore impossible to study the pattern as a whole: it never
remains the same now for more than a few hours, or minutes.  The
kaleidoscope is no longer merely twisting and turning: it is whirling
and racing.



II

_Lack of Liaison_

Lord Gort's difficulties were increased to a grievous extent by the
fact that only once during the weeks that the Battle of Flanders
raged--when the withdrawal from the line of the Dyle began--did he
secure written orders from the French First Group of Armies, under
whose nominal co-ordination his Force was serving.  His co-operation
with his immediate superior, General Billotte, was of the most
friendly and cordial character, but their agreement, though complete,
never got past the verbal stage.  General Billotte, moreover, was
fatally injured in a motor accident on the night of 21st May.  He was
succeeded in his functions as co-ordinator by General Blanchard,
commanding the French 7th Army; but this was never officially
confirmed.

Lord Gort suffered a further disadvantage in receiving from home
orders to initiate and carry out operations which, owing to the speed
with which events were moving, had become impracticable almost before
the orders were issued.  General Ironside's visit to that end has
already been described.

Now came Cabinet action, in the form of a very strong telegram from
the Prime Minister to M. Reynaud, the new French Premier, demanding
that French Commanders both in the north and south areas--which by
this time were completely cut off from one another--together with
Belgian G.Q.G., should be given the most stringent orders to execute
"Weygand's Plan, which alone could turn defeat into victory."

The Weygand plan was for a counter-offensive on a very large scale.
The part allotted to the B.E.F. was to join with the French 1st Army
on its left in attacking to the south-west, with the Belgian Cavalry
Corps on its right.

That was the general idea, but of details there were none.  As
already noted, Lord Gort did not receive any written orders from the
French; he had no information from any source as to the exact
location either of allied or enemy forces on the far side of the gap;
his own troops were heavily engaged on his eastern and southern
fronts, and his lines of communication were threatened, if not cut.
Nor could he feel very optimistic about the extent of the support
which might be expected from the French 1st Army.  Moreover, the
Belgian cavalry, even if available, would have had to travel forty
miles across country to get into position.  The French mechanized
divisions and his own armoured units had already suffered severe
losses, which had definitely reduced their strength.  In addition,
his available ammunition at the moment only amounted to some 300
rounds per gun.

Finally, the Weygand plan was apparently based upon the belief, quite
erroneous, that the French 7th Army had recaptured Peronne, Albert,
and Amiens--the line of the Somme, in fact.  In other words, the plan
had no substance at all.  Nothing had been verified, nothing worked
out, nothing co-ordinated.  Never was a British General called upon
to participate in a more nebulous or unpromising operation.

However, Lord Gort saw General Blanchard, and proposed that to
implement their part in the Weygand plan, Blanchard's Army Group
should stage an attack southwards, with two British divisions and one
French division under Sir Ronald Adam, and the French Cavalry Corps.
At the same time Lord Gort reiterated, both to General Blanchard and
our own Secretary of State, the self-evident proposition that the
main effort must come from south of the gap, and that the northern
forces, beleaguered and hammered as they were upon every side, could
effect little more than a sortie.

Owing to the necessity of finding time to effect the essential troop
movements and reliefs, Lord Gort stated that he could not be ready
until 26th May.  It was then 23rd May.

There is no need to enlarge further upon this particular operation,
as it was destined never to take place.  Once more events had moved
too quickly.



III

_Administration Problems_

Before returning to the beleaguered garrison of the irregular salient
which was beginning to form round Dunkirk and Ostende, it may be
interesting and illuminating to consider some of Lord Gort's more
pressing administrative (as opposed to operative) problems during
this trying period, and the steps which were taken to deal with them.

First, the question of supply.  An Army in these days marches not
only upon its stomach, but upon its carburettor, so to say, as well.
Without petrol it would be as helpless as without food or ammunition.

For the first week after the invasion our administrative
arrangements, which formed a part of Plan D, had worked normally.
Then came the break through the French 9th Army, and the
Quartermaster-General, who maintained close touch with Lord Gort
throughout, deemed it advisable to discontinue the use of the railway
through Amiens and Arras, and to switch all traffic via Eu and
Abbeville to Bethune.  He also ordered forward every available
trainload of ammunition to the Hazebrouck area.

