

The Evolution of Hungary
AND ITS PLACE
In European History

BY
Count Paul Teleki

1923

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THE EVOLUTION OF HUNGARY
AND ITS PLACE
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


FIG. 1. Relief map of Hungary, showing the relation of old and new boundaries to the mountains. Notice (1) the undisturbed continuity and breadth of the main sandstone range of the Carpathians; (2) the broken inner chains, partly old massifs, partly volcanic, partly limestone; and (3) the converging of all the rivers. (Photograph of a model made under the direction of Cholnoky.)

The Evolution of Hungary

AND ITS PLACE

In European History

BY

COUNT PAUL TELEKI, PHIL.D.

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Budapest; former Prime Minister of Hungary; Lecturer at the
Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Massachusetts, 1921

new york

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AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

AS this book leaves the press, I wish to again express to President Harry Augustus Garfield, of Williams College, Chairman of the Institute of Politics, and to the Board of Advisors, my deep gratitude for all their kindness, and for the opportunity of discussing the history and actual situation of my country before an audience of such high class and keen interest.

As originally given, the course of lectures was entitled: "The Place of Hungary in European History." It should, of course, be remembered that the lectures are printed as originally written in July and August, 1921, regardless of subsequent changes in Hungarian parties, elections, and economic matters. Chapter VII, especially, should be read with a realization that it refers to conditions as they were two years ago.

I am under obligations to Mr. Charles Feleky, of New York, for compiling most of the bibliography. Mr. F. M. Hart, of the United States Geological Survey, Washington, D. C., has redrawn a number of the maps and diagrams for this book, largely from originals prepared by Hungarian geographers and statisticians, and especially by Mr. Albert Halász, of Budapest. The relief map of Hungary (Fig. 1) was made by Dr. John Xantus, under the direction of Professor Eugen de Cholnoky of the University of Kolozsvár. The sources of other maps are indicated upon the pages of the book.

I cannot omit deep and cordial thanks to my dear friend and geographical colleague, Colonel Lawrence Martin, of Washington, for the keen interest he has taken in my book, the invaluable help and the work he has devoted to it at every stage—regardless of the value of his time and the weariness of making corrections in the manuscript and illustrations, and on the proof sheets—and for his real friendship in joyous and in hard times in my life.

PAUL TELEKI.

Budapest,
July 3, 1922.

PREFACE

IT has interested scientists and students of contemporary international politics in America to observe, in connection with the history of Hungary since the armistice in 1918, that Count Paul Teleki has been the official or unofficial geographer of each successive government of his country. This indicates clearly that there is thorough agreement that he is the man best informed on geographical matters in Hungary. He has also served his country with distinction in five different cabinet positions. He held the portfolio of Instruction once, and that of Foreign Affairs three times in different administrations; finally he was Minister President, or Premier, during a very difficult period of Hungary's existence. Hence it is patent that he was unusually well qualified to give a series of lectures on the new Hungarian kingdom at the Institute of Politics in Williamstown during the summer of 1921.

Teleki was born in Budapest, on November 1, 1879. He studied law, political science, and geography at the University of Budapest, and specialized for one year at the Agricultural Academy. He has stated that he decided to become a geographer because of the inspiring lectures of Professor Louis de Lóczy, of the University of Budapest. Teleki received his doctor's degree in 1903. He then made an extensive trip to the Sudan.

On his return he finished his first major work entitled: "Atlas to the History of Cartography of the Japanese Islands," a cartographic monograph which is accepted in Japan, and in the scientific world outside, as the best study of that subject. This atlas also contains a translation of the Dutch journals of Mathys Quast and Abel Janszoon Tasman, written in 1639. The publication of this atlas attracted much attention among geographical scholars because of the explanation of the effect of the discovery of America upon the European world's knowledge of Japan and its representation upon maps. Mr. E. L. Stevenson of the American Geographical Society of New York has characterized Teleki's atlas as: "one of superior excellence, a model for those who have in contemplation a history of the cartography of any other single country." Teleki was awarded the *Jomard Prize* of the *Société de Géographie de Paris* in 1911, when M. Henri Cordier characterized the atlas as one of the monumental works of geography. Dr. Hermann Wagner, the Nestor of

German geographers, wrote: "He never used secondhand sources if he was able in some way, even with the greatest difficulty, to find the original source."

In 1909 the International Geographical Congress in Geneva elected Teleki one of the seven members of a committee formed for the study of ancient charts. He became successively: member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; corresponding member of the Geographical Society of Vienna; honorary member of the Spanish Geographical Society; president of the Turan Society; president of the Society for Social Hygiene; and general secretary of the Hungarian Geographical Society (*Magyar-Földrajzi Társaság*). From 1909 to 1913 he was president of Hungarian Geographical Institute. Through his efforts appeared the first Hungarian scientific atlas of the world, published by this institute.

During the summer of 1912, he was one of the official delegates of the Hungarian Geographical Society to the Transcontinental Excursion of the American Geographical Society of New York, traveling in the United States for two months in a company of distinguished geographers. To all his European colleagues and to the American geographers who accompanied this excursion, Teleki endeared himself as a charming companion and an efficient scientist. One of the fruits of this American journey was Teleki's lectures, in 1913, at the Commercial Normal School, and, in 1922, at the University of Budapest, on the Economic Geography of the United States. His book, "*Amerika Gazdasági Földrajza*," 220 pages, Budapest 1922, is thus far published only in Hungarian. It presents the economic geography of the United States in a new way and is especially valuable because it is the work of a competent geographer, possessing perspective regarding the United States which we Americans necessarily lack.

Before the war Teleki took little part in political life, though he represented a constituency in Parliament, being elected three times between 1905 and 1911; he was usually a member of the Opposition. In general he kept aloof from party struggles and has told me that he never made speeches except on social hygiene and education.

During the war he served as a lieutenant in the Hungarian army. Part of this time he was on duty with troops, and part of the time in charge of a large office which looked out for disabled soldiers. Teleki then ranked as an Undersecretary of War. His office for disabled soldiers had eighteen hospitals with about 18,000 beds, a widows' and orphans' section, and a social section. This last Teleki organized personally. Believing that the first principle of social help is that the work must be done individually, not as with a mob, he initiated the social experiment of an individual solution of the future of disabled soldiers and their families with 50, then

with 500, and finally 2500 cases. I know of no such experiment elsewhere, and have been told that Teleki's experiment was a brilliant success. His system might furnish a solution of agricultural reforms in such countries as his own. Unfortunately this great work was no sooner well under way than the disabled soldiers became bolsheviks, in the early days of Károlyi's régime, ruining the whole work. Teleki tried to save what he could of it, and I have been told that he and his assistants spent two months working at their offices, with revolvers in their pockets. The disabled soldiers feared the bolshevik leaders, however, thus making it impossible for this interesting social experiment to continue.

Early in the war it was reported in the American newspapers that he had been killed in action. As this was never denied, I regretted for four years the loss of an able geographer and warm friend. On going to Hungary in January, 1919, I was overjoyed to learn that Teleki was still alive.

Teleki did not entirely lay aside his scholarly and philosophical work during the war. Every soldier knows how much waste time there is in an army,—long waiting during the days, periods of wakeful inactivity between inspections at night. What Teleki did was to work out notes for a history of geographical thought. From these notes, taking advantage of a long sick leave in 1917, Teleki dictated a book "*A Földrajzi Gondolat Története.*" Upon the basis of this essay of 231 pages, Teleki took, in 1917, the chair in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to which he had been elected in 1913.

The extent to which Teleki was effectively active in the capacity of geographer of the several Hungarian administrations since the armistice, as alluded to above, can best be stated in terms of an American geographer's contacts with him during this period. In January, 1919, the American Commission to Negotiate Peace sent a mission to Austria-Hungary. When we arrived in Budapest we found that Provisional President Michael Károlyi had designated Teleki to be of all possible service to the Americans who had come to Hungary to study the situation with a view to the drafting of a peace treaty. Upon the basis of a comprehensive knowledge of the geographical material available in Paris for the use of the several delegations to the Peace Conference, I have no hesitancy in saying that the cartographic and documentary material on Hungary, which Count Teleki gave us in Budapest, and which we sent to Paris, was the most complete and accurate data regarding a single country which was supplied by any European government, either of the Allies or of the Central Powers. It appeared to me, also, that it was unusually dispassionate, and that, although Teleki was a conspicuous member of the League for the Maintenance of the Integrity of Hungary, the maps and pamphlets which he helped to prepare

were obviously the work of an unprejudiced scientist. Immediately after the armistice, Teleki had perceived the need of preparing concise information, and particularly graphic maps and diagrams, and had persuaded the new Hungarian government to provide facilities for having statisticians, draftsmen, and printers prepare a summary picture of Hungary for the use of the Peace Conference. Thus Teleki did very much the same thing in his own country that the *Inquiry* did, regarding various countries, for the American government.

Károlyi subsequently prevailed upon Teleki to accept an appointment as professional geographical adviser of the Hungarian Peace Delegation, which he, as president of Hungary, was getting ready to send to Paris. Although a political opponent of Károlyi, it is a tribute to Teleki's ability as a geographer that he was offered this appointment and agreed to accept it.

At the time of the bolshevist coup, when Károlyi resigned the presidency and the government was seized by Béla Kun, Teleki and I both happened to be in Berne, Switzerland. The Béla Kun government made overtures to him to return to Budapest and become geographical adviser to the bolshevists. I shall never forget Teleki's indignation, and his vehement statement that he would rather be shot or imprisoned than undertake service under Béla Kun. Nevertheless, the fact stands out that Teleki, though a bourgeois, was so eminent as a geographer that even the bolshevist government desired him to enter its service.

In June, 1919, Teleki entered the Ministry of the provisional anti-bolshevist government at Szeged, accepting the portfolio of Instruction. Subsequently he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. I had seen Teleki in Vienna during the previous weeks, and it happened that he was leaving for Szeged within a day of the time I left for Paris. When we said good-by to each other, he told me confidentially that an anti-bolshevist government was to be set up, and that he was going to Szeged to do what he could for his country by enlisting actively in the movement to overthrow Béla Kun. He never spoke of the personal danger he was to encounter. It became evident what a brave thing Count Teleki and his associates were doing, in the weeks afterwards in Paris, for we received reports about the nature and strength of the counter-revolutionary government in Szeged. This government had a tiny army, made up of scores of officers to each private soldier; it was not outside the country like the revolutionary governments which have sprung up at various times since 1918, in Switzerland, Italy, and Austria to try to upset existing régimes in distant countries. It was on the soil of Hungary itself; and its members were making active opposition to a relentless and rather powerful foe who was at that time hanging and shooting Hungarians in Budapest without trial. Béla Kun would have promptly executed every

member of the Szeged government, had it been possible to capture them at that time. Hence Teleki was doing an unusual thing as a geographer, and an exceedingly brave thing as a Hungarian patriot. But of this he seemed to be quite unconscious; his only aim was to help restore his country to peaceable and reputable administration.

He has never spoken to me of such matters, but other Hungarians have told me that Teleki showed his personal daring many times during the recent eventful years of his country's history. One instance was in August, 1919, four days after Béla Kun was overthrown. There followed two days of half-communist, half-socialist government, and then the Roumanians entered Budapest. Teleki, learning of this in Szeged and hoping there were to be changes in a conservative direction, persuaded the Council of Ministers to agree that he should go personally to see the situation in Budapest. The next morning he flew to Siófok, a village near Budapest, which had been till the second day before the bolshevik army's aerial headquarters. He landed there in order to prevent his aeroplane being taken by communists or by Roumanians in Budapest. There were about a thousand bolsheviki in this village, including some officers of the army of Béla Kun. Teleki calmly dined in a great hall in the midst of eight hundred dining bolsheviks. He would say, modestly, that there was no heroism in this trip.

After the government of Béla Kun was overthrown, Count Teleki participated in the new government, at first only in the way of preparing for the peace conference. In 1920 he was elected to the Hungarian National Assembly from the constituency of Szeged.

During the existence of the Hungarian Peace Delegation which went to France and lived at Neuilly, Teleki was the geographer of the delegation, and was as effective in this capacity as any representative from the Central Powers could possibly have been, considering the conditions under which this delegation negotiated the Trianon Treaty. The Hungarian plenipotentiaries were not permitted to sit at a table with the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of the new states adjacent to Hungary. They did their work alone in their own quarters, being given a draft treaty, presenting observations upon it, and finally receiving word that modifications had been made upon the basis of certain of their observations but that in other cases the draft treaty must stand as originally drawn up. The cartographic and diagrammatic material prepared by Teleki and his associates was so clear and logical, however, that, regardless of how the present generation of Hungarians views the wisdom and justice of the Treaty of Trianon, it must be admitted that the peace terms were decidedly different from what they might have been if Teleki had not done his work. In this connection a tribute must be paid

to his atlas: "The Economics of Hungary in Maps," prepared for the Commission of Count Paul Teleki, Chief of the Office for the Preparation of Peace Negotiations, by Aladár de Edvi Illés and Albert Halász, and published in Budapest in 1920 and 1921. This is one of the best atlases presenting the geography of a country, and a number of the maps from it have been reproduced by Teleki in this book. He is a positive genius on graphic maps and atlases. His atlas of the economic resources and systems of communications of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and European Turkey, published in Budapest in 1922, will be indispensable to all students of Central European and Balkan affairs.

On March 18, 1920, Teleki became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of Premier Simonyi-Semedam. On July 19th, 1920, he assumed office as Minister President or Premier of Hungary. He reorganized his cabinet on December 16, 1920, and guided the affairs of his country until May 2, 1921, with all the sagacity and wisdom of a trained statesman.

An outstanding event during this period was the first return to Hungary of the late King Charles. In April, 1921, Count Teleki, the Premier, and Admiral Horthy, the Regent, quite independently, realizing that the return of a Hapsburg to the throne of Hungary was impossible, persuaded the former King to leave Hungary and return to Switzerland. It is not easy for Americans to understand why Teleki, who has always said that Charles was the rightful King of Hungary, took the position that his King could not ascend the throne and rule the country. Premier Teleki felt, and frankly told the King, as Admiral Horthy told him later the same day, that it would ruin Hungary if he were to attempt to rule as King, because the neighbors of Hungary would never permit a Hapsburg to reassume the Hungarian crown.

I speak of this wise and brave act of Teleki as an outstanding event of the period during which he was Premier; I think, however, that he would like it better if his administration were remembered, not for this, but for the series of wise undertakings and reforms which were effected during this period. Of some of these he speaks modestly in the later chapters of this book. These acts did much to set Hungary on the road to progress and along the paths of peace. The Treaty of Trianon, formally establishing the complete independence of Hungary and its recognition by the Great Powers, after four centuries of various degrees of foreign rule or semi-independence, was ratified by the Hungarian Parliament under Teleki's premiership on November 13, 1920. He also issued the great order of amnesty.

No geographer in the history of the world has ever had such an opportunity in statecraft as Teleki had; and, remembering always that before the war, although at

times a member of the Hungarian House of Commons, he had worked upon and made speeches only regarding social questions, Teleki's three different periods of service as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and particularly his administration as Premier, are all the more remarkable.

In May, 1921, after his retirement from the office of Premier, which seems to have been caused chiefly by those who objected to his persuading King Charles to leave Hungary, Teleki quietly entered upon the scholastic work of his professorship of geography in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Budapest, a chair which he was the first to occupy. It is quite characteristic of him that he said, in all simplicity and sincerity, that he was "happy to be once more a private man."

It has been my great privilege as an American geographer, and as the leader of a Round-table Conference at the initial session of the Institute of Politics, to have talked over with Teleki the general plan and many of the details of his lectures at Williamstown in August, 1921, and to have read his manuscript before it was sent to the printer and again in proof. The geographical picture presented by the author is sound and adequate. I regard this book as one of the best geographical publications of the present year, and one which will be an essential part of the equipment of all thoughtful students of geography, history, ethnography, economics, and current European politics.

LAWRENCE MARTIN.

Washington, D. C.

May 8, 1922.

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THE EVOLUTION OF HUNGARY
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LECTURE I

GEOGRAPHICAL OUTLINES

MY first words must be the expression of my gratitude for and appreciation of the opportunity you have offered me by inviting me to take part in the work planned by the Institute of Politics in a noble spirit in quest of the truth.

I recognize a parallel between this spirit in the realm of knowledge and your initiative in ascertaining the material wants of our needy population and your prompt and magnanimous response. The deeds of the American Relief Administration and the American Red Cross will be forever engraved in the hearts of the whole Hungarian nation.

I have spoken of the quest of scientific truth; for truth alone can be the foundation of a better world, and the only way to establish the truth is to acquire knowledge and collect information. I look upon the work you have engaged in, with deep realization of the true needs of mankind, as a work of scientific survey. Our generation today is hungry for knowledge, because it has realized, more and more, that full knowledge was lacking when peace was made, and only a few manifested the desire to acquire it.

I could enter upon a detailed and specific criticism of the peace treaty of Trianon, partitioning my country, but I will refrain from doing it—though you can readily believe that it is a great temptation for me to do so, not only as a Hungarian, as you would naturally think, but even more so as a geographer, whose business it is to deal with territorial and boundary questions. I will refrain because I am not in the fortunate position of my distinguished fellow-lecturers, Viscount Bryce and Signor Tittoni, who could treat these questions from an indisputably unbiased point of view.

It is not my intention to plead the cause of Hungary. Advocacy and pleading will avail but little to advance the work of world-regeneration imposed on us by the Great War. Only knowledge will do this, a thorough knowledge of the relations existing between the different nations. This thorough knowledge was lacking at the time when peace was made. I do not wish to dwell on this point, and will only remark that this lack of knowledge may have been natural in view of the magnitude

and variety of the issues arising out of the great struggle.

I regard the matter in a different light and see that we have to forget much of what has happened. We must not try to turn back—there being no turning back in history—but must consider how matters actually stand, and try to find the way by which we can, in the shortest possible time, secure conditions for the foundation of an assured peace and of economic prosperity, and for the development of a real sense of humanity.

As a Hungarian I have good reason to insist upon knowledge. Hungary, though situated in the heart of Europe, has remained almost unknown to the outside world. Since the Middle Ages we have had no foreign representation or relations of our own, except that of some of our Transylvanian princes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even the greatest of our politicians—and this I can assert from personal experience—failed to appreciate the value of international connections, even in the moments of greatest danger.

I shall return later to these questions of foreign policy and our connections with Austria.

He who wishes to co-operate in the quest for scientific truth must first of all explain to his fellow-workmen those conditions and facts of which he himself possesses an expert knowledge, and, in turn, of course, gratefully accept any and all scientifically established truths which others impart.

If we want this work of reconstruction to be done well, we must abjure every form of exaggeration; we must tell the truth, and try to see things from every point of view, even if this sometimes does violence to our feelings. Since the war ended I have witnessed some negotiations, some bargainings and hagglings, and others of the like nature have come to my knowledge, and I find too much of the spirit: “What can I get out of the other? How can I outwit him?” and I find much less of the point of view: “How can we co-operate?” The pressure of the world’s public opinion, and naturally in the first place that of your great country, may, however, go far towards providing a remedy for this evil.

I highly appreciate the words of an address made by President Garfield on February 8 last:

“Each country knows its own wants, but appreciates all too little the needs of its neighbors.”

I am absolutely of his opinion. First of all mutual understanding is necessary, vitally necessary, and it must be based upon a dispassionate consideration of the facts.

The unusual spirit which has dominated the diplomacy of the United States in Hungary, since the Armistice, has been most gratifying and encouraging to us. The thought uppermost in the minds of your representatives has obviously been:

“Hostilities have ceased. What interests have we Americans in common with the Hungarians? Let us work earnestly together along those lines and arrange our differences later.”

Here is the foundation for a new departure in diplomacy and one in the development of which small nations have a vital interest. One of your diplomats in describing this policy to me said:

“It aims at a development of international relations which will enable co-operation to supplant destructive rivalry as the dominating idea of diplomacy.”

Hungary will be glad to go hand in hand with your great country along this road which leads to better understanding, to peaceful co-operation, and away from that rivalry so aptly characterized as destructive, which has been the bane of peace and civilization. In these vital questions of mankind we must try to use the methods of the chemist, the physician, the mechanic. We must take into consideration all the facts—whether pleasing or not—without fear or hypocrisy. And if we are able to see things clearly as they are, we must conform our actions to what is needed, without fear and without reservation.

I shall speak to you of Hungary, for I assume that is the subject you expect me to treat, and it is the one on which I am best able to give you information.

Let us trace the history of the land, a history which was not unfamiliar to Americans of the generation of your grandsires. More than that, the Hungarians were at that time the European people best known in the United States. No lesser statesmen than Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and Abraham Lincoln had gone on record, in speeches and in bills introduced by them, as favoring the independence of Hungary and the righting of my country's historical wrongs. Much was contributed to such a knowledge by the great number of Hungarians—mostly emigrants after our last war for freedom in 1849—who fought in your army in the Civil War.

It is best to draw broad outlines historically and add a picture of Hungary's present economic situation. In doing so there are two aspects of the subject which you probably will desire me to consider: first, the relations which existed between Hungary and the neighboring states at various epochs, with Hungary's place in the

European constellation; and, secondly, a general survey of Hungary during and after the war, with the conditions now existing in the Basin of the Middle Danube, the region which for long centuries constituted the Kingdom of Hungary.



FIG. 2

FIG. 2. The geographical position of Hungary in Europe. The political geography of the continent is shown as before the Balkan Wars and the Great War, except that the present Hungary is represented.

To begin with, we had best cover the geography and history of Hungary in some detail. This may be considerable, but it seems indispensable if we wish to obtain a clear perspective of the great lines of possible development in this section of Europe, of which Hungary once formed a preponderant part, exercising at certain epochs a dominant influence. Today, though much diminished in territory, Hungary still retains her important geographical position (Fig. 2). I believe you will discover in the course of my lectures that it is the pivot of consolidation for south-eastern Europe. What you wish to know and what you demand from me are facts—those great basic facts and conditions which dominate life, and which are always no less powerful than the human will, indeed, in the long run, even more powerful.

Let me begin with the geography of the land and afterwards show you its history, merely those facts of its history and of the history of its settlement, which have been

of permanent influence and which, continuing for a long time, perhaps for centuries, throw light upon our condition today.

Do not think I am a believer in the absolute determining influence of surroundings. I consider human will one of the greatest factors and in modern times and in civilized countries a determining factor of human fate. But it would be equally unwise to think ourselves independent of the life of the earth's surface in general of which human life is a part and an element, though the development of the human brain has introduced into it a factor of ever-increasing preponderance.

The power of human will and of outer conditions is in reality changing constantly and greatly—according to time and place. Life is extremely complicated and cannot be regarded from any one point of view. The influence which a fact, or a feature of the earth's surface, or an action may exercise upon life, and the consequences to which all this may lead, depends on the strength of the several factors playing their part in the life of the spot under contemplation. It is very seldom that direct influences can be determined. If Taine derives the polytheism of the Greeks from the variety of their home country of peninsulas, gulfs, and rugged mountains, we may consider this rather as a *jeu d'esprit*, the pretty conceit of an artist-writer.

The influence of surroundings on human life and history is twofold. The one is that which is exercised on the everyday life of the man bound to the place, viz., on the majority of mankind, and thus indirectly on all; the other is that exercised on single facts of history.

The first of these influences was recognized by Taine, and even before him, though its importance was exaggerated. But if you read the works of modern geographers—Professor W. M. Davis' "Human Response to Geographical Environment," Professor A. P. Brigham's "Geographical Influences in American History," Professor J. Brunhes' "Human Geography"—you will find a keen judgment and understanding of complexity. I, for my part, must not dwell now on this problem.

The second influence exercised by surroundings on single facts presents a question of greater controversy. Here a much greater rôle is played by interests and politics. I do not mention names, because I do not speak for the purpose of aggravating differences. But look about you and read; and you will find today perfervid friends of natural frontiers, and others who deny the existence of such frontiers; you will find advocates and foes of the right to free access to the sea; you will find that the question as to whether the growth of certain cities is due to natural causes or to political tactics is treated according to political needs, and so on. It may be an element of the vitality of nations to carry interests and hatreds even into the domain of science. But I think we must return to an objective point of view, if we are

to carry on our research for the sake of humanity; and I fear many a scientist of practically all the nations concerned in the recent war will look some day with regret at things he has written in these years.

All these questions of nature's influence on human history, the interdependence of facts so different in character, need careful study and a keen judgment.

Let us now leave theory. I desire to show you some instances in the case of my own country.

You will recognize this country at first sight on any map of Europe, that is, the whole territory of pre-war Hungary and its surroundings. What is to be seen on the map of Europe east of the Alps? You will see that the spine of Europe ends abruptly along a line on the thirteenth meridian; let me say, for a better understanding, on a line drawn through Vienna, Graz, and Zagreb. The Alps are compelled by the hard, old trunk of Styria to deviate to the north and south. The northern Alpine mountain-zones turn to the northeast, and we see them—after a gap marked only by hills to the east of Vienna—reappearing in the continuous chain of the Carpathians which, turning always to the right, describes about three-quarters of a circle and surrounds what we know today as the Basin of the Middle Danube. This is the Kingdom of Hungary.

The southern ranges turn to the southeast and under the name of "Dinarides" separate the interior of the Balkan peninsula from the Adriatic. The central Alpine zones separate (Fig. 1) and follow both the north and south zones—but more pronouncedly the north—as detached, single mountains or short ranges; while the main mass of all between the Carpathians and the Dinarides, which sank during the geological ages from Cretaceous to Tertiary times, lies today deep under the new deposits of a sea which filled the whole of the great Hungarian basin during the Mesozoic. To the south the crystalline central zones reappear behind the coastal ranges of the Dinarides and turn to the east, meeting the Carpathians, which have now curved round to a decided westerly direction. Where the ranges meet and so complete the enclosure of the basin, it looks as if they were tied to a string. This is the great confusion of mountain land constituting the Central Balkans.

The Alps, the Carpathians, the Dinarides, and the Balkans, though folded in about the same period, differ distinctly in character. Each of the latter three is formed from zones which occur in the Alps, but in these ranges the position and importance of each zone are not as seen in the Alps. In the Alps limestone, dolomite, and crystalline zones are predominant. Many of you may know the character of those picturesque ranges of Switzerland and the Tyrol. In the Carpathians the only belt which is continuous and of conspicuous breadth is the *flysch*-zone of sandstone. The

general character of the mountains is broad-backed and continuous, carrying a garment of thick virgin forests. The Dinarides, especially in the north, where they concern us, are built of limestone. The character of this mountain-land is one of plateaus dissected by abrupt valleys and narrow cañons; the surface contains "dolines" and greater undrained basins, the "poljes," some of which are well known as distinct centers of Balkan history. The Balkans again are mostly crystalline, and they are more mature than the Carpathians or the Alps. Their forest garment is less dense, less continuous. But the characteristic property of the Balkans, which has had the greater influence upon the history of the peoples thrown by fate into this part of the continent, is the confusion in the system of its ranges.




FIG. 3.

FIG. 3. Natural regions of Hungary: 1. Alföld or great lowlands, sand, black clay, and loess plain, producing wheat and corn; 2. Dunántúl or Transdanubia, rolling hills, outlayers of the Alps, temperate climate, oldest culture, varied agriculture; 3. Kis Alföld or little plain, temperate climate, intensive agriculture, sugar-beets; 4. Northwestern Highlands, developed forestry (pine, beech, oak), mining, hillside agriculture, potatoes; 5. Northeastern Highlands, wilder (best) pine forests, mining, salt; 6. Eastern and Southern Carpathians, intensive forestry, rich pastures, sheep, cattle; 7. Bihár Mountains, beech and oak forests, ore mining, pastures; 8. Mezőség or Transylvanian Basin, strongly rolling, clay slopes, young formations, salt near borders, center natural gas, intensive maize growing, cattle; 9. Karst mountainland (Dinarides), forests, flourishing iron ore mining. Ruled areas are regions of

transition. See also Figures 1 and 41.

The character of these main groups of Central Europe's morphology is reflected in its influence on human fate and history.

There are hardly to be found two neighboring countries more different in point of historic fate than the two sister regions formed by the fanlike divergence of the Alpine zones. The northern region, the great depression, surrounded by the folds of the Carpathians, forms the most perfectly closed basin of Europe. Its average height above sea-level is 300 meters, ranging from 108 in the center to 600 on the edges, where belts of the plain penetrate the girdle of mountains. It is, of course, a hydrographical unit, practically all its rivers running to the center of the plain (Fig. 1), with consecutive circular climatological and floral belts; even the animals, migrating to higher altitudes, completely assume the unity and centralization of this region. It may perhaps be of interest if I tell you that certain birds, for instance, gulls, which live in the northwestern part of Hungary, in the last long valley on the northwest, that of the Vág, when migrating in the autumn, descend to the Hungarian plain, go down to the Adriatic and Mediterranean, and thence to Africa. From the Bohemian or Czech side of the Carpathians, only a few miles farther to the west, the gulls go down along the Elbe River, thence to the North Sea and along the shores of Holland, France, and Spain, then down to the western coast of Africa. In all respects the Carpathian Basin is well defined.




FIG. 4.

FIG. 4. The rainfall of Hungary. The Hungarian lowlands, with 500 to 600 millimeters of annual rainfall, are much drier than some parts of Germany and Austria, with 400 to 500 millimeters, because the rainfall is not evenly distributed throughout the year; in the spring and summer there are sometimes several weeks without a drop of rain or dew.

There is no greater contrast to be found anywhere, if you pass the imaginary line between the Continent proper and the Balkan peninsula—a line drawn from the north end of the Adriatic to the northwestern coast of the Black Sea. I quote Marriott's new book on "The Eastern Question":

"At the first sight the peninsula seems, with small exceptions, to be covered by a series of mountain ranges, subject to no law, save that of caprice, starting from nowhere in particular, ending nowhere in particular, now running north and south, now east and west, with no obvious purpose or well-defined trend."

According to recent conclusions of the Hungarian geologist, Baron Nopcsa, geology tells us a story of great sinkings, chiefly to the south, and of dissection; morphology shows independent basins, valleys, highways, systemless mountain masses. The hydrographical system leads us in at least four directions.

Human history tells us the consequences. It tells us stories of great highways traversing the region, independently of the life of the rest of the peninsula; of

conquerors taking possession of one or more of the isolated territories; of wars between peoples; and of civilizations developing in isolated basins; then of series of intermixtures of peoples in the more accessible basins and along the highways, and on the other hand, of relatively pure remnants of very old peoples in the basins situated remote from the great highways of conquerors and nations.

But it is not my business to tell you *this* story. I have to tell you that of the northern region, of the great Basin of the Middle Danube and the mountain girdles protecting it (Fig. 5).

There are two primeval facts, which the two main features have stamped here on human history, viz., the tendency for all to unite towards what we call the central point of gravity of the greatest geographical weight, and the protecting action of the main mountain girdle stretching from west-northwest northward, eastward, and then southward.

As to the first of these, there was no stability so long as the unity of the Basin was not recognized by a Power then holding the center and consequently impelled to extend its rule to the broad belts of mountains and forests, and taking possession of the passes.

Neither Huns, nor Gepids, nor the Avars could weld the lowland into a permanent State. Nor could the Goths, nor the Longobards, nor yet the Franks, coming from the west, nor the Pannonian Slavs establish a lasting sovereignty in Transdanubia. Short was the rule of the Gepids in Transylvania, of the Bulgarians in the south, of Quades and Markomanns in the north, and even the great Moravian Empire in the northwest could not withstand the first serious attack.




FIG. 5.

FIG. 5. The Carpathian Mountains, encircling the Basin of the Middle Danube. The Alps, the Dinarides, and the Balkan Mountains form the other borders of this basin. The Magyars are thought to have entered Hungary by the Verecke Pass, northeast of the present site of Budapest.

We shall see later how the Magyars settled in the country. Let us note here that they were the first to push out their frontiers on every side, in a comparatively short time, to the crest of the Carpathians, and how this measure proved effective. There exist, of course, no absolute barriers, such as last for all time and withstand every force. The Carpathians, especially in their narrower part in the northeast, were crossed by some of the nations and hordes of the age of the great migrations, particularly by the Huns. But other waves, the Scythians, the Bulgarians, the Petchenegs, and others, were turned aside toward the south and north by the Carpathians. Some of the tribes of the Goths were turned southward in their wanderings, while the Avars seem to have entered the basin from the south, through what was pre-war Roumania. Still nobody tried to prevent the crossing of the mountains. And when in the thirteenth century the last danger, the great Mongol invasion, came from the East, internal struggles prevented the King of Hungary from meeting it in time on the mountain-crest and he was defeated on the plain. But the mountains have in our own days given signal proof of their efficacy as a splendid barrier, even when defended only by weak forces.

A barrier of defense, by virtue of their breadth and their dense wood-cover, and thus forming a great, practically uninhabited belt, they were at the same time a barrier to expansion. Some of our kings with their own royal troops, or by policy, tried to extend their power to the other side. The nation's practical political sense did not follow the kings of the first national dynasty to Moldavia, nor the Anjou King Louis to Galicia and Poland, nor the great renaissance King Matthias Hunyadi to Moravia and Silesia. The possession of these lands practically never lasted longer than the reign of the conquering king.

I have said that the strength of any factor influencing life is relative, that it depends on its harmony and disharmony with other factors. All this varies not only from place to place, but also from time to time. Still, you may see the influence of the same factor at different periods and sometimes the coincidence will strike you. Certain features, though much less outstanding than the Carpathian wall, are seen again and again at different periods of history to constitute natural frontiers (Fig. 6).




FIG. 6.

FIG. 6. Boundaries recurring at different periods in history: *A-A*, Bulgarian Empire, ninth century; *B-B*, the territory conquered by the Protestant princes of Transylvania; *C-C* the Hungarian Banat of Macsó; *D-D*, line where the Austro-Hungarian army stopped in 1914; *E-E*, boundary of the Gepids in 500 A.D., of the Banat of Szörény in the fourteenth century, and of Little Wallachia in the eighteenth century; *F-F*, Field Marshal Mackensen's line, 1917, corresponding with part of *A-A*.

Old northern Hungary, the Slovakia of today, belongs to two water systems, the waters of the western part flowing into the Danube between Pressburg and Budapest, those of the eastern part, converging like the sections of a fan, towards the Tisza River, flowing down right through the middle of the Hungarian plain. The watershed is traversed practically by only two roads and parallel-running railroads. This watershed is said to have been the northernmost limit, though perhaps not the real frontier of the first Bulgarian Empire in the beginning of the ninth century. When the Magyars occupied and extended their country to the main ranges of the Carpathians, the watershed lost its importance as a dividing line, because all the rivers of both sides run towards the central Hungarian plain, although in opposite curves. But the line recovered its importance when an alien and strong enemy-power, the Turk, occupied the lowlands and barred the ways to the south. We see the line in the seventeenth century dividing the Hapsburg part of Hungary from the territory temporarily occupied by our Transylvania princes to the north, and in Reformation times dividing the strongholds of Catholicism on the west from those of Protestantism on the east. The boundary vanishes when the Turks are driven out and both sides again have free access to the lowlands and thus have a common center of gravitation.