[Illustration: SITUATION OF B. E. F. 23rd MAY, 1940. DIAGRAM 2]

The situation continued to deteriorate, and already the spectre of
broken lines of communication, and the consequences thereof, was
raising its head.  New bases must be organised in anticipation.

Straightway shipments of supplies and stores were despatched from
home direct to Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk.  And none too soon, for
the railway at Abbeville was cut on 21st May, leaving a quarter of a
million men separated from their proper bases and in need of some
2,000 tons per day of ammunition, supplies and petrol.

Petrol dumps, so far, were sufficiently abundant, but the food
situation was serious.  Difficulties here had been complicated by the
establishment of so many independent, improvised forces, without
regular organisation for subsistence.  Deficiencies were met to a
certain extent by commandeering Naafi supplies in Lille and through
negotiation with civilian firms.

By 22nd May the situation had grown more threatening still, for the
ports of Calais and Boulogne were definitely out of action and the
greater part of the Railhead Mechanical Transport had been captured.
Effort, however, was never relaxed, and a certain amount of rations
and small arms ammunition continued to arrive by air for a little
longer; but after 23rd May it became impossible for aircraft to land.

Dunkirk was now established as a Base.  Its water supply had been
destroyed, but its wharfage arrangements continued workable till 26th
May, though perpetual air-raids imposed a heavy strain on the dogged
stevedore battalions.  Ultimately cranes and quays were put out of
action, and supplies could only be landed from lighters, on the
beaches.  Yet in spite of all, deliveries were continued to the
troops, somehow, until 30th May.

Improvised arrangements, too, were made for the evacuation of
casualties.  In the restricted space now at the disposal of the
B.E.F., Casualty Clearing Stations had to be turned into hospitals.
Hospital ships continued to berth at Dunkirk till the very end of
things, and casualties were evacuated to them both by road and rail.
Ambulance trains were running as late as 26th May.  But this is to
anticipate.



IV

_A Drastic Step_

On 23rd May Lord Gort was compelled to place the B.E.F. on
half-rations.  When we consider the added strain that such
unavoidable privation must have imposed upon men with more than a
week of continuous and desperate fighting still lying ahead of them,
our admiration for the courage and endurance of the B.E.F. must be
further increased.




CHAPTER IX

BACKS TO THE WALL

I

_A Shrinking Perimeter_

The general dispositions of the B.E.F. and allied forces were now
beginning to contract upon themselves into a definable area, more
easy to visualise than formerly, for the sufficient but regrettable
reason that it was rapidly growing smaller.

Having already written off from this record the Armoured Division,
which, together with the 51st Division and Units of the 12th and
other Divisions, was now irrevocably separated from the B.E.F. by the
gap between north and south, we may confine ourselves to the terrain
occupied by the troops under Lord Gort's immediate command.

This area on Friday, 24th May, after a fortnight's desperate
fighting, formed a rough triangle with sides about fifty miles in
length.  The base consisted of the French and Belgian coast from
Gravelines to Zeebrugge; the apex was situated in the neighbourhood
of Douai.  From Douai to Gravelines ran the Canal line, or southern
face of the triangle, through Bethune and Aire to St. Omer, and
thence along the river Aa to Gravelines and the sea.  (This last
sector had now been taken over by the French.)

Dunkirk itself was controlled, in accordance with French practice, by
the Admiral du Nord, Admiral Abrial.  Under his authority the command
of military forces in this area was assumed on 24th May by General de
Corps d'Armée Fagalde.  This Corps had been fighting hitherto on the
left of the Belgians.

The third side of the triangle, that facing east, consisted roughly
of the original Allied front, as arranged for under Plan E--the
Escaut line.  This sector was held by four British divisions, the
42nd, 1st, 3rd, and 4th, following the frontier line as far as
Halluin; where the Belgian line took over and extended north-eastward
in the direction of Ghent.



II

_The Pincers at Work_

Such was the geographical situation, approximately, on 24th May.  But
a further contraction of the triangle was immediately due.