There is another frontier better known historically, viz., the Danube, which marks off the west part, into which the last foothills of the Alps descend from the main body of the basin. You know this to have been the limit of the Roman province of Pannonia, with its farthest northern stronghold, Aquincum, on the spot where our capital city stands today. But you may perhaps not know that it was also the eastern limit of the Eastern Frank Empire in the ninth century.

Rivers lose their importance as boundaries with the progress of civilization. In early centuries mighty streams flowing slowly between marshy borders through lowlands might have been formidable barriers, especially with a strong force behind them. The river made navigable by dredging is no longer a dividing obstacle; on the contrary, it connects its shores so that sister-towns spring into life on its opposite banks. They may still form very good lines of delimitation, especially when marshes border their courses and when other facts, for instance, an ethnographic difference on the two sides, accentuates the line. This is the case with the Lower Danube, dividing Roumania and Bulgaria; or the River Drave, separating the Croats and Magyars and their respective lands. The Middle Danube is not of this type.

The Great War accentuated two other historical frontiers in the neighborhood of Hungary. It was at the many-branched, marshy Kolubara River in western Serbia, on the frontier river of the Hungarian Banat of Macsó, four centuries ago a frontier-

march against the Turkish advance, that the Serbs stopped our offensive in 1914. And the last line Mackensen reached in 1917 in Roumania, the Sereth-Putna line, situated where the space is narrowest between the Black Sea and the Carpathians, not only once formed the old frontier of the two Roumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, but also the limit of the Bulgarian Empire of the ninth century towards the land which was the home of the Magyars in the eighth and ninth centuries (Fig. 6).

We may find other lines which at different, far-distant periods of history reappear as boundaries. May I mention only the lower part of the "Olt" River in Roumania, the temporary eastern limit of the land of Gepids about 500 A.D.; again a frontier, that of the Hungarian Banat of Szörény, during the reign of our Anjou King Louis in the fourteenth century; and again a frontier, that of Little Wallachia, during the eighteenth century, immediately after the Turks withdrew from the country? And it is perhaps interesting to note that Serbia at the time of the death of its ruler, George Branković, in 1459 reflects the frontiers of Moesia Superior of Roman days.

After this digression, let us come back to the historical frontiers of Hungary. I have told you all about the general character of the Carpathian frontier, of its continuity and mightiness. The attention of students of frontiers should be called specially to the breadth of the uninhabited belt and to the wood-cover. These are elements of a first-class importance in judging and comparing mountain boundaries—more important than height and ruggedness. And I call your attention also to the question of coinciding factors.

In the case of the Carpathians, for instance, you may look at a geological, a climatological, a morphological, a hydrographical, a biological, or a demographical map of Europe, or at any others, such as forest maps, those of arable land or of railroads, and you will find marked on all those maps the semicircle of the Carpathians as a dividing barrier.

The combination of all the conditions aforementioned in a belt which is of great breadth and remarkable for the scarcity of its population—this, rather than the mere arbitrary setting of any particular line of demarcation, constitutes an actual division of absolute efficacy and great historical and political importance. The further details are of less importance; and, in the study of frontiers, problems of quite another character present themselves. It makes no difference whether the line of watershed or that connecting the highest peaks denotes the frontier. The main fact remains through ages, though there are periods of local changes, of the pushing down of the frontier line by a stronger power from the highest peaks towards the valley-heads of the outer slope. In the Carpathians it is the straighter line of the highest crests that marks

the frontier. There are noteworthy deviations only in two places. One is near Pressburg, where the necessity for protection against aggressions through the gate of Vienna, where the Danube enters the Hungarian basins, made the Hungarian frontier guards descend even in early centuries to the Morava or March River, now the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria. The other is on the most eastern side of the old frontier, in the southeast corner of Transylvania. The boundary line descends here from the very broad-backed mountain top, where the watershed is not recognizable and does not divide, to the defiles or cañons of the Little Besztercze, Békás, Tatros, Ojtoz, and Bodza rivulets, the gates of the mountain-land. The linking together of these gorges or gateways forms a better line of defense. I should like to call your attention to the fact that Professor Penck of Berlin advocated such a type of frontier on a much more important spot, which was strongly disputed during the Great War. This is the northeast frontier of Italy, where Professor Penck is in favor of a line connecting the defiles of the Brenta, Piave, Livenza, and Tagliamento, instead of the Austro-Italian frontier along the crest of the Dolomites and the Karnian Alps.

The other frontiers of Hungary were less marked, in comparison to the splendid wall of the Carpathians, but are interesting in several respects. Where the Alps are forced by the above-mentioned Styrian block to part, the lowland basin penetrates into the Alps themselves in the great “gulf” of Graz. Farther to the south, passing through isolated hills and downs between the Drave and the Save, the outliers of the plain penetrate far into Bosnia. At these points the political frontiers, too, have been at all times less fixed. In the time of the kings of our old national dynasty, the Árpáds, the Basin of Graz—and just before the Turkish conquest, Bosnia also—belonged in great part to Hungary. Farther to the east, the broad mass of the lowlands extends south, far into historical Serbia. Here the Hungarian expansion chose as the southernmost demarcation line, the Save, not the Drave and Danube frontier of recent times, and the territory between the three rivers was for long centuries—up to the time of the Turkish occupation—one of the most thickly populated Magyar regions. The crest of the Balkan mountain masses was reached as the boundary of the Hungarian State only twice and then temporarily and for a very short time, and only for the defense of the real frontier. This happened after the first settling down of the Magyars.

But that leads us to another group of facts, to the story of how the Magyars settled in this Middle Danube Basin. So now we shall leave frontier questions. In my next lecture I shall speak of the settling, that intermediate and complex link between natural conditions and the more easily recognizable facts of human history.

LECTURE II

THE MAKING OF THE STATE

LAST time we went into a good deal of geographical detail, and you will understand why, for American history proves to you sufficiently the need of geographical knowledge. Let me remind you of the important rôle the Appalachians played in the consolidation of the Thirteen Colonies and the forming of the nation; also of the rôle the Cumberland Gap, leading to Kentucky and Tennessee, played in the winning of the West. Or shall I mention here the rôle of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers in the formation of the Empire State; or of the Mississippi—which reminds me so much in appearance of our Tisza (Theiss) River—in the Civil War, or in the economic development of the country before the time of the railways? Geographical knowledge is indispensable for dealing with all political and economic questions.

Today we shall turn to history.

It is not necessary to explain why I go back in the illustration of present conditions to former and even to very remote times. In this country, you are well acquainted with the fact that your history and the forming of the nation can only be understood if looked upon in the light of its origin. Likewise with us, if one wishes to study the racial question in Hungary, it is not enough to go back fifteen or twenty years and look at what our immediate predecessors have done. We must go back to the eighteenth century, to the settlement of Hungary after the Turkish rule, and to the end of the sixteenth century, when the Turks came in with all force; we must even go back as far as the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries to understand the manner of this first colonization. Because all these things have a very great influence on the situation which existed before the war and on all that took place during the war.




FIG. 7.

FIG. 7. Comparison of area of the United States of America with present Kingdom of Hungary and the "succession states," which share in and extend outside the territories of former Austria-Hungary. Dotted line represents pre-war Hungary; 1, Poland; 2, Czechoslovakia; 3, territories of Tyrol and Trentino, ceded by Austria to Italy; 4, Austrian republic; 5, Eastern Galicia; 6, Roumania; 7, Yugoslavia; 8, Free State of Fiume, formerly Hungarian; present Kingdom of Hungary has solid black boundary and printed name HUNGARY.

Or, another example: If you wish, for instance, to understand the economic conditions in Hungary, especially that of our great industry, you must go back to the eighteenth century and see that at the time of the highest development of mercantilism in Europe, when other states were constructing the basis of their economic wealth, Hungary was practically a colony of the Austrian Empire. These are just two examples of why I have to go back in history. In this historical review only those main facts will be touched upon which are of great importance in their effect on life and labor and on political evolution in modern times.

In my first lecture I said that before some one power took into its possession all the Basin of the Middle Danube up to the crest of the protecting mountains, there was no stable political organization. The situation of the territory as a point of convergence from east, south, and west now came to full significance.

It was at the end of the ninth century that the Magyars entered and occupied the land. Even earlier, while living in what is now Moldavia and Bessarabia (provinces of Roumania today) they seem to have been acquainted with the plains of the Danube and the Tisza. It was probably by the northeastern passes, across Ruthenia of today, that they entered the country—the extreme western part of the steppe-belt, similar to the continuous plain of southern Russia. The way they came was that of all the migrating peoples. The migration movement, a consequence of climatical changes and of the destruction of irrigation works in Asia, pressed them, wave by wave, from home to home, westward.

A prominent American geographer, Mr. Ellsworth Huntington, wrote a splendid book on the subject, “The Pulse of Asia.” May I call your attention also to an article which a Hungarian colleague of mine, Professor Cholnoky, wrote in the excellent volume which the American Geographical Society published in memory of the Transcontinental Excursion in 1912? My colleague compared the situation in Asia, the desiccation and the importance of irrigation works, with the situation in the southwestern states of America before Europeans came there, i.e., the situation of the Pueblo Indians, who were very much dependent upon the amount of rainfall.

We have no precise knowledge of the origin of all the tribes which constituted the Magyar people at the time they entered their future home. But we see that in a moment of great danger, in one of those moments of hot struggle which gave a new impulse to migration, there arises *the man*, the man whom Asia’s races needed to form peoples from the related but scattered ranks and to lead them to new conquests. The great peoples of Asia—Huns, Hiungnūs, Yuë-Tchis, Mongols, and others—were all more or less collected from the same or related tribes. It was the will of the great chiefs, of the Attilas, Kublai Khans, and Tamerlanes, who raided the plains and put the stamp of the chief’s own clan on all the peoples they touched. The *man* of the Magyars arose in the person of Árpád. He probably led his people across the passes of modern Ruthenia, but perhaps also along the lower Danube—that is not quite determined by historians.

As to the origin of the tribes, the Finnish and Turkish affinities of our language lead to two different theories, studied at an early date by highly developed schools of Hungarian etymologists. There is much controversy between those advocating the Turkish and those believing in the Finnish origin. But the most probable truth is that Turkish warriors subjugated a greater mass of Finnish fishermen and farmers. Our language is more like Finnish; our national utensils, weapons, clothing, ornaments, and other objects are more akin to the Turkish. That is only natural. The master took over the language of the greater mass, language not being a question of pride in those

days of changing and mingling communities. The servant imitated the dress of the master and must have been proud of it. How things happened is easy to understand. Turkish shepherds and warriors were driven by drought from their pasture-lands in Asia. They fell upon peasants acquainted with irrigation, destroyed their works, and conquerors and conquered went forth to seek a new home. This may have happened in that part of Asia nearest Europe, e.g., in Turkestan. Through the Uralo-Caspian gap, between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, these waves inundated Europe on the great Ukrainian Steppe. Here they probably met the remnants of an indigenous population, which had been all but drowned in the first waves of the great migration of peoples and which were mixed with various elements of all the peoples who had passed that way for centuries. They also found Finns, and subsequently Slavs. These Finnish and Slavic people had filtered slowly southward from the forest-belt of central Russia to the steppe-belt. The forest-belt was rather quiet territory and migrations did not take place *en masse*. When the people of the forest-belt came into the steppe-belt the waves of the migrating warrior peoples swept them away, picked them up and carried them on into Europe. All these peoples together made a conglomerate mass, rolling continuously westward, sometimes as a coherent people governed by a warrior-prince, sometimes as a disintegrated mass of quarreling tribes. It is my opinion that Magyars and Bulgars, Avars and Huns, Scythians and others were composed of similar elements, only the percentage of the various elements in each tribe being different.

The Magyars belonged to this group of peoples, very much mixed by migration. Still they were different in character from the Huns and Avars, who entered our plains before them, over the same route. This is proved by the difference in the choice of their headquarters and settlements. Whereas the center of gravity of the real nomad peoples of the Hun-Avar type had always been somewhere among the marshes, pastures, and woods of the banks of the Tisza, where they were protected against surprise by enemies, the Magyars first occupied and settled those territories which are most suitable for the cultivation of cereals. You see these territories in Figure 8, an adaptation of a map from Lavis's "History of France," a map drawn by our illustrious master of the University of Paris, Professor Paul Vidal de la Blache. Stippled areas indicate the forest land. The *loess* (black) is the land which was best for the growing of cereals.

The fact that the Magyars, when entering the country, did not settle in the marshes and woods but in this last-mentioned part proves that the Hungarians were much more farmers, much more agriculturists, and a little more settled people than their migratory predecessors.




FIG. 8.

FIG. 8. Forest land and loess-covered land in Hungary (after Vidal de la Blache).

When the Magyars entered these lands they found in Transdanubia, the former Roman province of Pannonia, remnants and marks of a very high civilization, especially of the cultivation of vineyards. The Hungarians settled in this region and continued the work of farming and vine-growing. There is another proof of the Hungarians having been farmers to a much greater extent than the other migrating tribes. The words for wheat, barley, and rape, for sheaf, sickle, and plough, for vineyard and wine, the words for plowing and reaping, are of Magyar origin, proving that the Magyars brought agriculture with them from their former eastern homes. They raised a great many pigs.

There must have been many more Finnish fishermen among them than in former throngs, for the art of fishing was highly developed among them. But this was surely not the only cause of their more advanced civilization. They had not only warlike but also peaceful intercourse with the Byzantines, when, in the eighth and ninth centuries, they lived in those regions which are now western Ukraine, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, in the neighborhood of the then flourishing Bulgarian Empire and fairly near to the Byzantine Empire.

This trend toward more settled occupations was happily fused with the high political sense of the nomad Turks. It enabled them to solve the dilemma which inevitably led every nomadic people, venturing so far into Europe, either to ultimate extinction or to adjustment and assimilation with the civilization of Europe. Very few of these migrating peoples chose the latter and those who sprang from the same group as the Hungarians—Huns and Avars—were swept away by the reaction of the European nations. But the Hungarians chose the other way and the nomad people solidified into a nation and formed a state. This was an important step not only for us but for the history of Europe, which would have taken quite another course if the Hungarians had been swept away from the territory they then occupied.

Not less important was it that our ancestors, when they had to choose between Byzantine and Western civilization and connections, chose the latter.

The third remarkable fact in this line was that our first king did not ask help and recognition from the Emperor, but from the Pope, preserving freedom and independence when he accepted civilization. Still the neighboring German or Holy Roman Empire, as it was called, and its evolution, exercised the greatest influence upon the new political body. This influence of German institutions is quite natural because of the proximity of the two nations and on account of the ease of communication through the open gap of the Danube valley towards Vienna. We can follow this influence through all the centuries. But it was always strongly counterbalanced by the resistance offered by ancestral traditions and by the trend of national evolution. I call your attention to this double line of evolution, to this struggle which is characteristic of our history in the twentieth century as it was in the eighth century. The preservation of the ancestral traditions kept the Magyars from making an unnatural leap from the nomadic stage immediately into feudalism of the type of the late Carolingian times and directed them towards the forms of a patriarchal kingdom.

The political consolidation of the country, the strengthening of the central royal power, is coupled with the name of our first king, St. Stephen. Still, St. Stephen was not the first to introduce Western civilization and Christianity into Hungary; his father had done this before him. His father had remained a pagan, however, and it may perhaps interest you that when he was asked by the missionaries, who came into the country at his request, how it was possible that he, the Chief (he was not yet a king, but a chief), who had asked them to come and to spread Christian truth among the pagan Magyars, continued himself the sacrifice of the white horse (this was the great religious ceremony of the pagan Magyars and was done before and after every great enterprise), he replied: "The great chief of Hungary is a chief great enough to have

two religions at the same time.”

St. Stephen was the man who broke the power of the pagan chieftains, and with this he broke down paganism and also the clan system. But this last was broken down only politically. Economically it persisted; it survived in the form of common holding of land. The struggle which St. Stephen began for the right of private property lasted far down into the reigns of his successors. Great properties were given by St. Stephen to the bishops, and the religious orders, and to his partisans in the struggles against the great pagan chiefs. They all in return became dependent upon the king, bound to serve him with their arms. So a central, royal force was formed, apart from and opposed to the old clan system, with its trend towards separatism and segregation.

Still, the Hungarian royal system was not feudal, as was England under King John. The proud nomad chief or warrior did not know the “*Ich dien*” (I serve) of the medieval German knight. He saw in his king the chief of his newly united clan; and much of the intimacy of the nomad clan was preserved, especially its political body.

I want to point this out because there is no gap between this primitive political body and our constitution of today. The right of the nomad warrior to take his part in great decisions concerning the doings and the fate of the clan was never quite suppressed by even our strongest kings.

All of you are familiar with the Magna Charta of King John as the keystone of constitutional freedom in England. You may be less familiar with the fact that among the continental nations Hungary was first to obtain a similar solemn pledge for the respect of civic liberties. I speak of the Golden Bull of King Andrew, given in 1222. Here begins a very marked analogy in the development of Hungarian constitutional life with that of England, though entirely independently, and most likely in ignorance of the latter. This parallel lasted as long as Hungary remained master of her destiny.

If we can speak of democracy in those remote times, and we surely find there the origins of the most inspiring ideals of our own times, it is worthy of note that the great charter of Hungarian liberties, in some respects, went even beyond the Magna Charta. Thus, the Golden Bull explicitly grants to the nation the right of armed resistance against the king, should the latter disregard his solemn pledges. This right to resort to arms against the king proved most precious and was frequently resorted to in succeeding centuries by a nation imbued with an indomitable love of freedom.

While the privileged class of freemen was, of course, practically the only one to enjoy the rights and privileges granted by the constitution, a situation to which you find an analogy in this country up to the time of the Civil War, the Hungarian constitution explicitly declared the full equality of all freemen or yeomen in the

exercise of constitutional liberties. This equality in rights and privileges was most jealously guarded against the encroachments of the wealthiest landowners.

A German witness of the twelfth century, Bishop Otto von Greysing, tells us about the kingdom of our national dynasty. He says:

“The king’s power was far stronger than that of any German prince or even the Emperor. The administration was strongly centralized. The king named and deposed his own barons and lord lieutenants, and everyone obeyed him. Still, he was no despot, like the Byzantine or Russian rulers, and in all great decisions he asked the opinion of the great nobles or captains, and there were assemblies held at all times.”

I have traced the history of the migration of the Magyar race, of the clan system, and of the foundation of the kingdom. At the same time a parallel evolution took place, constituting an important coincidence.

I speak of the national amalgamation of, first, the already fairly well amalgamated Turk and Finn conquerors; second, the scattered old inhabitants, for the most part Slavs; third, the kindred nomad peoples coming later from the East; and fourth, all those, knights and serving people, Franks, Germans, Italians, Slavs, and even Greeks—who, at the hospitable call of our king, came from the west and settled in Hungary. This took place during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries; in the last-named it was practically carried to completion.

This absorption of foreign elements itself contributed to the dying out of the clan organization and worked hand in hand with the intention of the king to form a new order of society, organized on the ruins of the tribal system. In the struggles of this movement warriors were reduced to serfdom and serfs raised to freedom, and all elements of the nation were mingled and shaken together. The classes of medieval Hungary were formed regardless of nationality and origin. The ancestors of the Boeskays and Báthorys, who were later ruling princes of Transylvania, and other great families seem to have been German; those of the Rákóczis, princes of Transylvania and the great heroes of our struggles for freedom, were probably Slav; those of the Lórándffys, another very great family in former times, were Italian. But in the whole territory where the Magyars settled, all these peoples soon became one in language and formed a single nation, just as racially mixed, but also just as strongly united as the French in France.

We have now reviewed the political evolution of the nation and the social and racial amalgamation, and may turn to a third evolution which ran parallel with those and which was of very great influence upon the fate of the country. The Árpáds—

that is the name of our first national dynasty—created a peculiar mechanism to protect the frontier of the land, which they, with happy foresight, recognized to lie in the Carpathians. From the center, where the Magyars had settled, they pushed in every direction towards the crests of the surrounding mountains. They developed a system common to eastern Slavs and also common to Turanian races, as far east as China, i.e., the system of “march-belts” or “Clausæ.” The Hungarians left a broad belt of land, wild and uncultivated, surrounding the whole country. Inside this belt were the villages of the frontiersmen. This duty of protection was entrusted chiefly to Magyars or kindred tribes, Jazyges, Petchenegs, and partly also to German settlers.

If we were to draw a map of the settlements in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, we should find the southern lowlands and Transdanubia densely, the northeastern part of the lowlands less densely populated; we should see the smaller basins near the Carpathian boundary settled, but the great woodland between these border settlements and the lowlands uninhabited. Only in some valleys do we see the population of the lowlands entering slowly into the mountain regions.

The occupation of the intermediate regions between the border-belts and the lowlands, especially large in the north and east, was a much slower process. This early pioneer work was carried out for military reasons, the wood-clearing going hand in hand with the building of royal fortresses. The way into the virgin forests of the northwestern highlands was not opened until the thirteenth century, when our kings brought in Slav tribesmen, the white Croats, the ancestors of the Slovaks of today. They came in small groups, as workmen, organized according to a German system of forest-clearing under the command of *Schultheissen*, or village mayors, practically contractors.

After the devastation of Hungary by the Mongols in 1244, a danger which menaced the whole of Europe, Roumanians began to filter into the eastern mountains, filling those parts of the land which had been left uninhabited, between the German and Magyar frontier territories and the main group of Magyars. If you look at the country today where Magyars and Roumanians live together, you will still find the mountain portions, and especially the tops, settled by Roumanians, and the lowlands settled by Magyars, who also enter the mouths of the valleys; because the one has always been fond of the mountains and the other has always been fond of the plain.

You see here also an explanation of the fact that Magyars, Széklers—which name is not that of a separate nation, but means in Turkish simply “frontiersmen”—are to be found on the borders and are separated from the main mass of their kinsmen by hordes of alien people. Therefore, in the east, in Transylvania,

Roumanian settlements and Magyar settlements are dovetailed into one another, I should like to say resembling the emblem of the Northern Pacific Railway, which some of you may know.

Thus, a measure taken a thousand years ago caused headache in the Peace Conference and will probably continue to produce sleepless nights in the League of Nations.

Magyars have never been enthusiastic over town life. Our first towns were founded by German settlers. These Germans, as well as those who settled on the borders, the Saxons in the south and east of Transylvania and those who settled in the northern part of the country, in the Zips, were granted great privileges. The frontiersmen had a wide autonomy. In the towns no one, not even a Magyar nobleman, could settle without the burghers' permission, and this was seldom granted.

In 1405 the towns acquired the right of representation in parliament. They had great influence on the development of our commerce and system of economics. They were the first to pay a part of their tribute in money. This kind of payment increased and so laid the real foundations of the money system, introduced into economic life in place of exchange and barter. The king, of course, had the coins made in his own mint, but only the life of the town and the market could make money the real and effective vehicle of economic life.

As a result the king was no longer the only link between his land and the west. It was a great contrast to his position in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when he introduced the Christian religion and was the patron of missionaries; he called in the western settlers and created the first intercourse with foreign powers.

This trend of economic development and the growth of great fortunes, which I have mentioned, finally weakened the power of the king, a consequence which becomes strongly apparent in the early part of the thirteenth century. Large grants in return for help against rebellious pagan chiefs and later against rival pretenders to the throne, and on the other hand, the development of the money system of economics, encouraged the growth of great private properties and independence of central royal authority.

I mentioned pretenders to the throne. The usual and acknowledged right of succession during the reign of our old national dynasty was based on blood relationship. The conflict of primogeniture and seniority led to a struggle which was never decided in principle, though in practice succession of the son prevailed. I should like to call attention to the fact that here you see the result of Western European influence, where succession of the son was the tradition as opposed to the

Asiatic tradition of seniority. When the male line of the national dynasty died out the nation elected its kings freely, but there practically was no divergence from the principle of electing them from among the descendants of female branches of the old dynasty.

As long as the national kings reigned, the strength of blood and tradition held in check the centrifugal forces of an infiltrating German feudalism. As soon as the dynasty died out, the power of oligarchy raised its head, very late in comparison with Germany and the West in general. The Hungarian oligarchs were no separate class. The freemen or nobles, who were the successors of the warriors of olden days, all had the same rights, and were equal before the law. There was “one and only one nobility” (*una eademque nobilitas*), as we say in our law. The rights of this class were extensive! These were handed down, as I have said, from those of the nomad warrior. The nobility, the freemen, jealously guarded their rights and strove to enlarge them. The political sense of some great kings and the weakness of others, as in England, contributed to enlarge these rights and to create a strong system of national control.

The following are the main characteristics of the Hungarian constitutional life at the very end of the Middle Ages: Elective kingship, oath and diploma of coronation, both confirming the rights of the nation; the rights of the nobles to resist their king, laid down in general terms of written law; a representative parliamentary assembly of the nobility and towns; the duty of the Estates, the body of all nobles or freemen, to render military service, and as a reward their exemption from taxes; and finally, the County, again very much as in England, a decentralized, special organization of the main body of the nobility, meaning in those times the whole nation (from *Szekfü*).

To this I must add a few words to enable you to understand to what extent Hungary from the very beginning was a constitutional monarchy, where every freeman, without distinction of origin and race, took part in directing the affairs of his land.

No detail of Hungarian history, from the Middle Ages to our own days, can be understood without knowledge of the County, which has been of the highest importance in our history.

This institution was founded in the eleventh century by our first king, St. Stephen. It meant the royal castles and their environs, with jurisdiction only over the common people who were not freemen. In the beginning of the thirteenth century the freemen of the Counties, old tribesmen as well as freed descendants of the conquered races, began to rally and to hold their assemblies with royal permission in order to protect themselves against the encroachments of the great landowners. The freemen, the

king's warriors, became transformed into the landed nobility of the kingdom.

Development continued along these lines until in the fifteenth century we see that the County has become a complete political body. The nobility of each county sends deputies to Parliament, provided with strict instructions; laws and decrees are promulgated at the County Assembly and executed by County officials; the County enacts regulations, and it exercises jurisdiction through its courts. From the sixteenth century the County becomes the stronghold of constitutionalism against the absolute and centralistic efforts of the foreign dynasty, the Hapsburgs. The County's weapons were the right of refusal to collect taxes and to call recruits not voted by the Parliament, and the right to refuse to execute unlawful decrees and ordinances. These rights are substantially still in force and were last exercised with effect in 1904. Here you may perhaps allow me to mention a personal experience.

In 1904 the Government tried to govern the country by ordinances lacking the sanction of Parliament. The Counties replied by making use of their right of resistance. Our County Assembly was called together by the Second Lord Lieutenant, who is an elected county official, but when we wanted to enter the County House the First Lord Lieutenant, who is appointed a representative of the Government, forbade our going in. He enforced this order by pickets of gendarmes, corresponding to your state troops. This body of men is paid and officered by the central government but is nominally under the orders of the county officials. In these days of constitutional conflict, however, I, who was at that time an elected county official, was faced by the bayonet of the gendarme of my own district, whose chief I was in the administration. Of course, the soldier himself laughed at the curious situation which, by the way, was by no means dangerous. But it shows you the possibility of the struggle between Government and County, and how far these troubles can go.

The military and the financial administration passed from royal officials to those elected by the County Assembly, as we have seen, and it remained thus until 1870. It was the military organization of the Counties which fought the long and heroic struggle in self-defense and for the protection of Europe against the Turks. But before I come to this warfare which had such direful consequences, let me tell you something more about the factors in whom power within the state was vested. One of these, as you have seen, was the small landed nobility, which rallied in a body in the Counties. The second was the bishops of the church and the monks, enjoying privileges bestowed by the kings, and endowed with rich estates. The third group was the great landowners, the oligarchs, a power which rose suddenly when the national dynasty died out in 1301. Still, the glory of the oligarchs did not last much

longer than half a century. It was destroyed by the great Anjous of Naples, Robert-Charles and Louis, elected to the throne of Hungary in the fourteenth century. As trained politicians they wisely judged the real situation and concealed the interests of the state in concessions to the landowners, giving them special rights but also imposing on them special duties. Thus the nobility became divided in the fourteenth century. A class of high nobles, of peers—though without titles—was created, with the privilege of having their own soldiers, but with the duty of providing a certain force at the king's command. In all other respects the rights of all the nobles remained the same. The institution was undoubtedly feudal, but the power of the king and the State being founded also on the existence of the small nobility and its County system, and such factors as the Magyar and German frontiersmen, Széklers and Saxons, with their large territorial autonomies, on the towns, and on the Church—feudalism in Hungary never became paramount and the unity of the State was always preserved intact. The nation herself kept watch over this unity, feeling that it involved her own vital interests. The nation disliked to see these interests exposed to doubtful enterprises and conquests.

I told you that only a few of our kings passed the Carpathians. When in the twelfth century they participated in the struggles of the Russo-Polish principalities, and became the arbitrators, and when in the thirteenth century the King of Hungary helped the first Hapsburg Rudolph against the King of Bohemia, their enterprises remained without consequences. And when Louis the Great, of the Anjou dynasty, gained Poland's crown by peaceful means, and extended his power to the Baltic marshlands, Hungary remained absolutely disinterested.

Greater interest was directed towards the west and south, where the continuation of the Great Plain invited advance. In each direction we had to defend our independence,—against the German and Byzantine Empires. Frederick Barbarossa and Manuel Comnenos both attempted the conquest of Hungary—the latter fought sixteen years for it—but neither was successful. A much greater danger to the country arose when for the first time it had to defend Europe against a new terrible and mighty foe. It is proof of Hungary's fame and strength at that time, however, that the whole strength of the Mongolian forces invading Europe was directed against Hungary, the main force in a mass against the Ruthenian passes, the left wing in three groups against the Transylvanian borders, the right one in three groups through Poland, turning southwards against our northern mountain-land. Hungary succumbed, but the Mongols soon retired and the country recovered.

The direction in which the national dynasty made a consistent fight was for access to the sea, which was attained in the beginning of the twelfth century by

Koloman the Bibliophile, the wise king, who also prohibited the burning of witches. The triune kingdom of later centuries, Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, was for a time the heritage of the younger sons of the kings of Hungary.

Towards the west, there was a continual struggle, but it was marked by no great actions and enterprises. Whenever there was a moment of weakness, as after the death of the great reformer, St. Stephen, or after the death of the last king of Árpád's and Stephen's dynasty, the German neighbors tried to interfere.

The fate of the Balkans, towards which the lowland country is most open, affected the country's history most of all. Three times a union with the Byzantine Empire threatened. In the thirteenth century the reviving power of the Bulgarian Empire threatened Hungary. Actions, of course, brought reactions, and twice the Hungarian kingdom reached the main divide of the Balkans, once in the twelfth century and again under its great king, Louis of Anjou.

Under Louis of Anjou, Hungary became one of the Great Powers of Europe. The lands of this king extended over an area three times that of pre-war Hungary. After having balanced for centuries between the German and Byzantine Empires, Hungary passed into the sphere of French influence and of French-Italian culture. The great king's court became a meeting-place for the scholars and artists of his native land. Hungarians visited the west; the king's Hungarian troops conquered for him the land of his origin, Naples, and fought his Italian wars against Venice and Genoa. King Louis forced these states to recognize freedom of trade and navigation on the Adriatic and Hungarian shipping took its place on the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately, King Louis had no son and his son-in-law, Sigismund of Luxemburg, dragged Hungary again into the German sphere of influence. Such sudden changes were, of course, very unfortunate politically.

During the long reigns of these two kings in the fourteenth century, the Turkish danger began to threaten Europe. The troops of the mighty King Louis went cheerfully to cross swords in the Balkans with the new enemy, the Turk. Sigismund, whose attention was much more absorbed by the affairs of his Western Empire, missed the opportunity afforded him as ruler of so many nations, and never tried to inflict a decisive blow upon the Turk. After his death dynastic struggles and other difficulties in the weakly governed land made such a blow impossible. Our great national hero, John Hunyadi, fought indefatigably with changing fortunes against the Turk, but the power of Hungary had become weakened and Europe could not find its way to act with the necessary unity. Even the Balkan peoples did not help Hunyadi with unswerving fidelity. Perhaps it would not have been possible to expel the Turk, who had the advantages of a fresh warrior spirit and of being governed by

the will of one man, from Europe, even if the German Emperor had been less engrossed with western affairs; or the great Magyar landowners had not always sought for weak personalities on the occasion of a new king's election; or the Genoese had not lent their ships to Murad, when Venice tried to bar his way over the narrow seas; and even if the Serbian despot had not communicated Hunyadi's first plan of attack to the Sultan, who then surrounded the Polish-Hungarian army at Varna. Even if all this had not happened, perhaps the Turk would not have been driven back, but he would at least have been checked, and the fate of Hungary, of the Christian Balkan States, and of Europe would have been changed. In the fifteenth century Hungary already felt the greatness of the danger, and the County nobles, seeing the land weakening in the hands of oligarchs and foreign kings, elected a national king, Matthias, the son of Hunyadi.

His reign of thirty-two years is the last age of happy prosperity and national greatness. Matthias was the great Renaissance King of Hungary. His court was a meeting-place for the world's great scholars; such as Regiomontanus, the great astronomer of the fifteenth century, and of Italian artists and poets. According to the testimony of the papal legates, the artistic splendors of his castles surpassed anything the Medicis by that time had created in Florence. His library, the Corvina, was and is of world-wide fame. At the same time he was beloved by the people, because of his great love of justice and the freedom of his intercourse with his subjects, as surely was no other monarch of the Renaissance epoch. He lacked the aggressive spirit of his father, however, and theoretical, strategical studies confirmed him in his aversion to the business of war. He was a keen diplomat and trained his barons to his own bent. He liked to solve questions by establishing a good strategical position along diplomatic lines. His reign was filled with less significant struggles for the Czech throne and against his covetous Austrian neighbor; but he neglected to make a definite attack on the Turk, with the regular army he had organized, the first standing army in Europe.

It is the weak side of the system of free election of the king that the slackening of the strong hand always frees the powers which have been held down and have desired a change. After Matthias' death, in the time of greatest danger, the Estates brought their king from Poland, where the absolute freedom of the landed nobles seemed to them a desirable condition of things. Thirty-six years after Matthias' death the small forces of the King of Hungary were annihilated at Mohács; the king himself was drowned and the Turks, meeting with no further resistance, overran a great part of Hungary, the whole of the plain.

In the next lecture you will see the tremendous influence of the Turkish

occupation on the fate of Hungary. Its effects we have felt ever since, especially at the outbreak of the World War and in its consequences. It will never cease to be the greatest causal element in the determination of our fate.

Let us now cast a glance at the political, cultural, and economic state of Hungary at the time when the Turkish conqueror dealt his blow.

Politically a new period of evolution had just begun. The greatest achievement of the Renaissance King Matthias was perhaps the systematic breaking down of feudalism. He prepared a strong military and administrative system for the unification of the powers of state.

Culturally we were in a period of great advancement. Still limited to the higher classes, science, architecture, painting, sculpture, and especially the goldsmith's craft were developed to a high degree and would probably soon have filtered into the broader layers of the population.

Economically the development of capitalism had begun and all the nationalities shared in this development.

This would normally have contributed to a further unification and strengthening of the country, which from the national point of view was never so strong and united as in this period. At the time of King Matthias the land was more than eighty-five per cent Magyar.

All this unity was destroyed, all this development stopped by the Turkish invasion.

I shall try to summarize those main facts of our history which have had a decisive influence on the course of the history of the European continent.

These facts may well be placed in four groups.

The *first* is that the Carpathians proved to be a most formidable barrier. As soon as the power holding the central part of the basin came to hold their whole length, these mountains proved absolutely effective as a frontier. Only a tremendous difference between the forces of the attacking and of the defending powers made it possible in one single instance for the attacking powers to cross the Carpathians. So the basin they surround formed a bulwark of Western civilization, with easy means of communication to the west, a dividing barrier to the northeast and southeast, and a weak frontier to the south.

Our *second* conclusion may be that by accepting Western civilization and religion instead of eastern, by consolidating the state, by strengthening the central government and so making it possible that they should remain in Europe, the Magyars definitely wedged off the southern from the northern Slavs. Without

expressing an opinion I shall state only the fact that if a Slav Power had developed in the Basin of the Middle Danube, connecting Bohemia, Poland, and the Balkans, and extending to the doors of Vienna, European history would have taken another course.

The *third* fact to be recognized is that the Hungarian State developed into a strong and well-defined individuality among the Powers of Europe. It successfully amalgamated Asiatic nomad, west European, and Slav elements. It created a strong national and central organization, filling out the country to its natural frontiers. With sound political reserve it kept its independence free from both the German and Byzantine Empires and from mighty temporary nomad Powers. Hungary's fame made the Mongols concentrate their main attack on her and she imposed respect and caution on the advancing Turk for more than a century and a half. She saved the flourishing but politically divided Italy of the Renaissance, the pride of our civilization, and perhaps we could even say that there would have been no room for theological discussions in Switzerland or Germany if the Turkish avalanche had not been stopped.

The *fourth* and last conclusion we may draw is that the country reached a high degree of civilization. We find the kings of the national dynasty in close cultural and family relations with all the great Western courts. We find Hungarians at the universities of Italy and Paris. We see Hungary forestalling England and Italy with her first Gothic church. Remarkably enough it was the French Gothic that was copied and not the German Gothic, which was so much nearer at hand. Out of the influence exercised early on the surrounding peoples of the Balkans and the Roumanian plains by intercourse and rivalry with Byzantium and by missionary work a political hegemony began to develop. Through this privileged position of Hungary and by means of steady work, Western civilization had hopes of rescuing the Balkan peoples from a stagnant and weakening Eastern culture.

The horoscope of Hungary, notwithstanding the struggles and dangers of weak periods, would have been very favorable, if a new and terrible foe had not arisen on the weak southern side. The Turkish blow cut this line of evolution and thereby changed the course of Hungarian, and with it, the course of European history.

LECTURE III

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TURKISH INVASION ON THE FATE OF MODERN HUNGARY

IN our modern history we have two great problems, concerning—I do not dare say here “foreign policies”—but something which interests foreigners, because of what you would call a foreign policy we had practically none. For a time, indeed, as I shall show you, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a part of Hungary, i.e., Transylvania, had its own foreign policy. But reunited Hungary, modern Hungary, since the second half of the nineteenth century has had no foreign policy. We had then two problems, the Austrian problem and the nationality problem, in which foreigners were interested. The period about which I shall speak today, the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, is of the greatest importance, because those problems have their foundation and their origin in those three centuries, and if I explain to you what happened in those centuries, only then will you be able to understand why in the nineteenth century political evolution took the course it did and why Hungary was in that position which has very much bound her hands.

In my first two lectures I characterized the development of Hungary before the Turkish blow, which changed the whole direction of our evolution. The high cultural development, the political strength and importance of Hungary among the peoples of Europe, was checked and broken. But notwithstanding this invasion there still survived from those old happy times of freedom and greatness the love of liberty and constitutionalism. We have seen how our land was divided into three parts, an event having the greatest influence on our modern history.

You shall see that the high cultural development and political standing among the peoples of Europe which we had attained in the fifteenth century was destroyed by the Turkish advance and the Turkish conquest of part of Hungary. The year 1526, the date of the battle of Mohács, is a landmark in our history and what comes after it is more or less only a great struggle for our independence. In this struggle we stood alone for the most part. The foresight of European diplomacy was not greater at that

time than at other times, and if you read the French historians you will see that they condemn the policy of Francis I, who entered into an alliance with the Turk, making it more easy for him to advance.

After the disastrous battle of Mohács, Hungary was divided into three parts. The central part of the land was conquered by the Turks. The natural consequence was that the other two parts were not so closely related. The two sections had elected two different kings. The eastern, or Transylvanian, section elected a national king, a Hungarian, John Zápolya. The western section, extending from the northeast (modern Ruthenia) to the southwest, was contiguous to Austria, and elected for its king Ferdinand, Duke of Austria, brother-in-law of the preceding king, Louis II, who fell in the battle of Mohács. Thus was accomplished the partition of Hungary, a partition which lasted one hundred and fifty years. During this time the three parts have in a certain sense each a separate history. In another sense the history is a common one, because there was always a common aim of the three parts to re-establish United Hungary.

The several parts of the Hungarian state proved stronger in their desperation than anyone could have expected. The strong organization of the County, an autonomous political body about which I have spoken previously, proved effective.

The conquering sultans found armed resistance on every side, and the Emperor-Kings, who, step by step, grew more eager to reduce Hungary to the legal status of their other provinces, found themselves checked by the defensive organization of the County.

Let us turn our attention now to the life and the condition of affairs in each of the three parts of Hungary (Fig. 11), and afterwards draw general conclusions.

I speak first of the central, the Turkish part of the land. On the periphery of the central part everything had been ruined. There was no definite boundary showing the extent of the Turkish conquest. The boundary changed according to the power of the Turk, of the other two parts of Hungary, and of the German Empire. There was a large border-belt in which there was constant warfare comparable to the struggle of the frontiersmen who entered Kentucky and Tennessee and went into the prairie and fought against the Indians, or of the pioneers of the north, who fought the Indians and the French. There were great battles as well as guerilla fights. The imperial forces in the fortresses of the Emperor-King, all foreign mercenaries, on one side, and the Turkish armies, on the other, vied with each other in devastating the land.

In this central part, where the Turkish occupation was more permanent, they took possession of the land, recognizing no rights of the conquered, compelling the landowners, the nobility, to emigrate. You can see the same kind of social evolution

today in parts annexed from Hungary, where there is a movement upon the part of the new rulers to deprive the Hungarian population of their leaders.

In this central part, the Turkish pashas, officials, and soldiers received grants of land. They oppressed the peasants, imposing very heavy taxes, so that in some parts whole communities emigrated. The peasants living on domains of the Sultan himself were better off than those living on private estates. Every pasha and every Turkish landowner knew that he had no certainty of retaining his estate for any length of time, that in a short time he might be removed from it by the Sultan or perhaps something much worse might happen to him—he might be given the “silk cord,” meaning condemnation to death. Hence the Turkish landlords tried to get out of the peasants as much as they could in a short time. On the estates of the Sultan these things did not happen, and the immigration into those domains was very large. There you have the reason for the formation of those great towns of an agricultural type, of those great farm-communities which are so characteristic of our lowlands. You will see that this movement was so strong and so effective that now, after three centuries, you can still see this fact expressed on the map in the distribution of population.




FIG. 9.

FIG. 9. Settlements in the lowlands, the great farmer town of Hódmező-Vásárhely and the surrounding farms (after Austro-Hungarian General Staff map, scale 1:75,000).

Outside the towns, as you see in Figure 9, are a great many scattered farms. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that the farmer stayed on his farm only during the summer when his labor was needed. As soon as he could, he went back to the town where he had protection against raiding bands of Turkish soldiers. Later on, after the Turks were driven out, and especially in the nineteenth century, these farms began to be transformed into regular habitations for the people, the farmers remaining on their farms all the year round. Today we have a new, third, phase of evolution in this matter. These farms are beginning to grow into villages, and after a time, perhaps in half a century, the whole situation will be much changed and we shall have villages there just as in other parts of Hungary. But today you can still see the consequences of the Turkish conquest. The map reflects the peculiar settlements,

FIG. 10. Settlements in the northeastern part of the lowlands which were not occupied by the Turks. Notice the difference in the way of settling in the central lowlands (after Austro-Hungarian General Staff map, scale 1:75,000).

To replace the Magyars who emigrated to escape Turkish aggression foreigners were brought in as settlers by the Turkish landowners. In this way were established the first settlements of Serbians and Roumanians along the banks of the lower Tisza and of the Maros down to Arad, in the southern part of the country. In the corner between the Drave, Danube, and Save rivers where many of the oldest Magyar settlements were situated, Serbians fleeing from the Turk had arrived as early as the beginning of the fifteenth century. Now the Turks drove out the whole Magyar population, and Serbians, partly new settlers, partly irregular soldiers of the Turk, came in. But where on Turkish territory, the Hungarian peasants were able to remain, and there they preserved their nationality with the dogged energy of our race.

I shall now turn to the second, the eastern part of our land, Transylvania; after the Turkish victory in 1526, it became a separate principality, under a national prince. This land became practically independent from the first and maintained its independence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, though paying formal tribute to the Sultan. This tribute was merely formal, and the Sultan was quite content to have a formal acknowledgment of his supremacy, and his troops never garrisoned the country. The clever diplomacy of able Magyar princes ruling Transylvania prevented the German and Turkish Emperors, who ruled large parts of the world, from subjugating this little state in Europe. Wedged politically between the German Empire, which reached through the part of Hungary under Hapsburg rule to its northern border and the Turkish Empire, which surrounded it, this little state played a great rôle in the history of Western Europe, to which it remained bound by all the ties of common intellectual interests and struggles. More than that, one of the cornerstones of Transylvania's constitution was the freedom of creed and religion, established by a law of 1557.




FIG. 11.

FIG. 11. The divisions of Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: 1, area of Turkish occupation; 2, Hapsburgian Hungary; 3, Transylvania; 4, part of Hungary annexed to Transylvania; 5, northeastern Hungary conquered by the princes of Transylvania from the Hapsburg kings; 6, territory of constant boundary fights.

As a son of this little country I am proud to be able to quote as a witness, Lord Bryce. Referring to his journey through Transylvania in 1868, three centuries after the promulgation of the law of the freedom of creed, he said in a discussion after a lecture in the Royal Geographic Society in London:

“I never entered a country where there is so complete an absence of religious persecution and intolerance as in Hungary.”^[1]

It is also interesting to note that the rulers of England and of Transylvania each demanded, nearly in the same year, that the Hapsburgs accord freedom of creed and religion to those parts of Hungary which were under the Hapsburg rule. Transylvania was a valued ally of the Protestant Powers of western Europe in the Thirty Years' War. The British Ambassador at Constantinople early in the seventeenth century said:

“Had Prince Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania received the same assistance which the European Powers gave to Gustavus Adolphus, he would have accomplished

more for Protestantism than Gustavus Adolphus did.”

Science went hand in hand with military enterprise and diplomacy. Magyars and Saxons regularly frequented the universities of Holland, Germany, and even England, and the relations then entered into persist down to our days, and are the consolation of our Protestants in the days of distress. Presbyterians, Puritans, Cartesians, Unitarians, and Coccejans held debates at the courts of Bethlen and Rákóczy. The Magyar literary language was formed at these courts, and science and art flourished. Scholars of European reputation taught in the schools of Transylvania.

The constitution of Transylvania was much more democratic than the constitution of medieval Hungary and reminds one even of the republican form of government. It was based on the so-called “three nations”; the Magyar County Nobility, the Széklers, and the Saxons. The *County Nobility* was by title Magyar, though it was not purely so by race; others being made nobles exactly like the Magyars. The *Széklers*, descendants of the Magyar and kindred frontier people, whom I mentioned in my first lecture, were mostly peasants; the *Saxons*, partly peasants of their old autonomous “Royal Land,” partly burghers of the towns. The Roumanians, about one-fourth of Transylvania’s population in the sixteenth century, had slowly filtered in from the south, mostly as shepherds, and their degree of civilization in consequence was far below that of the other “nations.” That is why we do not see them as participants in political life. Still there was no impediment to their entering the ranks of the County Nobility.

Hundreds of Roumanians were ennobled, and their families thus entered the ranks of the County Nobility. There are whole villages of such Roumanians, who are all Hungarian noblemen.

The “three nations” sent their representatives to Parliament, and the great part which the autonomous bodies, the towns and nations, played there, greatly influenced the political evolution of the whole land in a liberal direction. Parliament elected the Prince-Ruler. Thus the system itself was highly constitutional; still, in practice, the prince, who usually had very high personal qualities, exercised great power and was unrestricted in his deliberations, especially in respect to foreign matters. The Transylvanian princes often had to maintain independence by simulating friendship for the Sultan as well as by their skill as soldiers, while, at the same time, they acknowledged the supremacy of the King of Hungary. About that I shall speak later.

I shall consider now the situation of Transylvania in relation to the King of Hungary and the Emperor of Germany. The Transylvanians and their rulers always

considered themselves as depositaries of the national tradition of the kingdom of Hungary. They acknowledged the King of Hungary as their overlord. When I speak about the western part of the land, I shall explain how it was possible that the Transylvanians acknowledged him as king and at the same time fought with him a struggle for independence and freedom of creed.

Before I take up that matter I must say something about the foreign policy of Transylvania towards the east and southeast, that is towards the Balkans. The Sultan was quite content to consider the Transylvanians as vassals and to see the Transylvanian prince paying nominal tribute. The princes of Transylvania tried to spread Protestantism in Moldavia and Wallachia, but with no success. The great result, however, of their cultural influence was the creation of the Roumanian ecclesiastical language and ecclesiastical literature. Roumanian books were printed at the time at the expense of Hungarian nobles, and Prince George Rákóczy I gave orders to found a Roumanian ecclesiastical school and a Roumanian printing press. This whole movement was, of course, a part of the struggle of Transylvania for freedom of creed. When fighting for it themselves, they had to give it to other people.

In the northern and western parts of Hungary (under Hapsburg rule) the Transylvanian princes considered it their duty to keep watch over national and religious freedom. And with this I come to speak about the last of the three parts of disrupted Hungary, the western or the Hapsburg part.

You may ask me why Hungary at this time elected a Hapsburg prince as its king. The causes were two: One, the defense of his Austrian lands made it desirable for Ferdinand of Hapsburg to succeed to the throne of his unfortunate brother-in-law who fell in battle. The other, the western part of Hungary, hoped to get help from the powerful German Emperor against the Turk. The hope was not fulfilled. The Emperor, Charles V, was occupied with the affairs of Spain, France, and Italy. This was the time of the great Reformation, with its inner struggles and long wars. Instead of help, enfeebled Hungary had another surprise. She had to become accustomed to the King's living abroad.

The Hungarian people of this section had now to face the reality of a change in the balance of power in favor of Austria and in favor of a wider empire. The union between the German (later Austrian) and Hungarian empires was in the beginning only a personal one. It did not differ from similar unions Hungary had entered into during former centuries with Naples, Moravia, Bohemia, Austria, the German Empire, and several times with Poland. There was also in the beginning no calculated ill will on the part of the kings themselves to oppress Hungary. Still, by the natural

force of things, by the need for a concentration of all the powers of the common rulers and their lands, foreigners, the administrators of the Austrian domains, acquired more and more influence in the affairs of Hungary.

A struggle began in defense of the rights and of the independence of the nation. I shall not speak long about these struggles, but they are a red line going through all our history. You see in the centuries preceding the accession of the Hapsburgs the strife with our western neighbors as a struggle against German influence in general; from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century it had become a struggle against the power which possessed a part of Hungary. In the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth it was a struggle of the whole of Hungary ruled by the Emperor-King—a struggle of Hungary for its independence. And you see this line leading into our days, right up to 1918, the year when the Austro-Hungarian monarchy fell to pieces and when Hungary regained her independence.

Political Hungary, the “Estates,” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries defended their own rights, namely, to be the only medium through which and by which the king could govern Hungary. I mean by “Estates” the political body of the freemen who were called nobles. As a political body you have the parallel in France in the *Etats Généraux*. The French Estates, the Estates of Hungary, and the Estates of Prussia waged a similar struggle—the French Estates against Louis XIV, those of Brandenburg against Frederick the Great. But our Estates defended more and had more to lose than the French or the German Estates. It was possible for the members of the French or the German Estates, even if their power as a body was broken, to continue to take part in the administration of their land and nation as statesmen, as generals or as officials. Theirs were merely struggles in the general national evolution. In Hungary the breaking down of the Estates would have meant much more. It would have meant the taking over of the whole administration by foreigners, by the central administration in Vienna. In Hungary this would have been a national catastrophe. That was the difference (following Szekfi).

I ask you to give attention to this course of development, because therein is to be found the beginning of the evolution of one of those two great groups of events which led to the final misfortune of Hungary in our own days.

Things became worse when, succeeding Ferdinand I, Rudolph came to the throne in 1552. He transferred his residence to Prague. Hence Hungarian affairs were handled in a still more complicated manner. Furthermore, Rudolph was apathetic and took no interest in affairs of state. The complicated State machinery was getting out of gear; people could not obtain justice; ministers and officials began to act autocratically, curiously enough inflicting injustice mostly on the conservative

and most loyal of the great landowners. Hungary had practically lost her king and was faced by a phalanx of foreigners, who neither understood nor desired to understand the subtleties of the Hungarian constitution and the feeling of the people. Ill will grew where only accidental differences had existed before.

When, in addition to national differences and the struggle for national freedom, religious differences arose, there followed armed resistance, with long and bloody struggles against Austria. As early as the first part of the sixteenth century Luther's doctrine had many followers in northern Hungary, whereas eastern Hungary and Transylvania turned to the doctrine of Calvin. The Counter-Reformation found in Hungary a desperate resistance, in which, as I mentioned before, Transylvania aided the Hungarian Counties with all her forces. Several times the Transylvanian princes and their armies reached the very western limits of Hungary, the Austrian Province of Moravia, and even Vienna. Again and again the religious liberty and the national rights of the people of Hungary, the constitutional rights of the Estates and of the Counties, were acknowledged and confirmed by the king, to be shortly afterwards disregarded again.

The Hungarian state system, with its strong autonomous bodies, the Counties, proved more capable of exercising resistance than the Bohemian (Czech) "Estates," which were annihilated by the German Emperor in the battle of the "White Mountain." Still, Transylvania was much hampered by its semi-dependence on the Sultan, who had to be always carefully managed; hence Transylvania could just avert the worst from Hungary, but could not consistently follow the line leading to the re-establishment of the country's unity. The Estates of Hungary—only strong in the Counties, but disorganized as a whole body in consequence of the division of the land—saved the nation from incorporation into Germany. They could do it only by saving the constitution of the Estates. By doing so they petrified it, if I may say so, for a time, and carried over to the eighteenth and even the nineteenth century a system which, while very democratic in its form at the time it was made, was an edifice of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and in a very backward state when it came to the nineteenth century.

The chief thing which I should like you to note is that in this struggle against the foreigner for the life of the nation, with weapons of an old but strong system, there was neither time, nor possibility, nor demand for reforms. Parliament was impotent. The single Counties, though entitled to do so, were not capable of initiating reform, the average mentality of their assembly being too retarded and the means of getting the assent of the other Counties much too complicated. It was a further natural symptom that all that was foreign, especially all that was German, was hated. Even in

the clearest minds existed fear of weakening the power of resistance of the State and imperiling its theoretical independence by reforms,—first, by reason of disorders incidental to greater political reforms; second, by the weakness incidental to the transitional period of their introduction; and, third, by the influence the foreign imperial administration would exercise on the reforms themselves. So even the most advanced people did not dare to propose reforms, so much were they fearful lest the imperial officials might have a hand in them and thereby exercise greater influence on the Hungarian state and imperil the constitution.

I have told you now of the situation in the three parts of Hungary.

The chief aim in all three parts of the country was, as I have told, to restore Old Hungary. The Princes of Transylvania, in fighting against the kings, always recognized the kings of Hungary as overlords. This was not by virtue of necessity, as when they held off the Sultan by accepting formal vassalage. Political reason may have played its part in it. Still another factor stood in the background, the tradition of the one and indivisible kingdom of Hungary, bound up with the tradition of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen.

I shall have to explain this to you because our constitution can only thus be understood.

Everywhere, but especially in the medieval states of Europe, the act of coronation was of the nature of a religious consecration. In Hungary its solemnity was enhanced by the sacredness and authority of the crown and its first bearer, St. Stephen, the founder of the national kingdom. But we shall see that the act of coronation is considered something different in Hungary than in western Europe. The kings reigned by virtue of the authority inherited from St. Stephen, by the power of his patrimonial kingship, about which I spoke in my second lecture, and the crown grew to be a symbol of the transfer of this power. In a few words I shall show you the evolution in the symbolism of the crown. More and more frequently our kings, beginning with the thirteenth century, appealed to the crown as to a symbol, especially after the kings of the national dynasty had died out and when the coronation became the only link of continuity of St. Stephen's power.

Since our great King Louis of Anjou our kings have invoked their coronation with the Holy Crown as the foundation of their legitimacy, and they began to speak of the crown as "the crown of the kingdom" instead of as "my crown." The crown more and more became a symbol, and soon the kings began to use the term "Kingdom of the Holy Crown," instead of "my Kingdom." The State, as constituted by the Estates of the fifteenth century, already used the term "Total body of the Holy Crown"—*totum corpus sacrae coronae*—meaning the totality of the indivisible

realm, as well as the totality of all political factors of the land, King, Parliament, and Counties together. And, according to the formulation of Werböczy, the author of our first great compendium of laws in the first years of the sixteenth century, the bearer of the powers of the State is the political nation, the totality of the free, or noblemen.

Here you see, in brief, the whole evolution of our constitution.

From a mere precious jewel, from insignia of royal dignity, the Holy Crown grew into a symbol, not of the king and of his power, but into that of the whole nation.

In Hungary the act of coronation serves to indicate that the king reigns by power bestowed on him by the nation. This conception is outwardly expressed by the fact that the Holy Crown is placed on the new king's head, simultaneously, by the Archbishop-Primate of Hungary and a representative of Parliament, specially designated.

Henceforth the king is to reign by virtue of authority conferred on him on behalf of the nation, by the latter's highest spiritual and temporal dignitaries, officiating in the act of coronation.

This constitutional, not to say democratic, significance of the coronation of kings was still generally accepted all over Europe. As a comparison, I may mention that in other kingdoms crowns were either made for the occasion or were family or national heirlooms, placed on the king's head either by a dignitary of the Church, or by the new ruler himself, emphasizing thereby the "Divine Right."

I wish to add that the coronation of the King of Hungary is preceded by his rendering a solemn oath, by word of mouth and in writing, for the maintenance of the constitution as well as for the defense of the realm.

While according to the "Divine Right" conception the new king succeeds automatically to his predecessor—"le Roi est mort, vive le Roi"—in Hungary, not even the eldest son of the defunct King can assume royal power and exercise royal prerogatives, before passing through the solemn act of coronation with St. Stephen's crown, as provided by the constitution and as mentioned above. Should an attempt be made by the new ruler to the contrary, and history knows of but very few cases where this was done, the acts of the uncrowned King are illegal, null and void before the law, and the nation has a right to oppose them, and has, at all times, opposed them consistently.

Returning from this digression to Hungary of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, I must mention a radical change in the general constellation of the European balance of power with far-reaching effects on the fate of Hungary. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended the Thirty Years' War and settled the religious and political differences which had made central Europe an arena of domestic and

foreign rivalries, of warfare with and against outside influences and of general disorder and bloodshed. Central Europe, and its dominant power, the German Empire, where struggles involving public law and dynastic questions had produced a state of chaos, obtained a free hand and gathered force to turn west against the French and east against the Turk. France lost her influence on the German Protestant sovereigns. The German Emperor began to move out of his defensive position. But against strongly organized and centralized France nothing could be done as long as the Turk, France's age-long ally, was in his rear.

The Turk had to be driven out from Hungary before France could be fought on the great political issues of the day, such as matters of the Empire, the succession in Spain, and rival pretensions in Italy.

The breaking down of the Turkish offensive before Vienna in 1683, by the help of the heroic Polish king, Sobieski, created the impression that the power of the Turks was weakening and gave the impetus to an attack on them. In sixteen years the work was done, and the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 gave back practically the whole of Hungary, Croatia, and Slavonia to Hungary's king, Emperor Leopold I. The Hungarians, seeing the liberation of their land from the Turk, now turned with enthusiasm towards their king and joined his colors. For the reconquering of the fortress of Buda, our capital, the Hungarian Estates thanked their king by passing a law establishing the right of succession in the male line of the Hapsburg dynasty. In 1691, Transylvania, whose power had waned very much since the Treaty of Westphalia, and the consequent loss of her western allies, deciding that her historical mission was finished with the liberation of Old Hungary, joined the domains of the king. It was a time of enthusiasm.

But the aim of Leopold and of the ministers of the Empire was not the re-establishment of the Old Hungarian kingdom. Their aim was to get free of the Turk and to turn against the French. They took much more interest in the aforementioned three questions than in the Eastern question and the freedom of Hungary. To reside in Buda, like the kings before the Turkish conquest, would have meant an abdication of all imperial claims, hopes and power in central and western Europe. Only Hungarian idealists could contemplate such a possibility.

The aim of the Emperor Leopold was to form a great Power. Only a great, solidly organized Power could stand against centralized France,—so he thought—and Hungary was to be an element in the plan. That is why Hungary was reconquered from the Turk mainly with imperial troops. A Hungary reconquered with the forces of the Empire could, he thought, be more readily fused with it and Germanized.

It was unfortunate that the Turk was not driven out under the leadership of Transylvania, but under that of the imperial generals, and that this occurred in the heyday of absolutism in Europe, the time of Louis XIV and after. Perhaps this in its consequences is the greatest event in Hungarian history. It was a natural part of this plan of the imperial ministers that Hungary was to be denationalized. The struggle of the Hungarians to defend their religious and national liberty never ceased, but after the Westphalian Peace and with the great Turkish war, it grew less religious and more national. When with the Westphalian Peace Transylvania lost her natural Protestant allies against the Emperor, she began to look for others. It was, of course, to the enemy of the Emperors, France, that the Transylvanian princes addressed themselves. When Transylvania drew towards the end of her resources, the peoples in Northern Hungary, Magyars, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and German Protestants, took up the sword. Their princes, Thököly and Francis Rákóczy, asked for help from the Turk and from France. But both were insincere and left the Hungarians to their fate. The Hungarian "malcontents" were from that time an element in the calculations of French diplomacy; but France, which always attracted the small and ambitious nations with her admirable culture and the heroism of her people, could not, in consequence of a curiously shortsighted egoism, knit these bands tighter in the field of active politics. Equally unwise was the German policy, that of the Empire, in Hungary. There existed always a strong community of interest between Hungary and the west, towards which the basin opens, the lands of the Upper Danube. Reckoning with the existing force of Hungarian nationalism, the ministers of the Empire could have attained a less centralized but more firmly welded Great Power, but never by way of denationalization.

To Hungary the consequences were twofold. One was a pronounced and heretofore unknown tendency on the part of the Hungarian nation to lock herself up against all that was foreign. The other was that by force, Hungary had been changed in her national aspect.

The constitution proved strong enough to outlive the period of European absolutism and recover when the sun of freedom began to shine on Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. But the way in which the imperial ministers colonized Hungary was irreparably detrimental to the Magyar race.

I have told you how the Turks devastated and depopulated the country they conquered. To make clear the degree of this devastation and depopulation, let me tell you that the census taken twenty years after the Turks' final defeat in 1720 found something more than two and a half million people in the whole land, nine to the square kilometer, corresponding about to the density of population in Oklahoma in

1910. But the farther south one went into the territory of the Turkish occupation the scarcer and scarcer became the population. In the County of Fejér, near Budapest, it was of about the density of the South African Union of today. In the large County of Bácska, having a world reputation for its fertile soil and belonging now to Yugoslavia, it equaled the density of the Hedjaz in Arabia, and in the angle of the Tisza and Maros rivers the density of Persia. In the southern part, the Banat of Temes, which was the highway of the Turks, reconquered only in 1718, and where the richest soil of Hungary was to be found, it equaled the density of Siberia.




FIG. 12.

FIG. 12. Density of the population to the square kilometer of agricultural land in the central lowlands and in the surrounding highlands of old Hungary compared with the average yields of cereals. Notice the better feeding of the sparser population of the lowlands and the necessity that the highland population go down to the lowlands to work.

Though two centuries have elapsed since that time, and the industrial population—as apart from the agricultural—has increased from 4.87 per cent to 17.4 per cent of the whole population, and in the central lowland, between the Danube and the Tisza, from 6.33 per cent to 26.9 per cent, we can in Hungary of today see the consequences of this depopulation as shown by statistics. It is true that the density of population in the lowlands (182 per square mile) is today greater than in the highlands of Old Hungary (107 per square mile). But if we look more carefully at the statistics we shall find that the density of population compared with the arable land is much less in the lowlands (356) than in the highlands (437), although the yield per head of population is so much higher in the lowlands—3.71 quintals in wheat and rye against 1.56 in the highlands, and 2.81 in corn (maize) against 1.87—again the consequence of the devastation.

Under the above-mentioned conditions the absolutistic government of the

Empire had before it an entirely virgin field for colonization according to its ideas and purposes. Though the descendants of the nobles who had been driven out by the Turks had their right to the land of their fathers, the ministers of the Empire found ways and means to dispossess them. A so-called Commission on New Acquisitions was formed in Vienna which examined the titles of Hungarian landowners and peasants to their former estates in the liberated lowlands from which their fathers and grandfathers had been driven out by the Turk; and whenever it could, this Commission refused the proofs of Hungarian landowners, and gave the land to great foreign, especially German, families. Thus immense estates were formed, the parallels of which you vainly seek among the estates of the great Hungarian families of Transylvania. These estates were the main obstacles to the acquiring of land by the peasant class and to a sound and social agrarian development. The whole idea was that of the Austro-slav, Imperial Minister, Cardinal Kollonich, who in his pamphlet "Einrichtungswerk des Königreichs Hungern" clearly expressed his aim,—"The destruction of the Hungarian national character of the land."

To attain this object he proposed to call into the land foreigners, who would be faithful to the Emperor. So not only the nobles, but the Hungarian peasants were persecuted. The Magyars of purest race were held back or driven out from the lowlands by the prohibition to Protestants to settle there. The county administrations were prevented from returning and reforming themselves in the reconquered territory. Blood tribunals were erected at that time in Hungary and many a Protestant clergyman had to pay for his faith in a galley on the Mediterranean. Heavy taxes were imposed in an illegal way, and on those who proved their rights to an estate or a farm a new burden was imposed in the form of duties.

Reorganization of Hungary under the auspices of the Austrian imperial administrators was effected in about sixty-seven years. The population of Hungary grew in these sixty-seven years, from 1720 to 1787, by 210 per cent. But this figure does not show the extent of the movement, because it includes the non-Turkish parts of the land, from which settlers, in great majority non-Magyars, went down to the lowlands, pushing the ethnographical boundaries far forward.

More characteristic are the figures of the increase of population in the center of the former Turkish dominion. In sixty-seven years (1720-1787) the increase of non-Turks in the southern parts of the land, the Bácska, amounted to 632 per cent, equaling nearly the percentage of increase in the United States between 1790 and 1860; whereas in the plain of the Banat country the increase of population amounted to 1783 per cent, three times as great as the increase in the other sections and in the United States in the period referred to.

According to the plan of Cardinal Kollonich, who conducted this whole work as Imperial Minister, the bulk of the settlers in the new territory were foreign. Hungary, which at the time of King Matthias Hunyadi in the fifteenth century, just before the Turkish attack, had a population of at least 80 per cent Magyars, was changed to a polyglot state in which the proportion of Magyars had fallen in 1787 to 39 per cent; that is, to one-half, by means of this colonization work.

In the first years, following the retiring Turks, step by step, Germans were brought in as settlers. The great settlements in the Drave-Danube corner, those from Lake Balaton up to the capital, all around it, and farther to the north, up to the mountains of the Mátra (Fig. 41), and those in Szatmár-Németi came next into being. In due course the colonization was carried to the south, which the Turks left in a condition resembling the situation in the ninth century, when the Magyars came in. From northern Hungary the Slovaks were invited to settle in the lowlands, and that is why today you find in lower Hungary some great isolated Slovak villages. There are still living outside the Slovak language area about 32,000 Slovaks whose ancestors came there during the eighteenth century; and of the Germans living in pre-war Hungary, in all 1,900,000, about 1,200,000 are descendants of eighteenth century immigrants.

The influx of both nationalities may have been greater. But the Germans and Slovaks became mixed with the Magyars, and neither one of these two nationalities created great difficulties of a racial character. On the contrary, in 1848 they fought valiantly against Austria.

So the statesmen of the Austrian Empire did not have much success with these settlers. They had more luck with the Serbs and Roumanians. The first Serbs came in very small groups during the fifteenth century and these were absorbed. But the great bulk, the ancestors of about 86-87 per cent of the Serbs living in Hungarian territory today, came in during this work of Austrian colonization. When the imperial forces under Louis of Baden left the Balkans in 1690 and the Serbian patriarch of Ipek remained with his people unprotected against the Turk, he asked permission from the Emperor-King Leopold I, to settle temporarily in Hungary till Serbia should be freed from Turkish domination. He received the permission and 36,000 families at once entered southern Hungary. The imperial military administration formed a Serbian military district (Great-Kikinda) of territory previously inhabited by Magyars and kindred peoples, such as Cumans, Petchenegs, and Chazars.