On 25th May heavy attacks were experienced both on the Canal line and
the Belgian front.  The usual pincer tactics were being employed in
earnest now, the object being to pinch out our last available
seaport, Dunkirk.  So far the chief pressure had been experienced
upon the south front, but now the Belgian front on the Lys was
attacked in full force.  If this broke, the British left would be
seriously compromised.  There was no real rallying point between the
Lys and the Yser, and the route Estaire-Hazebrouck-Dunkirk, Lord
Gort's present main line of communication with the coast, would thus
be rendered impassable.

Lord Gort therefore took immediate steps to extend the British line
northward towards Ypres, from Halluin, along the old Ypres-Comines
Canal.

But plainly the situation was critical, for the breaking of the
Belgian line under present pressure could only be a matter of
time--probably of hours--and the British line itself was already
strung out to the extreme of attenuation.

Sir John Dill, now Chief of the Imperial General Staff, arrived on
the morning of the 25th in response to an invitation from Lord Gort,
and was quick to realise the full implications of the situation.  He
agreed that the counter-attack to the southward fixed for the next
day (the preparations for which have already been described) would
now serve no purpose, and it was later cancelled.  He also
telegraphed to the Secretary of State, informing him of the extreme
gravity of the situation.

Meanwhile the Belgians, as had been feared, were fast falling back
under heavy enemy pressure on the ground and in the air.  In other
words, the eastern wall of the triangle was caving in.



III

_Back to the Lys_

Next morning, the 26th, after a short discussion between Lord Gort
and General Blanchard, it was decided that there was nothing for it
but to withdraw behind the Lys, and a joint plan was immediately
formulated.  It was backs to the wall at last; there could be no
further sorties.

The lay-out of the B.E.F. was beginning to take final shape in the
Allied dispositions.  The area now occupied stretched across the Pas
de Calais like a great cone-shaped bag, with its apex at Douai and
its mouth opening on to the sea between Dunkirk and Nieuport.  The
apex was occupied by the French 1st Army: the sides were manned, for
the most part, by British troops.  Next the sea lay French troops on
the western flank, and French and Belgian on the eastern.

But the bag was still too large for its contents: the perimeter to be
defended, some 128 miles, was too long for the troops now available.
A withdrawal still nearer to the coast was indicated.

A scheme which would reduce the perimeter by some 58 miles was drawn
up and agreed.  The movement was calculated to finish in three days'
time, upon 29th May.

The difficulties of execution were great, for the corridor of
withdrawal was growing narrower as the sides of the bag continued to
contract--especially the south side, where the canal line had been
forced at various points--and troops were beginning inevitably to get
into one another's way.  The roads were few and narrow, and the
French troops added to the difficulties of the situation by bringing
into the area (despite a definite and official veto) considerable
quantities of horse-transport.  Pitiful crowds of refugees added to
the congestion and tragedy of the scene.



IV

_The Final Decision_

On the morning of 26th May an interchange of telegrams took place
between Lord Gort and the Secretary of State for War which put a
definite period to the Battle of Flanders.  Here is the text of the
fateful exchanges.  The first is from the Secretary of State.


    ".... I have had information all of which goes to show that
    French offensive from Somme cannot be made in sufficient strength
    to hold any prospect of functioning with your Allies in the
    North.  Should this prove to be the case you will be faced with a
    situation in which the safety of the B.E.F. will predominate.  In
    such conditions only course open to you may be to fight your way
    back to west, where all beaches and ports east of Gravelines will
    be used for embarkation.  Navy will provide fleet of ships and
    small boats, and R.A.F. would give full support.  As withdrawal
    may have to begin very early, preliminary plans should be
    urgently prepared.

    ".... Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaud to-morrow afternoon,
    when whole situation will be clarified including attitude of
    French to the possible move...."


To this Lord Gort replied that a withdrawal westward had been
arranged between the French and himself that morning.  He stated that
the Belgian news was disquieting, and added these grave words:--


    ".... I must not conceal from you that a great part of the B.E.F.
    and its equipment will inevitably be lost even in best
    circumstances."