The Roumanians came in still greater numbers. The great influx of the Roumanian population was due to the oppression by the so-called "Fanariots," who ruled over the two Roumanian principalities. The Fanariots were Greeks of the Fanar quarter of

Constantinople who, through higher political sense and administrative talent than the Turks had, soon became a kind of administrative aristocracy, and held positions of high responsibility. In the eighteenth century the Sultans put up at auction the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, modern Roumania, and for a century Fanariots followed each other in quick succession buying up these principalities from the Sultans and paying them tribute and taking out of the country as much as they could. That is why part of the Roumanian population of Wallachia and Moldavia emigrated into Hungary at this time.

As you know, there were Roumanians in Hungary in the thirteenth century. But their number did not increase very quickly. At the end of the sixteenth century they formed about one-quarter of the population of Transylvania, about 100,000. The greater influx began after the Tartar invasion of 1658. It was also then that they began to come down the valley of the Maros.

Still in 1700 they were not more than a quarter of a million in Transylvania. But now the Fanariot pressure became perceptible. In one century the number of Roumanians in Transylvania increased from 250,000 to 800,000 and in those territories, in the angle of the Maros and Tisza rivers, where the whole population increased so fantastically, they formed a majority. From the mountains of the Banat they also poured down to the plain. But here they were stopped all of a sudden by the Imperial régime, because they endangered the young German settlements, settled mostly from the Rhine valley, Alsace, and Lorraine.

From Bosnia and Herzegovina came to southern Hungary the Bunyevac and Sokac peoples (Catholic Serbs), whose present number is 150,000. The ancestors of 55,000 Croats settled in the west among Germans and Hungarians, in the territory Austria received from Hungary, those of the 23,000 Bulgarians and of 31,000 Czecho-Moravians far in the southeast, in the Banat; other Croats in the south, some Poles and one-third of the Ruthenians in the north. The great bulk of the latter, who are today altogether 450,000 in number, came as early as the fourteenth century, mostly with Prince Theodore Koriatovich, who received the great estate of Munkacs.

This is the story of the racial expropriation of Hungary by the Austrian Empire. I have had to tell you many details to show you its scale. I see that it is not well known, because a prominent confrère of mine wrote in a recent book: "Since Central Europe became peopled and civilized, the repartition of the principal ethnical groups has undergone but little change."

Thus you see that the foundation of the racial question in Hungary is this resettlement and colonization by Austria, and that the racial question leading up to

the modern claims of nationalities is primarily a problem of immigration. This forced immigration contributed much towards the misunderstanding of the whole matter by the Hungarians. Especially was this true because the Hungarians considered the policy purely a measure of the Austrian Imperial Government against their state and nation.

The vision of the Hungarian politicians was clouded. They saw only the fact that the Austrians colonized Hungary with aliens. Therefore they did not see the situation as it was. They looked backward, and not forward. They neglected measures in both of these respects—first, to enlarge and codify the rights of the alien nationalities; and, secondly, at that time when it would have been possible, in the eighteenth century, they missed the opportunity to spread the Magyar language and unify the land. Together with other old institutions they even preserved Latin as the parliamentary and administrative language, and so it remained until 1848. All the political efforts of the Estates were at that time exclusively concentrated on retaining the old constitution. The modern questions of the life of the state, financial and industrial questions, did not interest them. For anything that was not regulated in the collection of our laws, the *corpus juris*, they had no program and little interest. Hence in all such questions the Imperial Government had a free hand, and used it not only to check national evolution, but also to command the economic situation and direct it to the advantage of Austria.

The great Queen-Empress Maria Theresa, whose reign covers nearly half of the eighteenth century, tried in all her lands to improve the condition of the peasants. She asked the Hungarian Estates to abolish serfdom, and to pass a law obliging the nobles to pay taxes.^[2] It is characteristic, and that is why I mention it, that the Estates did not see in these reforms the call of the time, but only an attack on the constitution, of which their rights formed a part,^[3] and refused to comply with her wishes. Hence the Queen no longer deferred to parliament, but found other ways to get the taxes in the form of customs and duties, the administration of which had for centuries belonged to the royal rights. This act was of immeasurable consequence to the succeeding history of Hungary, because now both lines of customs between the Austrian lands of the Empress and Hungary came under the administration of the central imperial government and all the customs and tariffs of Hungary could be organized and directed according to the Viennese interests. By the tariffs which were fixed, the industry of Austria was supported, while Hungary (though without impairment of its constitution) became an agrarian colony of industrial Austria, which, already the stronger state of the two, was now ever gaining in strength. Hungarian wheat, corn, cattle, wine, wool, and other agricultural products went at low prices to

Austria, whereas the articles of Austrian manufacture were protected in Hungary against foreign competition.

This state of affairs lasted for a whole century undisturbed, so that when formal changes were made, when the prerogatives of the nobility, including their freedom from taxes, were abolished in 1848, and even when Hungary after 1867 recovered its administrative independence, and its industry was encouraged and supported by the state, the practical situation could not be changed. The foundation of the commercial relations of the two countries, laid during the first period of economic and commercial reconstruction and hardened by the administrative habits of a century, the advantage which Austrian industry once gained, its connections, buildings, and implements, remained a dominating influence down to our own days.

These were the circumstances under which Hungary came to the verge of modern times. In my next lecture I shall show you the peculiar way in which the reforms of the new time entered the life of Hungary, and explain the political situation between Austria and Hungary in the last decades before the war. You have seen how the evolution of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries influenced Hungary both in political and economic respects, and that in our industry, which we failed to improve in the eighteenth century, and at the beginning of the nineteenth, we were checked by the predominance of Austrian over Hungarian industry.

In conclusion, let us see how one of the problems of the recent Peace Treaty, that of those west Hungarian territories which, according to the Treaty of Trianon, are to be given to Austria, is related to our industry. This territory embraces a group of our strongest industrial centers. One of the economic consequences of the transfer will be that the people of that section will fall behind industrially, because many of the factories there were founded by Austrian firms, and under control of these as their branches, and such works will then probably be closed because the same firms have larger factories in Austria proper. Others will not be able to compete with the stronger Austrian plants.

[1] *Geographical Journal*, March, 1919. (Transylvania was at that time [in 1868] again a part of Hungary.)

[2] Due to their military obligations the nobles were exempt from taxation under the old constitution.

[3] And on the national military organization.

LECTURE IV

PRE-WAR ECONOMIC SITUATION OF HUNGARY

IN my remaining lectures I shall consider the modern development of Hungary along two different lines, economic and political. My talk today will be on economics and will also bring us to modern times and the questions of our own days.

From my three historical lectures you have no doubt obtained the impression that in the eighteenth century the Hungarians resisted the Imperial Austrian government in all reforms which that government wanted to introduce. They resisted simply because they resisted everything that came from Austria, feeling that every reform would cost them a part of their liberty and of their constitution.

It is curious, at the same time that it is a misfortune, that in the nineteenth century things changed diametrically. The Hungarians wanted reforms—I shall speak about this in my lecture on political questions—and at the same time the Austrian government, which was now pleased to see Hungary an agricultural colony of industrial Austria, did not want to introduce reforms which a hundred years before it had proposed.

However, the great revolutions which took place in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century brought about reforms in Hungary too. In 1848 the serfs were freed and sweeping constitutional reforms were made.

Some of the reforms were detrimental to the nobility without being as profitable to the former serfs, the farmers, as they should have been. The farmer obtained land without having the means to work it. The nobility, who received too little for their land—sometimes it was given to the farmers practically without remuneration—became quite impoverished.

The nobles did not recognize the situation. Having always been interested in politics, they turned to administrative employment instead of commerce, as they should have done. Unfortunately, in this the nobility were imitated by the burghers of the towns and by those of the peasant class who had been educated. At that time the whole nation lived in a state of illusion. They thought our economic development

would go on of itself. The consequence of this attitude of the nobility and of those imitating them was that only one class in Hungary, the Jews, took up commercial enterprise. It is quite interesting to the geographer and probably also to the student of economics and politics, to note the occupations of our Jews in the eighteenth century. They had settled in great numbers along the commercial highways, over which passed merchandise and agricultural products, especially the staple product, wheat. In such villages the Jews sometimes numbered ten and even thirty per cent of the population. When the first railways were built, they left the villages and settled in the towns, and the percentage of Jews in these villages often dwindled down to two or three per cent of the population. Their ability to adjust themselves to circumstances has had interesting consequences. It is a pity that only this one class of the nation accommodated itself to changed conditions, while others lagged behind.

All the interests of the time were directed to political questions. The Hungarians in the eighteenth and in the first part of the nineteenth century judged commercial and industrial questions only from the point of view of their political significance. I think it is characteristic that after we had recovered our home rule in 1867 and our first Prime Minister, Count Andrassy, the elder, presented his program, it dealt only with questions of public law, and not with commercial or industrial matters. At that time Hungarian capitalism, as far as it existed at all, was a branch of Austrian capitalism. The whole policy was that of complete freedom in economic questions. You know that individualism in economic theory and practice was then flourishing in Europe, and thus both our industrial and commercial laws, the foundation of our present industrial and commercial legislation, promulgated in that period (1872-1875) guaranteed complete freedom to all enterprise. The agrarian Hungarians fought for a liberal economic system against protectionism, which began to grow rapidly in the more industrialized Austria, especially after the economic crisis of 1873. In Hungary our free-trade policy lasted until about 1880, but then, following the great slump in grain prices in the world markets, came the most sudden change imaginable; from extreme economic liberalism we went over to extreme protectionism. Curiously enough, the final conflict was again in the field of politics. When Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1878, in spite of violent and persistent protests of Hungarian public opinion and press, in spite of obstruction in the Hungarian parliament, nothing could prevent public opinion's demanding that the government assign money for the encouragement and protection of home industry. They said: "If you have money for Bosnia, you must have money for our home industry." This argument was final, and protection was established.

This protectionism was very strong. Reaction against economic liberalism began

with the law of 1885, requiring specific qualifications for the carrying on of certain industries. Then followed a series of laws giving freedom from taxation to certain industries. You must keep in mind that the absolutistic government, following the breaking down of Hungary's struggle for freedom in 1849, had done away with the former intermediary tariffs between Austria and Hungary. Thus both countries could have but a common tariff protecting them from outside competition but not Hungary from Austrian competition or vice versa.

In consequence of these laws of 1872 new factories were established in a very short time. This way of promoting industry was not very wise, because personal enterprise and competition are much better. But still less reasonable than that first measure was a further development, the foundation of factories with active financial aid of the government. In fifteen years 464 such new factories sprang up, all with the direct financial aid of the state, amounting to 43,000,000 crowns annually. Of course, many of these factories could not pay for themselves without being subsidized continually. It would have been more logical to have helped provide small factories with machinery by means of subsidies, and by legislation to have prohibited orders for materials to be used by the state being given to foreign industries.

The same tendency which prevailed in the establishing of factories brought all the main railway lines, with the exception of two or three, into the hands of the state. The state took a hand in all branches of agriculture. It began to concern itself with cattle-breeding, importing western breeds; it encouraged the dairy industry, and promoted co-operative dairies. May I say here that in the last year before the war we had about 530 such co-operative societies with over 90,000 milch cows?

State intervention extended to all social questions of economic life; to the cessation of work on Sundays, the insurance of workmen and help in case of illness, the labor of women and children, the limitation of the hours of labor, the protection of the small farmer in the less advanced mountain regions, the regulation of relations between agricultural workmen and landowners, and so on. Should I express a general and objective criticism, it would be that if these laws were all really and sufficiently modern at the time they were made, then any shortcomings which might come to be observed would hardly ever be due to the fault of the legislators but to that of the executive. Whenever the times required we have not been lacking in sharpness of political insight or in the ability to take an unselfish attitude. But the legislator cannot do everything. So, for instance, though the Parliament composed of nobles abolished serfdom in 1848, the difference between serf and freeman was not so easily abolished. It is still not quite extinct in feeling between the peasants of free and of serf origin. State intervention extended also to the schools; a great many

industrial and agricultural schools were founded at the time. They are state schools, almost without exception.

The state took a very great part in the establishment of model farms, planting of vineyards, forestry, and reclamation of waste land. The state has today a whole series of scientific institutes which I wish very much I had time to explain more fully to you, because America has such splendid institutions of this type.




FIG. 13.

FIG. 13. The areas controlled by the flood protection societies along the Danube and Tisza and their affluents.

To judge the conditions of the present day we must have a twofold knowledge, first, of the historical development of Hungarian economics, of which I have told you as much as possible, and, secondly, of the conditions which were created by the Peace of Trianon, of which I shall now speak. It is not possible to cover all the problems, but I shall present some examples of the difficulties Hungary has to face today. I shall also try to give you some light on the program she proposes for their solution. The relief map (frontispiece) shows one of the problems. At the present time the water system is in the hands of five different states. Two groups of problems of great importance have arisen from this division. *First:* The upper courses of our

rivers are steep. The middle and lower courses are quite flat. This is quite plain from the map. In our lowlands the Tisza River and its tributaries remind me always, on a small scale, of the endlessly winding Mississippi. We have no glaciers, and no lakes to regulate the strong floods of our rivers. Only the forests serve to regulate them. The Hungarian state has made great improvements to guard the lowlands from floods. We had established an elaborate reclamation service, begun fully a century ago. Since that time there have been built nearly 4000 miles of dikes, up to 20 feet in height, and about 8000 miles of canals, by which nearly 15,000,000 acres of land are protected from floods. One-third of this work has been done in the valley of the Danube and two-thirds in the valley of the Tisza. This river is the more dangerous stream of the two, since the Tisza and its tributaries, coming down from the Transylvanian mountains, bring a greater volume of water in the spring and expose the country to greater dangers. You may judge of the magnitude of this reclamation work if you compare it to similar works in other parts of Europe. Whereas in Hungary we have reclaimed about 15,000,000 acres, the greatest works of this kind, done elsewhere, are in Holland, where they have reclaimed 5,500,000 acres, and in Italy, in the valley of the Po, where about 3,000,000 acres were protected. It is not necessary to explain the importance of this work as a protection from floods. It is enough to remind you of the flood which swept away a considerable part of the town of Dayton, Ohio, and the great work which the United States has subsequently begun in that region. To study and maintain a steady work of protection 800 rain-gauges have been erected in the mountain regions of pre-war Hungary, and 1600 stations to observe water-volume have been established on the upper courses of our rivers; on the lower courses of the streams have been placed 130 water-gauges.

To maintain this whole system, to keep the dikes and canals in order, we had a great net of alarm stations with telephones. Daily reports and daily maps showing the water level were being published and seventy-eight local co-operative companies were at work keeping dikes and locks in repair. Outside these great systems many smaller rivers and marshes were drained and the soil improved on a territory of 856,000 hectares.

new ones.

Second: Hungary did not, as most people think, retain with the lowlands the best wheat and corn land. The best of these latter are found in the two lowland countries of the Banat and the Bácska, now for the most part Yugoslav, a smaller part Roumanian. They constituted 9.8 per cent of Hungary's territory, and yielded 27.9 per cent of her wheat, 71.4 of her corn and 23.2 per cent of her oats. The part of the lowlands retained by Hungary is much more exposed to climatic difficulties such as drought. In 32.2 per cent of her former territory Hungary has retained 54 per cent of her marshes and 39 per cent of her unproductive land, mostly alkali flats and drifting sand in the lowlands.

This means that we shall have to change our agricultural program and take into account the fact that the lowlands which remain in Hungary are subject to drought and adverse climatic influences generally.




FIG. 15.

FIG. 15. Corn production of east central Europe. Notice how well the corn belt, resembling the corn belt of the Mississippi region, is defined towards north and south.

(1) Free City of Danzig; (2) Memel district; (3) East Prussia; (4) Vilna District; (5) Poland; (6) Upper Silesia; (7) Eastern Galicia; (8) Czechoslovakia; (9) Italy; (10) Austria; (11) Roumania; (12) Bessarabia; (13) Free State of Fiume; (14) Yugoslavia; (15) Bulgaria; (16) Albania; (17) Greece; (18) Turkey; the name HUNGARY is printed on the new state, and its pre-war boundary is shown by dashes.




FIG. 16.

FIG. 16. The harvest of fodder plants of the great Hungarian lowland (broken line) compared with that of the whole of old Hungary (solid line) from 1885 to 1915. You will notice the influence of the dry climate and the great dependence on small differences in moisture in the lowlands by the twice-as-great variation in the crops. The diagrams are constructed, as explained in the text, to give comparable data. Figures at left represent millions of quintals.

The diagrams (Figs. 16, 17) show yields of 30 years for the whole land—meaning, of course, old Hungary—and for the great lowland, the “Alföld.”

For the purpose of comparison I have had to increase the figures of the lowlands to the size of an area equal to that of the whole country. You will see on all the diagrams how the line representing the lowlands with each change shows a much stronger variation than the line representing the yield of the whole country. The greatest variations you will remark are on the diagram of fodder plants, which need the most moisture. Wheat also shows very large variations. Even barley, the cereal most indigenous to the steppes, is no exception. All this means that in the lowlands there is a much greater yearly difference in our crops than in Hungary as a whole.




FIG. 17.

FIG. 17. The barley crop of the lowlands (broken line) compared with that of the whole of old Hungary (solid line). Constructed like Fig. 16. Notice the small difference in divergence. Barley is a steppe plant and does not feel the lack of moisture so much. Based upon the yields from 1885 to 1915. Figures on left margin in millions of quintals.

Being now reduced to the status of an agricultural state by the loss of our iron and tin, our economic, and consequently our financial balance depends wholly on the changes of climate, upon some drops of rain, more or less, in our lowlands. Men can stabilize the uncertain condition of the water supply and improve the land by irrigation. But, may I ask you, how you would irrigate the country around Phoenix if the Roosevelt dam were in the hands of a foreign power and if this were true of all the great works of your reclamation system, the Truckee-Carson, and so on? I show you this great problem without wishing to complain or to be too critical.

The situation leads to but one conclusion. If we are to produce more, the Hungarian lowlands need relative independence of climate so as to equal at least the average yields of Transdanubia, and that is only possible by irrigation. According to our various experts 800,000 to 2,000,000 acres in all could be irrigated, the greatest part in Hungary, but some also in the southern, Yugoslav territory, and a small part in the Roumanian frontier districts. Wheat crops could be raised to the extent of 1,300,000 quintals, other grain crops 1,200,000 quintals, hay 9,000,000; this means in money \$40,000,000 a year.

The water-power stations of old Hungary are shown on the map of east central Europe. You see there one state (Fig. 18) which is without water power today. There remains to Hungary about one and one-half per cent of its former water power. And so we have the question as to how the dams in the highlands are to be

maintained, how we may come to an agreement with the states holding the upper courses of the rivers as to the storage of water. This is a problem not only of flood protection and of water power, but also of shipping and of the building of canals, which would greatly improve commercial conditions. There were two plans to build canals from the Tisza River, the main drainage of the eastern rivers, to the Danube. These canals would very much shorten the distance between the iron-works and the timber-land of the eastern part of the basin and the western commercial centers. But, of course, all this work must go hand in hand. The canals must be built at the same time as the irrigation works, but since there is a difference in level between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers canals can only be built if the safety of the water system is guaranteed. This is another of the great problems which now exist and which will have to be settled and regulated in some way.




FIG. 18.

FIG. 18. Potential water powers of east central Europe, showing the lack of water power in Hungary, the small amount in Poland, and the great extent in other states.

(1) Free City of Danzig; (2) Memel district; (3) East Prussia; (4) Vilna district; (5) Poland; (6) Upper Silesia; (7) Eastern Galicia; (8) Czechoslovakia; (9) Italy; (10) Austria; (11) Roumania; (12) Bessarabia; (13) Free State of Fiume; (14) Yugoslavia; (15) Bulgaria; (16) Albania; (17) Greece; (18) Turkey; the name HUNGARY is printed on the new state, its pre-war boundary being shown by dashes.




FIG. 19.

FIG. 19. Developed and potential water powers of Hungary. The average yearly output of water power would be, at midwater, 34 milliards of kilowatt hours. Hungary's pre-war navigable waterways (black lines) had an aggregate length of 3500 kilometers.

This means that on the upper courses of the rivers, which are all far within the territories transferred to the sovereignty of Hungary's neighbors, storage dams must be erected. Plans were made just before the war for the construction of storage dams combined with water-power stations on all the rivers of old Hungary, the plants being connected with cables either arranged in circular connection or centralized so as to obviate violent disturbances of the water power at the different plants. There would be obtained from ten chief plants and eventually some smaller ones 2,000,000-2,800,000 horse-power.




FIG. 20.

FIG. 20. Forests of Hungary. You will notice the lack, within the new boundaries of Hungary, of wood, especially pine wood. The wooded area of Hungary, in 1913, was 7,400,000 hectares; about 2,000,000 were oak, about 3,600,000 beech and other varieties, and 1,800,000 hectares pine forests. Paper mills are shown on the map by circles.

All this is of tremendous importance if we want to change our agricultural program, as we must. Having lost its best wheat and corn land, Hungary is no longer a land of extensive cereal production and must turn to intensive and varied agriculture. Part of the lowland must be forested, for Hungary has lost over 90 per cent of its timber lands.

Old Hungary was a first-class forest country, 25.8 per cent of her territory being forest land, of which 16 per cent was in state forests, and about 50 per cent under state control. Of the forests one-fourth were pine forests, covering the encircling mountain barrier, one-fourth oak forests, timber-oak. The oak of Transdanubia, all that remains to Hungary, is crooked and good only for firewood. The other forests are mostly beech, but in the lowlands there are great plantations of acacias. This characteristic tree of the savannas serves to bind the drifting sand of the dunes, which are of great extent. The original area of oak and beech forests, especially those in private hands, have been diminished by about 300,000 hectares, equaling 5 per cent. On the other hand, the pine forests, on account of foresting by the state

and obligatory foresting imposed on the private owners, especially in the regions where our rivers have their sources, have increased by 100,000 hectares (5.6 per cent). Wood was one of the greatest exports of Hungary, although the highlands had to supply the absolutely timberless lowlands. Exports amounted to about 90,000,000 crowns, of which 60,000,000 crowns were for sawed wood, and exceeding imports by 62,000,000 crowns. The chief buyers were Austria and Italy.

We have to increase the number of our cattle, because in old Hungary we had 34 head of cattle to each unit of population, whereas now we have only 28.7. We have to increase especially the number of our sheep, of which we lost many by the decisions of the Peace Conference. But we also lost many during the reign of bolshevism, when about 800,000 sheep were killed and eaten by the Red Army. All this will lead to an increase of meadows and pastures, and we must also increase the cultivation of fodder plants.

There are other factors which will work in the same direction. The shortage in fuel will influence the use of machinery. Perhaps the discovery of sufficient quantities of oil may help; perhaps we may find natural gas; and in the western part of the country we have found traces of oil and explorations are now being made. I hope that before the end of the year we shall find sufficient oil to make a very great improvement in our condition; but this is still only a hope. We shall have to increase the acreage of industrial plants, and this, as well as the decrease in the number of manual laborers and loss of most of our artificial manure factories, will all tend to decrease the acreage of our wheat-lands. So we shall have to change our agricultural program. This will probably also include a change in our exports. I shall come to the question of exports later; here I continue to deal with the problems created by the Peace Conference.

Third: You know that all our rivers converge towards the center of the plain. Any map of our railroads shows you that it was natural for the railroads to converge towards the northern part of the central plain—towards the capital, Budapest. The railroads follow the lines which were taken by the highways in the fourteenth century. And you may understand that there was nothing artificial in centralizing the railroads in the Hungarian capital when I tell you that our first railroads were built by the Austrian Imperial Government, unconcerned in the development of the Hungarian capital, Budapest.

I said in a former lecture that the density of population in the lowlands, if compared with arable land, is much less than in the highlands, and that this is a consequence of Turkish rule. Because of their greater fertility the lowlands attracted population and fed it. We have in the lowlands a great many seasonal workers from

the highlands. They begin harvesting in the south and proceed to the north just as is done in the Mississippi Valley. Here again new problems have arisen. New and artificial boundaries cut off these people from their working places. Riots and revolutions in some parts of former Hungary, now Roumanian territory, opening towards the lowlands, in Bihar county, have demonstrated to the politician those factors which the geographer knew before.

I shall show you the consequences of the constant influx of population to the lowlands and of the commercial exchange between the lowlands and the highlands. The definitive influx is absorbed, in great part, on the edge of the lowlands. Here, between lowlands and highlands, commercial centers sprang up wherever rivers made openings in the mountain chains. A line, which the Hungarian geographers call the "market line," connects all these towns as the line of exchange between the highland region and the lowlands (Fig. 21).

On the inner side of this line are situated the regions of the "Alföld," or Great Hungarian Lowland, which being about two-fifths of the whole basin, produces 60 per cent of its wheat, 70 per cent of its corn and tobacco, 80 per cent of its rape; the Little Lowland in the west, the best cultivated territory in the land, producing the bulk of our sugar-beets; and the Transdanubian hilly region, cultivated since Roman times, with varied and intensive agriculture and well-developed lignite mining. The Transylvanian Basin is separated from the "Alföld" by the central mountains of Bihar. Its chief product is corn. Its importance has much increased of late, owing to the discovery of natural gas.

conditions of production, and of the products themselves, formed together the greater economic energy of old Hungary. The economic energies latent in all parts of the world and called into being by the activity of men do not exist independently. The more intense the activity of man, the greater his needs and requirements; the higher his civilization, the more do economic units become interdependent. Economic regions, like geographical regions in general, have no sharply defined boundaries. They receive the stamp of their character from that part which possesses the most pronounced features. Each region is connected with and not separated from the adjoining region by boundary lines which form a gradual transition. The economic activities of the neighboring regions meet and mingle here. Exchange of products brings trade into being.

Compare the situation of the Hungarian towns in relation to the settlements and their size in the whole of eastern Europe. You see the lowlands well marked. The "market line" itself is merely an imaginary line, which indicates a belt, an important stretch of land. This belt is the transition belt, the connecting link between regions which meet and melt together. It may be interesting to know that, while the density of population in the highland region is between 30 and 52 to the square kilometer, and it is between 60 and 70 in the lowland region, the density of this transition zone between lowlands and highlands is nearly 90. Thus it is by far the most densely populated region of the whole land. This is because it is a region of commercial intercourse. Here the population of the highlands settles first on its way to the lowlands, and the towns of this region grow more rapidly than other towns,—35 to 60 per cent in the two decades 1890-1910. Still, it is not only the element of intensified exchange and intercourse which causes the population of the transition belts and their towns to grow. There are two other forces: the happy co-operation of climate and soil—making the belts the best producing part of the land—and the trend of the roads.

As you have seen, the central lowlands are very much exposed to the effects of difference in rainfall and to climatic changes generally. Now, on the edge of the lowlands we have always enough rain, that is, near the mountains; at the same time the soil here is like the soil in the central part of the lowlands. So the best soil and a much better climate being found here, the yields of this section are much greater. This transition belt covers less than 25 per cent of the land surface, yet at the same time, counting an average between bad and good years, it gave approximately 35 per cent of the crops of old Hungary, about 50 per cent of its corn, and more than 40 per cent of its wheat.

A great part of the new boundary of Hungary was drawn just in this belt; I think

it is not necessary to mention and to explain that along nearly every mile it creates many problems, problems of commercial intercourse incidental to the cutting of centuries-old ways of communication between the people on both sides of the line, who in this part of the country have been the most enterprising and commercially alert. A whole series of problems, which the governments of Hungary and of the neighboring states will have to solve, has arisen, and much trouble and work will be necessary in the course of their solution.

Boundaries were supposed to be placed according to racial lines. In my opinion the racial problem was not solved; in reality because in place of one state, Hungary, with a majority of 54 per cent of Magyars, there were created other states, which are not much less, in fact, some of them even more mixed from the racial point of view. Czechoslovakia has a majority of 58 per cent Czechs and Slovaks, but in truth only a minority of 46 per cent because the Slovaks are a distinct nation and are not Czechs; Roumania has a majority of 66 per cent Roumanians. It is true that Yugoslavia has about 70 per cent Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. But though the language is practically the same, they are distinct nationalities. How distinct and even hostile these peoples are is known to everyone who saw Croat regiments fighting against Serbia in the recent war. Now there are in Yugoslavia 37.7 per cent Serbs, 20.7 per cent Croats, 9 per cent Slovenes. While the racial problems were left unsolved by this shifting about, which has been as unscientific as it has been impractical, new economic problems have been created by the separation of economic units.

This complication of both racial and economic problems has created much more complex and much more difficult situations for the new governments than any of the former governments ever had during previous centuries.

In returning to the question of the towns and the "market line" I shall point to the site of our capital, Budapest. This is indisputably the point of greatest geographical potentiality in this section of Europe, since four different regions, two lowlands and two highlands, meet. Apart from this, other factors, decisive in its being chosen as the capital of Hungary, were the facts that here was found the best crossing of the great river Danube and, on the right bank, the incomparable, natural, mountain fortress of Buda, towering like the mesas of Arizona and New Mexico. Hot springs nearby had led the Romans, long before the Hungarians came into the country, to build the capital of Pannonia at this place. Finally, the floodproof elevation on the flat left bank, the "city" of today, is the crowning superiority of Budapest's location.

Budapest stands about where the Danube changes its course from an easterly to a southerly direction. The bend of any great river is of commercial importance, and

this is especially true of the Danube, for it is the only great waterway in Europe which flows from west to east. All the other rivers of Europe can be classed in groups, each group running more or less in the same direction, to the same sea. All the German rivers and those of Poland flow parallel to one another into the North Sea and the Baltic. All the great rivers of Russia run to the Black Sea and the Caspian. The Danube's importance and character as a main waterway lie further in the fact that above the "Iron Gates," situated just where in former times Roumania, Hungary, and Serbia met, it is a continental waterway, connecting the basins of Lower Hungary, Upper Hungary, Austria, Bavaria. It has much less to do with the sea than any other river, and this part of the Danube is notably cut off from the sea. The "Iron Gates" are difficult to pass and were still more difficult to pass in former times. If it were not so, why should the two countries whose capitals lie on the shores of the Danube, Hungary and Serbia, have fought and risked their existence for another way to the sea? Even if the difficulties the Danube Commission is facing in framing regulations, and especially in the matter of their observation by all the riparian states, should be overcome and the question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be happily solved, the continental character of the Danube waterway would be changed very little. It would be quite another matter if the Danube did not turn east in the south of Hungary, but flowed directly south and emptied into the Bay of Saloniki.

Hungary's natural port was never in the direction of the mouth of the Danube. It was always Fiume on the Adriatic. Serbia never looked to the east for a port on the Danube, on whose shore its capital was situated; it also looked to the Adriatic. Even before it belonged to Hungary, Fiume's trade was 75 per cent Hungarian and only 30 per cent Austrian. That is why Hungary spent so much money on this narrow, unsuitable port, difficult to approach from the land side and out of the way of the open sea. The Karst plateaus of the Dinarides, running parallel to the sea-coast, made the building of transverse railways extremely difficult. That is why the Fiume line is only a single-track line, and decades have been spent in the planning of and partial building of a second line to the coast. Free access to the sea is again one of those problems which have been recently created though not solved and which must be settled by the states which are neighbors in this part of the world, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Hungary needs access to the sea, not necessarily in her own territory, but still a safe outlet. This must be settled.

Politics have in the past played a large part in the relations between Hungary and Croatia, now part of Yugoslavia. They have played a much greater part than the economic interests can afford. It is most lamentable from the point of view of human

progress that even leading politicians of European continental states give so little calm consideration to questions of unimpeded intercourse between peoples. They consider so little how to attain the greatest good with the least possible violence, weighing carefully the reality and importance of economic interests and trying to arrive at means of co-operation. Alas! I fail to see much co-operation at present, but let us hope that the ideas of wartime will give place to ideas of peaceful co-operation between our nations. The first problems to be solved, the solution of which will bring nations closer together, are economic problems. In this domain common interests can be found and advantages gained for all.




FIG. 22.

FIG. 22. Railway traffic of Hungary in 1913. The number of parallel lines shows the intensity of traffic, each line representing 1000 gross tons to the kilometer of line. The dotted lines represent less than 500 tons to the kilometer. You see the most important line to be the one from Budapest to Vienna on the north shore of the Danube.

Figure 22 shows the railways of Hungary, indicating the amount of her foreign trade. You see the importance of Budapest in the light of exports and foreign commerce in general, and further that the main lines of export from Budapest do not lead to the sea but to Austria. About 80 per cent of our exports went to Austria, which was contiguous to more than 65 per cent of our former boundary.

Budapest was the center of commerce in cereals. This was largely so because on the Danube it is the last town to which ships of 650 tons can come up the river. Only ships of 500 tons can go above Budapest. If the "Iron Gates" were entirely opened, a work not yet finished, ships of 1000 tons could come up to Budapest without transshipment. Moreover, this city is the center of gravity of the wheat-growing lowlands. Two-thirds of all wheat, corn, and other cereals come to Budapest by water, and one-third by rail. All these facts have created the greatest industry of Budapest—flour-milling. It may be of interest to you to know that Budapest is second only to Minneapolis in the list of the flour-milling cities of the world and served as a model for modern milling processes. Minneapolis mills about 15,000,000 bushels of wheat, whereas Budapest mills about 7,500,000 bushels. The total capacity of our mills would be much more, amounting, according to certain evaluations, to as much as 20,000,000, but havoc came. Today they are doing much less milling than in peace-time, because the frontier has been closed by Yugoslavia and the wheat and corn of the latter country cannot, for the moment, come to the flour mills of Budapest.

In connection with this the geographer has something interesting to note. Local mills had sprung up everywhere in former Hungary and being in close connection with the producing area, they are industrially better situated; but the Budapest mills have retained their importance, an example of the dominating power of a good commercial situation. I call industrial location the proximity of a mill or any other plant to the source of raw materials and the commercial location the most suitable access to the area of distribution. So the commercial location wins over the industrial location. But this is natural and I think it may be compared with the fall of the flour import of Great Britain in the ten years between 1900 and 1910 and the increase of its wheat import, to about 22,000,000 bushels. The export of former Hungary in grains and flour amounted in recent years to about 25,000,000 bushels. Today it is much less, of course, because we have lost the southern market. It will be less in the future, because, as I have told you, our wheat acreage will decrease.

These are all merely examples of the difficulty in eastern Europe.

My object in dwelling on these problems was to add an illustration to President Garfield's statement:

"The Great War has, with few exceptions, left the nations prostrate, unable without mutual aid to go forward or apparently even to frame programs of reconstruction possible of execution."




FIG. 23.

FIG. 23. River traffic on the Danube, and the tonnage of goods sent and received. The ocean traffic of the Danube seaports, Braila and Galati, is not indicated.

(1) Free City of Danzig; (2) Memel district; (3) East Prussia; (4) Vilna district; (5) Poland; (6) Upper Silesia; (7) Eastern Galicia; (8) Czechoslovakia; (9) Italy; (10) Austria; (11) Roumania; (12) Bessarabia; (13) Free State of Fiume; (14) Yugoslavia; (15) Bulgaria; (16) Albania; (17) Greece; (18) Turkey; the name HUNGARY is printed on the new state.