Later in the day came a further telegram from the War Office:--


    ".... Prime Minister had conversation M. Reynaud this afternoon.
    Latter fully explained to him the situation and resources French
    Army.  It is clear that it will not be possible for French to
    deliver attack from the south in sufficient strength to enable
    them to effect junction with Northern Armies.  In these
    circumstances no course open to you but to fall back upon coast
    .... M. Reynaud communicating General Weygand, and latter will no
    doubt issue orders in this sense forthwith.  You are now
    authorised to operate towards coast forthwith in conjunction with
    French and Belgian Armies."


So the Weygand plan had been abandoned at last, and the B.E.F. was
bidden to make its own arrangements for a final stand--in other words
for surrender, evacuation, or resistance _à l'outrance_.




CHAPTER X

THE DUNKIRK BRIDGEHEAD

I

_The End of the Belgian Army_

The situation upon the Belgian front was indeed menacing, for the
thing was happening which Lord Gort had always feared--namely, that
the Belgian Army, in its withdrawal, would be forced away to the
north, instead of falling back upon the Yser in contact with the
British; and that he would in consequence be left with a wide gap
between his left flank and the sea.

Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, who had been carrying out liaison duties
with the Belgian Army, took a message in this sense to the King of
the Belgians.  The reply was discouraging: quite evidently the
Belgians were reaching the end of their powers of resistance.

As a last resource, Lord Gort appealed to the Secretary of State for
War direct to bring strong pressure to bear upon the Belgian
Government to maintain touch with the B.E.F.  He sent a similar
message to Sir Roger Keyes, but the Admiral's reply was fated never
to reach him.

The receipt of the reply could have made little difference, for late
upon the following evening, 27th May, Lord Gort was informed by the
French General Koeltz, at Dunkirk, that the King of the Belgians had
already asked for an armistice as from midnight that night.  The blow
was none the less staggering because it was fully expected.

"This," says Lord Gort, "was the first intimation I had received of
this intention, though I had already formed the opinion that the
Belgian Army was now incapable of offering serious or prolonged
resistance to the enemy.

"I now found myself faced with an open gap of twenty miles between
Ypres and the sea."

It is understood to-day that although the King of the Belgians did in
point of fact inform the French Command and Lord Gort of his
intention to capitulate, yet the message was so much delayed in
transit that the man most vitally concerned first heard the news a
bare hour before the time fixed for the surrender.



II

_Evacuation Plans_

However, Lord Gort already had his plans for final withdrawal to a
bridgehead at Dunkirk well in hand.

The task fell into two parts--arrangement for the withdrawal of the
forward troops, still fighting on extended fronts, and the
organisation of a scheme of actual embarkation from Dunkirk and the
beaches of the French and Belgian coasts; beginning with all units
which were not required to continue the battle, and leaving the
fighting troops to the last.  Lord Gort himself was fully occupied
with the first of these; the second he allotted to Lt.-General Sir
Ronald Adam, whose duties as Commander 3rd Corps were now taken over
by Major-General S. R. Wason on the morning of 27th May.

Sir Ronald immediately made contact with General Fagalde, in
conformity with whose orders he was to act, "provided these did not
imperil the safety and welfare of the British troops."

Early that morning a conference was held at Cassel, at which Sir
Ronald Adam, Admiral Abrial and General Fagalde, General Blanchard,
General Prioux (now in command of the French 1st Army), and General
Koeltz (representing General Weygand) were present.  It was probably
the last time they all saw one another.

From that conference emerged the lay-out of the last bastion of all,
the Dunkirk Perimeter.  The French were to be responsible roughly for
the western half, and the British for the eastern.  The news of the
Belgian surrender had not yet broken, the Belgian Army was not
included in the plan, although the Perimeter could have been extended
eastward to include them if necessary.



III

_The Dunkirk Perimeter_

A brief examination of Diagram 3 will reveal the principal features
of the Dunkirk Perimeter as it finally emerged.  It is no longer
necessary, alas, to search the map of Northern France for this unit
or that; all are now contained, or will be shortly, within a shallow
salient some fifteen miles wide and less than ten miles deep at its
deepest, extending from a point on the coast midway between
Gravelines and Dunkirk to Nieuport in Belgium.  There were no quays
or piers except at Dunkirk itself; but at intervals along the dunes
lay the little seaside resorts of Coxyde, La Panne, and
Malo-les-Bains.