FIG. 24. The railways of Czechoslovakia, of Hungary, and of Roumania. In Czechoslovakia (upper map) you will notice the lack of connection between the farthest east (Ruthenia) and the region of best-developed transportation which is in the west. In Roumania (lower map) you will notice along the western frontier—the boundary with Hungary and Yugoslavia—a system of many small lines which are all cut off from their western connections. The mountain lands are very well




FIG. 24.

indicated by the lack of railroads. In Hungary (middle map) you will notice that the junctions are for the most part lacking, being now outside the country. These junctions were the only commercial towns on what we have called in the text "the market line."

You see, these examples show that it is impossible to frame programs without common understanding. To prove this, after I have shown you the railroad system of former Hungary, I shall show you those of three states on the same map (Fig. 24), Roumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and you may judge of the extent to which co-operation is needed if the states are to be at all open to commercial development. Note how the railway systems are cut off and that none of them can be operated without the aid of its

neighbors and without co-operation. In the Hungarian system junction stations on main lines have been wholly cut off, with the exception of some few. Czechoslovakia, especially in the eastern part, is without communication with the western industrial part of the land. Finally, consider the railway lines of Roumania, with the characteristic lines on the western side "hanging in the air." You see from all this that conditions are such that we have need of some understanding, much good will on the part of the governments, and still more good will on the part of the different nations themselves. But what has been done in the last decades in the world to create or strengthen good will?

I would suggest as a step towards a possible evolution and towards opening the way for economic progress, that the foreign office of every nation should be

equipped with a large staff of expert economists. Every state, far or near, must study thoroughly all conditions of others and on this study build the world's mutual understanding for the future.

Moreover, governments must encourage and help personal intercourse between business men and business organizations in all countries in every way. The world today needs to get away from old ideas to new ideas of co-operation and accomplishment. The peoples themselves must be brought nearer to one another. I have already said today—and I shall explain it more thoroughly in connection with the racial questions—that it is only by the way of common economic interests that people, who today are still living in an atmosphere of war psychology, can be brought nearer together. I think that is the work we are doing here at the Institute of Politics.

[\[4\]](#) Since that time it has been constituted and is now in the first stage of elaborating its by-laws.

LECTURE V

MODERN POLITICAL EVOLUTION—FROM THE COMPROMISE WITH AUSTRIA, 1867, TO BOLSHEVISM AND RESTORATION, 1919

MAY I remind you that in my former lectures I have tried to show two lines of development which, I think, have been of the greatest consequence to our modern evolution and to the situation in our day? One was the colonization of Hungary by foreigners, and the other the conservatism which grew up in the defense of the constitution. The conservatism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a reaction against Austria and it was not what I should call an aristocratic policy. It is only the word “nobility” which made the Hungarian constitution look aristocratic. In truth, this nobility was a much more democratic body than was the corresponding political body of France at the same time, and it was so by reason of the number of its members, the manner of its creation, and the regeneration of the class of nobles. In Hungary the number of those who had political rights in the beginning of the nineteenth century was much greater than in France. In 1830 France, with a population of about 30,000,000, had only 94,000 voters. Hungary, with a population of a little more than 11,000,000, a little more than a third of the population of France, had 136,000 voters.^[5]

At the same time the nobility was no exclusive caste. Hundreds and thousands of serfs, of citizens of the towns, of foreigners, brought in as settlers by our kings, were ennobled during the centuries. As I have explained before, no difference was made as to race or nationality. We find hundreds and thousands of Germans, Slovaks, Roumanians, and, what is still more interesting, Norsemen, Frenchmen, and Italians in our nobility. Most of them became Magyars in a short time.

No political difference was made as to wealth or poverty. Many of the nobles lived a peasant life. There being no legal difference between the poorest and the mightiest noble, the difference between classes was less conspicuous and there was a close bond between them all. This democratic organization would have been a great source of regeneration under a national king, if all the efforts could have been

concentrated on social and economic development. As things stood, in reality, all force of speech and deed was used for the preservation of the constitution, and the dead weight of conservatism was so great, among both nobility and townspeople, as to hold back progress in other directions. The development of the townspeople was further held back by the Austrian mercantilist policy. Our towns had no modern factories at the time and their artisans were still organized in guilds.

The reform movement in Hungary in the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth century began in quite a peculiar way. It was started by a few men who as soldiers (noble guardsmen) had seen foreign countries, and it is curious that it began from the cultural side first, in fostering the development of our language and literature. Our parliamentary and administrative language, as you know, had been Latin, so that interest in the use of the Hungarian language here had to be developed.

The noble guardsmen's reform was taken up by enthusiasts at home and the time brought forth great poets. The first generation of these was much under the influence of foreign writers and of the Roman classics, but in the second generation we see pure Hungarian forms and characters, with an enthusiastic national romanticism. The loving admiration for the past gave birth to a series of splendid epic poems, the best of our literature, and some plays. A strong belief in a future worthy of the past was expressed in a series of patriotic odes, hymns, and songs.

Social and political reforms grew out of this literary movement. The man who had the greater share in both social and political evolutionary reforms was a young captain of hussars, Count Stephen Széchenyi, to whom the nation gave the name of the "Greatest Magyar" after his death. It is characteristic that he began his reforms by founding the Hungarian Academy of Science. Other countries had Royal Academies, founded by their rulers who encouraged literature, science, and art; in Hungary there was nothing of the kind and the work had to be done by a few patriotic Hungarian men.

Count Széchenyi was a conservative reformer. He wanted first to introduce social reform, and only after the strengthening of the nation to introduce political reform. But the Austrian government, that of Metternich, opposed these reforms. The Austrian administration did not want Hungary to grow out of the position of an agricultural colony; hence, opposition was made to the reform movement and new discordance stirred up between king and nation.

The Hungarian movement was parallel to the Italian and German movements for national unity. I would call your attention to this fact, because it was of great importance and influenced our point of view in the racial question, to which I shall return later.

When the reform movements increased tempers were wrought up; so the social side was pushed into the background and the political questions came again to the front. The new leader of the more radical reform movement was Louis Kossuth, whose name is one of those of Hungarians best known in America; and it is one of our greatest sources of pride that of the few foreigners who have had the honor of speaking before your Congress, two were Hungarians and of these one was Kossuth. This was in 1852.

Characteristic of the time is the haste with which we turned towards the progressive ideas of the West. Unluckily we talked too much. Phrases oftentimes took the place of action. Every question was judged from a political point of view. For instance, the whole question of customs and tariffs was regarded as a question of public law and national pride. On the initiative of Kossuth and some other leaders a national society for the protection of industry was founded. But it undertook too great a task. Protection on all articles was advocated. They wanted to solve all questions at once—a stupendous task, much greater than America's task when trying to protect the young industry of the Colonies against the stronger industry of England. We were incomparably more backward in all our institutions and much less free in our movements than your ancestors were.

The obstinacy of the Austrian Imperial Government in opposing reforms brought things to a dramatic climax. Otherwise the Hungarian reform movement within the kingdom shows the remarkable symptom that there was no struggle of classes and that reforms were carried through peaceably. This was perhaps because they had begun on the cultural side and, thus, were less materialistic. But last, though not least, the recognition of the necessity of a national regeneration, the pride of all classes in their participation in the work, and perhaps above all the opposition of the anti-national government made the reform work a common, national duty. It was a rallying of the natural historical powers of the nation, which had slumbered till then. This power might have been utilized, the impressive young idealism could have been controlled, racial antagonisms could have been concealed, as were the social ones, by the nation itself. But none of the imperial ministers was sufficiently farsighted.

The dramatic climax was our struggle for independence, or, as it is called in Austria, the "revolution" of 1848. It was a time of revolution and of struggle for freedom, in all Europe. In Hungary it united West and East, Catholics and Protestants, Transylvanians and Germanophiles, nobles and peasants. The fact that the poorer nobility lived a peasant life was a very strong factor in uniting the classes. The defenders of liberty were beaten down in 1849 by Austria, with the help of a great Russian army, and there followed a period of absolutistic rule. Kossuth had to

leave Hungary. He hoped to achieve a new armed resistance. In the United States, as also in some states of Europe, he found much sympathy, but not a single state in Europe would give him actual help.

This absolutistic period lasted until 1866. In that year, after the Austro-German War in which Austria was beaten, the Emperor-King felt the necessity of a reconciliation with the Hungarian nation. Thus the Compromise between Austria and Hungary came about in 1867. The Compromise was in reality a practical adjustment brought about by the clash between Hungary's claim to national independence and the absolutistic Austrian contention that Hungary through the war for independence had forfeited even her ancient constitution and had become reduced to the legal status of a mere province of the Austrian Empire. These two diametrically opposed points of view had stubbornly faced one another from 1848 to 1867, causing fierce persecution of patriots and immeasurable harm to Hungary.

Realising their abandonment by the West, forsaking the hope of ever attaining Hungary's independence of their own force, the Hungarians deemed it expeditious to accept the concessions the Court was willing to offer in 1867. Emperor Francis-Joseph was willing to be crowned King of Hungary, to reinstate the constitution, with the exception of certain laws of 1848. Hungary was to have home-rule with a Hungarian cabinet, responsible to the Hungarian Parliament, and the Austrian administration in Hungary was abolished.

In lieu of Hungary's independence as embodied in the acts of 1848, the so-called "Compromise Laws" were passed both in Austria and in Hungary, establishing what constituted "Common Affairs." According to the legal construction of these acts both Austria and Hungary agreed, as sovereign states, that army and navy matters and foreign affairs should henceforth be considered common to both, thus the former Austrian army should henceforth be the Austro-Hungarian army, Austrian diplomacy, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, etc.

As far as public law went, both countries were henceforth to be equals. In reality, Hungary's share remained purely nominal. At no time did the number of Hungarians in the "common services" exceed 33 per cent, in fact this ratio was seldom reached; the War and Foreign offices remained in Vienna. Common matters were removed from the direct control of the Hungarian Parliament by the creation of the institution of the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations. The fact that the language of both the army and of the foreign service remained German did not make these institutions any more popular in Hungary.

The general political trend in Hungary in the first decades after 1867, under the influence of western Europe, was an extreme liberalism. My last lecture dealt with

the influence of this liberalism on economics. Today we turn to politics. As I have just said, Hungarian liberalism followed the same lines as the Italian and the German movements for national unity. The point of view of our political leaders on the racial question was influenced by those movements, I would say distorted by them. The aspiration of Hungarian liberalism was, like that of the other two, towards a nationally united state, without recognizing the great difference in the situation of the more mixed population of Hungary. The differences between Hungarians and other nationalities were accentuated even before the revolution by the adherence of some nationalities to the Austrian cause.

The Compromise of 1867 was the basis of the political system of Hungary for the last fifty years before the Great War. We shall not go into details, the happenings after the Great War having changed the situation altogether. I shall confine myself to facts of more permanent nature. The first is that the so-called "Compromise" was never looked upon by the nation as a happy solution.

The Hungarian government, having to defend the Compromise with Austria in Parliament and having to fight down the opposition, the Independence party, strongest among the Magyar electors, obtained its majority mostly in constituencies with mixed or non-Magyar population. And the government, viewing the situation as one impossible to change, had to defend the arrangement and the consequent laws. The bitterest electoral contests were always among the purely Magyar circumscriptions of the great plain. If you look at a series of recently published maps, of parliamentary elections in Hungary during these last fifty years, you will recognize that the oppositional constituencies, sometimes numerically stronger, sometimes, under heavy governmental pressure, reduced to a few, are always grouped along a line running through the purely Magyar Great Plains from southwest to northeast. Also, oftentimes much fewer voters elected a deputy in a mixed or non-Magyar district than in purely Magyar circumscriptions.

Having to defend the unpopular compromise and its consequences, the government sometimes used illegal means of bribery and abuse of power, and it opposed even a slight extension of political rights. The Magyar element was relatively very strong in the poorest class and an extension of franchise would have meant a great increase of voters in the central parts of the land, which always elected members of the opposition. That was one of the causes of what seemed to be an undemocratic attitude in regard to the extension of suffrage. But even the opposition, which on one occasion came into power, earned nothing but blame because it stood impotent before the power lying in a common army and diplomacy.

Here I come to quite modern questions, because in talking about these constant

differences with Austria, you may ask me: Why, then, did the Hungarian nation, which was opposed to this compromise with Austria, go into the war with enthusiasm? I was asked this question many times in France and England. My answer will not be a political one. To answer you I must once more call your attention to psychological factors.

May I tell you what I saw with my own eyes? When the war broke out I was at my country place in northeastern Hungary, just north of Transylvania, and I had to join my army corps in Bosnia, in the southwest. By motor car, I passed Roumanian, Hungarian, various German, Croatian, and Bosnian villages, and everywhere I found the same or nearly the same enthusiasm. But you must not think it was by any means an enthusiasm for the political side of the question. It is not logic in such questions always to go back to the great political problems of foreign politics. No! My impression was, that it was mostly the enthusiasm of youth for a fight, and if there was any political consideration, I may characterize it in the words of an old Hungarian hussar whom I met when we first passed the River Save, entering Serbia. The old hussar told us very quietly, with his pipe in his mouth:

“Now we shall finish quickly with these Serbians, to turn then to those rascals of Russians, who attacked us in the rear; but,” he said—and then he smiled—“when we finish with them, then we shall give the last blow to those damned Austrians.”

Well, this is also a political view, though different from what you are accustomed to read when studying questions of foreign policy. This is the view of the average man.

But I must say, returning to the other side of the question, that I should not perhaps use the term *enthusiasm*, but rather the term *revenge*, which was felt all over the country about the matter of the killing of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife. Francis Ferdinand was not at all beloved in Hungary—rather disliked; his wife was hardly known in Hungary. It was rather the feeling of indignation at the killing of a woman that influenced our people. It was perhaps this old chivalry in the Hungarian which won over political hatred of Austria, which the old hussar had expressed.

You must not forget that this assassination was merely the last drop in the bucket and that it was the issue with Serbia that brought Hungary into the war.

Serbia's history in the nineteenth century showed an almost uninterrupted succession of regicides, while even political assassinations were singularly unknown in Hungary. It is not without interest that 1000 years of Hungarian history show not a

single case of a ruler's being assassinated. In 1914 Serbian practices seemed about to extend to Hungary's own affairs, and the reaction against it was great and general.

The memory of the frightful outrages committed by Serbians in Hungary in 1848 when they came to the assistance of the Austrian Government and at its instigation helped crush Hungary's struggle for independence, was still vivid in the minds of the Hungarian masses.

Even so the only member of the councils held in Vienna who opposed strenuously the sending of the fateful ultimatum to Serbia and later the declaration of war, and who, when he could no longer stem the tide, acquiesced only on condition that not a foot of Serbia's territory was to be annexed, was a Hungarian, and the only Hungarian present, Count Stephen Tisza.

Here I have to stop, however, and must let bygones be bygones. Hungary in the World War would fill a book in itself and my subject allows me merely to deal with the consequences of the war on Hungary of today.

It may be asked how the revolution came about and how we broke down and fell so far that bolshevism became possible in Hungary. My answer is that of a witness who was at that moment rather far from the influence of political bias, and it is this: The very first revolution was made and directed from the background by men who were disguised bolshevists,—one of them, Count Michael Károlyi, bearer of one of the greatest aristocratic names of Hungary. I have known him since his youth and we often took part in sports together, and he was just as eccentric in his sports and in the books he read as he has proved to be in his political life.

The first revolution was at its outbreak disguised under national flags and flowers in the national colors, and everybody looked upon it as a movement for national freedom. The real situation was recognized by some men within a week, but it was too late. Let me come again to a personal experience, because I may have been the first man holding an official position in Hungary who had to deal with the soviets. I was at that time president of the Office for Invalids and War Widows, and as early as the fifth day of the revolution there were soviets of invalid soldiers organized, and I can tell you that during the following six weeks in which I remained at the head of that department, I had no chance to do half an hour's earnest and valuable work. I had to deal with soviets from nine o'clock in the morning to ten or eleven in the evening or till midnight. They had only a single wish—to divide among themselves all the funds which were at the disposal of my bureau for the purpose of caring for disabled soldiers returning to private life.

As to the point of view of leaders of the first revolution, especially those who later on became bolshevik, a short story again of my personal experience may be of

some interest to you. My office was under the Minister for Social Welfare, Mr. Kúnyi, who was subsequently, during the bolshevist régime, one of the fellow-workers of Béla Kun. For some weeks, consequently, he was my chief. One day he asked me how many invalids there were in Hungary, because they were asking for a special grant—we might say, as a Christmas or New Year's gift. I told him that it would not be possible to give to all the invalids; we must divide the funds at our disposal among the seriously and badly wounded and we must give to those who really needed it, mainly those with many children, because then we should be able to give a sum worth while to each man. Then he gave me the following characteristic answer, typical of a demagogue who often harangued the masses himself:

“I thought the same thing yesterday; today I cannot do it. The slightly wounded must get just as much as the badly wounded because the slightly wounded man is the one who is going to make trouble and disorder in the streets.”

I tell this story to characterize the policy of the time. In truth, the régime of Count Károlyi was already bolshevist. The best characterization I can give may be the words of a small artisan, a shoemaker, who said to a friend of mine:

“This is a cold bolshevism.”

The power of the leaders in the revolution had been so slight, so contested, that, when real “hot” bolshevism came, the most conservative people felt a certain relief and said:

“Nothing can come that is worse than this kind of government, this situation without the slightest safety for life and liberty.”

Of course, when out and out bolshevism came, they had the proof that there was something still worse than uncertainty—that is, persecution.

It has been truly said that bolshevism in Russia is a very bad and low travesty of democracy, and that bolshevism in Hungary was a caricature of this travesty.

The particular interest in the study of bolshevism in Hungary lies in the fact that Hungary is, so far, the only country where you are able to examine the effects of bolshevism on the spot. While a great deal has been said and written about bolshevism in Russia, this has been done with the disadvantage of distance. Until bolshevism in Russia is likewise a thing of the past, Hungary is and will be the best object lesson from which you can study the rise and fall of bolshevism and see what

effect it has on a country. Bolshevism in Hungary broke out on March 21, 1919, and ended August 12 of the same year.

I need not explain what bolshevism is, because you have heard more than enough on both sides of the question. Therefore, I shall confine myself to telling you of specific instances which will enable you not only to gain a clear picture of bolshevism in Hungary, but will also throw some light on this Utopian venture of our generation in general.

The chief characteristic of bolshevism was that a small group of men ruled by terrorism. I may describe this in the words of one of the soviet commissaries in Hungary, who said:

“Do not shrink from the shedding of blood, for nothing worth while can be obtained without it. Without blood there can be no terror, and without terror there can be no dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Terror indeed was the only means to force bolshevism on a country where three-fourths of the population derived their living from agriculture, and where, in spite of socialistic agitation of many years, respect for private property had nowhere developed as deep roots as among the farming elements.

Of course, it was by no means a dictatorship of the proletariat, but only a dictatorship of certain people, of practically very few people. For instance, the army was organized in a peculiar way. There was a front line, a large part of which was not in sympathy with the bolshevist movement and was unreliable, from their point of view. Behind them were some battalions who, in Hungary, played the part which certain Hungarian and Czech battalions, who were former prisoners-of-war, did in Russia. It was their duty to “make order,” whenever and wherever the army showed a tendency to go against the bolsheviks or to get away from them. Still behind this second group was a third class, very small, but a very well-equipped army of the so-called “Lenine-boys,” the terrorists who had the duty of controlling the middle group.

It is curious how the communists could win such a power over a whole population, which was in truth against them, especially the agricultural population, which is in Hungary about 67 per cent of the whole. It was done simply because there was no armed force. On the third day of the first revolution the Minister of War of the cabinet of Count Károlyi declared, in words since well-known and much quoted in Hungary:

“I don’t want to see soldiers any more.”

The consequence was that everyone threw down his arms.

If you ask how bolshevism collapsed, I can tell you that in truth it was not the Roumanian army, it was not the counter-revolutionist, anti-bolshevik army which we formed from enthusiastic officers and soldiers, which broke down bolshevism. It was the Hungarian peasant, whose passive but dogged resistance in not giving food, or not giving enough food, to the town of Budapest, the stronghold of bolshevism, weakened the movement very much and practically destroyed it. In the fourth month the bolshevik leaders had to engage in a fight with one of the neighbors, Roumania, to divert the attention of the people from the utter bankruptcy of their system. The lack of food, of ammunition, of all other things which you need for carrying on a war very soon drove the bolshevists to defeat, and permitted the advance of the Roumanians into Budapest, and, through Budapest, into a large part of the Transdanubian country as well. The resistance of the farmers against bolshevism was in general passive, but in places at times there were acute risings. These were generally beaten down relentlessly and many people, mostly small farmers, were shot down or hanged.

As to how the system was carried on, how law was abolished, and how the tribunals worked, hundreds of examples could be given, but I shall cite only a single example. This is the case of the "counter-revolutionary" party arrested in the Baross Café in Budapest. The trial took place the same day at midnight and after the prosecutor had explained the charge, Czerny, who was the commander of the so-called "Leninists" or "Terrorists," putting his watch on the table, gave the counsel for the defense one minute to plead for each case! Then, without the slightest formality, he condemned eight of the ten accused men to death, and they were shot the same morning.

Several people, among them the democratic leader, Louis Návay, and the famous professor and physician, Berend, were mercilessly shot down without trial. It would be impossible to give you the list here, but you can find information in Mr. Ch. Huszár's book about bolshevism (published also in foreign languages), in an anonymous English description: "From Behind the Veil," and in the great Hungarian *Compendium*, edited by Mr. G. Gratz.

Not less terrible than the material destruction was the destruction of things spiritual. The younger generation was perverted by a propaganda of loose morality and defiance of parental authority, which was calculated to put the final touch to the work of destroying the beneficent influence of religion.

Let us now turn to the economic side of bolshevism and see how this weakened the power of its organization.

In general, it may be said that the receipts of industrial plants were more than absorbed by the wages paid. Capital could neither be renewed nor secured, and without capital socialism is just as unable to produce as any other economic system.

We may note the following examples:

The State Railroad had during these four months of bolshevism 133,600,000 crowns receipts and 430,000,000 crowns disbursements, a net loss of 300,000,000 crowns.

It was about the same in the mail and telegraph service, 23,600,000 crowns receipts and 65,000,000 crowns disbursements. It was the same in the State-owned steel plants, where the receipts were 42,600,000 crowns and the disbursements 98,700,000 crowns.

The postal savings bank had 2,300,000 crowns receipts and 17,000,000 crowns disbursements.

The whole bolshevik régime showed half a billion receipts against five billion disbursements, or a loss of 900 per cent. Things could not go on in that way. In order that you may not have to depend solely upon my criticism, I shall quote two bolshevik leaders, one the Commissioner for Social Production of the Soviets, and the other the Chief Commissioner for Agriculture. In a speech delivered before the Soviet Assembly on June 16, 1919, after two and a half months of bolshevism, Mr. Varga, Commissioner for Social Production, made some startling confessions. He said:

“The attempt by amalgamation to socialize the establishments of craftsmen who were not pronouncedly capitalists was a dismal failure. One striking proof of this is the fact that five millions of crowns had to be remitted, by way of subvention, to the central office of electric fitters.”

“If asked what have been the results to production since the proletarian revolution, I must say [I quote his words] openly and frankly, that these results are terribly bad. Production has in general decreased enormously. . . . In mining, the decrease, as compared with the production of the capitalistic régime of the Károlyi era, is one of 10 to 38 per cent; in comparison with that of peace-time, 50 per cent.”

At the same session of the Assembly the Soviet Commissioner of Agriculture, Hamburger, admitted that the work of socialization in the field of agriculture had also been a dismal failure. In the county of Somogy 750,000 acres had been socialized, making practically one farm under one direction, and the outcome was a failure of production and a very great movement on the part of the farmers themselves against

the bolshevist system.

Of course, in agriculture figures could not be obtained as accurately as in industry, because reliable figures for agriculture could not have been compiled unless the system had lasted a whole year.

Figures on finance were not recorded by the bolshevists. But not less edifying than those of his colleagues were the confessions of Mr. Lengyel, Commissioner of Finance:

“The rise of wages and the consequent decrease of production have resulted, in *all our establishments, without exception*, in enormous loss.”

When bolshevism was broken down, the reaction came, of course. The word “reaction” sounds badly in the ears of many, I feel sure. It has an undemocratic sound. But I do not know of anything more undemocratic and anti-democratic than bolshevism. We who have seen terrorism by a few bolshevists know that there is no rule more autocratic than bolshevik rule. Reaction against bolshevism is democracy.

An element of this movement which began in August, 1919, is sometimes very much discredited in the eyes of many people, who look upon it as an anti-Jewish reaction. I should like to say that it is a mistake to think that the anti-Jewish movement, which really existed and which still exists in Hungary, is one against the Jewish religion or Jews in general. If I had to characterize it as a historian it would be rather with the words “anti-Galician movement.” It is much more a question of immigration, and antagonism towards a certain group of foreigners who turned against the nation. To prove that, let me quote these figures:

In 1785 we had 75,000 Jews in Hungary, who were on the best of terms with the Magyars and with the other peoples, and who began very strongly to amalgamate and fuse with the Magyars and other races. In 1910 we had 912,000 Jews, not counting those who were Christianized, who would amount to a few hundred thousand. You see the volume of immigration must have been very large because between these figures of 75,000 and 912,000 there lies only a century. It was at its height towards the close of the period in question, and was a consequence of persecution of Jews in Roumania and Russia, and of liberalism in Hungary. This produced a great influx of Jewish population from these two countries into Hungary. The great danger was not that there were many men of Jewish religion in Hungary—not at all. The danger was that we had a large immigration of foreigners, who by our very liberal laws were too soon made citizens and given the same rights as old citizens before they had any feeling of loyalty for the land and for their fellow-

countrymen. Practically they were allowed to acquire citizenship in one and all political rights in five years.

We recognized all our dangers of immigration too late—this as well as the other, about which I spoke in my third lecture. You are recognizing dangers inherent to immigration in time; and we may blame ourselves for not having done so.

Bolshevism in Hungary was led and directed by these foreigners. Of course, there were Jews of older Hungarian origin, just as there were Hungarians taking part in the bolshevist movement, but the hatred of the people was aroused by the Galicians. It is quite natural that in the counter-revolutionary movement there were excesses. But the stories about “white terror” were enormously exaggerated. As to the question why these stories have spread apparently without contradiction, the reason is largely because we had no means to defend ourselves.

To show how little known the circumstances were and how much people were misinformed, I should like to tell another of my personal experiences. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I received a telegram in the spring of 1920 from the union of the French and Italian post, telegraph, and telephone employees, saying that if the trial of a certain man named Lévai should lead to his condemnation they would declare a postal, telegraphic, and telephone boycott of Hungary. I was always very careful not to interfere with matters in the hands of the courts, so I did not know about it. But in this case I asked to see the evidence of the trial, and learned two things. One was that this Lévai was accused of having committed three murders, which later was proved to be true, and about fifty minor offences. The other thing I learned was that this man had never in his life had anything to do with either the post, or the telegraph, or the telephone service; he had quite another occupation. The foreign organizations mentioned had been misled, thinking it was one of their own people and at the same time that a prosecution was going on against an innocent man. It was later proved at the trial, open to publicity, that he really had committed three murders. Of course, I gave an answer explaining the whole situation, but the boycott was nevertheless declared and we had to fight it for about three months.

Let us now turn to the most recent political events—to what has happened since bolshevism was overcome and the conditions exist today.

In January, 1920, a national assembly was elected by an equal suffrage vote, every man and woman being a voter, without any distinction, from the age of twenty-one and upward. This national assembly is legally a kind of constituent body, but it is in truth practically something between a *constituante* which has only the duty of reforming the constitution, and an ordinary legislature, because the condition of the country demands that this national assembly deal also with practical questions of

everyday life, especially with our financial and economic reconstruction.

The national assembly elected a governor. In two instances in our history we have elected governors before. Once was in 1848, when Kossuth was elected governor, and the other was a very long time ago, in the fifteenth century, when John Hunyadi, our national hero, was governor in the absence of the king. The governor exercises all royal rights and is in the king's place. But, nevertheless, Hungary is considered a kingdom and not a republic.

While the majority of the people and of the political parties—I should say perhaps 95 per cent of the people—are royalist, I may remind you that our royalism has always been democratic and constitutional, so it means something else in Hungary than in other states. All sides agree today that the constitution needs a reform before royal power can be exercised again by a king in Hungary.

In order not to disturb the steady process of recuperation and the adjustment of all matters, finance, economics, and so on, the question of the throne has been postponed practically for years. Since I was in power when this was proposed, and was practically the man who suggested the postponement of this matter until we should be consolidated and have finished with those problems which are very important for the everyday life of the people, you will understand that I cannot speak in detail about the question of the throne, without contradicting the policy which I myself initiated in Hungary, and by which the matter has been taken out of discussion at home. I can tell you, however, that I have successfully represented this attitude both before our political parties and the people and before King Charles himself.

I have always maintained the point that the question of the throne is not acute today; we have other things to do which are more important to the nation at the present time, and I do not want this question, which in any case would cause trouble, to be thrown into our political life now, when we need co-operation of all parties in all the other important matters of our life.

Of course, there are people on both sides who disregard the postponement agreed upon, but still my successor has the same policy as I had and I hope that he will be able to carry it through effectively.

As to the future, you will realize that any prophecy would be futile, particularly in eastern Europe, where nothing can be predicted as yet.

As for the last question, about our political parties, we have two great political parties which together include 170 members out of the whole of 210 members of the legislature. These two parties, sometimes fusing to a common party, sometimes merely as a coalition of two parties, have been forming and backing the government. One of these parties more particularly represents the towns, especially the more

industrialized western part of Hungary, and at the same time the more catholic region. Catholicism is stronger in the west. The eastern part is more Protestant. At the same time it is more bound to political traditions personified in the name of Kossuth. The people there are more conservative as far as economics and agriculture are concerned. However, no sharp division can be made between the two parties, and there has always existed a smaller, what I may call a transitional party (17-22 members) between the two, trying to conciliate differences, and which has been formed from members of the two larger parties. These are the leading parties in Hungary today.

The old parties are gone. They were divided according to the point of view they took as to our relations and our settlement with Austria. The Austrian Empire gone, the separation effected, those programs, pro and contra, have lost their significance. The social-democratic party, never very strong, is not represented in Parliament. This is a consequence of bolshevism, with which very many of the leaders of this party became involved. So there was a reaction, partly within the party, partly outside it, like the *fascisti* movement in Italy. There is a party of some members, the democrat party, in opposition to the strongly Christian trend and program of the parties in power. This trend, as you may have recognized, is a natural consequence of bolshevism. And the laws proposed and accepted by these parties should always be judged in the *tout ensemble* of the situation of a people who have passed through such terrible experiences in the last years.

The chief work the national assembly is doing today is the work of our financial and economic consolidation, about which I shall speak to you in my next lecture.

[5] Voters compared to populations: (1) France before 1830—1 voter to 320 units of population; (2) France after 1831—1 voter to 160 units of population; (3) Hungary in 1830—1 voter to 85 units of population.

LECTURE VI

THE RACIAL QUESTION AND HUNGARY'S POLICY

[With Ethnographical Map of Hungary ([See color map](#))]

MANY friends have asked me to go more into detail on the racial questions than the general scheme of my lectures would permit on all subjects, and this I ask your permission to do today. This subject must necessarily include the nationality and racial problems of Hungary in general, with special emphasis on the policies of our pre-war governments, "Magyarization," etc.

You will recall from my historical lectures that the way in which Hungary was settled has been a deciding factor in such changes as Hungary's racial aspects have undergone. We can differentiate between three great periods in the history of her settlement; the first lasting up to the Tartar invasion (from the tenth century to 1244); the second to the Turkish invasion (1244-1526), and the third from 1526 to our time. In the first of these periods a great variety of people came to Hungary, but they were amalgamated, just as was the case in the other European countries. I have mentioned France. In the second period we received still more western settlers, but the process of amalgamation was able to keep up with that of immigration, and at the end of the period Hungary was more united nationally than ever. In the third period about which I have spoken rather fully—I remind you of the colonization in the eighteenth century—the process of natural amalgamation by the leading race could not keep pace with the speed and amount of the colonization, and Hungary became a racially mixed country. You will remember also that the way in which colonization was carried through resulted in the driving of a wedge into the understanding between the Magyars and some of the other nationalities; in the first place, the Serbians, in the next, the Roumanians; much less between the Hungarians and the other races, i.e., Slovaks, Germans, or Ruthenians. I cannot go into the whole story of these differences between the various nationalities in Hungary, because it would fill several lectures. There are many details, but I would characterize the situation by saying that there existed minor difficulties, such as political struggles and much

propaganda, but not those insoluble great problems of deep and general racial antagonisms, which most people think existed then.

The first grave differences arose, as I said, between Magyars and Serbs. The purpose and manner of the colonization of the Serbs on Austria's initiative was already a grievance to the Hungarians. You will remember that the manner of their colonization differed distinctly from the way in which the other nationalities came to Hungary. The Serbs settled as a whole nation,—a great immigration of many thousand families at one time.

The purpose of Austria was only halfway fulfilled by the colonization of our richest districts, and at the same time those of our leading Magyar clans in the time of the first settling. Austria's motto was *divide et impera*. So the Serbs were encouraged by the Imperial Government to ask for territorial separation from Hungary. They were given special privileges and relief from certain taxes. Joseph II, while thrusting aside the Hungarian parliament and constitution, graciously encouraged the separatist assembly of the Serbians in Vienna. The Serbians were thankful. They were the only nationality which fought with Austria against us in our wars for freedom in the eighteenth century and again in 1848. All this necessarily created ill-feeling on the part of the Magyars.

From the Serbians the nationalistic-separatist movement spread to the Roumanians, who were also Greek Orthodox, and thus not only racially but in religion different from the Hungarians. The Roumanian church had a very primitive organization till 1690, when the Serbian Bishops began to exercise their influence. It was again Joseph II, the most absolutistic king, who refused to render the oath for maintaining and following the Hungarian constitution, while he encouraged Roumanian separatism. Some of the desiderata of the Roumanians at the time, taken *per se*, seem just and reasonable. Keeping in mind the liberal policy pursued in Transylvania under the rule of its national Hungarian Princes, it is safe to say that these Princes—who substituted a new Roumanian ecclesiastic language in place of the heretofore unintelligible Old-Slavic liturgy and laid the foundation for modern Roumanian literary language—would have carried their work further to a recognition of the political rights of the Roumanians, as an individual unit in Transylvania. By that time (the eighteenth century), however, Transylvania was no longer master of her own destinies. Moreover, the Hungarians of the eighteenth century looked upon the status of non-Magyar races with very different eyes. They saw the connection between the autocratic efforts of the Vienna government to suppress the constitutional liberties from without, and the championing of racial ambitions directed against the Magyars from within.