[Illustration: SITUATION OF B. E. F. 28th MAY, 1940.  and 31st May,
1940. DIAGRAM 3]

The British sector had its right at Bergues (about seven miles inland
from Dunkirk), whence the line travelled, in a north-easterly
direction, across the frontier and through Furnes to Nieuport.
Canals formed the chief defences, over which the bridges had been
destroyed.  Inundations were also employed in places.

During 27th May troops and their transport began to withdraw into the
Perimeter, and Sir Ronald Adam was soon faced with formidable traffic
problems.  Where troops had received the necessary orders, vehicles
were disabled and abandoned in the assembly areas, but in the
circumstances it was inevitable that there should be stragglers and
units lacking definite instructions.  Refugees, too, impeded progress
everywhere.

These difficulties were no sooner cleared up than the French 60th
Division began to arrive from Belgium; at the same time rearward
elements of their light mechanised divisions appeared from the south.
These were followed by the transport of the French 3rd Corps, mostly
horsed.  None of these seem to have received any orders to leave
their transport outside the Perimeter, and despite the efforts of the
British traffic control units, much transport made its way into the
Perimeter, adding to the congestion.  One even hears stories of
French horsed-transport finding its way to the beaches, where
ultimately the unfortunate horses, lacking food or water, were cut
loose by British soldiers and turned inland.

However, by 28th May Brigadier the Hon. E. F. Lawson, C.R.A., of the
48th Division (lent to Sir Ronald Adam by Major-General Thorne) had
succeeded, by what must have been superhuman efforts, in manning the
Perimeter from Bergues to Nieuport with a number of units, chiefly
artillery.



IV

_The Final Withdrawal_

But the main body of the B.E.F. were not yet within the Perimeter;
nor would be for another forty-eight hours.  They were still fighting
on two fronts, or rather flanks--in the east, on a line running
roughly northward through Armentières and Ypres; and in the west,
under increasing pressure, on a line running northward from
Hazebrouck to Bergues.  In fact, they stood back to back, striving
for as long as possible to hold apart the two sides of the corridor
of evacuation.

It was a desperate time.  Communications were difficult, since
everything was on the move, including G.H.Q. and Corps headquarters.
Enemy pressure was increasing everywhere, and upon the evening of
27th May came the news of the Belgian capitulation.

There was nothing for it now but to withdraw to the sea, man the
Perimeter, and embark as many troops as possible.

There were final difficulties, however, with General Blanchard, whose
orders did not at that time correspond with those of Lord Gort.  Both
had been instructed to form a bridgehead, but General Blanchard, it
appeared, had received no orders regarding the actual evacuation of
his troops.  Moreover General Prioux, commanding the French 1st Army,
now sent word to say that his men were unfit for further exertion,
and that he proposed to remain where he was, between Bethune and
Lille.

It was only at the last moment that, as a result of Lord Gort's
earnest and reiterated appeals to French military pride and prestige,
3rd Corps and the Cavalry Corps of the French 1st Army joined the
B.E.F. within the Perimeter.



V

_A Close Call_

By 30th May the whole of the B.E.F. had been withdrawn within the
Perimeter, after days of desperate rearguard actions and isolated
clashes.  To describe these in detail here is impossible; they are a
matter for the military historian, and their story will ultimately be
told in many technical volumes.

The outstanding peril, however, had been upon the left flank, where
the Belgian surrender had left open the twenty-mile gap already
mentioned, through which German tanks and mobile troops were now
pouring, with Nieuport as their objective.  The bridge across the
canal at Nieuport, a most substantial affair, had not been blown, and
the enemy actually succeeded in establishing a bridgehead in the town
itself.  It must have been a scene of wild confusion.  Some German
troops attempted to cross in rubber boats; others mingled with the
troops of refugees, disguised even as nuns.

But they got no further.  The 4th Division was now in position, and
held firm, assisted by the shelling of enemy troops along the coast
by ships of the Royal Navy.  It had been a near thing, but that gap
was closed.