Here I must insert some information on a special question—the origin of the Roumanians. It was at this time (the middle of the eighteenth century) that the theory of the Roman origin of the Roumanians was first launched in politics by Bishop Klein. This theory was first put forth by Bonfinius in the fifteenth century and was based on the resemblance of the Italian and Roumanian languages; hence the claim of the Roumanians that they are descended from the legionaries and colonists of Emperor Trajanus in Transylvania. Roumanian historians and politicians have presented this theory as historical truth. Still the theory has always been much contested and critical historical investigation proved its invalidity. The proofs against it are various. *First*, the Roumanian language is akin to Neo-Latin dialects originating between the fourth and tenth centuries, long after the Romans retired from Dacia. According to the French linguists, G. Paris and Berget, the Roumanian language was formed on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, near which it is still a living tongue among the Macedo-Roumanians. *Second*, the legions conquering Dacia were in general not even Latins, but were mostly from Asia Minor. *Third*, the names in Transylvania, taking as a basis the list of the Roumanian ethnographer, Nic. Mazere, are only about 19 per cent Roumanian. Furthermore, the old Latin names of Dacia were nowhere preserved by the Roumanians, which is a decisive proof against any continuity of tradition. Even the Roumanian name of the village on the site of the ancient Roman chief town, *Ulpia Trajana*, is the Slav name *Grediste*. *Fourth*, there were before and during the Roman rule many artificially drained fishpools in Transylvania, the remnants of which can be traced even today. The Roumanians have not even a word for “fishpool,” but in Transylvania call it by the Hungarian term “halastó,” changed in their tongue to “halasteŭ.” It would take too long to say more about this. However, I think, “*sapienti sat*.” If not, then read what Madison Grant says in his world-renowned book, “The Passing of the Great Race.”

About the Croatians and their so-called “Illyric” movement I have little to say, Croatia not being considered by us an integral part of Hungary proper. Croats and Hungarians had many common interests and many common struggles during the centuries, and, of course, being bound to live a common political life naturally enough also had many political differences. These latter were aggravated in the last decades by petty sharp practices on the part of unwise departments of the administration. But a very interesting psychological factor in the judging of deeper feelings during the centuries is this, that while there are to be found many signs of ill-feeling against Venice in the folklore of these southern Slavs, there is nothing to be found in them about enmity against the Magyars.

Let me turn to the North. The Slovak national movement, originating in the

Slovak literary movement, followed the Hungarian literary renaissance, about which I have told you. This national literary movement had to struggle against the influence of the Czech literary school, and out of this grew political differences. The Slovaks, as a whole, were, next to the Germans, the highest in civilization among our nationalities, and many of them attained high positions. The consequence was an easier amalgamation of their educated class with the Hungarians and this was not rendered difficult by religious difference as in the case of Serbians and Roumanians.

Finally, I must point to the fact that there was no Ruthenian national movement at all; there was only an ecclesiastical question between Orthodox and Greek Catholics, but the Ruthenians were at all times good Hungarian patriots.

But even the Serbian and Roumanian nationalistic movements were not general to the whole body of these nationalities, and you would not judge them rightly if you thought that the controversies were as acute as those in the Balkans. I may quote a great Roumanian authority on this question, Mr. Alexander Vajda-Vojvod, a Transylvania politician, who in 1920 was prime minister of the kingdom of new Greater Roumania.

Two years before, when Roumania had just declared war on Austria-Hungary, but not on Germany, and Roumanian armies were pouring into Transylvania, while the Austro-Hungarian front had been hurled back hundreds of miles by the Russians after the defeat at Luck, and the Germans were exhausting themselves before Verdun, Mr. Vajda-Vojvod wrote an article in the *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, of which I take the liberty of quoting a few telling passages:

“Roumania’s declaration of war has painfully shocked the Roumanians of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They hoped to the last that a true realization of the political and economic interests of the kingdom would prove decisive, and that Roumania would participate in the war on our side, or at least observe a loyal neutrality. . . .

“Before the war, we could only emphasize the fact that our loyalty towards the dynasty and our patriotism had always unswervingly withstood any storms of the past. The world war has at last brought us an opportunity to prove our words by deeds. . . .

“When our leaders appealed to the people, our hosts entered the field most enthusiastically. On all battlefields the regiments of Roumanian majority distinguished themselves by signal bravery; thus, at the storming of Brest-Litovsk, at Baranowici, in Serbia, and on the Italian front. Our press could cite daily, with pride, the names of Roumanians decorated for bravery. The Infantry Regiment No. 50 has been

decorated by His Majesty as no other regiment has, and has received the same honor of Emperor William in 1915. . . .

“Count Apponyi has thanked the Roumanians of Hungary for the eloquent assurance of loyalty, made on their behalf at the time of Roumania’s declaration of war by my fellow M. P., Dr. St. Csicsó-Pop. . . .

“Every Austrian and Hungarian Roumanian feels the deepest satisfaction over the unblemished patriotic and loyal attitude of our people. . . .

“The Roumanians of the Monarchy are untouched by *irredenta*. In our people and in our intellectuals there is a deep conviction that we owe our culture and our progress to the House of Hapsburg. It is deeply realized further that *the political struggle between Magyars and Roumanians can only be considered as a dissension among brothers, all the more so since in view of the common danger of annihilation by Russia both peoples are welded into one by the unbreakable ties of common vital interests, now and evermore. . . .*

“Nothing can shake the conviction in us that the future of Roumania does not require the destruction of the Hapsburg Monarchy, but on the contrary, the powerful strengthening of the latter, and a close union with the Kingdom to the same end. . . .”

After this I can tell you my personal experience, living in a county inhabited by Roumanians. The great bulk of the people there never had differences, and my conviction about the situation is akin to that which I have heard expressed about Armenia during our lectures here: “They would live in peace if they were let alone.” I think an American friend of mine, who went to Transylvania, was quite right in judging the situation after a very short time in the following words to me:

“I have the feeling that the Roumanians in Transylvania are much more Transylvanian than Roumanian, and I have also the impression that the Hungarians have a certain Transylvanian feeling.”

It seems to me that this point is disregarded by very many people who have dealt with these questions in a diplomatic way and in literature. There is much said about the racial factors—generally with defining race—about the different ethnic factors, such as language, customs, etc. They speak of the historical factor, and the economic factor, but least is said about a factor which, when one studies life in general, is in any case as strong as any of the others, and that is the element of tradition. As far as I know and see the situation, I think that the tradition of common life is a much stronger element and is the only factor which, with the economic interest, can help us

to get through the difficulties which have been created so recently. These general questions will be dealt with in my last lecture.

Now, if you ask me, "What then was the cause of racial differences in Hungary?" I can answer you very briefly in two words, one pointing to the mistakes made by the Hungarians and the other pointing to the opposing side in the struggle. The two words are *administration* and *agitation*.

Before going into the details of the significance of these two words, I remind you of what has been said in my former lectures about nationalism which in the first part of the nineteenth century, following the Italian and German examples with enthusiasm, aimed similarly to create of Hungary a nationally united country. This, of course, was a great mistake. There was undoubtedly some justification for this mistaken attitude, as far as the people in general were concerned, in the fact that Austria backed the nationalities other than Magyar, and that Hungary considered the nationality problem as an element of the Austrian anti-Magyar policy. However, in the case of the great political leaders the mistake was unpardonable. We may say today that if a national hero like King Matthias or even Louis of Anjou had proposed reforms in regard to the status of nationalities, there would have been no Magyar resistance. But this is vain philosophizing and we must consider facts.

After the change in the national aspect of the country, by which the Hungarian element was reduced to about one-half, after the rise of racial feeling everywhere following the Napoleonic wars, and the creation of the term nationality and the growth of the ideas of nationality, of which Lord Bryce spoke in his lecture on the ninth of August; after the Imperial Government encouraged the nationalities to become disloyal to Hungary, it was utterly naïve still to believe in the possibility of assimilation and in the creation of a nationally united state. It is true, and it must be said, that some leading politicians, especially Louis Kossuth, whom you Americans know well, saw the danger, but his suggestion came too late. When he was in exile after 1850, and after he had been in the United States, he proposed to create in Hungary a federalistic state. However, a clever man can more easily change his opinion when he comes to see matters more clearly than before, than a nation can be won from one day to another to diametrically opposite opinion and policy.

Kossuth himself had done the most and had made the most fervent speeches between 1840 and 1849 in favor of a nationally united State. He and the other politicians did much to make this the first political axiom of the nation. But the nation could not change from one day to the next to the new policy and could not be awakened from the dream of following the example of United Italy.

That I am right in using the word "dream" is proved also by the fact that in truth

nothing was earnestly undertaken to carry through an effective Magyarization.

In Hungary we have established state schools only since 1867. It was at a time when we regained home-rule from Austria. Till then the schools were maintained exclusively by religious denominations, towns, endowments, or private individuals. Thus you will understand that in 1910, the time of the last census, only one sixth of all primary schools were state schools, all the rest being supported by the above agencies, enjoying complete autonomy in regard to the language of instruction, though subsidized in most instances by the Hungarian government. It is true that the language of instruction in the state schools was Hungarian, or Magyar, but even in these, if anyone wished to have his child instructed in another language, spoken to a greater extent in the particular locality, an adequate number of hours was set apart in the course of study for instruction therein.

According to Hungarian law, salaries of teachers have to be the same in all primary schools. Where the salary paid by the school does not attain the minimum prescribed, the deficiency is paid by the state—regardless of the character and language of the particular school. In 1914 there were 3320 primary schools in the country, teaching in a language other than Magyar. Of these, 2048 were recipients of state subsidies. Total subsidies in that year paid to non-Magyar schools amounted to 2,615,000 gold crowns, and were mostly paid to Roumanian and Slovak schools. For instance, the 2,900,000 Roumanians in Hungary had about 2,300 elementary schools with the Roumanian language as the language of teaching, whereas, in Roumania 7,000,000 Roumanians at the same time had only 4,450 such schools. Compared to the standard in Hungary they should have had 5,550 schools in Roumania. In 1909-1910 in Roumania only 45.3 per cent of the children went to school; in Hungary 49 per cent of the Roumanian children went to school. I may add that while in Roumania only 59 per cent of the recruits could read and write, in Hungary 70 per cent of the recruits of Roumanian nationality could do so.




FIG. 25.

FIG. 25. Elementary education in Hungary in 1912-13. The areas of the squares show the number of schools in each country, also indicated by the figures printed beneath the squares. You will notice that the state schools formed only 20%, whereas the parish schools formed 72% of the whole. In the community schools, and parish schools, where the language of instruction was chosen by the local people, 2233 schools gave instruction in Roumanian, 377 in Slovak, 270 in Serbian, 59 in Ruthenian, 12 in Italian, 447 in German, and 10 in other languages.

I shall quote a Roumanian witness on the situation, Mr. Take Jonescu, minister of foreign affairs, who said once,

“Look at the Roumanian peasants in Hungary. They are much higher in civilization than ours in the kingdom of Roumania.”

This is explained, perhaps, as you know, by the fact that in the past centuries during the Turkish occupation, Roumania was very much oppressed by the Turks and the Fanariots who were the rulers, whereas Transylvania managed to remain free both as to creed and general civilization. You have heard also that the first Roumanian books were printed in Transylvania and were encouraged by the Transylvanian princes and nobles. There was then no lack of harmony on racial questions. Things were much

the same as regards Serbian education. The intellectual renaissance of Serbia was started in the town of Ujvidék, in Hungary. The first Serbian books were likewise printed in Hungary. From Hungary the Serbian and Roumanian literary language spread into the kingdoms of Serbia and Roumania.

It is significant that while the percentage of Magyars and Germans able to read and write was in excess of their proportion in the total population of the country (a fact easily explained by higher cultural standing), the proportion of Slovaks and Croats able to read and write corresponds exactly to their relative numbers in the total population (10.7 per cent and 1.1 per cent, respectively); almost the same can be said about the Serbs. The figures for Roumanians show a most unfavorable proportion in spite of their otherwise favorable comparison with their kin in the Roumanian kingdom. While the Roumanians formed 16 per cent of the total population of the country, less than half of this number (7.8 per cent) were able to read and write. Another way of demonstrating this deficiency is to note that these 16 per cent had almost as many illiterates as three and a half times as many Magyars. And yet, Slovaks and Croats had no better educational facilities than the Roumanians. What is more, there was no other non-Magyar race in Hungary proper having as many educational agencies of their own as the Roumanians. Since the deficiency of the Roumanians in respect to literacy in Hungary might be misinterpreted, it might not be without interest again to call your attention to the fact that Roumanians in the Roumanian kingdom showed even a lower percentage of literacy than these Roumanians in Hungary. Even more telling are the figures for the Serbs. While almost half of the Serbs living in Hungary (48.5 per cent), over six years of age, were able to read and write, only 20.3 per cent of those living in the Kingdom of Serbia could do so, according to the Serbian census of 1900.

Hungary and its government were often accused of having "Magyarized" or forced the Magyar language upon people through the medium of the schools. Scientifically two points must be investigated: (1) What was the intention of the government and how was it carried through? (2) Did it meet with success? As to the first, the main law, about which there has been much discussion, was passed in 1906. The text of the law may be criticized from the point of view of the rights of non-Magyar races to teach in their own languages and to develop their racial culture. But if we look at the facts, I must say that the execution of the law remained very far from its intention. The same thing happened as that which caused so much criticism of the law of 1868. In 1868, after the settlement of our relations with Austria, the Hungarian Parliament passed a very liberal law concerning the rights of nationalities. It is often maintained by all those who criticize the treatment of non-Magyar

nationalities in Hungary, that the provisions of this law were never carried through, and that in practice it was much less liberal than stated in the word of the law. It was a curious but general tendency that the administration carried out the provisions of the laws only superficially. This must be admitted by the Hungarians for those laws which were liberal towards other nationalities, but it must be stated also for the laws which were nationalistic and pro-Magyar, with the same result. After the promulgation of the school law, one could see outside of the doors of the school buildings, painted in large letters: "Greek-Catholic Elementary School," and similarly in other cases. These were printed only in Hungarian, and with the Hungarian arms, but much less care was taken as to the ideas which were spread by the teacher within the school.

The situation which brought the whole trouble to Hungary might be briefly characterized thus—that we passed laws which were liberal to the other nationalities but created discontent among them by not carrying them out in all respects. On the other hand, we passed laws, especially this much-quoted school law, which were unfavorable to the other nationalities and caused discontent among them when passed, while the Magyar nationalists did not derive the benefit which was expected to result from carrying them out.

The fundamental weakness in the charges of "Magyarization," preferred against the Hungarian schools, lies in the fact that learning to speak Magyar and calling yourself a Magyar are two separate things. Bishop Brent told us the other night of 700,000 Filipino children being taught in English. Yet, by what he said, they still seem to consider themselves Filipinos, though speaking English. In the non-Hungarian communities of Hungary, where state schools were founded before 1880, the number of those who declared themselves Magyars increased in thirty years by 6 per cent—which is less than the increase of 7.9 per cent in the whole land. Whereas, the number of those speaking Magyar, but declaring themselves to be of other nationality, increased by 23.6 per cent. Can it further be maintained that the spread of the Magyar language was paramount with the suppression of the separate individuality of races in Hungary?

Our statistics prove to those who think that our schools could do much in the way of "Magyarization," that people between twenty and forty years of age are much more inclined to change their nationality and become "Magyarized" and learn the Magyar language than the children. This has been the consequence of the economic development. In my economic lecture we have compared the density of population in the lowlands and the highlands, which is still very unequal, being less numerous in the lowlands, though this is the richer country. Now, from all

surrounding highlands there is a constant emigration into the central lowlands. The lowlands are practically purely Magyar, except for some isolated German and Slovak settlements, and so there is an absolute "Magyarization" of these people who come down to the plain. The towns also have had a great "Magyarizing" influence. The towns themselves, which in former times were German, later became Hungarian owing to their surroundings. The Germans changed their nationality the most quickly and in the towns have become Hungarian. These towns, when absorbing population, "Magyarize." They show an increase from 1869 to 1910 of nearly 43 per cent, whereas, in the whole land the increase in population was only 19 per cent.

From all this you might conclude that the Magyars as a whole were economically better off than their non-Magyar fellow-citizens. Keeping in mind that Hungary is a predominantly agricultural country, let us examine the distribution of the farm and village population among the various races.

Here you find the striking fact that among the Magyars there were 48½ per cent of landless farmers and dwellers in villages, whereas, among the Slovaks there were only 33½ per cent and among the Roumanians only 31½ per cent. This was the result of a very undemocratic point of view of our government, mentioned already in one of my political lectures. Fearing very much the sentiment of the Magyar population against Austria, the government did not wish to make suffrage more general. They feared just this great amount of poor Hungarian population, which was strongly opposed to the point of view of those governments which maintained and supported the common army and common foreign representation with Austria, or better, so-called "common" because in practice both were simply Austrian.

Among the eight ministers of foreign affairs from 1867 to 1918, there were only two real Hungarians, and one of these held office only during three days. Of the 174 generals commanding army corps, divisions, and brigades in 1914, only eleven were Hungarian, 163 Austrians. In the Ministry of War there were employed at the beginning of the War 1,007 Austrians, 474 Czechs, and only 65 Hungarians.

You may know also that direct taxes are no more popular in Hungary than in any other country. Yet if you look at the number of citizens who support the state by their taxes, you find a rate entirely different from that in the population statistics. The Magyars and Germans, forming 65 per cent of the population, paid 78½ per cent of all the direct taxes, whereas, for instance, the Roumanians, who were 16 per cent of the population, paid only 8 per cent of the direct taxes.

Moreover, the right to vote, bound to a certain tax, was defined by chance to the great disadvantage of the Magyars. The standard for this right was not a uniform sum of money, paid in taxes, over the entire country, but a certain land-value; one-quarter

of a fief. A fief is an old measure varying very much in the different regions, according to the fertility of the soil. In Transdanubia and the Great Plain, inhabited by Magyars, a fief averages between 24 and 64 yokes (32-84 acres), in the mountains of what is now Slovakia, between 16 and 26 yokes (21-35 acres). In the county of Bihar a Roumanian of the mountain-districts could have a vote upon payment of 0.92 crowns in taxes, a Hungarian of the plain only upon payment of 30 crowns. In Transylvania proper 14,400, out of the Magyar population of 918,000, and 34,400, out of the non-Magyar population of 1,560,000, had votes (1.6 per cent Magyars; 2.2 per cent non-Magys).

In speaking about the vote, I wish to put in a proper light the question as to how the non-Magyar nationalities were represented in parliament. You may read in several books—but going back mostly to the same source, i.e., to Scotus Viator's^[6] writings—that the non-Magys were compelled by bribery and all means of oppression to elect Magyar candidates. These writers set forth a partial and indiscriminating comparison of the number of Magyar and non-Magyar members of parliament. The sources are propaganda literature, and others quote the statements without investigating the facts. They compare the number of non-Magys elected as members of the radical-nationalist party to the number of all the other parties in parliament, and say that among 413 members there were only a dozen non-Magys. But I should like to ask by what right these writers refrain from counting those non-Magyar members who were not elected as members of the radical-nationalist, but of the governmental party? Do they stamp them as renegades? Why should every non-Magyar, who professes friendship with the Magys and loyalty to the state, be a "renegade"? An impartial mode of comparison would be to compare the number of oppositional non-Magys (national party) with the oppositional Magys. The figures then stand as 1:4 and not as 1:40, even this difference due to the greater national feeling and stronger individuality of the Magyar elector. There was governmental oppression and bribery, as it was and still is practically everywhere in eastern Europe. You will find the same tale of misdeeds of the administration which Scotus Viator relates about Hungary, in J. E. Courtenay Bodley's book about France. And England had to pass the severe "Ballot Act" as we passed the law of "Curial Jurisdiction" to control election practices. But there was oppression by the government and I felt it myself when first elected in my home constituency, as Magyar oppositional candidate, when all government power was exercised in favor of a Roumanian lawyer, who was the candidate of the governmental party.^[7]

The motive for the action of the governments, as I set forth in a former lecture,

was to maintain the settlement of 1867 with Austria. The governments and their members were chosen by the Emperor-King from this point of view.

All I have told shows you that there was much inconsistency in what the Hungarian governments did in respect to nationalities. On the one side there were people who strongly advocated the policy of creating a united national state. On the other hand, very little was attempted, and still less done to carry it through, especially where it would have been most vital and effective. Very much was said, much less was done in this respect. And there was nothing of what could be called a system.

Take, for instance, the question of non-Magyar banks. Fifty years ago, in 1870, Hungary had 180 banks; of these 167 were Magyar banks, 12 German, and 1 Slovak. In 1915 Hungary had 1789 banks, of which 1468 were Magyar, 95 German, 36 Slovak, 156 Roumanian, 30 Serbian, 4 others. If you stop to figure out the percentage in the increase of the number of Magyar and non-Magyar banks, it will be pretty clear to you that no obstacles were put in the way of individual non-Magyar business enterprise. This refers, however, merely to the number of banks. In order not to make a misleading statement, I hasten to add that the big banks of the principal city of the country, Budapest, had an infinitely larger amount of capital than the non-Magyar banks of the country districts. On the other hand, non-Magyar banks compare pretty favorably with Magyar provincial banks. Though it was generally known that some of these non-Magyar banks were in close touch with foreign governments and financed largely by anti-Magyar interests, they were not interfered with by the Hungarian government.

It is very curious that the government which Magyarizes does nothing against a growing anti-Magyar movement such as this, a strong organization, of which everybody in the state knew the significance. The government always acted as if it knew nothing about it. I could describe the inconsistency of racial policy in Hungary in no better way than by pointing to the absurd inconsistency of preaching in Parliament the idea of a united nation, and, on the other hand, doing nothing in this respect in directions where the most could have been done, where the people were easiest to reach.

Just in one respect, i.e., the schools, the state began to do something, but on absolutely false principles, and on principles which, it might have been stated from the first moment, could never bring those results for which the state looked. This is due both to tradition and circumstances. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the strong political sense inherited from our ancestors was diverted into quarreling and wrangling over questions of public law, and problems and details of purely political legislation and administration. Economic and social questions were

neglected, although I must say that, after regaining our home-rule in 1867, some very advanced social laws were passed. If you were to study our social legislation you would find it very progressive, even model in certain respects. We had also a fairly large number of first-class social institutions. But the average administrator, the average official in the administration, had not as much social feeling as was necessary, and was not educated in that direction. But do not compare the legislature and the administration only to those of the far more modern greatest nations, but to our neighbors, Serbia and Roumania, and then you will be able to declare a very high standard for Hungary.

In my economic lecture I told you how we turned from extreme economic liberalism to extreme economic protectionism and how the state took a hand in everything. The consequence was that the spirit of enterprise was weakened, every task was laid upon the state. Economic progress, and especially the measures taken by the state, were regarded by the ruling political school with self-satisfaction, but without a thorough knowledge of circumstances in foreign countries and comparison with them. Form and theory contented these political dreamers. As I have said, the state undertook every task, and every task, every problem was laid upon the shoulders of the state—economic, social, and national. For instance, I knew many landowners who asked for a state school in their villages and who gave money to erect a state school with Magyar instruction. Often, however, the same landowner never spoke a word of Magyar with his tenants or the people employed on his estate, but spoke their language—Slovak or Roumanian. I wish to show you the inconsistency of the work in Hungary and of the good intentions on one side and the working out in everyday life on the other. Very many things were planned, but little was carried out in everyday life. Both may have been mistakes. The greatest mistake of the much-slandered Magyarization effort was its inconsistency.

To show you further an example of our government policy, I shall ask you a question. Supposing “Magyarization” had meant oppression of non-Magyar races, would you not have thought that there would have been more of the non-Magyar intelligentsia in free professions than in the employ of the Hungarian government? Just the opposite is true. While among the intellectuals on the payrolls of the Hungarian administration 6.3 per cent were Roumanians, we find only 1.1 per cent of them in free professions. The corresponding figures for the Serbs were 1½ per cent and 0.7 per cent; those of the Slovaks 1.8 per cent and 0.9 per cent.

But the average politician and even many of the most prominent men did not study life. Of course, they all saw the danger in the propaganda carried on from the neighboring countries and by some agitation within.

If I were now to sum up the causes of ill-feeling, I could do so as follows:

That matters went as far as they did was first of all due to the lack of good administration. It may have been in part a consequence of the system about which I spoke to you in my second lecture, i.e., the county system, where the administration was less controlled by the state, and so was much to be blamed for giving ground for racial discontent. However, the system could not be abolished even though there was much objection to it. It was a part of the constitution. I was myself in the county administration for two years, so I speak from personal experience. Many of the county officials were elected to offices in given districts without regard to whether or not they spoke the language of all the nationalities who lived in that district. This was bound to cause trouble. I saw a case where the officials and the people wanted the same thing, but were misled by the interpreter and the situation became dangerous. On the other hand, in another case I had to refuse the unanimous candidate of the people [for] a certain post for disciplinary reasons; but because I could speak the language of the people, and could explain the issue, everybody understood the matter and accepted my proposal.

I firmly believe that everyday life with its innumerable small happenings has a greater influence on the average man than big political issues which as a rule are outside of his sphere. What people feel in everyday life has much more influence upon the formation of the thought of the great majority of people, than is usually realized.

The following is a striking example of the fact that at times even nationality is not permanent but something which can be changed according to the interests which everyday life brings with it. I once asked a very prominent Czech politician how many Poles there were in the district of Teschen, which, as you know, was contested between Czechoslovakia and Poland. He said, "Perhaps 40,000, perhaps 100,000." I said, "How does it happen that you give me such different numbers just now, when this question seems to be of momentous importance?" He replied, "Well, the figures change. The people of certain villages are changing their nationality every week, according to their economic interests and sometimes according to the economic interests of the mayor of the village." Those were his words. You see from that that even nationality can be changed by varying interests. But it cannot be changed by the influence of the schools. That is not the way.

This can be said as well of those who are attacking Hungarian school questions, and of those in Hungary who were trying to carry out some "Magyarization" by proposing certain school laws. Both are mistaken. I told you that it can be proved by figures that neither the school nor the army—of course, not the army in Hungary,

because its language was German—were the “Magyarizing” factors but much more the economic life. While older people learned Hungarian for business reasons, and at times became Magyars, it is a fact that the children, who in the schools learned Hungarian and spoke it there for two or three years, but at home did not speak it to their parents, forgot it as quickly as they had learned it. Thus “Magyarization” through the medium of the schools was unsuccessful and absolutely ineffective. This could have been realized by both sides—by those who proposed school laws with the intention of “Magyarization” and by those who attacked it as a measure of “Magyarization.” Both could have seen that they were quarreling about something which was much less effective than either thought it was.

Before summing up, let me call your attention, very briefly, to the fact that the Hungarian governments never took strong steps as to the protection of Magyar minorities in Croatia, where there were 106,000 Magyars, and in Roumania, where the Roumanian statistics do not give the number of alien nationalities, but where there were about 100,000 Magyars according to our reckoning. As to Croatia, schools as well as territorial army were Croatian.

Those who made the nationalistic school laws would have accomplished more if they had said, “Teach less and educate more. Be the leader of the population in respect to all their everyday life and their agricultural and industrial activities before school and after school.” By this method they would probably more effectively have won the people for their purpose than by simply teaching them and, after the door of the school was closed, forgetting the connection between them and those who had gone to school.

To sum up what I have said about the situation in Hungary concerning the problem of the nationalities, there are these things to be considered:

First, a decadence of political sense, reducing it to the level of political quarreling.

Second, a disregard of our own conditions, the imitation of western European ideas of nationalism.

Third, a lack of sufficient social feeling in the local administration.

Fourth, a lack of true and sound direction of the administration, insufficient control by the state. The county officials could not be removed by the state, being elected by the autonomous county. Therefore, in very many cases matters were serious before it was possible to interfere. If there had been a state administration, change would have been easier. It was very difficult for us to change the system, because in other respects, as I have told you, the county was the bulwark of self-government and of our constitution. It could not be simply abolished, therefore,

though there were projects to change it and to bring about stronger centralization.

Fifth, we made grave mistakes and created enemies by our inconsistency in not carrying out laws which we had passed, as well as by passing laws which could not be or were not carried out.

Sixth, the governments neglected to control and check propaganda going on freely among the non-Magyar races, under the direction of strong cultural societies and of political banks and savings banks of anti-Magyar tendency, subsidized from abroad.

Seventh, this propaganda itself, which, construed unfavorable political, social or economic conditions, affecting certain classes of the population, without distinction of race, as aggressive measures directed against a given non-Magyar race, and therefore blamed Hungary as a nation and not merely the government which really was responsible for the said conditions.

National differences were, as you know, very much accentuated in all Europe at the close of the war, and in Hungary perhaps more than anywhere else. I can quote a French colleague of mine, Professor Brunhes, who says, in a recent book, that most harm was done by pacifist internationalists, who denied the existence of country and homeland—"patrie." Now it is a question of how such differences can be settled for the future. I think this is a question which does not concern Hungary alone. I shall deal with it in the last lecture.

[6] Seton Watson.

[7] Collections of maps indicating the results of elections from 1866 to 1915. The Hungarian Peace Negotiations (1921, Budapest), Vol. III. B, Map VII.

LECTURE VII

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE WAR

IN this second lecture on economic matters, I shall complete the picture I drew in my first lecture on this subject, and shall deal with problems for the understanding of which it was necessary to explain to you our revolution, bolshevism in Hungary, with the ensuing Roumanian occupation, and the political situation today.

To judge the economic situation of Hungary and its economic, agricultural, and financial programs, about which I shall speak, three elements are to be taken into consideration: *first*, the pre-war situation and economic policy; *second*, the consequences of revolution and bolshevism and of the Roumanian occupation; *third*, the consequences of the decisions of the Peace Conference.

To what I have said about our pre-war economic condition and policy, I have to add that, notwithstanding the strong line of state-protectionism, private and co-operative interests and banking have shown rapid development in the last decades. The business of the banks in Hungary differs essentially from the sphere of banking in America. The great industries in Hungary are in the hands, and not only in the hands but are actually run by the big banks. To give just a few figures as to the size of our industry, I will say that in 1913 we had about 4540 industrial plants, with nearly 400,000 workers. The value of the shares of the companies amounted to about \$600,000,000.

In the field of agriculture we have a powerful society controlling and directing the study of agricultural development and giving suggestions to the government as to legislation. This society has branch societies for special work, including cattle-raising, horticulture, viticulture, bee-keeping, silkworm raising, etc. Another organization carries on work with different branches for providing farmers with farm implements and for organizing their marketing; another for credit organization. Co-operative organizations of consumers showed great development in later times.




FIG. 26.

FIG. 26. Area sown in corn (maize) in Hungary in 1913 (upper map), and stock of swine in 1917 (lower map). These two maps show one of the problems which our program of agriculture will have to face,—the loss of much more corn than of our stock of swine. We shall either have to grow more corn or else diminish the number of pigs.

Entering now upon the problems of present-day reform, let us turn first to the great agrarian reform, the need for which was acknowledged long before the war. Several plans and bills were introduced and at the same time the parceling or dividing up of estates was carried on upon a fairly large scale. About one million acres were divided between 1905 and 1913, but the greater part was in territory which no longer belongs to Hungary. In the Great Plain, the present Hungary, the extremes of very large estates and very small farms are most strongly expressed. The revolution witnessed the most radical plans of agrarian reform, among them a plan to divide up the whole country into farms of nowhere more than 250 acres, practically

into farms of 13 acres on an average. Great ideas of colonization were launched with little care for facts. I was at that time President of the Bureau for Disabled Soldiers and warned the government against these radical schemes, but without result. I had tried an experiment with about 2500 wounded men, leading each man individually back to civil life. During this experiment, dealing in a practical way with conditions of living, I reached the conclusion that such great and nicely built up schemes are very fine on paper, but cannot be carried out in real life, because the people benefiting by them do not want them. The right and the opportunity to acquire land must be given, but the land should not be divided up without care as to whether it is really wanted or can be worked properly. Each man furnishes a distinct case. I agree that dealing with the needs of each man individually is a very difficult task. But cases are very different. One man needs much help, another little. Some dislike and refuse it. Others try to outwit the helping hand. But when you have a limited amount of money to carry out such work—leading one man back to his old occupation, teaching the other some new one, helping the third by giving work to his children, and a thousand other cases—then you can accomplish much more if you try to solve each case individually by careful work and with the least expenditure of money and with the assurance that you will not have to do the work all over again. Such work cannot be performed by the State alone. I immediately realized the need of help from society. I can say that I was on the right track and that this plan is not an impossible one.

But this is a digression, and we may return to the plans for agricultural reform. There was not very much general logic in the plans of our revolutionary government. The size of the lands to be allotted depended on the number and on the will of those who wanted the land in any place. For instance, in one village there were about 500 acres to divide and a thousand so-called “claim-holders,”—rightful claimants. Each would have received half an acre. In the next village 6000 acres were to be divided, among three hundred claim-holders, so that each one would have received 20 acres. The people of the second village dug trenches to defend their new property against the less happy people of the first village.

Then bolshevism came, and with it the abolition of private property. When the reign of bolshevism ended the new government immediately took things in hand and I was happy in carrying out our reform last autumn with the aid of our Minister of Agriculture, himself a small farmer. The fundamental points of our reform were:

First: Not to divide all property on a theoretical scheme without absolute need for division, but to divide only so much as is really wanted.

Second: To confine the effect of the law to a certain fixed time, so as not to leave the landowners for an indefinite period in uncertainty and so kill the spirit of

enterprise.

As to the first, I think our reform differs favorably from those of the revolution and from those of our neighboring states, because we are not fixing any maximum or minimum size of farms and estates. We are not dividing the land on the principle of annihilating the big farms and estates, but with the constructive purpose of making it possible for everyone to have land. Czechoslovakia, for instance, has fixed the maximum of land to be held by one individual between 190 and 315 acres; Yugoslavia at 126-190 acres; Roumania at 1200 acres (500 hectares) in the old territory, and at about 600 acres (500 yokes), with a possibility of going down to 225 acres, in Transylvania.

As to the second item which I mentioned; the desire for land will itself indicate the amount to be divided; whereas, for the future necessity, arising after the great reform, we can easily satisfy it from those big estates or parts thereof which will be offered for parcelling in consequence of the great progressive taxes, and by the right to purchase estates to be sold or let, assured to the Minister of Agriculture by law and by the ordinance relating to the Bill of Inheritance, which seeks to provide some similar measure for estates, inherited by distant relations. A further—as we think, good and sound—provision of the law is that the state shall not take the whole effectuation of this scheme in hand with the aid of some great and slow administrative machinery, but instead admit the possibility of private arrangement, assuring the intervention of the state, however, where difficulties arise and obstinacy prevails. If necessary a further reform will come, but to extend the working of this measure without a limit of time would probably be an obstacle to the enterprising spirit of the farming interests.

Even with this moderate reform there were very many people who figured that the provisioning of the great towns and especially of our capital, now mostly the task of large estates, would suffer temporarily. It is wise to preserve large estates, to a certain extent, because in the transition period there is a greater percentage of waste of products on the small farms because of the fact that everything is handled on a smaller scale. But, of course, life itself will smooth out many of the difficulties. The slow supplying of the new farms with livestock and implements will have a twofold influence in the beginning. It will retard the buying of land, and there will be a decrease of production on the insufficiently equipped farm.

Now we have to face both issues and this we shall do mostly by co-operative organizations which will also have the task of teaching the small farmer to cultivate more winter rye, sugar-beets, tobacco, peas, millet, broom plant, which to an extent of 80 per cent are grown today on large farms.

I come to the second great agricultural problem which has influenced political life very much in the last two years. This is a problem which has an interest everywhere in Europe—that of getting away from the fastbound forms of producing and distributing goods and going over to free competition in production and in commerce.

State socialism was said to be a necessity in wartime. It may be true for certain states, but I am inclined to think that in Hungary we could have gotten through with less detrimental economic consequences if production, transportation, distribution, and consumption had not been controlled and restricted. As soon as—about three months ago and after long political fights—we overcame our hysterical fear of freeing wheat and rye from requisitioning by the state and from fixed prices, our apparent shortage was immediately covered and without the perception of great increase of prices.



FIG. 27.

FIG. 27. Sugar factories of east central Europe. You will notice the great number of sugar factories in Czechoslovakia and the lack of them in Hungary. The sugar factories of western Hungary (Burgenland) now transferred to Austria, are cut off from their sugar-beets in Hungary.

(1) Free City of Danzig; (2) Memel district; (3) East Prussia; (4) Vilna district; (5) Poland; (6) Upper Silesia; (7) Eastern Galicia; (8) Czechoslovakia; (9) Italy; (10) Austria; (11) Roumania; (12) Bessarabia; (13) Free State of Fiume; (14) Yugoslavia; (15) Bulgaria; (16) Albania; (17) Greece; (18) Turkey; the name HUNGARY is printed on the new state.

But the difficulty of the problem is not only in its agricultural aspect. It seriously affects social questions and those of industrial development. Providing food for the non-agricultural classes is an inheritance of wartime, a consequence of the higher prices of food products. Our state gave cheaper foods to millions; during a year the

number who received it grew to 3,900,000 people; that means a total of 50 per cent of our population. Cheap food was provided especially for state employees and for industrial workmen. The carrying out of this undertaking was immensely difficult. We could never get the necessary amount of grain from the farmers, and still the whole measure was but a drop of relief in the sea of high prices which wiped out the savings and afterwards the whole property of people living on fixed incomes.

If we compare the increase of prices in Hungary with that in the western countries of Europe we shall find that the increase in Great Britain, as calculated by us, seemed to be between 200 and 250 per cent; in France, about 270 per cent; in Belgium, about 350 per cent. In Hungary, by way of contrast, wheat increased in price by 1400 to 1900 per cent, coal by 3000 to 8000 per cent and sugar by 8000 to 15,000 per cent. The price of wood increased to 400 times its peace-time value; clothing, 150 times. Since 1920 we have passed the highest point and we can already see a considerable decrease in the prices of necessities. The decrease is about one-third as regards the price for articles of food and clothing. But there is still an increase in the cost of housing and a great increase in fuel, due to our losses in mines and forest-lands.




FIG. 28.

FIG. 28. The fluctuation of the income of hand-workers and head-workers in Hungary during the war and revolutionary times, as compared with the cost of living.

I have tried to show you on a graph (Fig. 28) in comparison with the cost of living the income of three classes of hand-workers and of three classes of what we may call "head-workers." The line of high costs is imaginary. The other lines on the graph show the income of hand-workers and of different head-workers—I mean intellectuals and employees.

In 1914 the income of officers was very high, but, as you see, it fell as early as 1915. In 1916 it was much below the line of high prices, so officers were very far from being able to live on the same standard as in peace-time. The same is true in regard to state and private employees. You see how much every one had to cut down his needs—and if you go about in our streets, you will remark it by noticing people's clothes, and observing houses and roadways which are greatly in need of repair. For the latest period you will observe an increase, a great improvement in the situation of all classes of workmen, whereas there is none in that of the three groups of head-workers with fixed salaries. As we know, every one had to cut down his needs.

Bolshevism and the Roumanian invasion greatly increased the difficulty of the situation, so that during a long period we could hardly get clothes and had very little food.

You can get an idea of the situation of our employees when I tell you that in the lowest class of state employees, with college education—they are arranged in eleven classes—a man with a wife and two children gets a daily payment of about twelve cents and members of the Cabinet receive a yearly salary of about \$216. I may tell you that as Prime Minister my salary was about \$300 a year. Of course, the buying power of our money in Hungary is much greater, about four times as great as the exchange indicates. Multiply these figures by four; even then they are very low indeed.

However, the state supplies certain products to its employees at very low prices; they received in 1920, 10.1 kilograms of flour monthly, 9 of potatoes, 1.3 of lard, 1.2 of sugar, and 110 of firewood per head. Still the state can hardly raise more. Old Hungary had about 95,000 officials and 237,000 servants and workmen employed by the state. The new program is based on 177,000 altogether for the future. But all the decrease in servants and workmen is due to the fact that the state cannot get people for these posts; they are paid better everywhere else. School-teachers, judges, and high administrative functionaries are the worst off.

After bolshevism we had to pass through another experience which also contributed very much to aggravate the situation. The Roumanian army was attacked by the bolsheviki whom they beat because the bolshevists, as I told you in my fifth lecture, were weakened by the passive resistance of the Hungarian peasants at their backs. Then the Roumanian army occupied Budapest and about two-thirds of the remaining country. When the Roumanian army withdrew it took away nearly everything movable. I will give you one example because there is no time to go into details and it would go beyond the line of my lecture. Of the locomotives remaining to us after subtracting the material which was in the territories taken from Hungary, they took about 43 per cent; of passenger and baggage cars, 41 per cent; of private cars about 88 per cent. This will show you what few things remained to us with which to build up the land again.

The matter of the existence of our employees and the state work which has to be done for their relief is very much in arrears, because Hungarian functionaries in the new neighboring states, even if born in those parts and speaking the language, have had to leave the country, taking with them in most cases only the necessary belongings. The number of these expelled families today exceeds 90,000. To them must be added other refugees, non-employees, amounting in total to about 250,000 in May, 1921, when I left office.

I show you three pictures, indicating how people—for instance, my colleagues of the University of Kolozsvár—arrived in Budapest. I show you these not to make accusation against anyone—this being not a matter I need enter upon now—but in order that you may see the amount of state work we have had to do to find shelter, food, and employment for all these people. It is a very large and constantly increasing task. We had much difficulty, especially in winter. While I was in office there were about three thousand railway cars occupied by these people in this way, which means not only a great problem in caring for them, but it involves another great problem in our loss of the use of these railway cars by our not having them available as rolling stock.

There is also a scarcity of employment in industry. That is natural; it is everywhere. I cannot say it is catastrophic in Hungary, but still it shows fairly large figures. In the machine, chemical, and brick industries 35,000 workmen out of 80,000 had to leave their employment from March to July, 1921. The lack of employment is increasing and things are aggravated and the remedy is not in our own hands because we are dependent today in most industries on foreign raw materials, a great part of which, of course, came from the highland parts of former Hungary. An exception is the brick industry.

I have already spoken about our frontiers in connection with geographical questions. I shall now show you a series of problems connected with the dismemberment of an economic unit of long standing.

The materials which are not available in Hungary could be imported from elsewhere as for instance we import salt from Germany today, while we had formerly exported it as far as Brazil. But every import is a speculation in currency. If goods could be exchanged for goods, then methods would be somewhat easier, because our industry is working, though working mostly for export, because the costs of production are very high and most of our people cannot buy even our own products. Prices cannot be lowered, because the medicine would be worse than the disease. Wages, fifteen times those of peace-time, are relative to costs of production, a twentieth to a hundredth that of peace-time and are still comparatively very low. But we are, as you all know, not the only people who are suffering from lack of employment. You know many states of Europe are paying unemployment doles. We know from experience which we gained during the revolution that these doles were more of a detriment than a benefit. Therefore we are now trying another way, that of co-operation between capital and labor (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*). This consists of a co-operative body of owners and workmen, which discusses the mutual differences as well as the questions of increasing production, in the common interest of both parties and the state, which will, if necessary, be the third party, as a kind of intermediary.





FIG 29.

FIG. 29. Iron mining in 1913. The whole amount was 20,500,000 metric quintals or about 2,000,000 tons. The only mine (No. 11, near Rudóháza) left inside the frontiers of Hungary will be, according to the opinion of experts, exhausted within seven or eight years. Compare with the following two maps.






FIG. 31.

FIG. 31. Engineering works in 1913, indicating value of production per factory. Where there are several factories the circles are divided into segments. Comparing this map with the former two maps you will see all engineering and fabrication of machinery remains without raw materials.




FIG. 32.

FIG. 32. Output of flour mills in 1913. If you compare the maps of wheat and corn production (Figs. 14, 26) you will be able to judge the critical condition of this industry.




FIG. 33.

FIG. 33. Tobacco plantations in 1913 (triangles and squares), areas, in hectares, planted to tobacco; tobacco receiving stations (black circles), amounts, in quintals, of tobacco stored; tobacco factories (stippled circles), value of manufactured output, in crowns. The factories, built in the mountains for climatic and social reasons, as explained in the text, are now cut off from their plantations, which remain in Hungary. Again an industrial problem.

The iron mines are now almost all outside the frontiers of Hungary, while the iron-works are on both sides of the frontier and machine industry has remained a very great industry inside the present borders. A difficult problem has arisen and leads to great difficulties in that industry. Our iron-works during the last year have used almost nothing but scrap iron. The iron ore of the only mine which has remained in Hungary produces a poor iron (30-32 per cent Fe.) which cannot be melted alone. I want to show you the tobacco industry. Tobacco is grown in Hungary, although the factories are outside the frontiers of today. They have been built there partly because the climatical conditions are much better in the highlands and also because in the highlands there was scarcity of employment and the state wanted to give work. As for our power forces—coal, water-energy, natural gas, we are now very short of these in Hungary.^[8] As to the situation at the flour mills in Budapest, to which I referred in my fourth lecture, the illustrations speak for themselves. The commercial atlas which we published^[9] gives further information.




FIG. 34.

FIG. 34. Stocks of mineral fuel—coal, lignite, peat, natural gas.




FIG. 35.

FIG. 35. Promotion of industries by the state. Amount of subsidies given in money and in machinery between 1881 and 1914 per head. You will understand the map by remembering what I have said about the strong protectionalism developed since 1880. You will notice further that the greatest aids were given to counties which are now cut off from Hungary, and by this you will be able to judge, in a further respect, the critical condition of our industry.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties which I have explained and those which I could not explain, our financial plan is to "help ourselves." It coincides with the American point of view. We have decided that we would not go begging for foreign help. This would have only the value of morphine injections. We wanted to work out our own salvation and we do not look for a foreign loan and do not count on foreign capital until such time as we shall have succeeded in presenting an acceptable budget, for that will be the only basis for a foreign loan; this I think we shall attain. Already our ordinary budget for this year^[10] shows an improvement of 5,500,000 crowns. This sum sounds very large, but if you put it into dollars it is not so much. Our Minister of Finance has today, in his desire to draw a true picture of the situation, wished to separate the figures of pure state finances from those of national exploitation and works, and to separate the losses due to consequences of war and revolutions from the normal budget.

We stopped the printing of paper money, in consequence of which the Hungarian crown has today a value three times that of the Austrian crown. This was accomplished in two months.

We imposed the heaviest progressive taxes as much as we could without endangering production and enterprise and taking into account our social duties. The financial program of Mr. L. Hegedüs, our Minister of Finance, is very ingenious. Without moving a great staff of employees he is able to collect practically all revenues. I want to give you only one example. Nobody has to declare any shares of stock in his possession. Such declarations could hardly be controlled. But each bank or other company formed on shares has to increase its capital by 15 per cent, the new shares belonging to the State—which, however, does not acquire thereby the right to vote. In that way each old share will be depreciated by 13 per cent of its value and pay thereby the tax of the shareholders.

It was Mr. Hegedüs' first purpose to make arrangements for the payment of our debts in foreign countries, because the regulation of all pre-war debts would make it possible to present proposals for such new ones as might be needed. We have concluded conventions in this respect with France and Holland and are on the way to a similar convention with Great Britain.

We also tried to put aside all international rancor in order to settle and improve commerce with our neighbors. But this is not an easy problem. Racial hatred, political alliance against Hungary in a hysterical fear of revenge, the fear of the governments of chauvinist parties, and the fear of each political party that it may be putting a good weapon in the adversary's hand form one group of difficulties. Persecution and expulsion of the 3,000,000 Hungarians subjected to the rule of neighboring so-called "succession states" and protected only nominally by the Minority Treaties, the dispossession of the Hungarians in all these states is the other group of facts which makes it impossible to talk of economic agreements with cool heads. These political problems cannot be separated from the economic problems, however, because the persecutions are partly of an economic nature. Good politicians must take into consideration things as they are. A prominent French politician told me, with a tone of disapproval, "But you cannot deny that you have ideas of revenge." I was tempted to smile at the champion of Alsace-Lorraine. This land constitutes 5 per cent of the territory of France, with 6 per cent of French population, while Hungary lost 59 per cent of its territory in which 23 per cent of the population is of Magyar race. I did not smile, but said, "The Hungarian government signed the treaty, and conforms to the situation, but you cannot command what people feel in their hearts, and as feelings are elements of power you will take them

into account, if you are a politician and not an impractical idealist. You will take them into account and then act and use all such powers according to your purpose. Your purpose, of course, may be one thing or another. It may be the stable peace of the world or it may be something else.”

We recognize that the crisis of Hungarian economic life is part of the world crisis—of the European crisis especially. This crisis was not caused by over-production; its cause is the disruption of the world-market, isolation in law, in politics, and in finance. Its most efficient remedy is the restoration of the currencies of the world, and the way to this leads through the increase and not through the decrease of production. That is why we want to increase our production, even with difficulty and even if we cannot sell our products today and even if we have to pay very high wages; but we want to increase it because we think it the only path leading to the restoration of our currency.

I will show you the consequences of political environment in eastern Europe, and how far eastern Europe is from what we could, with some right, call normal commercial conditions. The following statistics of our imports and exports give an example. In 1920 our imports from Czechoslovakia amounted in all to 20,100 carloads, which were nearly all firewood and some timber, 16,000 of which were carloads from former Hungarian territory. With Austria the intercourse was more active, excepting in the summer when the boycott was declared against Hungary which lasted three months. If we compare the imports from the present and the former territory of Austria (including Bohemia) with the imports from the Austrian Empire in peace-time, it diminished from about \$300,000,000 to about \$16,000,000. I must confess that these figures are somewhat arbitrary in consequence of the difficulties of calculation and selection, but still the great difference shows you something. The export figures run parallel to the imports.

Things look still worse towards the east and south. From Roumania our imports amounted to 1325 carloads, mostly goods from the former parts of Hungary, 409 of the imports being wood, and 256 salt from what were formerly Hungarian counties. Here I may remark, that these counties produced in peace-time about 19,000 carloads, of which more than 18,000 were used in former Hungary. The exports amounted to 142 carloads. Now Hungary has to import salt from Germany, and on account of the higher expense salt consumption went down from 13.3 kilograms per head in peace-time to about 10 kilograms now. From old Roumania, Hungary imported exclusively petroleum and benzine. With Yugoslavia the total imports were somewhat over 230 carloads and the exports 376. As a matter of curiosity I may add that we bought from Yugoslavia in a whole year 118 swine and 125 head of

cattle.




FIG. 36.

FIG. 36. Salt mining in Hungary in 1916. Areas of circles show quantities of salt extracted per mine. Figures under circles give quantities in metric quintals.

Of course, all these figures are not of the same value as figures reckoned in peace-time. The transfer of large territories belonging formerly to the same political or economic body but with scarcely an exception belonging still to the same natural economic unit, the great changes in the size of the different countries and the great change in the reciprocal quantities of the different goods, crops, and animals, which I mentioned in my former lecture when I spoke about the Hungarian program of agriculture—all these should be taken into account and, when compared with the old figures, make the best statement that we can get merely approximate, I may say even arbitrary. But still, even if we take into account the unreliability of the statistical data, they show us fairly well the whole of the situation. And our summary judgment can still be derived from them, that intercourse in eastern Europe is limited to the extreme. Things must be cleared up if we are to have a return to prosperity.




FIG. 37.

FIG. 37. The weight of crops in Hungary.

The commercial treaties that are being concluded today in eastern Europe are short-period agreements. They fall into two categories: provisional treaties of commerce, and agreements for the exchange of goods. It is obvious that it is not possible to conclude long-term agreements, but even so the degree of particularism is striking; for instance, the annoyance to industrial undertakings desiring to settle in the different states, and in the matter of industrial rights, where the granting of privilege is according to the most-favored-nation principle, rather than to the needs of the inhabitants. It is interesting to see that agricultural Roumania permits only fixed contingents of foodstuffs to go out to Austria, for instance, only 3000 carloads of wheat flour, 12,000 of corn, and 6000 cattle; whereas Austria's export contingents are detailed with such minuteness that even thimbles and skates are enumerated, and Roumania is allowed to import them to the extent of 2,000,000 Austrian crowns (then \$2350). The contingent agreement with Yugoslavia is of the same unwieldiness. Lead pencils figure in it to the value of \$600. Yugoslavia, which possesses now in Croatia 3,700,000 acres of forest, of which 600,000 are of the best timber, forbids the export of more than 500 cars of timber.

The most curious thing I shall tell you now. Hungary and Austria concluded a provisional agreement. In this there are enumerated in the list of imports to Hungary ten carloads of furniture. It characterizes the situation when I say that this minimum quantity aroused a fervent protest from the Hungarian joiners, and the Hungarian government is now trying to withdraw this agreement. It shows you how far things went and how much trouble now grows out of insignificant matters.

Quite instructive also are the prohibition lists of imports. The list accompanying the general duty-tariff of Yugoslavia contains 670 kinds of goods, which it is prohibited to import, among them such details as palm-leaves for decoration, and

whips made from gut.

How far the breaking up of the economic world cramps the trade of eastern Europe is shown by the prohibition of export of all preserves, fruit grown in the south, oranges, macaroni, soaps, all kinds of brushes, etc. How far the list went is proved by the fact that there were exempted from it three months later simple shoes, shoe-laces, toothbrushes, some kinds of buttons, etc.

There are other commercial agreements which cannot be carried through. For instance, Poland's agreement with Hungary, on account of insurmountable difficulties in transit through Czechoslovak territory, though on one of the two main lines the two states are distant one from the other only eighty miles and on the other only seventy miles. The 500,000 railway sleepers, 1200 carloads of salt, and 1800 of oil could not reach Hungary, whereas Poland could get but a small quantity of Hungarian wine.

In another case a state cannot send industrial articles directly to the neighboring country, but has to send them by way of a common neighboring country in order to conceal their origin. This route is three to four times as long in miles and involves infinitely more delay than the direct way. In Transylvania the number of cattle has increased far beyond the number at any former period, but there is no export, because the frontier to Hungary is closed by Roumania and on the other hand the Hungarian small farmer does not like to see the price of his own cattle decreased by competition. There are also lacking proper organizations for this commerce in Transylvania, and the railroad traffic has absolutely gone to pieces there.

If I may sum up the situation, I think that the economic agreements concluded today in eastern Europe are nothing else than legalization of mutual chicaneries. Matters look as if many of the responsible people even would not confess to themselves that an old, laboriously built-up, economic organization has been destroyed. So single states have got into great difficulties. Look at Czechoslovakia. Its territory comprised about 83 per cent of the textile industry of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The glass, paper, sugar, and other industries were also strongest in this part of the two countries. These products were marketed in the whole territory of the former monarchy. Czechoslovakia tried a new way of export which the peace treaty created by way of the Elbe River, having got a free port in Hamburg.

But the old industries of Czechoslovakia were not producing standardized goods, but a variety of goods adapted to the requirements of people in the monarchy and to their different tastes, so the markets were on the south and southeast and had to be looked for there.

The general lack of an important carrying trade was always evident, and what existed of it centered in Vienna. If you enter the shops of Prague today, you will notice evidences of this fact. On the other hand, Prague was not a great trading-center, especially not for the transit trade, at any time during the monarchy's existence. The inner conditions which play the deciding part in the development of industries, which—with some exceptions—cannot be created solely for export, are in Czechoslovakia the same as they were in the greater monarchy, also as to the variety of the nationalities. Only the territory is much smaller, the means of production therefore are much less, the home market smaller, and the need of foreign markets greater.




FIG. 38.

FIG. 38. Coal production of east central Europe, showing how little fuel Hungary has.

(1) Free City of Danzig; (2) Memel district; (3) East Prussia; (4) Vilna district; (5) Poland; (6) Upper Silesia; (7) Eastern Galicia; (8) Czechoslovakia; (9) Italy; (10) Austria; (11) Roumania; (12) Bessarabia; (13) Free State of Fiume; (14) Yugoslavia; (15) Bulgaria; (16) Albania; (17) Greece; (18) Turkey; the name HUNGARY is printed on the new state.

With Hungary *pourparlers* went on for months, during which time Hungary could not get coal except by a roundabout route, and Czechoslovakia, for its part, imported wheat from China. What can you expect from treaties in which, for instance, Czechoslovakia is allowed to import only 10,000 shirts from Austria?

There arise now questions of rectification of frontiers, new questions of political or ethnic character, combined with economic problems as to territory, where factories were separated from their raw material produced in their neighborhood, villages from their pastures and stations, and so on.

I will give you an example. I shall choose for the purpose the frontier which separates two states, both of which are Hungary's neighbors—Roumania and Yugoslavia—so that I may not be considered partial in this. I shall lay aside now the political and ethnic recriminations of both sides and shall tell you just what the Roumanians said in their memorandum which they presented at the Peace Conference in 1919 about the Yugoslav-Roumanian frontier. They said that the decision cutting off the mountains from the lowlands to the detriment of all the inhabitants prevented the people of the Maros valley having access to the Tisza and to the Danube, the two great navigable rivers, which would be of vital interest both to these people and to the farther Transylvanians. It cuts in two the main railway line connecting the Maros valley with the lower Danube by which they had exchanged goods in former times. It cuts off the Roumanian territory from the main railway line and the Danube, and it cuts in two the Béga-Temes canal. Still it is just here that the Roumanians made the Serbians have their first sad experience with new conditions when the Roumanians closed the locks above the town of Temesvár and the water level went down so that the retreating Serbians could not save their booty by carrying it down in boats.

But these are only the main facts. The whole course of the boundary cuts off towns from their railway stations; for instance, in the case of Valkány, it cuts off the village from its station. The village is Roumanian and the station is in Yugoslavia. Many towns, for instance Fehértemplom and Versecz, are cut off from their surroundings and the very important station and Danube port of Bázias is left to the Roumanians with about 10 kilometers of railway lines and from there on the line is Yugoslav, while the Roumanian station has no other means of communication with Roumania. On every new frontier line there will arise many such problems of villages

and their fields and pastures cut in two, the boundaries running for the most through absolutely level country. Old Hungary's boundary of 3700 kilometers was crossed by 23 railroads and 79 roads (79.4 per cent of which cross passes and rivers), new Hungary's 1450 kilometers of boundary are crossed by 46 railroads and 107 roads—not counting hundreds of carriage tracks—79.7 per cent of which pass through absolutely open country.

This has another interesting consequence. Smuggling has become a widespread occupation in these parts of Europe, so widespread that I can say, I think with justice, that economic statistics—statistics of imports and exports, especially as regards livestock—cannot be made up correctly because of the prevalence of smuggling, and you will understand that smugglers do not care to report their figures to officials of the government.




FIG. 39.

FIG. 39. The railways of Hungary and her neighbors [see also the coal map (Fig. 38)]. The dividing line between eastern and western Europe is shown by the density of the railway net.

(1) Free City of Danzig; (2) Memel district; (3) East Prussia; (4) Vilna district; (5) Poland; (6) Upper Silesia; (7) Eastern Galicia; (8) Czechoslovakia; (9) Italy; (10) Austria; (11) Roumania; (12) Bessarabia; (13) Free State of Fiume; (14) Yugoslavia; (15) Bulgaria; (16) Albania; (17) Greece; (18) Turkey

I have quoted intentionally only difficulties of an economic nature, but you know too well there still remain the deepest trenches dug in the war and still more by the peace, those of political differences and racial hatred. I can best quote here a word of my illustrious French colleague, Professor Jean Brunhes, who says in his recent

great work on “The Geography of History”:^[11]

“There were no ethnographical wars in history before our time. More and more rivalries and hatreds are created among races. From the century during which the most was spoken about universal fraternity and equality of races, history will date the beginning of the most violent antagonism between brother groups of the human family. Human masses are sincere. They acquire sincerely new ideas and impulses. They do not drop them easily. By speaking to them of races they have been educated to hate each other from race to race. And hate is more difficult to unlearn than love.”

How will the waves be smoothed down and friendly relations restored in this terribly shorn east central Europe? The remedies are not easily discovered, and it is a far way anyhow to reach them, the farther on account of the barriers of feelings and of the barriers created by all decisions of an indivisible system, which has been built. It would be vain to try to give you the solution. I am no sorcerer. But certain things make us smile. Surely you have heard about a Danube Confederation. I was asked my opinion of it, especially by many Frenchmen. There is no definite scheme. But many of these indefinite plans, especially the more elaborate ideas and plans, are nothing else than the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in a new edition, an edition without any foundation and with much greater possibilities for insoluble quarrels. In the long run all schemes for a Danube Confederation will lead to trouble. There is a great need for co-operation on the part of all these new, enlarged or carved-up states, and Hungary has already given proofs of its good will. We shall, because we must, arrive at a certain settlement on the most necessary exchange of goods. But to proceed further, I do not know whether all these states are on the right track. I doubt the wisdom of going further. I doubt if partial economic understandings with an inimical attitude against others lead to the desired result and do not, on the contrary, retard a settlement. And so also, I think, do the criticisms which are launched by one system of government against a different system on the other side of a boundary. Would you in America ever think to refrain from making a commercial treaty with another power as long as it did not want to be an independent republic? You would not consider that to be in conformity with your ideals of freedom and free decision. Well, in our corner of the world there are many such influences at work and they are not facilitating an understanding.

We must investigate facts if we wish to reconstruct prosperity and humanity on earth. There is more need to do this than to recriminate and indulge in criticism,

obviously easy criticism, as to the acts of the Peace Conference. The politician, the practical man, as well as the scientist, must be aware that the feelings of peoples are important considerations and that the failure to take them into account is shortsightedness and a terrible mistake. I think that those who are called upon to decide the fate of peoples—politicians of all states—must be permeated with a consciousness of the fact that their decisions are affecting organic beings and that what they are doing is not merely passing a legal judgment, even if it seems to be nothing more than that, but that they are at the same time always giving direction to evolution, to the organic life of mankind on the earth's surface. And in this case they must be conscious that the human will is not the only factor, as I explained in my first lecture, and still less is it the will of some leaders.

I feel that I am advocating my own science, geography. But I would ask those of you who are not geographers, if you do not feel today—especially you here, after having heard all these lectures which have been delivered—the need of a method, a science, which without going into the smallest details of simple things tries to embrace all the facts and features on the earth's surface in their world-wide connections and mutual relations, as well as in their local relations. The war has especially brought before our eyes the thorough interconnection of all factors, all things and all happenings in each part of the world, in each region and in the world, as a whole, and the intercommunication of all parts of the whole world. The war has unveiled connections which existed before in peace-times but were not recognized. It was only the quickness of events as well as the interest aroused which made us recognize them better. But the intensity and the number of happenings seem to have been too great for anybody to draw the right conclusion with cool blood, with calm head, and due foresight.

I think I am telling you things which you know and feel already, but I tell you them as I, a geographer, see them. To the geographer life is a unit; nothing stands alone. We cannot favor one element of human life and rule and divide the world according to that one element. You cannot deny the unity of a life-unit solely because some of its elements are not homogeneous. Life will try to return to its natural courses and it is our duty and our only salvation to study the trend of life, to enable the leaders of mankind to accommodate themselves to it without prejudice, and to free it from any pressure of misled public opinion.

[8] Maimed Hungary retained in 32.2 per cent of her territory 41 per cent of her former population. It retained an excess (in comparison with population) of:

arable land, 42.9 per cent; vineyards, 68.7 per cent; wheat, 45.7 per cent; rye, 62.9 per cent; barley, 47.3 per cent; swine, 51.7 per cent; horses, 46.7 per cent; industrial factories, 47.8 per cent; and 54 per cent of her swamps. It is short in the following, having retained only: meadows, 25.1 per cent; gardens, 25 per cent; pastures, 30.5 per cent; woods, 14.3 per cent (oak, 32.2 per cent; beech, 13.7 per cent; pine, 2.6 per cent); oats, 32.2 per cent; corn, 35 per cent; potatoes, 39.1 per cent; cattle, 34.7 per cent; sheep, 27.6 per cent; coal, 40.6 per cent; iron, 6.5 per cent; salt, bauxite, gold, silver, copper, antimony, pyrite, manganese, 0 per cent; non-arable land, 39 per cent. In combining these figures in respect to different industries, you yourselves will be able to judge of the difficulty of our problems and of our program.

[9] “The Economics of Hungary in Maps,” Budapest, 1921.

[10] Written in August, 1921.

[11] *Géographie de l'Histoire*, 643.

LECTURE VIII

THE RACIAL OR NATIONALITY PROBLEM AS SEEN BY A GEOGRAPHER

I SHALL speak today about the racial problem as seen by a geographer. I want to say here that I use the term “racial” in this lecture in the way in which it is used in the modern, popular, political literature. I use it with the meaning “nationality,” or still better, “linguistic group,” which was the criterion of the Peace Conference. Scientifically neither “nationality” nor “linguistic group” are equal to “race.” The latter implies heredity and has, in the long run, influenced human fate more than language or nationality, which can be and very often are changed.

In one of his lectures Lord Bryce stated the difficulties of the problem with striking clearness. He defined nationality as “an aggregate of men drawn together and linked together by certain sentiments.”^[12] He added, further, that no two cases are alike. I propose to show you how I happened to come to the same conclusion from the geographical side, and how my investigations have led me, if not to a solution, at least to a clear realization of the scientific method we have to apply in order to come nearer to a solution.

I do not think the public opinion of the world has any definite idea of the nature of these problems, although much has been written about them. If I look over the political literature of the so-called “racial question” I see that old prejudices prevail. We see old stories of oppression, typically in Macedonia, which can be followed in a whole line of books. Things sometimes become ridiculous when both sides to a controversy publish the same photograph to prove the brutality of the adversary. If the books about the nationality problem are studied from the point of view of their sources, they prove that sources are few and that quotations are many. This reminds me of a very tiring piece of work I once did when I was studying the history of maps, made in Europe, of the Japanese Islands. I found in several scientific bibliographies the title “Description of the Islands of Japan, by Louis Teixeira,” quoted as the title of a book. I made inquiries everywhere—in Holland, Spain, and in the libraries of South America—for eight or nine months, until I found out that the

book never existed. Louis Teixeira was a royal cartographer who had drawn a map for the King of Spain and his sailors, but he never wrote a book. The whole mistake was due to an early misleading quotation at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

I think any scholarly study of the "racial question" will prove the necessity of new, detailed, unprejudiced investigation. You will find, in studying the question, that there is today too much generalization. Public opinion has got the impression that the question in Macedonia is the same as in Hungary, in Hungary the same as in Armenia, and so on in any other countries where races live intermixed.

Another difficulty is that, even where the point of view of the investigation and the suggestions as to solutions are scientific, one science usually prevails, and that the Law. Rather I should say that a kind of philosophy of law prevails. Sometimes sentimentalism prevails, i.e., giving rights to the oppressed. But for the most part these theories are not constructive. They usually do not consider the plain truth of life which necessitates compensation. These ideas, when carried out, often lead by "liberating" the "oppressed," enabling him to put the "oppressor" in the same or more often in a worse position. The main fault is that all these problems have been misused by propagandists and little investigated by science with really impartial methods.

Let me show you how I approached the question from a geographical point of view. I know that the idea I bring is new and is still to be passed upon by critics, but I am convinced that it is of some interest. I myself began to see clearly when, after some ideas had come to me, I had to draw, with some colleagues—though for another purpose—a detailed ethnographical map, one on which the draftsman is not obliged to simplify or contract the facts. For the problem in general it is not of importance that this happened to be a map of Hungary.

Ethnographical maps, in general, do not tell you anything else than which race or nation in the different territories is in the majority. They never tell you how large the majority is, nor do they tell you the density of the population. For instance, on the ethnographical map of Europe in Andrée's well-known "Hand Atlas"—or any other of the kind—18 million Poles are represented by more than five times as much colored space as 7.4 million Belgians (Walloons and Flemings) and 2.3 million Norwegians by nearly eight times as much colored space as the 7.4 million Belgians. This gives the average map reader the impression that there must be eight times as many Norwegians as Belgians, about 58 millions instead of 2.3 millions.

On the ethnic maps made by the British General Staff the 10.5 million Roumanians are represented by a red patch about eleven times as large as the blue patch of the 6.3 million Czechs, equalling, according to the scale, but falsely, about

70 million Roumanians; similarly the 3.5 million Bulgarians are represented by a green patch more than twice as large as that of the Czechs, giving the false impression of there being about 14 million Bulgarians.

So far wrong, and in certain cases even more mistaken, is the impression which a commonly used ethnographical map gives to the general reader. To draw from such a map conclusions influencing administrative or legislative decisions would, of course, be absurd.

That is the reason why I suggested to some geographer friends that we should draw a map large enough to prevent impartiality by choosing a scale upon which we should not need to generalize. On this map we drew circles. Each large circle represents a population of 1000, each smaller one 100; half-circles 500 and 50 respectively, but the latter are used down to 25 inhabitants. Figure 40 is a reduced part of this map.