Embarkation had already begun, and was to continue.  And now it is
time to examine the arrangements made by the Admiralty and home
authorities, which, with the devoted assistance of the Royal Air
Force, were to bring the battered but undefeated B.E.F. safely to
Dover.

But before we do so, before our operations on land become merged with
those upon the sea, let us look back for a moment.

The outstanding point to observe--and it emerges again and again--is
this, that throughout the strain and turmoil of these nightmare
weeks, with overwhelming pressure upon each front and a demoralised
and crumbling ally on either flank, there never seems at any time to
have been loss either of heart or head, or failure to rise to one
desperate emergency after another on the part of the B.E.F.  And that
applies with equal truth to those who led and those who followed.

CHAPTER XI

THALASSA, THALASSA!

I

_The Situation on the Beaches_

Lord Gort himself was now within the Perimeter, at his new and final
headquarters at La Panne--for many months the General Headquarters of
King Albert of Belgium and the remnants of his little Army, during
the Great War.

The B.E.F. had taken up their allotted sectors within the Perimeter,
with 1st Corps on the right, from Bergues to the frontier, and 2nd
Corps on the left, from the frontier, through Furnes, to the Nieuport
bridgehead.  3rd Corps held the canal running south from Dunkirk to
Bergues, including Bergues itself.

Upon the afternoon of Tuesday, 28th May, Lord Gort received the
reports of Sir Ronald Adam and the Quartermaster-General regarding
the embarkation situation.  These were not too optimistic.


    "No ship could be loaded at the docks at Dunkirk, and few wounded
    could be evacuated.  There was no water at Dunkirk and very
    little on the beaches.  The naval plans were not yet in full
    operation, and 20,000 men were waiting to be taken off....  The
    area was congested with French and Belgian troops and their
    transport, as well as with refugees."


However, 10,000 men had already been embarked; and the two generals
were of the opinion that the troops could be gradually evacuated, and
kept supplied with food from home until the operation was
completed--given reasonable immunity from air attack.

Yes, there was the rub.  Could that immunity be secured?  Intensive
bombing of these exposed beaches, continued long enough, must mean
the annihilation of the B.E.F.  Lord Gort accordingly communicated
the gist of the report to the C.I.G.S. asking for the advice and
instructions of His Majesty's Government in the event of a crisis.
He received two replies.

The first was a telegram of encouragement and good wishes from His
Majesty the King, which was immediately communicated to all ranks,
and heartened them mightily.  The second was from the Secretary of
State:--


    "If you are cut off from us, and all evacuation from Dunkirk and
    the beaches had, in your judgment been finally prevented after
    every attempt to open it had failed, you would become sole judge
    of when it was impossible to inflict further damage on the enemy."


Lord Gort was thus empowered, by implication, if he found himself and
his force isolated and at the end of their resources, to avoid
further useless sacrifice of life by surrender to the enemy.

But he was never isolated: the Navy and Air Force saw to that.  And
the British soldier is never quite at the end of his resources.



II

_Aid by Sea and Air_

The Admiralty had placed the naval arrangements for embarkation in
the hands of the Dover Command, and nobly did they rise to the
occasion.  A Senior Naval Officer was immediately sent to Dunkirk to
work out detailed plans, and in a surprisingly short time,
considering the difficulties of the undertaking, a flotilla of small
ships, boats, and odd craft were collected for the purpose of
carrying the troops out from the beaches to the deep-water vessels
waiting for them.

Beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray Dunes, and Malo-les-Bains,
one being allotted to each Corps, and military beach parties were
improvised upon each Corps beach.  The start was slow, for soldiers
are not sailors, and were unhandy with the boats on a falling tide;
upon the first day not more than two hundred men were embarked.
Thereafter matters improved rapidly.  More naval units arrived, and
supplies of food, water, and ammunition were despatched from England
to the beaches.  Enemy activity was such that few of the earlier
consignments reached their destination; but some got through, and
more came later.

By 29th May naval arrangements were in running order, and the miracle
of deliverance had begun.