FIG. 40. Ethnic map of part of the Banat near Temesvár, formerly Hungary, now Roumania. The dashed line is a county boundary. Based on map made in 1918, scale 1:200,000. Note that this map combines density of population with ethnic distribution. See also the "Ethnographical Map of Hungary, Based on Density of Population," with the old and the new boundaries of Hungary indicated, respectively, by dashed and dotted lines. It is in a pocket in the back of this book. The text printed in the upper right-hand corner of this large colored map amplifies what is said in this chapter. There are also three small insert maps illustrating the points of map construction there explained.

A large wall map such as this, representing by special small circles each 1000, 500, 100, and down to 25 inhabitants on the very spot on which they live reveals to him who looks a whole series of coherent facts, which he cannot see from such an ethnographical map as is generally used. The latter answers only, and even then only to a certain extent, the one question: which is the dominating nationality in a given

place on the map? Whether the population is 100 per cent of one nationality or only 51 per cent majority, it does not say. It indicates only roughly the existence of a minority. Such a map is useless for a scientific investigation, because race or nationality is only one factor in the life of human groups. On the large wall map mentioned we can show a series of other factors. You see the mode of settling, the size and form of villages and towns, the trend of commerce, the density or paucity of population of the different regions, according to their morphological and economical character, and you see the intermingling of races.

I chose Hungary as the first example for study, first, because the large-scale map drawn for the Peace Conference was the best object for the study; second, because my knowledge of details acquired on the spot would help me there the most; and third, because Hungary has been stamped unwillingly as an example of the racial problem by Miss Marion L. Newbegin, D.Sc., of Edinburgh, editor of the *Scottish Geographical Magazine* and an authority on the Balkan question. She says:

“In brief, I would suggest that what makes a nation is not only race—whatever race may mean—not only religion, nor language, nor history, nor tradition, all of which have been suggested, and all of which often play a part, but, partially, at least, a community of economic interests dependent upon geographic factors. Of these the most important seems to me the existence of an area capable of supporting a large population, surrounded by one which becomes progressively less fitted to support such a population. The marginal area of scanty population forms the natural frontiers, and, among nation-making factors of great importance, I would emphasize the existence side by side within the belt favorable to population of the most fertile lands, of those best fitted to form seats of industries, and also of the great nodal points, upon which the chief lines of communication connecting the parts of the country together, and connecting it also with the outside of the world, converge.”^[13]

This was a description that fitted Hungary in all details. Miss Newbegin gives this description of an ideal land, where the problem would be solved in contrast to the insoluble Balkan situation.

When starting this work scientifically I had to put aside every national feeling, and look at the question merely as a scientist. I had to determine in first place whether the statistics which were to be my foundation were statistics which could be trusted—as far as we can trust any statistics. Of course, no statistics in the world are absolutely reliable, not because the compilers do not wish to make them reliable, but because there are mistakes in counting. When using great numbers, however, the

mistakes of different kinds balance each other.

I found certain things which proved to me that everyone can rely on Hungarian census statistics. For instance, when we compare religions and nationalities in Transylvania we can check the nationality statistics by the statistics of religions. You can say today that you are a Hungarian; you can say tomorrow that you are a Slovak; but you cannot say today that you are a Roman Catholic and tomorrow that you are a Protestant because that is written down in the books of your church and you cannot change by a simple declaration to the statistician.

Now in Transylvania it is possible to make such a check because practically all Roumanians and Gypsies are either Uniates or Greek Orthodox, while all Hungarians are Roman Catholics, Calvinists, Unitarians, or Lutherans, and practically all Saxons are Lutherans. Of course, there is a slight number of Hungarians who are Lutherans, and Germans who are Roman Catholics, but these balance. Jews profess to be Hungarians or Germans.

The figures were:

<i>Religions:</i>		<i>Nationalities:</i>	
Roman Catholics,	906,000	Hungarians	918,000
Calvinists, Unitarians, and Jews			
Lutherans	229,000	Saxons	234,000
Uniates and Greek Orthodox	1,542,000	Roumanians and Gypsies	1,526,000

The figures corresponded in Transylvania proper and in two other parts of the country which I studied.

At the same time I had testimony from a Roumanian professor, Nikolas Mazere, who states in a book written before the war, that the ecclesiastical statistics made by the Roumanian priests in Hungary were not reliable and could not be utilized scientifically, therefore he used Hungarian statistics. He said of them that they did not vary very much from the ecclesiastical statistics made by the priests. The Hungarian statistics give 1,397,000 Roumanians in Transylvania, the Roumanian ecclesiastical statistics 1,418,000. The difference is slight.

Next I had the testimony of Professor Niederle, a well-known Czech ethnologist, who says the margin of error in the Hungarian statistics in regard to Slovaks may be perhaps as high as ten per cent. This he states on the authority of Slovak nationalist leaders who say that the Hungarian statistics were made to the detriment of the Slovaks.

As you see I could safely rely on Hungarian statistics and could start with them to deal with a subject scientifically.

On the large wall map we see some important features, which are not shown upon small ethnic maps. The first is, that the mixture of races is so considerable, so varied and so complicated not only in itself, but particularly in relation to natural regions, to valleys and basins, to economic relations, to groupings of towns, to the trend of the roads, that ethnic boundaries cannot be drawn, except in very few cases and on very short lines. Even by dividing the country into impossibly small units we do not come to a line—to a real separation of nationalities. The villages themselves are in several cases greatly mixed racially and in some parts—of course, I must say such facts cannot always be generalized—the ethnic boundary cannot be traced because the nationalities cannot be separated. Sometimes they change. For instance, within eastern Slovakia you find a great many Magyarized Slovaks, Slovakized Magyars, and Slovakized or Magyarized Saxons or Germans, as well as Slovakized Ruthenians. You cannot state definitely the nationality of every single man. Often he does not know himself, for you must keep in mind that in many regions of former Hungary simple peasants spoke two, three, and even four languages. Inter-marriage is in certain regions—as in this region—frequent and the future nationality of the children depends upon several factors; speech, of course, is important, but there is tradition, and interest, and the surroundings; even occupation plays its great part. And speech itself depends on many factors and the amount and strength of racial feelings, or on the negligence of the parents, on their possible wishes or friendships, and so on.

But these are more or less known facts. There is another fact which stands out on the large map. This fact is that not only the type of settlements, the form and size of villages, and their respective situations or groupings, but also the way of ethnic mingling was typical in certain definite regions, which mostly and on great lines coincide with the natural regions. The mode of settling always goes hand in hand with the agricultural and industrial system. But I shall come to that later, and treat it from a general point of view.

I shall now describe to you some of these regions in detail. First, I show you the region between the Maros, the Tisza, and the lower Danube rivers and the Krassó Mountains, a territory which we call the Banat. It is about half as large as the smaller countries of Europe—Belgium, Holland, or Switzerland. This country is inhabited by four different nationalities, divided by percentage as follows:

Roumanians.....	30	per cent
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Germans.....	27	per cent
Serbians.....	20.5	per cent
Hungarians.....	16.8	per cent

These four races constitute, together, 95 per cent, the remainder belonging in greater part to two smaller nationalities, Slovaks and Bulgarians.

Of the 432 villages in this territory 303, or three quarters of the whole number, are each of pure nationality. I mean that one nationality holds the majority in these villages by 80 per cent or even more, and there are only 129 villages which have become more mixed. These villages figure on the large-scale ethnic map as very distinct red, pink, green, lilac, or yellow patches. However, these patches are so sprinkled all over the country that it is rare to find two villages of the same nationality as neighbors. Here is one striking instance. If you go from the town of Pancsova to the town of Great-Becskerek (the two principal towns of the southwest part of this country), you will pass five villages, each of four to five thousand inhabitants, everyone of a different nationality. The first is purely German, the second Serbian, the third Hungarian, the fourth Slovak, the last purely Roumanian. There is no possibility for drawing an ethnic boundary there. I should characterize this region as a curious kaleidoscope of ethnically unmixed villages in one of the most mixed regions in the world.



FIG. 41. Natural regions suggested as administrative divisions: **NW** (Northwest), 85% Slovaks, centering in single large valley; **HL** (Highland), 55% Hungarians, 40% Slovaks, sloping down to the great plain; **Ea** and **SI** (Eastern Slovakia), 51% Hungarians, 26½% Slovaks, 15% Ruthenians, 6% Germans, the western part centering on the town of Kassa, the rivers of both parts converging like the fingers of a fan to the south (see Fig. 1); **M** (Maramaros), 45% Ruthenians, 23% Slovaks, 17% Germans, 15% Hungarians, high mountain-land with a sharp boundary towards the great plain, all valleys opening to the plain, with no connection in any other direction; **LL** (little lowlands with the outlayers of the Alps on the west), 60% Hungarians, 20% Germans, 13% Slovaks, highest grade of agriculture in Hungary, sugar-beet territory; **Tr D** (Transdanubia), 78% Hungarians, 15% Germans, strongly-rolling land extending to sharp ethnic frontier with Croatia, on the south; **D** (Danube lowlands), 88% Hungarians, type of settlements,—villages around commercial centers, like Budapest, or commercial highways like the Danube; **Ta** (Tanyak), 63% Hungarians, 27% Slovaks, these latter only in five communes in the southeast, central plain with typical huge farmer towns, with older land divided between small farms and farm groups; **H** (Hajdu), 99½% Hungarians, same kind of large farmer towns, but closer together and with less dispersed farms, centering on the town of Debreczen; **Ny & E** (Nyir and Er), 82% Hungarians, northeastern lowlands not devastated by the Turk; **Bi** (Bihar), western slope of the Bihar Mountains and contiguous lowland, the mountains inhabited by Roumanians, the lowland by Hungarians in old valleys opening to the lowland, 47% Hungarians and 47% Roumanians; **Bacs** (Bácska), 24½% Hungarians, 36% Germans, 31% Roumanians, 20½% Serbians; **Bán** (Banat), 16.8% Hungarians, 27% Germans, 30%

Roumanians, 20½% Serbians, compare with text; **Kr H** (mountains of Krassó and Hunyad), 83% Roumanians, this being the main group of Greek Orthodox Roumanians; **Ma** (Maros valley), 72% Roumanians, 20% Hungarians, the latter in the towns; **Sza** (Szamos valley), 62% Roumanians, 35% Hungarians, again, as in the former region, the Hungarians mostly in the towns; **Szi** (Szilagy county), 27% Hungarians, 70% Roumanians, sloping down towards the great lowlands; **Me** (Mezőség, Transylvanian Basin, strongly rolling, treeless, but fertile, hill land, 38% Hungarians, 58% Roumanians, *Sza.*, *Szi.*, and *Me.* are of the same ethnic mixture, when looking at statistics, but the last two are absolutely mixed, whereas in *Sza.* there is an ethnic division between towns and villages, and the commercial interests center on different towns; **Szax I and II** (Saxonian country), 30½% Germans, 53% Roumanians, 13% Hungarians, compare with the text; **Szék** (Székler country), 76% Hungarians, compare with what I have said about the Széklers in my historical lectures.

You will see on the map that none of the nationalities retained a peculiar mode of settling. The ground-plan of all the villages shows the same symmetrical figures, all streets crossing at right angles. The villages are all of a fairly large size, many of 2000 to 4000 inhabitants. The map reflects the newly settled country and the system of agriculture is accordingly intensive, compared to other parts of Hungary. The boundaries are well defined. On the opposite right banks of all the three boundary rivers, Maros, Tisza, and Danube, and in the Krassó Mountains you find absolutely different conditions of settling and other ethnic types. In such a country you will not have difficulties with lingual rights in the villages, but in the next greater unit you must choose a complicated system of equal right. The uniformity of economic conditions and interests will help you when necessarily you throw your weight on the side of economic life in your struggle against the racial arguments pulling it asunder.

Now I come to another example. Not far from here, in eastern Transylvania, you have also a country of settlers but not of new settlers like these in the Banat, who all came in the eighteenth century. I spoke about this in my third lecture. The new, foreign owners of large tracts of land in the Banat who got their grants from the Emperor-King after the Turks were driven out, sought workmen among peasants in different countries, going as far as Alsace-Lorraine but selecting unsystematically and at random, and thus created these curiously unmixed villages of the Banat. All of the Saxons in eastern and southern Transylvania settled here simultaneously in the eleventh century. Their privileges and their autonomy protected them during long centuries against the competition of other races and against mixture with them. Roumanians introduced themselves later into this territory and did not participate in the autonomous rights and in the community of property of the Saxons. Today the Roumanians outnumber the Saxons, whose autonomous rights have vanished. They also threaten the old Saxon property.

The type of ethnic mixture in this part of Transylvania is quite different from that

in the Banat. For one thing, there are not four but only two nationalities of about equal strength. In 50 per cent of the villages the strength of both races is equal, though in the whole territory the Saxons are fewer than the Roumanians (31 per cent as against 53 per cent). But the Hungarians, the smallest in number in this particular part of Transylvania (13 per cent), are uniting with the Saxons, so that the two races are about balanced in the villages. This balance is further expressed by the fact that the culture of the Saxon is the higher. The region is fairly well defined. It consists of certain large valleys, the economic gravitation towards some centers being very sharp.

Without drawing conclusions after each example, I proceed to another region, namely, the north. There we have large territories within eastern Slovakia, in which there are four nationalities. If we make a comparison between eastern Slovakia and the Banat there is apparently not much difference between them as to the type of ethnic mingling. But I can tell you that there are no other regions so entirely different in this respect as these two. You have Magyars, who number 50 per cent; Slovaks, 26 per cent; Ruthenians, 15 per cent; and Germans, 6 per cent. But the Germans are much stronger in civilization. But the intermixture is absolutely different from what we have seen in the south, because most of the Germans here are townspeople. The Ruthenians live in valleys between which there is no direct communication. They have to come down to Slovak or Magyar territory to reach neighboring valleys. The new frontier of Ruthenia does not cut off the Ruthenians from the Slovaks along the ethnic boundary, which cannot be easily defined. One third of the Ruthenians, or about 150,000, remain outside. In the west Slovak villages, in the south Magyar villages prevail. But going towards the center of the country you find the intermixture always stronger and stronger; nowhere in Hungary do you find such intermixture of language. There are few parts of Hungary where you find so many Magyarized Slovaks and Slovakized Magyars, Slovakized Ruthenians, and Slovakized or Magyarized Germans.

This has its geographical causes. There is no other part of Hungary, perhaps, so well defined geographically and so united economically, because all the rivers run toward a center, a bay of the great Hungarian lowland. The main city of this center of gravitation is Kassa. In this country we find purely Slovak and purely Hungarian districts, towns with German majorities, and good-sized valleys with a pure Ruthenian population. Nevertheless the districts are relatively small; but all of them are part of the same economic and geographic unity.

Now I come to another region which is quite near to the last. This is the old Hungarian county of Marmaros in the Ruthenian territory, which according to the

Peace Treaty is to receive autonomy within Czechoslovakia. In this county Ruthenians are in relative majority (45 per cent), especially in the northern two-thirds of the county, though, of course, there are among them some Hungarians and some German Jews, also many Galician Jews of which there is a constant influx, and Hungarians of different religions—altogether 31 per cent. There are also Roumanians in this county—23.6 per cent—but you find them not mixed with the Ruthenians. In the south of this region two valleys are inhabited by Roumanians. The two valleys have a population of about 80,000, practically all Roumanians. However, the valleys and roads lead to towns and territories inhabited by non-Roumanians, by Hungarians, by Ruthenians. The Roumanians themselves are practically cut off from the Roumanians living in a greater mass to the south in the northern part of Transylvania. There is a pass in the mountains leading from Transylvania into this country which cannot be traversed for eight months in the year. You can follow on a detailed map the geographically and economically complicated situation which now exists.

A fifth case is in western Hungary, or, geographically defined, in the region of the foothills of the Alps. I mean the northwestern part of this territory lately christened by the Austrians “Burgenland.” The western boundary is, though geographically not well marked, defined by a very old tradition which made the German frontiersmen of this land very good Hungarian patriots. The eastern boundary is not the frontier defined on ethnic bases by the Peace Conference, but stretches farther to the east, including the commercial centers of the regions. This region has about 230,000 Magyar and about 228,500 German inhabitants with Croatian enclaves (47,000). Though the latter two occupy the western, the Magyars the eastern part, the region cannot be economically divided in two parts from north to south, but there could easily have been made an administrative division separating districts of rather distinct racial character.

There are other regions, which are racially united—to retain my nomenclature—of a racially unmixed type; taking race always in its more political and not in the biological meaning. There is, for instance, along the northwestern frontier of former Hungary the long valley of the upper and middle Vág, inhabited by nearly 700,000 people of which 593,000 are Slovaks. This territory is well defined by mountain boundaries to all sides except to the south. There is in the southeast of former Hungary a great mountain-land—though better defined by its uniform character than by dividing boundaries—inhabited by 650,000 people, 535,000 of whom (83 per cent) are Roumanians. It forms part of the Banat and of Transylvania. Crossed by a part of the Maros valley towards which its smaller waters flow, and being altogether

a pasture, wood, and mining country, such a region could easily form a specific economic and administrative territory. There is the territory of the old Székler—or as we spell it “Székely”—frontiers-people in farthest eastern Transylvania, purely Magyar in the two central counties (95-98 per cent). The population of the whole territory is 668,000, 76 per cent of which are Magyars. They are grouped in the valleys descending the volcanic range of the Hargitta and in the basins behind it, up to the old Roumanian frontier. This territory has now been given to Roumania.

I could proceed in that way, but let us here draw some conclusions, to return to the remaining regions later.

My first and main conclusion from all these facts is that you cannot solve the racial question of politics in practice according to a unique system, or scheme. In all more or less mixed language areas, there are different and conflicting interests. In such territories only the mutual compensation of interest can bring a solution and peace. I used Hungary as an example for reasons which I have given, and because I have the ethnic map of Hungary before me, but I could have used others. You have an example in the Dobrudja, a country much contested between Roumania and Bulgaria, now belonging in all its extent to the former. On the southeast you can draw a very distinct Turkish region with villages of very strong Turkish majority. In the south you can define a small region of Bulgarian villages; and in the west a larger region of Roumanian villages. Out in the northeast there is a region where you cannot define a single nationality. You can say only it is a very mixed region which needs another solution, because there are Turks, Roumanians, and Russians mixed in each village.

In such cases there is a need for compensation—for compensation of the rights, and of the wants and needs of each race, of each language.

To give you a parallel, we find the same need for compensation in various economic interests—industrial, agricultural, and commercial interests. Why could people not compensate racial, linguistic, interests just as they take it for granted in economic life? In economic life everyone knows he must compensate his interests with the others, and that thus everyone will get along and will be satisfied. Why cannot mankind find such a solution in racial and in language questions? It is becoming better realized every day that the ethnologic interpretation of nationality has been overemphasized in the last generation. This was done not so much by scientists but rather by politicians for the sake of drawing tighter the bonds of a political unit or of exciting popular passions against other political units of a different or partly different ethnical composition. Thus oftentimes purely political ambitions received a higher spiritual sanction by the somewhat artificial contention of a purely

ethnical superstate, described by a French colleague of mine as “released from all earthly ties of geography, economics, and age-long habits.” Thus we can put a question: How could the ethnic, the racial contention of “nation” hold sway over the minds of many in our own generation? And how could race finally be simply identified with language, a factor of much less importance in the long run? The reason most obvious for it is that any clear realization of the term “nation” was blurred by a coincidence of other competent factors with the purely ethnical side of the question,—and more than that with the purely ethnic question of speech—particularly since the middle of the last century.

For the purpose of illustration I may say that the two greatest national movements by which ethnic unity has been accomplished, those of Italy and Germany, were fully as much economic and geographic as they were “racial.” From the economic point of view it was just as desirable to abolish the absurd customs barriers; from the geographic point of view it was just as logical to unite the well-defined territorial units of formerly divided Italy or of the German States, as for ethnical reasons. Voltaire is credited with the statement that just because smart people are often homely it does not follow that all homely people are smart. Likewise, it might be safely said that just because ethnical movements proved at times economically designed and geographically logical, it does not follow that ethnical considerations can override geographic and economic questions in every case.

I return now to the question why it is generally, and especially today, so difficult to come to an agreement in territories of mixed speech. It is because nationalities, “races,” were taught to hate each other. Imagine, in returning to the economic resemblance of which I told you—imagine a world where every manufacturer is taught to hate every farmer and every farmer is taught to hate every business man—what would be the result? In the days before racial hatred, in its modern degree and aspect, was known and in many of the territories where there was no racial hatred, wise solutions could be found and were found. The situation in Transylvania in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is an example of this. I do not wish to return to long historical lectures and to impose on you the burden of studying lifeless old parchments. I would not here refer to it if among many antiquated provisions, rights and privileges, interesting only historians today, the old Transylvanian constitution did not contain also the clearer conception of the rights of races living in a small territory. It was mutual respect for the same ideals and a solution of the racial problem which enabled this small country inhabited by different races to show a united national front both to Sultans and Emperors during one hundred and fifty years of the most

troubled period of European history. The Transylvanian constitution recognized three nationalities—the autonomous Székler (frontiersmen), the autonomous Saxon frontiersmen, and the Hungarian County nobility. The last class only was called Hungarian, but it contained many people of other race or language, who were ennobled and in that way possessed the franchise. Transylvania had a Federal Constitution with a common assembly and a common elected supreme executive in the person of the prince. Each nationality had its own territory as provided in the old grants. You remember, perhaps, some of these things without my telling you, from my first lectures.

So far the constitution resembles somewhat the American constitution, but more the modern Swiss. The characteristic difference, found nowhere else, lay in the fact that territorial autonomy and personal extraterritoriality were combined in a way to frustrate any racial frictions. In the first place, all Saxons, Széklers, or Hungarians, no matter where they lived, had their common assembly, exercising autonomy for home affairs, such as schools, churches, and courts of law. On the other hand, each member of one of these autonomous nationalities or corporations was extraterritorial, in so far as wherever he lived, whether in the territory of his own nation or in that of another, he still came under the jurisdiction of courts of his own nation.

I need not say that I am speaking here of a medieval constitution, unfit to be applied in its original form in modern times. But you will, I think, readily see that there is a striking original idea in it, which, with proper democratization and modernization, might still furnish the key to the solution of today's problems.

Returning now to my own investigations, I found that regions showing a specific ethnic type, such as I have shown you—not the commonly understood ethnic type of a certain nation but the type of specific mingling coincide with marked characteristics in the way of settling, in the way of laying out and building of villages, in the manner of division of the farm lands, and consequently of farming-habits, and of the whole agricultural system. All these characteristics—combined in some regions with the characteristics of racially mixed towns and very mixed mining districts—created the possibility of crystallizing regions of marked individuality in all respects mentioned.

Thus we are able to create an appropriate administration, both in economic and political respects, for the given region, adapted to its individuality and not copied or simply constructed according to some theoretical principle. Natural regions were not first defined by science. They were felt and recognized by common sense in far-back centuries. If we return to them in recognizing—I would nearly say in rediscovering them scientifically—it is our cultural advance eliminating step by step the arbitrary from our view of the world and approaching an understanding of life in its

complexity. Synthesis becomes more and more possible in science, and in its applications. Analytical work does not show true life, it only helps the scientist to approach it. In human progress analytical and synthetical work interchange. The great progress of analytical sciences in the nineteenth century, and more than ever in the twentieth century, enables us to have a greater and deeper understanding of synthetic methods of reasoning.

I would mention an idea somewhat parallel with my conception, which had its inception in France—the idea of regionalism. Its history and its periods themselves are interesting. It came first in poetry; later on it had another stage in science, in geography. The first stage is bound to the name of the great poet Mistral, the other to the name of the great geographer Vidal de la Blache, and geographical monographs on regions are today highly developed in France. The third stage of French regionalism was the political one, when the Minister of Commerce, Mr. Clémentel, with the help of some geographers, notably Mr. Hauser, made up a scheme for drawing together the territories of the 119 chambers of commerce in nineteen regions which are natural regions having natural centers and having strong common economic interests, and all natural conditions for a further development of such characteristics. This way of thinking and the whole argumentation of the bill as well as the little book by Mr. Hauser on which the bill is based, go hand in hand with what I found on the ethnical side.

I have told you that a certain type of ethnical mingling involves a certain characteristic type of the way of living, of agriculture, of settling. Age-long traditional habits of races or of a certain mixture of races, age-long habits, which are—I remind you of Mr. Osborn's judgment in his introduction to Mr. Madison Grant's "The Passing of the Great Race"—much stronger and lasting incomparably longer than language; such age-long habits give the human type to a region. New regions get their human type by the way of settling and colonization.

I found, as I said, in the region of the Banat a special type of ethnic mixture—villages of pure nationality in one of the most mixed countries in the world. You have a special type, because these are without exception villages colonized at the same time, in the eighteenth century. They have very similar methods of farming, and the Serbian or the Roumanian of this region in his farming habits, and especially the form of his villages, much more resembles the German of the Banat than the Serbian or the Roumanian of other regions or countries. And so it is with the type and form of Hungarian villages. So when you go over any of the three frontier rivers of this region, or enter the mountains on the east, you find very well-defined boundaries of the way of farming, of the way and type of settlement, and the whole economic

interest. On the north and west, beyond the Maros or the Tisza, you find the characteristic big farmer towns of the Hungarian plain with the many thousand scattered farms around and between them—all of which has no parallel in the Banat. In the east you find dirty little Roumanian mountain villages winding in valleys and scattered on slopes. In the south there is Serbia with its small villages, having a predilection for hilltops, and small trading towns in the valleys.

Every ethnic region has a character of its own. Scientifically speaking, this character is not determined by the fact that the region is inhabited by a majority of Czechs or Poles, of Turks, or Bulgars, of Slovaks or Ruthenians, and so on. We have to ascertain in the first place *how the component elements are mixed*.

I feel tempted to speak about physically mixed and chemically combined races in certain regions, making this difference, of course from the point of view of political ethnography and not of anthropology. In countries like the Saxon territory in Transylvania where Saxons and Roumanians do not intermarry as a rule, you have physically mixed, in eastern Slovakia, of which I spoke, at least in great part, chemically alloyed races or nationalities. It may be just as impossible to separate them in respect to sovereignty of the whole of administration, but appropriate solutions may be found. However, they will be different, having to look in the first case for impartial balance and compensation of interests and using in the other case the common habits to build up a commonwealth of their own.

There are of course regions inhabited only by one and the same political race or nationality. Taking Hungary, I told you of examples where we have in the southeast wedge the pure Roumanian; on the great plain and in the far east the pure Hungarian; in the west the pure German; in the upper Vág valley the Slovaks. These regions, inhabited by one race exclusively, do not offer any difficult administrative problem to political science, but solutions applied to them cannot be applied to other regions of a more complicated "racial" composition. We will have to choose administrative ways and administrative solutions of a different kind, both in a political and in an economic way. They run parallel, however. We shall have to find quite another solution in a country where each village is of a pure nationality, but there is not a single district which would be a pure nation. We shall have to find still other solutions in countries where we find districts of pure nationalities. In some cases these territories are of the size of a Hungarian county, and others where you find a pure nationality on a territory of the size to form a province.

The absolute freedom or dominance of a language would be possible in these four different cases or I may say stages in the village, the district, the county, the province. Where the ethnological traits begin to be mixed, compensation of interests

and of language rights must take place. And here the example of the old Transylvanian constitution with its double scheme of territorial autonomy and extraterritoriality may help very much to find solutions.

Again, another solution must be found, investigating the problem scientifically, for two nationalities living together intermixed nearly to the last house in all the villages; quite another solution for a territory where this mixture is only in the district and not in the village.

General statistical figures do not help. You must go into details to judge. To explain this to you I will show you the situation in three Transylvanian regions (compare the maps):

<i>Region</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Magyars</i>	<i>Roumanians</i>	<i>Germans</i>
Szilágy.....	394,000	26.6 per cent	70.5 per cent	
Szamos.....	362,000	34.6 per cent	61.6 per cent	2.5 per cent
Mezőség.....	181,000	38.0 per cent	58.3 per cent	

The three regions are contiguous. Nevertheless, they could not be considered as one. In the first, sloping towards the great Hungarian plain and in the third which forms the treeless and rolling, but fertile center of the Transylvanian basin there are no towns of importance, and small villages of more or less pure or mixed nationality vary in every direction. In the third region, separating these, the towns, among them the chief town of Transylvania, Kolozsvár (now Cluj), are Magyar, the villages in majority Roumanian but with a decadent rate towards the west, where in four districts there are one-third Magyars, two-thirds Roumanians, whereas in the easternmost district 50,000 out of 58,000 inhabitants are Roumanians.

There is besides the territories held by one linguistic group or "race" which I have mentioned, the great continuous territory of Magyar-speech, with about 8,800,000 people, marked on Figure 40 as the regions LL., Tr. D., D., Ta., Bi., H., and Ny. and E. These are the regions in which the whole territory, though a unit by the one criterion of preponderant language, can be divided on geographical bases, according to manner of settling, due to geographical and historical causes and, of course, going hand in hand with the mode of life, of farming, the system of agriculture. It would go far beyond the limits of a lecture to describe their differences. But the regions which the map shows all have their specific economic character and their own commercial centers. Hungary could be divided in districts approximately on these lines, districts, each of which has at the same time a definite ethnic character and a typical uniform mode of settling and similar ways of farming,

and with its own distinct economic interest, characteristic products, which could be specialized (as Mr. Clémentel suggested for his French regions), and its own commercial centers grown up historically according to natural needs. And lastly but above all stands the local tradition of community of life and interests, often also that of common local history.

Much could be told about all that. But my space is short and you will understand how the different administrative solutions would work out in detail, even if I cannot enter upon them today, because that would lead me to many questions of detail about the courts, economics, schools, elections, etc. At the present time I simply want to indicate the new side of the problem which has not been known and contemplated till now. And I think, approaching it from this side, we can more quickly come to a solution or at least to a way leading to some solution concerning Hungary than our politicians who did know and should see the situation, but did not care for a solution, or than the Peace Conference who did not know the situation, but had at least the principle leading to a solution, the wish to establish stable peace—came even near to a solution of the problem. Our politicians clung to an idea which it was no longer possible to carry out, and which they consequently never attempted to realize. The other thought endeavored to find a solution in the simple shifting of sovereignties of certain territories instead of changing the principles of administrations, which would have been more important, because the administration remained in principle the same, but in practice became far worse.

But to come to a good and stable solution of such a complicated matter needs, of course, a thorough study of life and a survey of conditions. Taking well-known national problems for example, such as Macedonia, Albania, Thrace, or Armenia, I must confess that I have not yet seen any truly scientific proposals advanced for their solution. What has happened in these regions of a mixed population seems to be merely a shifting of territorial sovereignty from one contending faction to the other. I do not feel competent to argue which side is the more entitled to exercise sovereignty. I merely wish to call your attention to the fact that, for instance, at the close of the First Balkan War certain Macedonian territories came to Bulgaria which, after the Second Balkan War, went to Serbia and Greece, and all that by the decision merely of the same Powers. In both cases the power that at the moment was stronger claimed the same territories by virtue of actual or pretended ethnical majorities. Now we have just as little assurance that political changes will stop in the year 1921 as in any previous year of history. There is no logical reason why this kind of solution will not go on in Macedonia for further decades or centuries.

I said, there are no scientific—I mean by this, critically built up—and individually

constructive solutions for these problems. I must add that in the supreme decisions concerning the fate of twentieth century Europe diametrically opposed views, decrees (awards), and arguments were involved. It is a commonplace to repeat that the main principle of the Peace Conference in carrying through territorial changes was professed to be ethnic. This element was believed to be stronger than any economic interest or tradition. Even so, the principle was not carried through in all cases, and there were further strategic and economic adjustments in favor of our neighbors. But I do not want to speak about this point. I spoke about the principle. As a curious contrast let me say this: The Committee of the League of Nations sent out to study the question of the Aaland Islands in the Baltic suggested in its report of April 16, 1921, that the islands (96.2 per cent of the population of which are Swedes by speech and culture) should remain with Finland because (1) Finland has undeniable sovereign rights on the Aalands because they formed an integral part of it when Finland's independence was proclaimed and recognized in 1917; and (2) because to take the islands from Finland, would mean a change of the State of Finland.

And the argument contains about the following:

“The minorities of a state cannot trouble the order of this state simply because they wish for the sake of language or religion to leave its commonwealth. Such secessions of fractions of a state's population would introduce a usage opposed to the principle of the territorial and political integrity of states and would lead to international anarchy. The secession of a minority and its adherence to another state, or its acquiring independence, can be the solution only in exceptional cases, and it can be founded on rights only, when the state in question is not able or willing to give to the minority the appropriate guarantees.”

This shows you diametrically opposed principles upon which great questions were decided. To secure stable results principles must be built up on thorough knowledge of facts. Further, they must be well explained.

Finally, the right settlement can be no other than the scientific solution. Instead of talking so much of nations and races and thereby stimulating racial hatred, without having even settled ideas on the definition of those terms, let us rather study life. I have seen how the Russian farmers, made captives during the war, understood the Hungarian farmer, and vice versa, by means of their common implements of farming, and common ways of working the soil; and I dare say—though it may seem a little extravagant—that the identical form of a hoe exercises as strong an attraction as

many a political argument. How much more ought whole groups of people who have lived close together for centuries to understand one another! If statesmen would devote more of their attention to small details of life, considered unimportant, we should take a great step to reach a better understanding among nations. We could find that it is those things that look so small, the everyday happenings of life that draw peoples together, while the great political questions do not interest them in general, but are all too often used to separate them.

Much has been said lately of linguistic, historical, strategic, and economic arguments, and all have been used to divide peoples, to atomize them, but all too little has the importance of tradition been realized in the linking together of peoples. I want to point to this tradition, which expresses itself in the everyday life of peoples. I am convinced that the strength of tradition will be more and more noticeable for it is deeply rooted in the majority of mankind. We must be well aware of its existence and must refrain from opposing more or less ephemeral political fashions of the day to the living forces of human nature. A better future of mankind needs less politics and more of unbiased scientific study of human nature in certain parts of the world.

In leaving this place where I have spent so many pleasant hours in your company, I wish to thank you with all my heart for the attention you have given to my lectures. I have considered my subject merely as an object lesson to be used to throw light upon some of the general problems with which you have been concerned. Your interest was all the more gratifying to me because the subject of my lectures dealt with a comparatively unknown country. In closing, may I also reiterate my gratitude to the Chairman and Board of Advisors of the Institute of Politics for having invited me to speak before you.

[12] "International Relations," p. 116.

[13] The *Geographical Journal* (The Royal Geographical Society, London), Vol. L, No. 5, November, 1917. "Race and Nationality," by Marion L. Newbegin, D.Sc., read at the meeting of the Society, May 7, 1917.

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[15] The bibliography is divided into sections designated by Roman numerals which correspond to the numbers of certain chapters in the book.

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Anthony À Wood.

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