The difficulties, of course, were enormous.  There was perpetual
bombing.  On 27th May Dunkirk was set on fire, and a pall of black
smoke from burning oil-tanks hung over the port and impeded the view
of the anti-aircraft gunners.  The inner harbour was blocked, except
for small ships.  Dunkirk was therefore cleared of troops, who were
sent to the dunes east of the town to await embarkation.  The port
itself was manned by naval ratings, and continued to function somehow
until the very end, embarking troops in numbers which far exceeded
expectation.

Bombing and shelling grew more and more severe.  There was a
particularly heavy attack upon 29th May, when the port and the
beaches both suffered severely.  Nevertheless the fighter aircraft of
the Royal Air Force, by heroic exertion, succeeded in intercepting a
large proportion of the enemy attacks.  "Those attacks which
arrived," says Lord Gort, "though at times serious, were never able
to impede our embarkation for long."



III

_The French Troops_

Further complications were occasioned, as already indicated, by the
arrival in the Perimeter of more than 100,000 French troops, most of
them with their transport.

Apart from the congestion caused, their presence raised the question
of embarkation in an acute form.  Admiral Abrial, it seemed, had
received no orders from his Government that the whole of the British
troops were to be embarked; he was under the impression that the main
body of the B.E.F. would defend the Perimeter to the last, side by
side with the French, and seemed surprised that any other course of
action should be contemplated.

Lord Gort immediately sent Sir Ronald Adam to make known to the
Admiral the orders which had been received from His Majesty's
Government, and which were now in process of being carried out.

This point having been made clear, another immediately obtruded
itself.  It was obvious that the French troops now expected to be
evacuated to England with their British comrades.  Unfortunately no
steps had been taken by French authorities to provide ships for this
purpose.

In the end, as an interim measure pending definite instructions from
the War Office, Lord Gort allotted two British ships to the French
forthwith, and gave up to them the beach at Malo-les-Bains for their
own use.

Orders were subsequently received from home that British and French
troops were to embark in equal proportions--a quixotic but
characteristic decision.



IV

_Lord Gort Completes his Task_

The manning of the perimeter had been completed upon 29th May, and
Sir Ronald Adam, his difficult duty successfully accomplished, was
ordered to embark next day.

The evacuation of troops was now proceeding steadily, despite all
that the enemy could do.  3rd Corps went first, then 2nd.  As they
departed the Perimeter was reduced in size, for enemy pressure was
growing more and more severe, and it was only prudent to concentrate
now round the permanent defences of Dunkirk itself.

By 30th May there remained some 80,000 British troops, out of a total
of 250,000.  Lord Gort's long and arduous task was approaching
completion, and the burden of an overpowering responsibility was
about to be lifted from his shoulders.  He now received a telegram
from the Secretary of State, apprising him of the fact.


    "Continue to defend present perimeter to the utmost, in order to
    cover maximum evacuation, now proceeding well....  If we can
    still communicate with you we shall send you an order to return
    to England with such officers as you may choose, at the moment
    when we deem your command so reduced that it can be handed to a
    Corps Commander.  You should now nominate this commander.  If
    communications are broken, you are to hand over and return, as
    specified, when your effective fighting force does not exceed
    equivalent of three divisions.  This is in accordance with
    correct military procedure, and no personal discretion is left to
    you in the matter....  The Corps Commander chosen by you should
    be ordered to carry on defence and evacuation with French,
    whether from Dunkirk or beaches...."


In other words, the focal centre of the conflict had now shifted from
France to Britain.  The Battle of Flanders was almost over; at any
moment the Battle of Britain might begin.  Still, it must have been a
keen and bitter disappointment to such a soldier and leader as Lord
Gort not to be the last man to quit those stricken beaches.

However, his orders intentionally gave him no option, and he carried
them out without demur or delay.  On the afternoon of 31st May he
informed Major-General the Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander that he had
selected him to remain in France in command of the 1st Corps, now
numbering less than 20,000 men, and passed on to him the instructions
which he himself had received from His Majesty's Government, which
were that he was to operate under Admiral Abrial and assist the
French in the final defence of Dunkirk.

The same evening Lord Gort embarked, in H.M.S. _Hebe_, and sailed for
England at 2 a.m. next morning.

He had the satisfaction of knowing that 80 per cent. of his forces
had been extricated by his and their exertions, backed by the
unswerving courage and devotion of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air
Force, from what had more than once looked like a hopeless position.

"At this time," he observes in a final note, "the withdrawal of 2nd
Corps was proceeding according to plan, but under increasing enemy
pressure by land and air; the troops were moving to their places on
the beaches steadily and in good order.  The plans made by the
Admiralty to provide small craft were by now in full operation;
embarkation was proceeding far more smoothly than it had yet done,
and was favoured by a calm sea that night."

In all, 211,532 fit men and 13,053 casualties were embarked at
Dunkirk and the beaches, in addition to 112,546 allied troops, of
whom all but a very few were French.



V

_The Final Scene_

With Lord Gort's departure his Despatch comes automatically to an
end, without any description of the final evacuation of the B.E.F.
But little of the tale remains to be told.  Steadily the work went
on; less and less crowded grew the beaches, and the last units were
embarked forty-eight hours later.

The story of Dunkirk has already become history.  You may read it in
the pages of the Poet Laureate's epic narrative, _The Nine Days'
Wonder_, or gather it from the lips of any of the thousands who
actually figured in it.  There is no need to enlarge upon the theme
here.

Yet perhaps it is permissible, in closing, to record the impressions
of one of the volunteers who toiled throughout the final hours of the
evacuation, pulling an oar in one of the small boats which plied
unceasingly between the beach of Dunkirk and a steamer waiting
off-shore.

"There they stood," he said, "lined up like a bus-queue, right from
the dunes, down the shore, to the water's edge, and sometimes up to
their waists beyond.  They were as patient and orderly, too, as
people in an ordinary bus-queue.  There were bombers overhead and
artillery fire all around them.  They were hungry and thirsty and
dead-beat; yet they kept in line, and no one tried to steal a march
on any one else.  Most of them even managed to summon up an
occasional joke or wisecrack.

"The one thing I shall never forget, though--the picture that will
always haunt me--was the look in the faces of the men while we were
filling up another boatload.  Would there be room for them in this
lot--or--?  You could see anxious eyes counting the heads; in front,
and calculating chances.  Then, as we paddled away, loaded to the
gunnel, the face of the man left at the head of the queue--the man
who had _just_ missed--grinning resolutely, and wishing us luck, and
wondering in his heart if we should be able to manage another trip!"

They did manage another trip, and more yet, and in the end every soul
was taken off.

At midnight upon Sunday, 2nd June, Major General Alexander and the
Senior Naval officer (Captain W. G. Tennant, R.N.) made a final tour
of the beaches and harbour in a motor boat; and, "on being satisfied
that no British troops were left on shore, they themselves left for
England."

The First Round was over--and there had been no knock-out.




ISSUED BY THE WAR OFFICE

First published 1941

CROWN COPYRIGHT RESERVED

LONDON: PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. Stationery Office at York House,
Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2; 39-41 King
Street, Manchester 2; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; 80 Chichester
Street, Belfast; or through any bookseller

Price 6_d._ net or 20_s._ 0_d._ for 50 copies

S.O. Code No. 57-567




[Illustration: FRANCE AND FLANDERS]

HIS MAJESTY THE KING, on May 29th 1940, sent the following message to
the Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force:--

"_All your countrymen have been following with pride and admiration
the courageous resistance of the British Expeditionary Force during
the continuous fighting of the last fortnight._

"_Placed by circumstances outside their control in a position of
extreme difficulty they are displaying a gallantry that has never
been surpassed in the annals of the British Army._

"_The hearts of everyone of us at home are with you and your
magnificent troops in this hour of peril._"

* * *

Lord Gort, the Commander-in-Chief, replied:--

"_The Commander-in-Chief, with humble duty, begs leave on behalf of
all ranks of the B.E.F. to thank Your Majesty for your message._

"_May I assure Your Majesty that the Army is doing all in its power
to live up to its proud tradition and is immensely encouraged at this
critical moment by the words of Your Majesty's telegram._"


[The end of _The Battle of Flanders 1940_ by Ian Hay]